Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary To Lam plans a trip to North Korea. This marks the first such visit by a Vietnamese leader in that role for almost 20 years. The move highlights Vietnam’s growing interest in world events.
Mr. Lam will join a military parade on October 10. That date honors the 80th year since the Workers’ Party of Korea began. The party rules North Korea. This event shows strong ties between the two nations.
Vietnam wants to help ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The country has faced splits and conflicts for decades. North and South Korea remain divided since the 1950s war. Vietnam hopes to offer useful ideas from its own changes.
In the 1980s, Vietnam started big economic shifts called Doi Moi. These reforms opened the nation to trade and growth. The economy grew fast, with GDP rising over 6% each year on average since then. Vietnam now trades with the US, its former foe. It also keeps links with North Korea. Sharing these steps could guide North Korea toward better times.
Vietnam works to keep peace around the world. It stays out of arms deals with North Korea. This choice helps avoid more strain. Vietnam might also help talks between North Korea, the US, and South Korea. Such talks could lower risks of fights.
History ties the two countries close. During the Vietnam War, North Korea sent real aid. From 1965 to 1969, it shipped food, drugs, and bullets. About 100 North Koreans joined North Vietnam’s air force. They flew missions and lost lives. In Bac Giang, 60 km from Hanoi, a small site remembers 14 North Korean pilots who died in battle.
This support showed North Korea’s firm stand with its ally. The war raged far from Korea’s shores. Yet Pyongyang stepped in directly. It proved a deep bond under communism.
To Lam’s visit points to Vietnam’s bolder steps in talks with neighbors. As a bridge, Vietnam draws on its past. It balances old friends and new ones. This role fits Vietnam’s place in Southeast Asia and beyond. Leaders there watch for ways to build calm.
The trip comes at a key time. North Korea faces outside pressure over its programs. Vietnam’s input might open doors. Experts note Vietnam’s skill in talks, like hosting US-North Korea summits in the past. No new arms flow or big shifts appear likely. Still, the visit builds trust step by step.
Readers might ask why now. Vietnam eyes more trade and safety in the region. Strong links with North Korea aid that goal. The parade offers a spot to chat face to face. It lets leaders share views on peace.
In short, To Lam’s journey revives old bonds. It pushes Vietnam toward a larger voice. Peace stays the main aim.
Breaking Two Decades of High-Level Diplomatic Silence
Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam’s planned visit to North Korea in October 2025 represents a watershed moment in regional diplomacy. This marks the first visit by Vietnam’s top leader to Pyongyang in nearly 20 years, signaling a dramatic shift in Hanoi’s foreign policy calculus and its ambitions to play a more assertive role in regional security architecture.
Historical Context: From Battlefield Brothers to Distant Comrades
The Vietnam War Alliance
The relationship between Vietnam and North Korea has deep historical roots. During the Vietnam War (1965-1969), North Korea provided substantial military support to North Vietnam, sending approximately 100 personnel to serve in various capacities within North Vietnam’s air force. The memorial in Tan Dinh commune, Bac Giang, commemorating 14 North Korean pilots who died in combat, stands as a physical testament to this solidarity.
Beyond military personnel, Pyongyang supplied food, medicine, and ammunition—critical support that demonstrated ideological commitment transcending geographical distance. This was not mere symbolic support; it was direct military intervention in a conflict far from Korean shores.
The Post-War Drift
Following Vietnam’s economic reforms (Đổi Mới) beginning in 1986 and its subsequent normalization of relations with the United States in 1995, Hanoi and Pyongyang’s paths diverged significantly. Vietnam embraced market economics while maintaining one-party rule, becoming one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies. North Korea, conversely, remained isolated and economically stagnant.
The last visit by a Vietnamese general secretary to North Korea occurred around 2005-2006, during a period when both nations were exploring different development trajectories. The two-decade gap in high-level visits reflects this fundamental divergence in national strategies.
To Lam’s Strategic Objectives
1. Positioning Vietnam as a Regional Mediator
To Lam’s visit signals Vietnam’s aspiration to position itself as a credible mediator in the Korean Peninsula crisis. Vietnam possesses unique credentials for this role:
Historical Trust: As a fellow communist state that fought alongside North Korea, Vietnam maintains ideological legitimacy in Pyongyang’s eyes that Western nations or even China cannot replicate.
Reform Success Story: Vietnam’s transformation from war-torn nation to economic powerhouse provides a compelling model. With GDP growth averaging 6-7% annually and successful integration into global supply chains, Vietnam can demonstrate that economic opening doesn’t necessitate political liberalization.
Balanced Diplomacy: Vietnam has successfully normalized relations with former adversaries—the United States, France, and others—while maintaining party control. This “Vietnam model” could theoretically offer North Korea a pathway toward economic development without regime collapse.
2. Sharing Reform Experience
Vietnam’s reform experience holds particular relevance for North Korea. Key lessons include:
- Gradual Economic Opening: Vietnam didn’t implement shock therapy but pursued incremental reforms
- Maintaining Party Control: The Communist Party retained political dominance throughout economic transformation
- Foreign Investment Strategy: Attracting foreign direct investment while protecting strategic sectors
- Export-Oriented Growth: Building manufacturing capacity for global markets
However, the transferability of this model faces significant obstacles. Vietnam benefited from timing (entering global markets during rapid globalization), geography (proximity to China and ASEAN markets), and international goodwill post-war reconciliation. North Korea faces international sanctions, technological isolation, and deep mistrust from potential economic partners.
3. Demonstrating Foreign Policy Independence
This visit also serves To Lam’s domestic agenda. By engaging with North Korea—a pariah state in Western eyes—Vietnam demonstrates:
Strategic Autonomy: Despite deepening economic ties with the US, EU, and Japan, Vietnam maintains independent foreign policy Regional Leadership: Positioning Vietnam as a proactive player in regional security rather than a reactive participant Party Legitimacy: Reinforcing the Communist Party’s role as guardian of national sovereignty and strategic interests
The Singapore Dimension: Complex Implications
Economic Considerations
Supply Chain Competition: If Vietnam’s engagement helps facilitate North Korean economic opening, Singapore could face long-term competition. North Korea possesses a disciplined, educated workforce willing to work for low wages—potentially attractive to manufacturers seeking alternatives to China or Vietnam itself.
However, this remains highly speculative. North Korea’s infrastructure deficit, sanctions regime, and political risk make it an unlikely manufacturing hub in the medium term.
ASEAN Dynamics: Vietnam’s proactive diplomacy could enhance ASEAN’s relevance in Northeast Asian security discussions. Singapore, as a founding ASEAN member and traditional convener, might benefit from expanded regional influence, though Vietnam’s leadership in this domain could shift diplomatic gravity within ASEAN.
Security Implications
US-Singapore Relations: Singapore maintains close defense ties with the United States, hosting rotational US military deployments. Vietnam’s engagement with North Korea could complicate regional security architecture if perceived as undermining US-led pressure campaigns.
However, if Vietnam successfully facilitates dialogue between North Korea and the US (building on the failed 2019 Hanoi Summit between Trump and Kim Jong Un), Singapore could benefit from reduced regional tensions and enhanced security stability.
Regional Stability: The Korean Peninsula situation directly impacts Southeast Asian security. North Korean missile tests have overflown Japanese territory, and conflict escalation could disrupt critical shipping lanes through the South China Sea and Malacca Strait—economic lifelines for Singapore.
Any diplomatic breakthrough facilitated by Vietnam would serve Singapore’s interests in maintaining regional peace and open trade routes.
Diplomatic Precedents
The Hanoi Summit Legacy: The 2019 Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi demonstrated Vietnam’s willingness to host sensitive diplomatic initiatives. That summit ultimately failed, but it established Vietnam as a potential neutral ground for Korean Peninsula negotiations.
To Lam’s visit suggests Vietnam remains committed to this mediator role, potentially offering Singapore opportunities to participate in multilateral frameworks addressing Korean Peninsula issues.
Challenges and Limitations
China’s Shadow
Any discussion of Vietnam-North Korea relations must account for China’s dominant influence. Beijing remains North Korea’s primary benefactor and strategic protector. Vietnam’s ability to influence Pyongyang is necessarily constrained by Chinese interests.
China may view Vietnam’s diplomatic initiative with suspicion, particularly if it appears to facilitate US-North Korea dialogue without Chinese mediation. This could complicate Vietnam’s delicate balancing act between Washington and Beijing—a challenge Singapore understands intimately.
Sanctions Reality
International sanctions severely constrain Vietnam’s engagement options. While diplomatic visits remain permissible, meaningful economic cooperation that might incentivize North Korean reform faces legal and political obstacles.
Vietnam must carefully navigate these restrictions to avoid jeopardizing its economic relationships with the US, EU, and other major trading partners—relationships far more valuable than potential North Korean ties.
North Korean Intentions
The fundamental question remains: Does North Korea genuinely seek economic reform, or does it view external engagement merely as a tactic to reduce pressure while maintaining its nuclear program and political system unchanged?
Vietnam’s reform success required fundamental leadership decisions to prioritize economic development over ideological purity. Without similar commitment from Pyongyang, Vietnam’s mediation efforts may prove futile.
Singapore’s Strategic Response
Opportunities
Diplomatic Coordination: Singapore should engage Vietnam to understand its North Korea strategy and identify potential coordination opportunities. Both nations share interests in regional stability and ASEAN relevance.
Economic Preparedness: While immediate North Korean economic opening seems unlikely, Singapore should monitor developments. If sanctions ease, Singapore’s financial services and logistics expertise could facilitate North Korean reintegration into global commerce.
Track Two Diplomacy: Singapore’s think tanks and academic institutions could collaborate with Vietnamese counterparts on Korean Peninsula issues, building intellectual infrastructure for potential future negotiations.
Risks to Monitor
Alliance Complications: If Vietnam’s North Korea engagement strains US relations, this could complicate ASEAN unity and Singapore’s own balancing act between great powers.
Sanctions Violations: Singapore must ensure its own financial system isn’t inadvertently used to circumvent North Korea sanctions, particularly as Vietnam increases engagement.
Regional Power Shifts: Vietnam’s rising diplomatic profile could challenge Singapore’s traditional role as ASEAN’s external voice, requiring adaptation of Singapore’s regional strategy.
Conclusion: A New Era of Vietnamese Diplomacy
To Lam’s visit to North Korea represents more than renewed bilateral ties—it signals Vietnam’s transformation into a proactive regional diplomatic player. After decades of focusing primarily on economic development and cautiously managing great power relations, Vietnam now seeks to shape regional security outcomes.
For Singapore, this development presents both opportunities and challenges. A more diplomatically active Vietnam could strengthen ASEAN’s collective voice and contribute to Korean Peninsula stability. However, it also introduces complexity to regional power dynamics and potentially shifts diplomatic influence within Southeast Asia.
The success or failure of Vietnam’s North Korea engagement will depend on multiple factors beyond Hanoi’s control: Chinese acquiescence, US tolerance, North Korean willingness to reform, and the broader geopolitical environment. Singapore’s optimal strategy involves watchful engagement—supporting ASEAN solidarity while maintaining flexibility to adapt as Vietnam’s Korean Peninsula diplomacy unfolds.
Ultimately, if Vietnam can leverage its unique historical relationship and reform experience to facilitate even modest progress on Korean Peninsula tensions, the entire region—including Singapore—stands to benefit from reduced security risks and enhanced diplomatic cooperation frameworks.
Key Takeaways for Singapore
- Monitor Vietnam’s diplomatic initiatives for potential ASEAN coordination opportunities
- Maintain strong US defense relationships while supporting ASEAN-led diplomatic processes
- Prepare for potential long-term shifts in regional manufacturing and logistics if North Korean economic opening occurs
- Strengthen financial compliance systems to prevent sanctions circumvention
- Engage Vietnamese counterparts in Track Two diplomacy on Korean Peninsula issues
- Adapt to Vietnam’s rising regional diplomatic profile while maintaining Singapore’s own convening role
The next two decades of Vietnam-North Korea relations may look very different from the previous two—and Singapore must position itself strategically for this evolving landscape.