The recent exposure of China’s sophisticated influence operation in the Philippines through InfinitUs Marketing Solutions represents a watershed moment in understanding how authoritarian regimes conduct information warfare in Southeast Asia. This comprehensive analysis examines the operation’s mechanics, strategic objectives, and critical implications for Singapore’s national security and information ecosystem.
The InfinitUs Operation: A Deep Dive
Operational Architecture
InfinitUs Marketing Solutions, owned by Paul Li—who simultaneously operates a Chinese migration facilitation business—executed a multi-layered influence campaign funded directly by China’s embassy in Manila. The operation’s sophistication lies not in technological innovation but in its systematic exploitation of social media dynamics and cultural vulnerabilities.
The “Army” Structure: Internal documents reveal InfinitUs maintained at least ten identified fake Facebook accounts functioning as a coordinated “army.” These profiles operated under strict protocols outlined in work-progress reports submitted to the Chinese embassy, with one report explicitly stating: “ARMY ALWAYS SUPPORTS THE ADVOCACIES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR’S PAGE.”
Tradecraft Analysis: The operation exhibited both sophistication and carelessness. While InfinitUs demonstrated advanced understanding of social media manipulation—including coordinated posting schedules, strategic engagement timing, and narrative amplification—basic operational security failures exposed the network. One profile used stock photography from Dreamstime, while multiple accounts posted identical business reviews, creating forensic markers that analysts used to map the entire network.
Strategic Objectives and Targeting
The operation pursued three interconnected strategic goals:
1. Degrading the U.S.-Philippine Alliance
InfinitUs specifically targeted content supporting the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. A November 2024 report described how the “army propagated the special video explainer about the cons of the Typhon missile of the US being deployed (sic) the Philippines.” This targeting coincided with crucial negotiations over U.S. military access to Philippine bases—facilities critical to any potential Taiwan contingency.
2. Shaping Electoral Outcomes
The aggressive targeting of Congressman Robert Ace Barbers illustrates China’s willingness to interfere directly in Philippine democratic processes. After Barbers championed maritime legislation strengthening Filipino claims in disputed waters, InfinitUs accounts swarmed his Facebook page with “uncorroborated accusations of criminality.” The timing—immediately before May’s midterm elections—suggests deliberate electoral interference designed to punish anti-China politicians and deter others.
Analysis firm Cyabra identified similar patterns targeting President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. on X with allegations of corruption and drug addiction during campaign periods, suggesting a systematic approach to political character assassination.
3. Manufacturing Consent for Chinese Positions
The operation’s most insidious objective involved normalizing Chinese territorial claims and military aggression. As Chinese coast guard vessels fired water cannons at Philippine ships in November 2021, InfinitUs accounts flooded social media with messages like “We should stop fighting China” on maritime issues. This created false impressions of grassroots Filipino support for accommodation with Beijing precisely when aggressive Chinese actions should have generated outrage.
The Proxy Network: Beyond Digital Manipulation
InfinitUs’s effectiveness multiplied through a sophisticated proxy network that blurred lines between authentic Filipino voices and Chinese influence operations.
The APCU Mechanism: The Association of Philippines-China Understanding, re-established by former President Gloria Arroyo and a Chinese Communist Party agency, functioned as a legitimization and recruitment apparatus. By providing awards worth $850 to $3,440—multiples of average Philippine monthly wages—to dozens of prominent Filipinos, APCU created financial dependencies that encouraged pro-China advocacy.
Recipients included:
- Manuel Mamba: Provincial leader opposing U.S. military hosting plans
- Regina Tecson: Key aide to Sara Duterte (frontrunner for 2028 presidential elections)
- Former ambassadors to Beijing: Jaime T. Cruz and Carlos Chan
- Rommel Banlaoi: Chinese-educated scholar whose deputy national security advisor nomination was blocked by security officials
The Ni Hao Manila Amplification: InfinitUs created Ni Hao Manila as a seemingly independent Filipino media outlet, purchasing fake likes and followers to establish credibility. With 115,000 YouTube followers and 300,000 on TikTok, the outlet amplified content from APCU-connected individuals, creating circular validation loops. Authentic-seeming Filipino voices echoed Chinese talking points, which InfinitUs accounts then shared as grassroots sentiment, which Ni Hao Manila covered as news.
Graphika analyst Margot Hardy identified telltale signs of inorganic activity: videos with hundreds of likes but zero comments, sudden follower surges, and coordinated sharing patterns inconsistent with organic growth.
Tactical Evolution: Lessons from U.S. Operations
Ironically, China appears to have learned from American information operations. Reuters previously exposed how the U.S. operated a pandemic-era program using fake social media accounts to undermine Chinese vaccines in the Philippines. China’s InfinitUs operation mirrors these tactics while adding innovations:
- Localized ownership: Using a Manila-based firm with a Philippine-Chinese owner provided plausible deniability and cultural authenticity
- Financial ecosystem: APCU awards created sustainable influence networks rather than one-off campaigns
- Media infrastructure: Ni Hao Manila provided content that fake accounts could share, creating self-sustaining narrative loops
- Long-term presence: Unlike time-limited U.S. programs, this operation appears designed for permanent presence
Strategic Context: The New Cold War Battlefield
Geopolitical Stakes
The Philippines occupies uniquely critical geography in great power competition. Its proximity to Taiwan, control of strategic waterways, and role in the “first island chain” make it indispensable to both U.S. and Chinese military strategies. China’s People’s Liberation Army has been ordered to prepare for Taiwan contingency operations by 2027, making the next three years decisive.
President Marcos Jr.’s pivot toward the U.S.—reversing predecessor Rodrigo Duterte’s pro-China stance—threatened Beijing’s strategic position. The InfinitUs operation represents China’s response: if military pressure and economic coercion cannot bring Manila to heel, perhaps information warfare can elect a more compliant government.
Sara Duterte, frontrunner for 2028, has criticized Marcos Jr.’s pro-American policies. Her aide Regina Tecson received APCU awards. This is not coincidence—it is strategic investment in potential future leadership.
Information Ecosystem Vulnerabilities
The Philippines presents ideal conditions for influence operations:
High Social Media Penetration: Filipinos spend more time on social media than any other nationality—averaging over 10 hours daily. Facebook dominates as the primary news source for millions, creating centralized influence opportunities.
Weak Regulatory Framework: As the article notes, the Philippines lacks robust foreign interference laws, though modernization efforts are underway. This regulatory vacuum allows operations to persist with minimal legal risk.
Economic Vulnerabilities: Awards of $850-$3,440 represent 3-10 times average monthly wages, making financial inducement highly effective. China exploits economic disparities to build influence networks at relatively low cost.
Historical Grievances: Colonial history with the U.S. provides ready-made narratives for anti-American content. InfinitUs accounts exploited these sentiments, framing U.S. alliance as neo-colonialism rather than security partnership.
The Diminished U.S. Response
Washington’s reduced capacity to counter Chinese influence operations compounds the problem. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s April 2025 closure of the State Department office coordinating counter-influence efforts with Manila—justified by accusations of censorship and waste—eliminated crucial institutional knowledge and bilateral cooperation mechanisms.
The Philippines had contributed to a database tracking Chinese operations run by this office. Its closure represents unilateral U.S. information disarmament amid escalating Chinese information warfare. While the White House claims this hasn’t “hindered U.S. influence,” Philippine officials like Jonathan Malaya clearly indicate otherwise, noting awareness of “third-party proxies” but lacking tools to counter them effectively.
Implications for Singapore: A Critical Assessment
Direct Vulnerabilities and Parallels
Singapore shares critical characteristics making it susceptible to similar influence operations:
1. Strategic Geography and Balance
Like the Philippines, Singapore occupies crucial territory in great power competition—controlling the Malacca Strait through which 80% of China’s oil imports transit. Singapore maintains official neutrality while hosting U.S. military facilities and conducting joint exercises. This balancing act makes Singapore an attractive target for influence operations seeking to:
- Reduce U.S. military access
- Influence procurement decisions (F-35 vs. Chinese alternatives)
- Shape ASEAN positions on South China Sea disputes
- Affect Singapore’s role in Quad-plus arrangements
2. Ethnic and Cultural Leverage
Singapore’s 74% Chinese ethnic majority creates different but equally exploitable dynamics. While the Philippines operation targeted anti-U.S. sentiment, Singapore operations might exploit:
- Cultural affinity narratives (“returning to Chinese civilization”)
- Business dependencies (China is Singapore’s largest trading partner)
- Language accessibility (Mandarin proficiency among many Singaporeans)
- Diaspora engagement through United Front Work Department channels
3. Digital Sophistication Cuts Both Ways
Singapore’s advanced digital infrastructure and high internet penetration (92% of population) create attack surface for influence operations. While Singaporeans are generally more digitally literate than Filipinos, this creates different vulnerabilities:
- Professional networks like LinkedIn become influence vectors
- Business WhatsApp groups spread disinformation
- Sophisticated deepfakes target educated audiences
- Academic and think tank networks face infiltration
Existing Singapore Defenses
Singapore maintains significantly stronger defenses than the Philippines:
Regulatory Framework: The Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) and Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) provide legal tools to counter influence operations. FICA specifically requires registration of entities conducting foreign influence activities and gives authorities power to issue directives limiting such activities.
Media Literacy: Government-led media literacy programs and the generally higher education levels provide some cognitive resistance to crude propaganda. However, sophisticated operations like InfinitUs—using local proxies and authentic-seeming content—may bypass these defenses.
Intelligence Capabilities: The Internal Security Department and Security and Intelligence Division maintain robust capabilities for detecting foreign interference. Unlike the Philippines, Singapore has successfully prosecuted Chinese intelligence operations, demonstrating both capability and political will.
Controlled Information Environment: While controversial, Singapore’s managed approach to media creates barriers to foreign influence that more open societies lack. Major platforms cooperate with government requests to remove inauthentic content.
Potential Attack Vectors
Despite strong defenses, Singapore faces specific vulnerabilities:
1. Business Community Compromise
Singapore’s position as Asia’s financial hub creates unique exposure. Chinese influence operations could target:
- Business associations and chambers of commerce
- Executives with China operations facing economic coercion
- Investment promotion activities that blur into influence operations
- Corporate social media accounts with large followings
InfinitUs owner Paul Li operated both the influence firm and a Chinese migration business—in Singapore, similar dual-use entities in fintech, trade promotion, or professional services could provide cover for influence operations.
2. Academic and Research Institutions
Singapore’s universities attract significant Chinese funding and maintain extensive collaborations with Chinese institutions. Potential compromise vectors include:
- Confucius Institutes and cultural centers
- Research funding with strings attached
- Student organizations influenced by Chinese Students and Scholars Associations
- Self-censorship among researchers dependent on China access
The Philippine operation’s targeting of “Chinese-educated counter-terrorism scholar” Rommel Banlaoi illustrates this vulnerability. Singapore hosts numerous Chinese-educated academics in sensitive positions.
3. Political Influence Through Proxies
While direct political interference faces high barriers in Singapore’s controlled system, indirect influence through civil society creates openings:
- Community organizations in Chinese-majority constituencies
- Professional associations influencing policy consultations
- Social enterprises with Chinese funding
- NGOs operating in China-sensitive areas (Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan)
The APCU model—using awards and recognition to cultivate influence networks—could be replicated through Singapore business associations, cultural organizations, or professional societies.
4. Next-Generation Leadership
Long-term influence operations may target:
- Young political candidates before they achieve prominence
- Rising business leaders through executive education programs
- Social media influencers with large followings
- Overseas Singaporeans studying in China
The Philippine operation’s apparent investment in Sara Duterte’s aide suggests multi-year horizons. Similar patient cultivation of Singapore’s 4G and 5G leadership represents strategic threat.
Operational Signatures to Monitor
Based on InfinitUs analysis, Singapore authorities should monitor for:
Digital Markers:
- Coordinated inauthentic behavior across multiple accounts
- Stock photography or recycled content in profile pictures
- Identical or near-identical posting across multiple accounts
- Unusual engagement patterns (high likes, zero comments)
- Sudden follower surges inconsistent with organic growth
- Accounts dormant for extended periods then suddenly active around specific events
Content Patterns:
- Amplification of identical narratives across seemingly unrelated accounts
- Systematic targeting of specific politicians or policies
- “Happy nice China” content mixed with political messaging
- Anti-U.S. content during bilateral military exercises or high-level visits
- Criticism of Singapore government policies favorable to U.S. interests
- Promotion of Chinese perspectives on Taiwan, South China Sea, Xinjiang
Financial Markers:
- Awards, grants, or “research funding” to individuals in sensitive positions
- All-expenses-paid trips to China for journalists, academics, or officials
- Speaking fees significantly above market rates for pro-China content
- Investment in media outlets or influencer networks
- Donations to civil society organizations from obscure Chinese foundations
Network Indicators:
- Overlap between business facilitation and media/influence activities
- Connections between seemingly independent organizations through shared personnel
- Circular content flows: think tank → media outlet → social media → back to think tank
- Proxies amplifying each other’s content in coordinated patterns
Broader Regional Implications
The ASEAN Information Battleground
The InfinitUs operation is not isolated to the Philippines. Evidence suggests systematic Chinese influence operations across Southeast Asia:
Thailand: Similar patterns of fake accounts promoting Chinese infrastructure projects while attacking U.S. military cooperation.
Malaysia: Chinese-language media ecosystem potentially compromised through investment and content-sharing agreements with PRC outlets.
Indonesia: Religious and ethnic tensions exploited through disinformation campaigns during elections, with some evidence of Chinese amplification.
Vietnam: Despite territorial disputes, Chinese operations target overseas Vietnamese communities and domestic social media.
Singapore sits at the center of this regional information battleground, making it both target and potential staging ground for operations affecting neighbors.
The Technology Dimension
Future operations will likely deploy technologies barely visible in the InfinitUs case:
Generative AI: Large language models can produce unlimited unique content, defeating detection methods relying on identifying repeated text. Chinese-language models like Ernie Bot or Baidu’s offerings could generate culturally appropriate Mandarin or Singlish content at scale.
Deepfakes: Synthetic video of Singaporean politicians making inflammatory statements could trigger communal tensions or political crises. The technology has reached quality levels making detection extremely difficult.
Micro-targeting: Data from TikTok, WeChat, and other Chinese platforms enables precision targeting based on psychological profiles, making influence operations more effective per dollar spent.
Blockchain and Crypto: Decentralized platforms and cryptocurrency payments make attribution and interdiction more difficult. Future APCU-style operations might distribute payments via crypto, leaving no financial paper trail.
Policy Recommendations for Singapore
Immediate Actions
1. Comprehensive Audit: Conduct classified assessment of potential InfinitUs-style operations already active in Singapore. This should include:
- Social media forensic analysis of accounts engaging with PRC diplomatic missions
- Financial audits of organizations receiving Chinese funding
- Network mapping of individuals attending PRC-sponsored events
- Review of business entities with dual influence-operation potential
2. Enhanced Monitoring: Expand ISD and SID resources dedicated to information warfare detection, specifically:
- Recruit additional analysts with Chinese-language skills and cultural knowledge
- Develop AI tools for detecting coordinated inauthentic behavior at scale
- Establish real-time monitoring of Singaporean political discourse across platforms
- Create honeypot accounts and organizations to attract and map influence networks
3. Platform Cooperation: Formalize arrangements with Meta, TikTok, X, and others for:
- Rapid removal of inauthentic accounts once identified
- Transparency reports on Singapore-focused influence operations
- Real-time alerts when coordinated campaigns target Singapore
- Data sharing agreements (within privacy constraints) for threat analysis
4. Public Attribution: When influence operations are detected, consider public exposure following the Philippine Senate model. Sunlight remains an effective disinfectant, and transparency builds public resilience.
Medium-Term Structural Reforms
1. Legislative Enhancement: While FICA provides strong foundation, consider additions:
- Mandatory disclosure of foreign government funding above specified thresholds
- Registration requirements for entities conducting communications on behalf of foreign governments
- Enhanced penalties for operating fake accounts for foreign influence purposes
- Protection for whistleblowers exposing influence operations
2. Civil Society Resilience: Build societal resistance through:
- Expanded media literacy programs focusing specifically on influence operations
- Public education campaigns explaining how foreign interference works
- Training for journalists to recognize and investigate influence operations
- Support for independent research on information warfare targeting Singapore
3. Regional Cooperation: Work with ASEAN partners to:
- Share intelligence on cross-border influence operations
- Coordinate responses to region-wide campaigns
- Develop common standards for platform accountability
- Create joint crisis response mechanisms for major information attacks
4. Academic and Think Tank Safeguards: Establish guidelines for:
- Disclosure of foreign government funding for research
- Restrictions on classified-information holders accepting foreign money
- Review processes for partnerships with PRC-linked institutions
- Counter-intelligence briefings for researchers in sensitive areas
Long-Term Strategic Initiatives
1. Offensive Counter-Influence: Consider whether Singapore should conduct its own influence operations to:
- Counter Chinese narratives in regional information space
- Promote Singaporean perspectives on South China Sea and Taiwan issues
- Support democratic governance narratives in ASEAN
- Expose Chinese influence operations to reduce their effectiveness
This requires careful consideration of ethical, legal, and strategic implications, but relying purely on defense may prove insufficient.
2. Technology Development: Invest in indigenous capabilities for:
- AI-powered detection of synthetic media and coordinated inauthentic behavior
- Blockchain-based identity verification to combat fake accounts
- Platform alternatives that compete with Chinese-controlled social media
- Counter-narrative content creation tools
3. Alliance Coordination: Deepen information warfare cooperation with:
- Five Eyes partners (recognizing Singapore is not member but can cooperate)
- Like-minded regional partners (Japan, South Korea, Australia)
- Democratic technology companies committed to platform integrity
- Academic institutions researching authoritarian information operations
4. Resilient Information Ecosystem: Foster development of:
- High-quality independent journalism investigating foreign interference
- Diverse media ownership preventing single-point compromise
- Digital platforms with strong authentication and transparency
- Public sphere norms that stigmatize foreign influence while protecting legitimate speech
Conclusion: The Invisible War
The InfinitUs operation exposes how modern authoritarianism wages war without firing shots. By corrupting information ecosystems, manipulating democratic processes, and purchasing influence networks, China seeks to achieve through information operations what military force cannot accomplish: compliant neighbors that accommodate rather than resist its hegemonic ambitions.
For Singapore, the stakes could not be higher. As a small state dependent on rules-based international order, great power respect for sovereignty, and peaceful dispute resolution, Singapore cannot afford an information environment where truth becomes fungible and foreign powers shape domestic discourse. The Philippine experience demonstrates that even countries with strong U.S. ties remain vulnerable to sophisticated influence operations.
Yet the Philippines also demonstrates that exposure and resistance are possible. Senator Tolentino’s April 2025 hearing, despite its limitations, brought InfinitUs into public view and triggered Meta’s removal of the fake accounts. Investigative journalism by Reuters provided crucial documentation. Civil society awareness—however nascent—creates antibodies against future operations.
Singapore possesses stronger defenses than the Philippines: more robust institutions, better-resourced intelligence agencies, and more comprehensive legal frameworks. But complacency would be fatal. The same factors that make Singapore successful—openness to trade, multicultural society, regional hub status—create vulnerabilities that sophisticated adversaries will exploit.
The invisible war for Southeast Asian minds has entered a decisive phase. Whether Singapore emerges with information sovereignty intact, or whether it gradually becomes another node in China’s regional influence network, depends on decisions made in the coming months and years. The InfinitUs operation provides the warning. The question is whether Singapore will heed it.
About the Author: This analysis draws on open-source intelligence, academic research on information warfare, and comparative study of authoritarian influence operations globally. It represents an independent assessment and does not reflect the positions of any government or organization.
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