The ongoing dispute between the United States and China over Huawei technologies represents one of the most significant flashpoints in the broader US-China strategic competition. This recent escalation regarding Huawei’s Ascend AI chips further complicates an already complex relationship with far-reaching implications for global technology markets, trade relations, and countries caught in between, like Singapore.
The Huawei Dispute: Evolution and Current State
Historical Context
The US-China tensions over Huawei began intensifying around 2018-2019 under the first Trump administration, initially focused on telecommunications equipment and 5G infrastructure based on national security concerns. The Biden administration largely maintained this tough stance, and no,w in 2025, the second Trump administration appears to be continuing this approach, particularly regarding advanced AI chips.
Current Escalation
The recent Commerce Department guidance represents a significant expansion of restrictions by targeting Huawei’s Ascend AI chips. This move signals:
- Extraterritorial application of US export controls – initially suggesting restrictions would apply “anywhere in the world” (though this language was later removed)
- Technology containment strategy – going beyond national security to limiting China’s technological advancement in strategic sectors like AI.
- Direct challenge to China’s technological ambitions – directly impacting China’s “Made in China 2025” plans and self-sufficiency goals
China’s Response
China’s strong reaction—claiming the US undermined the Geneva trade talks—indicates:
- Growing frustration with continued technology restrictions
- Increasing confidence in challenging US actions diplomatically
- Potential willingness to retaliate in other economic or diplomatic spheres
Impact on Singapore
As a small, open economy with strong ties to both the US and China, Singapore faces unique challenges navigating these tensions.
Economic Implications
- Tech sector vulnerability: Singapore’s substantial tech industry operates in global supply chains caught between US restrictions and Chinese alternatives
- Business uncertainty: Singaporean companies utilizing Chinese AI technologies may need to reassess compliance risks
- Investment decisions: Tech investment flows could be disrupted as companies reassess regional strategies
Diplomatic Challenges
- Strategic balancing act: Singapore must maintain its carefully calibrated position without appearing to take sides
- Regional leadership role: As ASEAN chair in recent years, Singapore has tried to promote regional cooperation amid great power competition
- Preserving autonomy: Increasing pressure to align with either the US or Chinese technology ecosystems threatens Singapore’s strategic autonomy.
Specific Sectors at Risk
- Banking and Finance: Singapore’s status as a financial hub depends on secure, interoperable technology systems
- Smart Nation initiatives: Singapore’s digital transformation plans may need to navigate competing technology standards
- Research institutions: Collaboration with both US and Chinese entities becomes more complex under stricter export controls
Strategic Outlook and Implications
Short-term Impact
The immediate effect will likely be increased caution among Singaporean businesses and institutions when dealing with Chinese technology, particularly Huawei’s AI systems. We may see delayed procurement decisions and greater legal scrutiny of existing technology partnerships.
Medium-term Scenarios
- Technology decoupling accelerates: Singapore could be forced into difficult choices between the US and Chinese technology ecosystems.
- Regulatory arbitrage opportunity: Singapore might position itself as a neutral ground for technology development under clear regulatory frameworks
- Supply chain realignment: Singaporean companies may diversify suppliers and technology partners to mitigate risks
Long-term Strategic Considerations
- Digital sovereignty: Singapore may need to invest more heavily in domestic technology capabilities
- Regional technology standards: ASEAN could develop its own approach to technology governance
- Multilateral engagement: Singapore will likely continue advocating for rules-based international technology governance
Conclusion
The escalating US-China tensions over Huawei’s AI chips represent more than just a trade dispute—they signal a fundamental restructuring of the global technology landscape with significant implications for Singapore. As a highly digitalized economy dependent on global trade and technology flows, Singapore faces both risks and opportunities in this evolving environment.
The city-state’s traditional diplomatic approach of maintaining good relations with all major powers while preserving its own autonomy will be increasingly tested as technology becomes more deeply intertwined with geopolitics. Singapore’s response to these challenges will likely involve a combination of careful diplomatic balancing, strategic investments in domestic capabilities, and continued advocacy for stable, rules-based international technology governance.
Impact of the Huawei Dispute on Semiconductor Industries Across Asia
Executive Summary
The ongoing US-China confrontation over Huawei’s semiconductor technology, particularly its Ascend AI chips, represents a pivotal moment in the global semiconductor landscape. The recent escalation—with the US Commerce Department issuing guidance that using Huawei Ascend chips potentially violates export controls—marks a significant intensification in the technological rivalry between the world’s two largest economies. This comprehensive review examines the wide-ranging implications for semiconductor industries across Singapore, ASEAN, and the broader Asian region, identifying strategic challenges, emerging opportunities, and likely industry transformations in the coming years.
Part I: The Huawei Case – Current Status and Evolution
1.1 Chronology of the Dispute
The US-China semiconductor confrontation has evolved through several distinct phases:
2018-2019: Initial Restrictions
- May 2019: The First Trump administration places Huawei on the Entity List, restricting access to US technology
- Limited exemptions granted for specific components to prevent immediate supply chain disruption
2020-2021: Escalating Pressure
- May 2020: Foreign Direct Product Rule amendments block TSMC from manufacturing chips for Huawei
- September 2020: Full implementation of restrictions effectively cutting Huawei off from advanced semiconductor supply chains
- Biden administration essentially maintains Trump-era restrictions while conducting policy revieScope22-2023: Broadening Scope.
2022-2023: Broadening Scope
- October 2022: Comprehensive export controls implemented on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment
- Export restrictions extended beyond Huawei to the broader Chinese semiconductor ecosystem
2024-2025: AI Chip Focus
- Early 2024: Biden administration targets advanced AI chip exports
- May 2025: The Second Trump administration issues new guidance specifically targeting Huawei’s Ascend AI chips, suggesting global application
1.2 Technical Assessment of Huawei’s Semiconductor Capabilities
Huawei’s semiconductor subsidiary, HiSilicon, has made remarkable progress despite restrictions:
- 7nm Manufacturing Achievement: Despite being cut off from TSMC, Huawei reportedly achieved 7nm chip manufacturing via SMIC (though with lower yields and performance than TSMC equivalents)
- Ascend AI Architecture: Huawei’s Ascend 910B AI chips represent an indigenous AI architecture with performance claims comparable to earlier generation NVIDIA chips
- Technological Gaps: Still facing significant challenges in manufacturing processes, EDA tools, and advanced packaging technologies
- Indigenous Supply Chain Development: Accelerated development of China-based alternatives for previously imported technologies
Part II: Impact on Asia’s Semiconductor Industry Landscape
2.1 Transformation of Regional Supply Chains
Supply Chain Bifurcation
- Emergence of parallel supply chains—one US-aligned and one China-focused—is accelerating.
- Component suppliers are increasingly forced to choose strategic alignment or develop segregated business units.
- Increased inventory stockpiling and redundancy measures are increasing working capital requirements across the industry.
Manufacturing Geography Shifts
- US allies (Japan, South Korea) are seeing pressure to restrict certain exports to China.
- Chip manufacturing investment is redirecting toward “friendly” locations
- Emerging “China+1” strategies for manufacturing diversification
Standards and Interoperability Challenges
- Risk of divergent technical standards between the US and Chinese semiconductor ecosystems
- Increasing complexity for OEMs needing to design for multiple technology stacks
- Potential fragmentation of previously unified technology platforms
2.2 Singapore’s Semiconductor Industry: Strategic Position and Vulnerabilities
Current Industry Profile
- Singapore hosts ~20% of global semiconductor equipment manufacturing
- Approximately 11% of global semiconductor output crosses Singapore’s production facilities
- Significant presence of US firms (Micron, GlobalFoundries) and equipment makers (Applied Materials)
- Deep integration in global semiconductor supply chains with particular strengths in:
- Test and assembly
- Specialty fabrication
- Semiconductor equipment manufacturing
Direct Huawei Dispute Impacts
- Regulatory uncertainty is forcing legal reviews of existing supply agreements.
- Potential extraterritorial application of US export controls creates compliance risk.s
- Singapore companies serving both the US and Chinese markets face increasing operational complexity.
Strategic Industry Challenges
- Managing technology transfer restrictions while maintaining business relationships
- Difficulty securing access to both advanced US technology and the growing Chinese market.
- Potential for “forced decoupling”, disrupting established supply relationships
- Research collaboration constraints with Chinese institutions affect innovation.
Emerging Opportunities
- Positioning as a neutral ground for semiconductor coordination between divided ecosystems
- Development of specialised compliance verification services
- Growth in demand for alternative supply chain arrangements favours Singapore’s reputation for stability and the rule of law
2.3 ASEAN Semiconductor Ecosystem Effects
Vietnam
- Accelerating semiconductor manufacturing investment as companies seek China alternatives
- Major expansion by Intel, Samsung, and other key players is creating a regional manufacturing cluster.
- Challenges in developing a sufficient skilled workforce to meet the growth demand
- Government incentives targeting semiconductor manufacturing expansion
Malaysia
- Test and assembly operations are seeing new investment flows
- Renewed strategic focus on the semiconductor industry in national development plans
- Penang’s established semiconductor ecosystem is positioned for expansion
- Particular exposure to US export controls due to the existing US company manufacturing presence
Thailand
- Emerging investments in speciality chip manufacturing and assembly
- “Thailand 4.0” industrial policy increasingly focused on the semiconductor value chain
- Limited indigenous technical capacity remains a constraint
Indonesia
- Early-stage semiconductor ambitions are complicated by technology access restrictions
- Raw material advantages (including key minerals) are becoming a strategic asset
- Domestic market size increasingly attractive for “China-friendly” semiconductor ecosystem
Philippines
- Established test and assembly industry facing reconfiguration pressures
- Skills-based advantages in semiconductor services are potentially valuable in a fragmented ecosystem
- Vulnerability to supply chain disruptions due to a limited domestic technology base
2.4 Broader Asian Semiconductor Powers: Positioning and Strategies
Taiwan
- TSMC’s dominant position in advanced node manufacturing is increasingly complicated by geopolitical tensions
- Accelerated overseas expansion (US, Japan) to diversify manufacturing footprint
- Intense pressure from both the US and China is creating strategic vulnerability.
- Critical dependency of the global semiconductor industry on Taiwanese manufacturing creates both leverage and risk.
South Korea
- Samsung and SK Hynix are investigating complex restrictions on their China operation.s
- Memory chip dominance is increasingly challenged by an emerging Chinese competitor.s
- Strategic focus on next-generation technologies (advanced packaging, High-NA EUV)
- Government-industry coordination to maintain technological leadership despite restrictions
Japan
- Revitalization of the semiconductor industry with a national strategy and subsidies
- Strengthened position in key materials and speciality production equipment
- Growing coordination with the S on technology restrictions toward China
- TSMC’s Japan expansion reinforces integration with US-aligned ecosystem
India
- Ambitious semiconductor manufacturing plans raise complicated technology access questions.
- Services and design strength provide an alternative entry point to manufacturing.
- Potential beneficiary of “China+1” strategies, but infrastructure limitations remain.
- Growing strategic technology partnership with the US, potentially opening advanced technology access.
Part III: Strategic Implications and Future Scenarios
3.1 Singapore’s Strategic Options
Policy Balancing Act
- Maintaining technical compliance with US export controls while preserving Chinese market access
- Developing enhanced regulatory frameworks for technology transfer management
- Potential specialized economic zones with differentiated technology governance
Industry Resilience Measures
- Accelerated investment in indigenous technology capabilities to reduce dependency
- Developing specialised capabilities in “policy-resilient” segments less affected by restrictions
- Enhanced government-industry coordination on strategic technology planning
Diplomatic Strategy Implications
- Increased importance of technology issues in diplomatic engagement
- Potential leadership role in developing regional technology governance frameworks
- Careful positioning to avoid the perception of taking sides in the US-China technology competition
3.2 ASEAN Collective Response Options
Regional Technology Coordination
- Potential for ASEAN-wide technology governance framework to maintain regional autonomy
- Coordinated investment in shared technology infrastructure to reduce external dependencies
- Joint approaches to standards development and regulatory harmonisation
Supply Chain Integration Opportunities
- Enhanced intra-ASEAN semiconductor value chain integration
- Development of ASEAN-specific technology platforms, avoiding US-China confrontation points
- Strategic complementarity between different ASEAN members’ semiconductor capabilities
Multilateral Engagement Strategies
- Collective ASEAN voice in global technology governance forums
- Balanced engagement with both the US and Chinese technology ecosystems
- Potential bridge-building role between increasingly divided technology spheres
3.3 Asian Semiconductor Industry Future Scenarios
Scenario 1: Accelerated Bifurcation
- Complete separation between the US and Chinese semiconductor ecosystems
- Dual standards, technologies, and supply chains are becoming entrenched
- High compliance costs and reduced economies of scale
- Significant disruption to existing business models and technology roadmaps
Scenario 2: Managed Coexistence
- Selective decoupling in specific strategic technologies
- Industry adaptation with dual-use strategies for different markets
- Emergence of specialised interface technologies bridging divided ecosystems
- Gradual adjustment rather than sudden disruption
Scenario 3: Multilateral Technology Governance
- Development of new international frameworks for technology competition
- Agreement on bounded competition parameters protecting core economic interests
- Coordinated export controls with a more precise scope and implementation
- Reduced uncertainty through predictable regulatory frameworks
3.4 Industry-Specific Strategic Considerations
Foundry Segment
- Advanced node manufacturing is increasingly tied to geopolitical alignment
- Mature node production potential bright spot for Singapore and ASEAN
- Speciality process technologies offering strategic differentiation opportunities
Equipment and Materials
- Critical vulnerability point for China’s semiconductor autonomy ambitions
- Particularly complex compliance challenges for multi-market companies
- Singapore’s equipment manufacturing cluster is facing strategic choices
Design and IP
- Growing value of architecture-level independence from the US and Chinese ecosystems
- Emerging opportunities for “neutral” IP platforms usable in both ecosystems
- Singapore’s design ecosystem is potentially valuable as a bridge between markets.
Test and Assembly
- Less affected by leading-edge restrictions but increasingly entangled in end-use verification
- ASEAN’s traditional strength potentially disrupted by compliance requirements
- Automation and advanced packaging technologies are opening new differentiation opportunities.
SpSpecializedpplications
- Automotive, industrial, and IoT semiconductors are less affected than leading-edge compute
- Potential strategic focus area for Singapore and ASEAN to avoid the US-China confrontation
- Growing importance as computing is increasingly distributed beyond data centres.
Part IV: Recommendations and Conclusions
4.1 Strategic Recommendations for Singapore
Government Policy Priorities
- Develop enhanced export control compliance frameworks, balancing security and commercial needs
- Increase investment in strategic semiconductor technologies less affected by restrictions
- Creates specialised advisory services helping companies navigate the complex regulatory environment
- Establish Singapore as a trusted neutral ground for the semiconductor ecosystem coordination
Industry Strategy Imperatives
- Develop scenario-based resilience plans for different technology restriction outcomes
- Invest in compliance automation and traceability technologies
- Focus innovation on areas with lower geopolitical sensitivity
- Explore hybrid business models, maintaining access to both the US and Chinese markets
Education and Workforce Development
- Accelerates specialised semiconductor talent development
- Focus on areas of anticipated growth, considering geopolitical constraints
- Balance between leading-edge and speciality technology skills
4.2 Considerations for ASEAN Economic Community
Policy Coordination Needs
- Harmonised approach to technology transfer regulations
- Coordinated investment in strategic semiconductor infrastructure
- CCo-Standardisation on technology governance in international forums
Industrial Development Opportunities
- Complementary specialisation across the ASEAN semiconductor ecosystem
- Regional technology standards development to maintain autonomy
- Strategic focus on segments less affected by the US-China confrontation
Multilateral Engagement Strategy
- Balanced economic partnership development with both the US and China
- Active participation in emerging technology governance forums
- ASEAN-centred frameworks for managing technology competition
4.3 Conclusion: Navigating the Fracturing Semiconductor Landscape
The US-China confrontation over Huawei and advanced semiconductors represents not just a bilateral dispute but a fundamental restructuring of the global technology order with profound implications for Asia. Singapore, ASEAN, and the broader Asian semiconductor industry face both significant challenges and strategic opportunities in this evolving landscape.
The most successful adaptation strategies will likely involve:
- Strategic Autonomy Development: Investing in technologies and capabilities less dependent on either the US or Chinese ecosystems
- Specialised Intermediary Roles: Leveraging neutral positions to bridge increasingly divided technology spheres
- Regulatory Innovation: Developing new governance approaches balancing security, innovation, and commercial interests
- Regional Coordination: Enhancing intra-Asian cooperation to maintain collective technology access and development capabilities
- Adaptive Business Models: Creating flexible organisational structures capable of navigating complex compliance requirements while maintaining market access
The transformation currently underway will reshape semiconductor industry fundamentals for decades to come. Singapore and ASEAN’s response to these changes will determine whether they remain marginalised participants in a bifurcated global system or sophisticated players with enhanced strategic importance in the new semiconductor landscape.
As the Huawei dispute demonstrates, semiconductor technology has moved beyond simple commercial competition to become central to national security and geopolitical positioning. This reality demands a sophisticated, multi-dimensional response integrating commercial strategy, technology policy, diplomatic engagement, and security considerations in ways previously unnecessary in the semiconductor industry.
Analysis of US Chip Export Restrictions to China and Regional Impact

Current Situation
The Trump administration has implemented new licensing requirements for semiconductor exports to China, which significantly affect major chip manufacturers such as Nvidia and AMD. Nvidia expects to lose approximately $5.5 billion, while AMD projects losses of up to $800 million due to these restrictions. These measures specifically target advanced GPUS used for AI and high-performance computing applications.
Strategic Analysis
The restrictions appear to be aimed at slowing China’s technological advancement, particularly in the fields of AI and supercomputing. However, analysts cited in the article warn that this strategy may backfire by:
- Accelerating China’s investment in domestic semiconductor development
- Creating an opportunity for Chinese firms like Huawei to develop competitive alternatives
- Potentially leading to China capturing a significant global market share in the long run
Impact on Singapore and Southeast Asia
Singapore Impact
Singapore, as a global semiconductor manufacturing hub, faces both challenges and opportunities:
Immediate impacts:
- Disruption to existing supply chains where Singapore firms are involved in the processing or assembly of restricted chips
- Potential decrease in transhipment volumes for semiconductor products destined for China
- Uncertainty for Singapore-based suppliers to Nvidia and AMD
Opportunities:
- Singapore could position itself as an alternative manufacturing base that meets US export control requirements
- Increased value as a neutral intermediary in the US-China tech competition
ASEAN Impact
Immediate impacts:
- Supply chain disruptions affecting regional electronics manufacturing
- Increased compliance costs for ASEAN companies operating in the semiconductor space
- Uncertainty in investment decisions for technology infrastructure
Opportunities:
- Potential for manufacturing shifts from China to ASEAN nations
- Increased strategic importance as alternative markets and production bases
Broader Asian Impact
Immediate impacts:
- Disruption to the integrated Asian semiconductor ecosystem
- Price volatility for specific chip categories
- Strategic recalibration for tech companies operating across multiple Asian markets
Long-term concerns:
- Bifurcation of technology standards between US-aligned and China-aligned regions
- Increased competition from an accelerated Chinese semiconductor industry
- Potential for regional fragmentation in technology development
Solutions and Strategic Responses
Immediate Solutions
- Diversification strategies for companies reliant on US or Chinese technology
- Regulatory compliance frameworks to navigate export controls while maintaining business continuity
- Strategic stockpiling of critical components to mitigate short-term supply disruptions
- Enhanced regional cooperation within ASEAN to coordinate responses
Long-Term Solutions
- Investment in semiconductor manufacturing capacity throughout Southeast Asia to reduce dependency on both US and Chinese suppliers
- Development of regional technology standards that can interface with both Western and Chinese ecosystems
- Creation of ASEAN-led semiconductor innovation hubs to develop indigenous capabilities
- Diplomatic initiatives to promote stability in tech trade policies
- Public-private partnerships to strengthen the semiconductor talent pipeline across Asia
Conclusion
While the immediate impact of US chip export restrictions creates significant business challenges, it also creates strategic opportunities for Singapore and ASEAN countries to position themselves as key players in a reconfigured global semiconductor landscape. Success will depend on the ability to leverage existing manufacturing expertise while developing new capabilities that serve both Western and Chinese markets without violating either side’s restrictions.
Analysis of the Semiconductor Wars: China and Taiwan
Strategic Context
The semiconductor conflict between China and Taiwan sits at the intersection of global technology competition, geopolitical tensions, and economic security. This struggle is multi-dimensional, involving not just the two primary actors but also the United States, South Korea, Japan, and the European Union.
Taiwan’s Semiconductor Dominance
Taiwan’s position in the global semiconductor ecosystem is extraordinary and nearly monopolistic:
- TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) controls approximately 55% of the global semiconductor foundry market
- Taiwan produces over 90% of the world’s most advanced chips (below 10nm)
- TSMC manufactures chips for major companies, including Apple, Nvidia, AMD, and Qualcomm
- Taiwan’s semiconductor industry represents approximately 15% of its GDP
This dominance has been built on decades of focused investment, the development of technical expertise, and strategic relationships with Western technology companies. Taiwan has positioned itself as the “trusted fabricator” for the world’s most sophisticated chip designs.
China’s Semiconductor Ambitions
China has identified semiconductor independence as a critical national security objective:
- The “Made in China 2025” initiative specifically targets semiconductor self-sufficiency
- China imports more than $300 billion in semiconductors annually, exceeding its oil imports
- Despite massive investments (over $150 billion through various government funds), China remains dependent on foreign technology for advanced chip manufacturing
- China’s most advanced domestic manufacturer, SMIC, remains several generations behind TSMC
Chinese efforts have been hampered by successive rounds of U.S. export controls targeting equipment, software, and expertise necessary for advanced semiconductor manufacturing.
The Taiwan Strait Factor
The semiconductor industry has become intertwined with broader geopolitical tensions:
- Taiwan’s chip dominance is frequently described as its “silicon shield” – the theory that its critical position in global supply chains offers protection against Chinese aggression
- Any military conflict involving Taiwan would severely disrupt global semiconductor supply chains
- China’s dependency on Taiwanese chips creates a significant vulnerability in its technological development plans
- The concentration of advanced semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan represents a single point of failure for the global economy.
Recent Developments
The Trump administration’s escalation of chip export controls has accelerated several trends:

- China’s domestic push: Chinese companies are redoubling efforts to develop indigenous alternatives to Western semiconductor technology
- Talent acquisition: China has aggressively recruited semiconductor engineers and executives from Taiwan, offering substantial compensation packages
- Investment diversion: Chinese capital is flowing toward semiconductor sectors not yet subject to export controls
- Alternative architectures: China is exploring alternative chip designs that could circumvent specific U.S. restrictions
- International partnerships: China is cultivating relationships with semiconductor firms in countries with less restrictive export policies
Impact on Regional Dynamics
Taiwan’s Position
Taiwan faces both opportunities and vulnerabilities:
- Economic leverage: Taiwan’s semiconductor dominance gives it economic leverage in international relations
- Security concerns: This same dominance makes it a target for industrial espionage and talent poaching
- Dependency risks: Taiwan’s economy is increasingly dependent on a single industry vulnerable to disruption
- Diversification pressure: Global customers are pressuring Taiwanese firms to diversify manufacturing locations
China’s Challenges and Responses
China’s semiconductor strategy faces significant obstacles:
- Technology gap: Despite progress, China remains at least 5-7 years behind in cutting-edge semiconductor manufacturing
- Equipment access: Export controls limit access to essential manufacturing equipment from companies like ASML, Applied Materials, and LAM Research
- Software dependencies: Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools controlled by U.S. companies remain critical bottlenecks
- Talent shortages: China lacks sufficient engineers with experience in advanced semiconductor manufacturing
China’s responses include:
- “Whole of nation” approach: Mobilising state-owned enterprises, private companies, universities, and government resources
- Legacy node focus: Concentrating on mature technology nodes not subject to the strictest export controls
- Parallel development paths: Pursuing multiple technical approaches simultaneously
- Alternative markets: Developing applications and markets for less advanced chips, where China has manufacturing capability
Long-Term Trajectories
Scenario 1: Continued Bifurcation
The most likely trajectory is continued fragmentation of the semiconductor ecosystem:
- Chinese companies developing separate technology stacks optimised for areas not dependent on cutting-edge nodes
- Taiwanese and Western firms maintain leadership in advanced manufacturing
- Increasing regionalisation of supply chains
- Higher overall costs as economies of scale are reduced
Scenario 2: Chinese Breakthrough
If China achieves a significant technological breakthrough:
- Indigenous alternatives to controlled Western equipment or designs could emerge
- China’s massive domestic market could provide the scale to support competitive alternatives
- Global market dynamics would shift dramatically as Chinese competitors enter international markets
- Taiwan’s strategic value might decrease
Scenario 3: International Accommodation
Economic pragmatism might eventually lead to:
- Negotiated arrangements allowing controlled technology transfer
- Cross-licensing of critical patents
- Cooperative frameworks for certain semiconductor applications
- Carve-outs for specific industrial sectors
Strategic Implications
- Economic security has become inseparable from national security in the semiconductor domain.
- Concentration risk remains severe despite awareness of the problem
- Technical barriers to entry are increasing as semiconductor manufacturing becomes more complex
- Return on investment for semiconductor nationalism remains questionable
- Private sector decisions are increasingly influenced by geopolitical considerations rather than purely economic factors
The semiconductor wars between China and Taiwan represent not only a competition between two economies but also a fundamental reconfiguration of global technology supply chains, with implications extending far beyond the immediate players.
Projected Long-Term Resolutions to the Semiconductor Wars
Current Realities Shaping Future Outcomes
To project realistic long-term resolutions, we must acknowledge several fundamental realities:
- Technical complexity continues to increase – Advanced semiconductor manufacturing requires increasingly sophisticated equipment, materials, and expertise
- Capital intensity remains extreme – New leading-edge fabs now cost $20+ billion
- China views semiconductor independence as non-negotiable for national security
- Taiwan’s economic identity is deeply intertwined with semiconductor leadership
- Supply chain interdependence remains despite diversification efforts
- Market forces ultimately favour efficiency over geopolitical considerations
Probable Long-Term Resolution Pathways

1. Managed Technological Divergence
Timeline: 7-15 years
The global semiconductor industry is likely to evolve into distinct but interconnected ecosystems:
- China develops self-sufficiency in legacy and mid-range nodes (28 nm- 14 nm)
- Taiwan/US/allies maintain leadership in cutting-edge processes (sub-5nm)
- Selective, regulated technology transfer becomes normalised
- Industry standards bifurcate in sensitive applications but remain compatible in commercial sectors
This resolution acknowledges the impracticality of complete decoupling and the political impossibility of complete reintegration. Instead, a regulated “semi-permeable membrane” develops between technology ecosystems.
2. Geographic Diversification with Specialised Roles
Timeline: 10-20 years
The concentration risk in Taiwan becomes politically untenable, leading to:
- Taiwan maintains design leadership, but manufacturing spreads globally
- China becomes dominant in specific specialised chip categories (power semiconductors, analogue, sensors)
- New manufacturing hubs emerge in neutral countries
- Intellectual property becomes more valuable than manufacturing capability
This scenario sees Taiwan transitioning up the value chain while enabling controlled diversification of manufacturing. China achieves partial self-sufficiency while the global industry develops redundancy through geographical dispersion.
3. Technology Plateau and Commoditization
Timeline: 15-25 years
As Moore’s Law approaches fundamental physical limits:
- Innovation shifts from node shrinking to architecture and packaging
- Manufacturing technology diffuses more widely as the cutting edge stabilises
- China achieves near-parity through alternative approaches
- Value migrates to systems integration and specialised applications
This resolution emerges if the pace of miniaturisation slows significantly, reducing the advantage of exclusive access to cutting-edge manufacturing. The focus shifts to specialised applications and system-level innovation rather than pure transistor density.
4. Multilateral Governance Framework
Timeline: 10-20 years
Economic necessity and shared risks eventually drive:
- Creation of an international semiconductor oversight body
- Negotiated technology access with verification mechanisms
- Harmonized export controls across allied nations
- Collective security guarantees for critical infrastructure
This framework would acknowledge semiconductors as critical global infrastructure, similar to international arrangements for telecommunications or air traffic control, with managed access rather than unrestricted competition or total exclusion.
Catalysts for Resolution
Several developments could accelerate movement toward these resolutions:
- Technical breakthrough in China that bypasses current restrictions
- Global crisis requiring semiconductor cooperation (pandemic, climate emergency)
- Economic pressure from downstream industries dependent on stable chip supply
- Security incident demonstrating vulnerability of concentrated supply chains
- Change in political leadership creating opportunity for policy reset
Most Probable Composite Outcome
The most likely long-term resolution combines elements of managed divergence and geographic diversification:
- China achieves self-sufficiency in most semiconductor categories except the absolute cutting edge
- Taiwan maintains a significant but reduced market share as manufacturing globalises
- Technology exchange continues under more formalised regulatory frameworks
- Industry standards maintain compatibility in commercial sectors but diverge in military applications
- New specialised manufacturing centres emerge in countries maintaining good relations with both China and the West
The semiconductor industry ultimately transitions from a winner-take-all competition to a regulated global utility model, characterised by redundancy, specialisation, and managed interdependence. The chip wars won’t end with absolute victory for any party, but rather with a new equilibrium reflecting technical realities and political compromises.
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