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Biotechnology as the New Geopolitical Battleground: US-China Rivalry

by | Oct 9, 2025 | Uncategorized | 0 comments

For decades, biotechnology represented one of the last bastions of genuine scientific cooperation between the United States and China. Joint research programs prevented millions of birth defects, improved seasonal flu vaccines, and advanced understanding of cancer, heart disease, and diabetes. This collaboration, anchored in the 1979 Sino-American Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology and updated as recently as December 2024, demonstrated that science could transcend geopolitical tensions. Today, that optimistic narrative is unraveling. As semiconductors and rare earth elements became weapons in the US-China technology competition, biotechnology is now being swept into the same geopolitical undertow—with potentially catastrophic consequences for global health innovation and for strategically positioned nations like Singapore.

The Shift: From Collaboration to Competition

The transformation of biotechnology from a collaborative endeavor to a contested domain reflects broader shifts in the US-China relationship. For much of the past two decades, this partnership was mutually beneficial. American pharmaceutical companies leveraged China’s low-cost production of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), while Chinese researchers gained access to advanced research facilities, methodologies, and partnerships with leading American universities and government agencies. The National Institutes of Health, Harvard, MIT, and Stanford all maintained significant research ties with Chinese institutions.

However, this equilibrium has fundamentally shifted. China’s Made in China 2025 initiative, launched in 2015, explicitly targets biotechnology alongside robotics, aerospace, and next-generation information technology as a strategic sector for advancement. The program channels billions into biotech development through state-led mechanisms that differ markedly from the market-driven American approach. Rather than waiting for organic innovation, Beijing has invested heavily in building indigenous biotech capacity, acquiring foreign technologies, and positioning itself as a competitor rather than merely a collaborator.

Simultaneously, the United States has begun viewing Chinese biotech advances through a national security lens. A bipartisan commission reported in April 2025 that China now has “the most immediate opportunity to overtake the United States in biotechnology” among five critical technology sectors. This warning echoes concerns previously raised about artificial intelligence and semiconductors—sectors where Chinese capabilities have advanced faster than many American policymakers expected.

The Dual-Use Dilemma

What distinguishes biotechnology from other contested technologies is its dual-use nature. Unlike semiconductors, which primarily serve commercial and limited military applications, biotechnology encompasses capabilities that range from developing life-saving medicines to potentially creating biological weapons. This reality adds a layer of national security concern that academic and pharmaceutical leaders often understate in their public statements.

The implications are sobering. Advances in synthetic biology, gene editing, and infectious disease research could theoretically be weaponized. Precision targeting using biological agents, pandemic pathogens engineered for specific genetic populations, and bioterrorism capabilities all fall within the theoretical realm of biotechnology applications. For American policymakers, allowing a competitor nation to develop dominant biotech capabilities raises existential security concerns that transcend conventional technology competition.

This dual-use reality creates an asymmetry in how the two nations approach biotech governance. The United States, bound by scientific openness norms and constitutional protections for research freedom, faces constraints that authoritarian systems do not. China can direct resources toward specific biotech goals without public scrutiny or internal debate about ethical boundaries. This structural difference compounds American concerns about falling behind in a technology that combines profound human benefit with potential catastrophic risk.

China’s Strategic Advantages and Rapid Advancement

Despite beginning from a lower technological base, China has rapidly narrowed the biotech gap through several mechanisms. First, state-directed investment has created specialized biotech zones and research clusters, particularly in cities like Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Beijing. These zones offer tax incentives, subsidized infrastructure, and streamlined regulatory approval for biotech companies—advantages that American startups lack.

Second, China has pursued an active technology acquisition strategy. While not always through illicit means, Chinese companies and research institutions have acquired stakes in foreign biotech firms, sponsored collaborative research, and recruited leading scientists through generous compensation packages. This dual approach of internal development and external acquisition has accelerated the pace of Chinese biotech advancement.

Third, China maintains significant advantages in clinical trial capacity and patient populations. With over 1.4 billion people, China offers researchers access to large, diverse populations for testing new therapies. Regulatory approval timelines in China are often faster than in the United States or Europe, allowing Chinese biotech companies to move drugs to market more quickly. For companies seeking to develop therapies for diseases prevalent in Asian populations, this represents a genuine competitive advantage.

The results are visible. Chinese biotech companies now lead in specific therapeutic areas, including traditional Chinese medicine modernization, stem cell therapies, and certain categories of immunotherapy. Chinese researchers publish prolifically in high-impact journals, and venture capital investment in Chinese biotech has grown substantially. While American biotech companies still dominate globally, the trajectory appears to be shifting—and this concerns Washington policymakers deeply.

American Response: Export Controls and Restrictions

Alarmed by these trends, the Trump administration (which took office in January 2025) has adopted a more restrictive approach to biotech collaboration with China. While formal export controls specifically targeting biotech remain limited compared to restrictions on semiconductors or artificial intelligence, the regulatory environment has tightened considerably.

Congressional pressure for biotech-specific restrictions has mounted. Lawmakers have proposed—though not yet enacted—legislation to ban federal contracts with Chinese biotech research and equipment firms deemed national security threats. These proposals face implementation challenges, as the biotech sector’s complexity makes it difficult to draw clear lines between commercial and strategically sensitive research. Unlike semiconductors, where chip design and manufacturing can be more easily regulated, biotech research often occurs in universities and small companies, making comprehensive oversight difficult.

The dilemma for American policymakers is acute: aggressive restrictions could damage American biotech innovation by limiting collaboration, reducing research funding, and driving talented researchers away from the United States. Yet allowing unrestricted collaboration risks accelerating China’s biotech capabilities and potentially enabling military applications. This tension has no clean resolution.

American experts have begun calling for substantial new investments in biotech research. A bipartisan commission recommended that the United States invest at least $15 billion into the sector over the next five years—a significant commitment meant to ensure American leadership and prevent a “ChatGPT moment for biotechnology,” where a breakthrough by a foreign competitor fundamentally shifts the competitive landscape.

The Supply Chain Vulnerability

A critical vulnerability for both American and global biotech markets is the concentration of active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) production in China. American pharmaceutical companies depend heavily on Chinese manufacturers for basic chemical inputs used in thousands of medications. This dependency creates a critical weakness that mirrors earlier concerns about semiconductor supply chains.

If the US-China relationship were to deteriorate further, China could theoretically restrict API exports, creating shortages of essential medications across America and its allies. This scenario, while unlikely in the near term, represents a genuine strategic vulnerability. American pharmaceutical companies and policymakers have begun discussing the need to reshore or “friendshore” API production to countries like India or Vietnam, but such a transition would require years and substantial investment.

This supply chain concentration means that even as competition in biotech innovation intensifies, mutual economic dependencies persist. China supplies the building blocks for much of global pharmaceutical production, while American companies and research institutions remain important customers. This creates a complex situation where both economic incentives and geopolitical tensions operate simultaneously.

Singapore’s Emergence as a Strategic Hub

In this geopolitically fraught environment, Singapore has emerged as an increasingly significant player. Over the past two decades, the city-state has deliberately positioned itself as a global biotech hub. Starting from 2000, when the government first articulated this ambition, Singapore has invested heavily in research institutions, attracted international biotech companies, and developed regulatory frameworks that balance innovation with safety.

Today, Singapore possesses several attributes that make it attractive in the US-China biotech competition. First, it offers strong intellectual property protections aligned with Western standards, a critical factor for biotech companies considering where to locate research and manufacturing operations. Second, as a politically neutral nation that maintains relationships with both the United States and China, Singapore can serve as a bridge between the two powers in ways that other nations cannot.

Third, Singapore has positioned itself as a hub for Asia-Pacific biotech research and manufacturing. The city-state hosts major research institutions including the Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR), prestigious universities with strong life sciences programs, and manufacturing facilities for biopharmaceuticals. These institutions attract talent from across Asia and the world, creating an ecosystem that rivals more established biotech centers in Boston, San Francisco, and London.

Fourth, Singapore’s regulatory environment has evolved to support biotech innovation while maintaining rigorous safety standards. The Health Sciences Authority (HSA) has streamlined approval processes for clinical trials and drug licensing, allowing companies to move treatments from research to patients more quickly than in some other jurisdictions.

Recent data reflects Singapore’s growing prominence. According to Bain & Company’s 2025 Asia-Pacific biotech report, Singapore is rising as a strategic biotech hub offering strong intellectual property protection, political neutrality, and regulatory alignment. While China continues to dominate the region in terms of absolute biotech investment and company numbers, Singapore has carved out a distinctive niche as a premium hub for high-quality research and manufacturing.

Singapore’s Precarious Position

Yet Singapore’s emergence as a biotech hub also places the nation in an increasingly precarious position. As the US-China competition intensifies, Singapore’s traditional strategy of maintaining equidistance from both powers becomes more difficult to sustain.

The fundamental tension is straightforward: American policymakers increasingly view any collaboration between American biotech entities and Chinese researchers or companies as potentially threatening to national security. Conversely, Chinese policymakers view American restrictions on biotech collaboration as hostile acts that justify retaliatory measures. Singapore, as a hub that attracts talent, investment, and research from both sides, finds itself caught in the middle.

Consider a concrete scenario: an American pharmaceutical company maintains a research facility in Singapore while collaborating with Chinese universities on drug development. Is this acceptable? From an American national security perspective, it risks technology transfer to a strategic competitor. From a Chinese perspective, it represents the kind of collaboration that should continue. Singapore’s government must navigate such questions while maintaining its reputation as a trusted partner for both sides.

This challenge extends to talent mobility. Singapore’s biotech sector attracts researchers from around the world, including significant numbers from China and the United States. As restrictions tighten, these researchers may face visa challenges, security clearance issues, or pressure to choose allegiances. The free movement of scientific talent that once characterized global biotech research has become politically fraught.

Furthermore, Singapore’s biotech sector depends on investment from multiple sources. Chinese venture capital and government-linked entities have been significant investors in Singapore’s biotech startups. American pharmaceutical companies and venture capitalists are equally important. As the US-China relationship becomes more adversarial, Singapore risks having investment sources dry up or face pressure to choose between them.

Implications for Global Health

The intensification of US-China biotech competition carries consequences that extend far beyond the two superpowers. Global health depends on biotech innovation and the free exchange of scientific knowledge. When geopolitical rivalry fragments the research ecosystem, everyone suffers.

Drug development timelines could lengthen as companies navigate increasingly complex international regulatory frameworks. Researchers may face restrictions on publishing findings or collaborating across borders. Manufacturing disruptions could create shortages of critical medications. Clinical trial recruitment could become more complicated as nations restrict movement of research subjects or trial data.

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the dangers of fragmented scientific collaboration. While the initial vaccine development benefited from international cooperation, subsequent efforts to develop treatments and variant-specific vaccines were hampered by geopolitical tensions. Researchers in different countries worked in parallel rather than sharing findings. Manufacturing capacity became politicized. Distribution became fraught with allegations of inequity. Imagine such fragmentation becoming the norm across biotech research generally.

For nations without the resources to develop independent biotech capabilities—including most developing countries—the stakes are particularly high. These countries depend on affordable access to medications and treatments developed primarily by American and Chinese companies, along with their collaborators. As this ecosystem fragments, developing nations risk being left behind, unable to access innovative treatments or being forced to choose geopolitical allegiances to secure medical access.

Singapore’s Strategic Options

Facing this uncertain landscape, Singapore’s government and biotech sector must consider several strategic options, each with trade-offs.

First, Singapore could attempt to maintain its role as a neutral bridge, positioning itself as a space where legitimate scientific collaboration can continue even as broader US-China tensions escalate. This approach would require Singapore to clearly distinguish between basic scientific research (which should remain collaborative) and research with direct military applications (which might be restricted). However, this distinction is often blurred in biotech, making such a strategy risky and potentially ineffective.

Second, Singapore could deepen its alignment with the United States, positioning itself explicitly as a partner in American efforts to maintain biotech leadership. This would involve welcoming American investment and research facilities while imposing restrictions on Chinese collaboration. This approach would likely strengthen Singapore’s relationships with the United States and allied nations but would risk damaging relationships with China and potentially deterring Chinese investment and talent from the biotech sector.

Third, Singapore could emphasize its indigenous biotech capabilities, working to develop distinctive research and commercial strengths that don’t directly implicate US-China competition. This might involve focusing on therapeutic areas relevant to Asian diseases, developing biotech solutions for tropical medicine, or building manufacturing excellence in specific segments. This approach could create a more independent biotech sector less vulnerable to geopolitical winds, though it would require sustained investment and might result in slower absolute growth.

Fourth, Singapore could attempt to regionalize biotech development by positioning itself as a hub for Southeast Asian biotech innovation more broadly. This would involve deepening collaboration with other Southeast Asian nations, potentially creating a regional biotech ecosystem that benefits multiple countries. However, most Southeast Asian nations have limited biotech infrastructure, and building regional capacity would require time and resources.

In reality, Singapore’s approach will likely involve elements of all four strategies. The nation will maintain relationships with both sides while carefully managing restrictions on sensitive research. It will emphasize its neutrality while quietly deepening ties with the United States. It will pursue indigenous capabilities while remaining open to international collaboration. This balancing act will require sophisticated diplomacy and careful policy calibration.

Recommendations and Conclusion

For Singapore to maximize its opportunity while minimizing geopolitical risks, several steps should be considered:

First, Singapore should establish a biotech research governance framework that transparently identifies which research areas are appropriate for open international collaboration and which might require restrictions for security reasons. This clarity would give researchers and companies guidance while demonstrating responsible stewardship.

Second, Singapore should continue investing in indigenous biotech capabilities, particularly in areas where Singapore has distinctive advantages—such as tropical medicine, precision medicine for Asian populations, or biotech manufacturing excellence. This would create a biotech sector less dependent on US-China dynamics.

Third, Singapore should engage in quiet diplomacy with both American and Chinese officials, emphasizing the mutual benefits of maintaining at least some collaborative space for biotech research. Singapore’s neutral status and diplomatic skills position it uniquely to facilitate such conversations.

Fourth, Singapore should work with other trusted partners—such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and other developed democracies—to establish norms around biotech collaboration that balance security concerns with the imperatives of scientific progress and global health.

Fifth, Singapore should make targeted investments in biotech areas that address global health challenges affecting developing nations. This would strengthen Singapore’s reputation as a contributor to global wellbeing rather than merely a site for great power competition.

Conclusion

Biotechnology is rapidly becoming the latest battleground in the US-China strategic rivalry, following earlier competitions over semiconductors and rare earths. This transformation reflects genuine security concerns on both sides, but it carries significant costs for global health and scientific progress. The traditional assumption that science transcends politics is giving way to a new reality where research is increasingly constrained by geopolitical considerations.

Singapore finds itself at the intersection of these great power dynamics. Its decades-long effort to position itself as a global biotech hub could be significantly enhanced or severely constrained by how it navigates the US-China biotech competition. Singapore’s neutrality, once an asset, is becoming increasingly precarious as both the United States and China expect alignment on key security issues.

The challenge for Singapore is to maintain its role as a globally integrated biotech hub while managing geopolitical pressures from both sides. This will require sophisticated policy calibration, careful diplomatic engagement, and willingness to make difficult choices about which collaborations serve Singapore’s long-term interests and which pose unacceptable risks.

For global health and scientific progress, the hope must be that even as competition intensifies, some space for collaboration persists. The diseases that kill millions annually don’t recognize geopolitical boundaries. Developing treatments for cancer, diabetes, infectious diseases, and genetic disorders benefits from the best minds working together regardless of nationality. If the US-China biotech competition ultimately fragments the global research ecosystem, as the Straits Times article suggests, then truly everyone loses—including the millions of patients worldwide who depend on biotech innovation for their health and survival.

Singapore Biotech Geopolitics: Scenario Analysis of Policy Challenges

Executive Summary

Singapore’s emergence as a global biotech hub represents both an opportunity and a strategic vulnerability in the intensifying US-China technology competition. This analysis explores four distinct scenarios that Singapore could face over the next 3-5 years, examining the policy implications, stakeholder impacts, and strategic choices required for each. The scenarios range from “Managed Competition” (where some collaboration persists) to “Full Decoupling” (where biotech ecosystems separate entirely). Understanding these scenarios helps Singapore policymakers navigate the precarious balance between maintaining its hub status and managing geopolitical pressures.

Scenario 1: Managed Competition (Probability: 40%)

Overview

In this scenario, the United States and China establish informal “rules of engagement” for biotech competition that preserve limited collaboration space. Restrictions exist but remain targeted rather than comprehensive. Singapore maintains its role as a neutral hub while implementing careful governance frameworks that satisfy both superpowers’ security concerns.

Key Characteristics

Regulatory Environment: The US BIOSECURE Act passes but with narrowly defined restrictions targeting only specific Chinese entities deemed national security threats. Export controls focus on dual-use equipment (advanced sequencing, synthetic biology tools) rather than blanket biotech restrictions. China responds with targeted retaliatory measures but maintains diplomatic channels.

Singapore’s Position: Singapore attracts continued investment from both sides—Chinese biopharmaceutical companies like WuXi Biologics maintain substantial operations (e.g., WuXi announced a $1.4 billion investment in a contract research, development, and manufacturing organization service center in Singapore), while American companies continue collaborations deemed non-sensitive.

Institutional Framework: Singapore develops a biotech “dual-track” system with transparent criteria separating research areas. Basic research and drug development for common diseases continue with international participation. Research with potential military applications faces heightened scrutiny and restricted international collaboration.

Case Study: The Tropical Disease Initiative

Scenario: A Singapore-based consortium receives funding from a mixture of US foundations, Chinese pharmaceutical companies, and Singaporean government sources to develop treatments for dengue fever, a disease affecting millions in Southeast Asia.

Policy Challenge: The project requires access to patient samples across Asia (including mainland China), US research expertise in molecular biology, and manufacturing capacity in Singapore. Each component triggers different regulatory concerns.

Resolution: The consortium establishes a governance structure where:

  • Patient data remains anonymized and stored exclusively in Singapore
  • US researchers focus on basic mechanism studies but don’t access Chinese patient samples directly
  • Chinese researchers contribute drug candidate development but don’t participate in US-funded portions
  • Manufacturing expertise is shared through technical documentation rather than direct personnel exchange
  • Publication of results requires mutual agreement but is ultimately permitted after 12-month review

Outcome: The project advances, dengue treatments progress, but collaboration occurs in parallel tracks rather than as a fully integrated effort. Development timelines extend by 18-24 months but breakthrough treatments eventually reach patients across the region.

Stakeholder Impact:

  • Patients: Delayed but ultimately achieved access to new treatments
  • Researchers: Frustrated by restrictions but able to contribute meaningfully
  • Companies: Accept reduced efficiency in exchange for market access across both US and Chinese spheres
  • Singapore Government: Successfully positions itself as trustworthy neutral arbiter

Implementation Challenges

Ambiguity in Classification: Determining which research is “basic” versus “sensitive” proves contentious. A project studying immune system responses could theoretically apply to bioweapon defense or to developing infectious disease treatments. Who decides?

Compliance Costs: Companies operating in Singapore must maintain separate research streams for different funding sources, increasing operational complexity and reducing efficiency. Smaller biotech startups struggle with compliance costs relative to their resources.

Researcher Mobility: The regime restricts personnel exchange but doesn’t eliminate it entirely. A Chinese researcher working on cancer immunotherapy in Singapore faces questions: Can she return to China and continue the research? Can she communicate findings to former colleagues? The ambiguity creates chilling effects on collaboration.

Intellectual Property Disputes: When research involves both US and Chinese contributions, ownership becomes complicated. A drug discovered partially through Chinese research but developed using US methodology—who owns the patent? Singapore courts could become arbitrators of US-China disputes, a politically sensitive role.

Scenario 2: Strategic Decoupling (Probability: 35%)

Overview

In this scenario, the US takes aggressive action to decouple from Chinese biotech, viewing the sector as strategically equivalent to semiconductors. Congress passes comprehensive restrictions, and Singapore faces mounting pressure to choose between collaboration with China or maintaining favor with the United States. Singapore attempts to remain neutral but finds this increasingly untenable.

Key Characteristics

Regulatory Environment: The BIOSECURE Act passes without narrowing amendments. The US implements “deemed export” restrictions that treat technology transfer to Singapore facilities operated by Chinese companies as equivalent to direct exports to China. US government agencies (NIH, DoD, DOE) are banned from funding projects involving Chinese organizations, regardless of location.

US Pressure on Singapore: American officials directly approach Singapore’s leadership, warning that biotech collaborations with Chinese entities could affect trade relationships, investment, or security partnerships. The US raises concerns that China could use biotechnology to strengthen military capabilities, framing the issue as one of national security rather than commercial competition.

Chinese Countermeasures: China restricts technology exports to Singapore, reduces venture capital investment in Singapore biotech startups, and encourages Chinese biotech companies to relocate research to mainland China, Hong Kong, or other regional hubs.

Case Study: WuXi Biologics’ Dilemma

Scenario: WuXi Biologics, which announced plans to create a contract research, development, and manufacturing (CRDM) center in Singapore, finds itself unable to operate as planned.

The Problem: WuXi’s Singapore facility was designed to serve both American pharmaceutical companies (seeking low-cost contract manufacturing) and Chinese companies (seeking international-standard manufacturing). Under decoupling pressure, American companies face legal risks if they send their drug development work to facilities partly owned by Chinese entities. Chinese companies worry about IP theft if they share research with American-affiliated operations.

Policy Dilemma for Singapore: Does Singapore:

  1. Allow WuXi to operate under restrictions that limit its client base to non-US companies, effectively reducing the facility’s viability?
  2. Pressure WuXi to divest Chinese ownership, which would anger Beijing?
  3. Impose restrictions making the facility effectively unusable, driving WuXi to relocate to Vietnam, Thailand, or Indonesia?

Resolution: WuXi announces a restructuring where its Singapore operations focus exclusively on contract manufacturing for Asian markets (excluding the US), while American clients migrate to manufacturing partnerships in India or other Allied countries. The Singapore facility becomes primarily a regional hub for Chinese pharmaceutical companies, reducing its role as a globally integrated biotech center.

Outcome: Singapore retains Chinese investment but loses American business, reducing the biotech sector’s diversity and resilience. Brain drain accelerates as talented researchers leave for Australia, New Zealand, or North America.

Stakeholder Impact:

  • WuXi Biologics: Accepts reduced Singapore role as part of larger strategic pivot to Asian markets
  • American Pharma Companies: Secure alternative manufacturing partners, reduce Singapore exposure
  • Singapore: Loses a significant employer and investor; biotech sector appears China-aligned rather than neutral
  • Researchers: High-performing scientists depart for more internationally integrated opportunities

Implementation Challenges

Forced Choices: Singapore cannot remain neutral if the US demands explicit choice. Maintaining biotech partnerships with China is incompatible with maintaining certain US security relationships.

Economic Costs: Singapore’s attractiveness as a biotech hub depends partly on being a bridge between markets. Pure geographic location doesn’t justify the investment in research infrastructure if only one market can be served.

Regional Competition: Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia actively recruit biotech investment. If Singapore appears China-aligned, companies may establish manufacturing and research in alternative Southeast Asian locations where they face fewer American restrictions.

Long-Term Brain Drain: Talented researchers attracted to Singapore specifically because of its globally integrated nature migrate elsewhere if Singapore becomes a regional China-focused hub rather than a global one.

Scenario 3: Singapore as a “Sanctuary Hub” (Probability: 15%)

Overview

In this scenario, Singapore successfully positions itself as a globally recognized sanctuary for biotech research that transcends geopolitical divides. By establishing clear governance frameworks and earning trust from both sides, Singapore attracts researchers and companies fleeing the more politicized environments in the US and China. This requires Singapore to make clear commitments to research neutrality and establish independent governance structures insulated from political pressure.

Key Characteristics

Governance Model: Singapore establishes an independent International Biotech Research Authority (analogous to the International Atomic Energy Agency) that governs research conducted within designated Singapore biotech zones. The authority establishes transparent criteria for what research is acceptable (therapeutic development) versus restricted (dual-use weaponizable research).

Research Zones: Designated biotech zones operate under international governance with researchers from both superpowers and other nations. Personnel exchanges are facilitated; IP is jointly owned by contributing institutions; publications are unrestricted.

Trust Building: Singapore’s Health Sciences Authority, A*STAR, and Biopolis demonstrate consistent independence from both US and Chinese political pressure over 2-3 years, building reputation as trustworthy neutral arbiters.

Case Study: The International Cancer Consortium

Scenario: Major research institutions from the US (MD Anderson, Memorial Sloan Kettering), China (Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences), Japan, South Korea, and Europe establish a joint research center in Singapore’s Biopolis to conduct cancer immunotherapy research.

Structure: The consortium operates under Singapore’s International Biotech Research Authority governance. Each institution contributes researchers, funding, and expertise. A neutral Singapore-based director leads the consortium. All discoveries are jointly owned; researchers from any participating nation can access findings; publications proceed without political approval.

Advantages:

  • Cancer researchers work on cutting-edge problems without geopolitical restrictions
  • Chinese and US researchers collaborate on specific projects rather than competing
  • Talented researchers worldwide view Singapore as a place where science transcends politics
  • Global pharmaceutical companies have confidence in accessing breakthrough treatments

Challenges:

  • Ensuring that dual-use discoveries (which could theoretically be weaponized) don’t actually get weaponized
  • Managing researcher safety and legal protection if either US or China objects to specific research
  • Funding the international governance structure
  • Preventing either superpower from trying to steal research or coerce researchers into espionage

Policy Requirement: Singapore would need explicit commitments from both US and China that:

  1. Researchers working in the international zones are protected from prosecution for technology transfer (within clearly defined boundaries)
  2. Both nations recognize the legitimacy of the International Biotech Research Authority
  3. Espionage targeting international research zones violates explicit agreements

Outcome: If successful, Singapore becomes the global center for collaborative biotech research. Talented researchers migrate to Singapore knowing they can work freely. International companies establish R&D facilities, attracted by the research environment. Singapore’s biotech sector grows explosively.

Stakeholder Impact:

  • Researchers: Unprecedented collaboration opportunities; research advances rapidly
  • Patients: Breakthrough treatments developed faster through collaborative approach
  • Singapore: Becomes globally recognized as the center of collaborative biotech science; significant economic and soft power benefits
  • US and China: Both benefit from breakthrough discoveries but share glory rather than competing for sole credit

Implementation Challenges

Trust Deficit: Both US and China would need to trust that the international authority is truly neutral and won’t favor the other side. This trust is extremely difficult to achieve given current tensions.

Security Concerns: Even if the authority is neutral, how does Singapore ensure that Chinese espionage agents don’t operate within the zone? How does it prevent American intelligence agencies from monitoring Chinese researchers?

Enforcement: If a researcher attempts to smuggle research or IP out of the zone, how is this handled? Who has jurisdiction?

Political Viability: American hawks would argue this is naïve appeasement of China. Chinese officials might view it as capitulation to Western dominance. Both sides face domestic political pressure against this model.

Funding: International governance structures require funding. Who pays? If the US and China both contribute, does either side gain leverage?

Scenario 4: Full Decoupling and Fragmented Regional Hubs (Probability: 10%)

Overview

In this scenario, geopolitical tensions escalate significantly. The US-China relationship deteriorates further, moving from competition to confrontation. The biotech sector fragments into separate ecosystems: an American-led Western alliance, a Chinese-led Asian bloc, and other nations struggling to choose sides. Singapore’s neutrality becomes impossible to maintain, forcing a difficult choice with substantial costs either way.

Key Characteristics

Regulatory Environment: Comprehensive bans on biotech collaboration with China. The BIOSECURE Act passes with extremely broad language. Penalties for violating restrictions include loss of government contracts, criminal prosecution, and sanctions. A new “China Technology Security Agency” is established to enforce restrictions.

Capital Flight: Venture capital investment in Southeast Asian biotech collapses as investors struggle to identify which entities have Chinese connections (however indirect). American VC firms retreat from Asia. Chinese VC firms face US sanctions if they invest in companies with American connections.

Talent Exodus: Researchers unable to work across borders migrate to the least constrained locations (possibly Singapore initially, or else to India, Vietnam, or private research institutions). The brain drain accelerates as researchers seek locations with the fewest geopolitical complications.

Manufacturing Fragmentation: The global pharmaceutical supply chain breaks into separate networks. Western companies source ingredients from Allied nations. Chinese companies source from China, Russia, and friendly nations. Third-world countries struggle to access affordable medications as supply chains become politicized.

Case Study: Singapore’s Forced Choice

Scenario: Researchers at Singapore’s ASTAR maintain longstanding collaborations with China’s Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences on stem cell research. Simultaneously, ASTAR has partnerships with MIT and Stanford on the same research. A congressional committee launches an investigation into whether A*STAR has been improperly transferring US-funded research to Chinese counterparts.

The Dilemma: Singapore’s government faces intense pressure to:

  1. Investigate A*STAR and potentially shut down Chinese collaborations (satisfying the US but angering China)
  2. Defend A*STAR’s research independence and maintain Chinese collaborations (satisfying China but facing US sanctions)
  3. Find a middle ground that proves unsatisfactory to both sides

Resolution: Singapore chooses option 1, investigating A*STAR and imposing restrictions on collaborative research with China. The government argues this is a sovereign decision made in Singapore’s interests, not capitulation to US pressure.

Chinese Response: China suspends scientific exchanges with Singapore. Chinese students are discouraged from studying at Singapore universities. Chinese companies reduce investment in Singapore biotech. Chinese pharmaceutical companies halt negotiations on contracts with Singapore manufacturers. The message is clear: neutrality is not an option.

American Response: Cautiously positive. The US increases biotech investment in Singapore, designating it as a trusted Allied biotech hub. However, the relationship remains transactional rather than warm, as American officials remain suspicious that Singapore might realign toward China in the future.

Singapore’s Position: The government has fundamentally shifted its relationship with China. Previously neutral, Singapore is now explicitly aligned with the US on technology matters, even if maintaining overall political and economic equilibrium with China.

Outcome: Singapore’s biotech sector bifurcates. Some capabilities and companies become explicitly American-allied, while others fade. Singapore remains an important biotech hub for the Western alliance but loses its distinctive position as a neutral bridge. Its technological ecosystem becomes geopolitically constrained rather than globally open.

Stakeholder Impact:

  • Singapore’s Government: Forced into explicit geopolitical alignment; loses freedom of action; becomes hostage to US-China relations
  • A*STAR and Research Institutions: Operate with significantly reduced international collaboration; dependent on US funding and partnerships
  • Researchers: Those with Chinese connections face pressure to realign or leave; talent exodus accelerates
  • Companies: Singapore-based biotech companies become flagged as potentially problematic by either side, depending on their partnerships
  • Patients: Treatment innovation slows as fractured research ecosystems struggle to coordinate. Developing nations struggle to access medications.

Implementation Challenges

Irreversibility: Once Singapore chooses one side, rebuilding relationships with the other is extremely difficult. A decade of trust-building can be destroyed in months.

Economic Costs: While the US may increase some biotech investment, it won’t fully replace the lost Chinese investment and partnerships. Singapore’s biotech sector experiences stagnation rather than growth.

Sovereignty Questions: If Singapore’s research independence must yield to geopolitical pressure from either superpower, its status as a truly independent nation-state is compromised.

Regional Instability: Other Southeast Asian nations watch closely. If Singapore, the wealthiest and most influential country in the region, is forced to choose sides, what does this mean for them? Regional unity could fracture.

Comparative Analysis: Pathways and Transition Points

Decision Tree: How Singapore Moves Between Scenarios

The Central Question: Will Singapore maintain the political will to preserve collaborative biotech research despite geopolitical pressure, or will it prioritize other strategic relationships?

Key Transition Points:

Point 1 – Early US Pressure (2025-2026): The Trump administration directly approaches Singapore’s government, requesting restrictions on Chinese biotech collaboration and suggesting trade consequences if Singapore doesn’t comply.

Decision: Does Singapore accommodate US requests or resist them?

  • Accommodating US: Moves toward Scenarios 2 or 4 (Decoupling or Full Decoupling)
  • Resisting US: Attempts to maintain Scenario 1 (Managed Competition) or develop Scenario 3 (Sanctuary Hub)

Point 2 – Chinese Retaliation (2026-2027): If Singapore restricts Chinese biotech collaboration in response to US pressure, China retaliates through trade, investment, or diplomatic pressure.

Decision: Does Singapore remain firm in its US alignment, or does it attempt to repair Chinese relationships?

  • Remaining Firm: Locks into Scenario 4 (Full Decoupling)
  • Attempting Repair: Retreats toward Scenario 1 (Managed Competition)

Point 3 – International Governance Proposal (2025-2027): If Singapore attempts to position itself as a neutral sanctuary hub, it must establish international governance structures and gain commitments from both US and China.

Decision: Do US and China accept Singapore’s proposed neutrality framework, or do they reject it as insufficient?

  • Both Accept: Scenario 3 (Sanctuary Hub) becomes viable
  • One or Both Reject: Falls back to Scenario 1 (Managed Competition) or degrades to Scenario 2 (Strategic Decoupling)

Probability Dynamics Over Time

2025-2026: Scenario 1 (Managed Competition) is most likely as the system is still adjusting to new regulatory frameworks. Scenario 3 (Sanctuary Hub) requires groundwork; Scenario 4 is still preventable through diplomacy.

2027-2029: If no major escalation occurs, Scenario 1 remains stable. If the US pursues aggressive decoupling policies and China responds with retaliation, the system transitions toward Scenario 2 or 4. If Singapore successfully implements international governance, Scenario 3 becomes viable.

2030+: The system likely stabilizes in one of the four scenarios. Transition becomes more difficult; path dependency sets in. A Singapore aligned with the US (Scenario 4) cannot easily return to being a neutral hub (Scenario 3).

Critical Success Factors for Each Scenario

Scenario 1 (Managed Competition): Success Requires

  • US and China accepting that some biotech collaboration is beneficial and not a threat
  • Clear, transparent governance frameworks that both sides trust
  • Singapore demonstrating consistent neutrality and competent administration
  • Researchers accepting reduced efficiency in exchange for maintained collaboration
  • Investment from both sides sufficient to sustain the biotech sector

Risk: Ambiguities in classification systems and creeping restrictions gradually erode the collaborative space

Scenario 2 (Strategic Decoupling): Success Requires (from Singapore’s perspective)

  • Maintaining US favor through clear biotech restrictions and alignment
  • Offering alternative attractions to American biotech companies (tax incentives, talent, infrastructure)
  • Managing Chinese relations to prevent economic retaliation

Risk: Singapore’s unique value as a globally connected hub is eliminated; it becomes simply another American-aligned regional biotech center

Scenario 3 (Sanctuary Hub): Success Requires

  • International governance structures that both US and China accept as legitimate
  • Singapore establishing unquestionable reputation for research integrity and neutrality
  • Both superpowers seeing mutual benefit in collaborative research
  • Security frameworks that prevent espionage while preserving research freedom
  • Sufficient international funding to support the model

Risk: Neither superpower may be willing to subordinate strategic interests to international governance; the model remains unrealistic

Scenario 4 (Full Decoupling): Success Requires (from a Western perspective)

  • Clear boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable collaborations
  • Enforcement mechanisms that prevent Chinese acquisition of sensitive research
  • Alternative supply chains and research partnerships for American companies
  • Singapore’s acceptance of geopolitical alignment

Risk: Global biotech innovation suffers; treatments for diseases affecting developing nations receive less research attention

Policy Recommendations for Singapore

Immediate Actions (2025-2026)

1. Establish Clear Governance Frameworks: Singapore should not wait to be forced to make choices by external pressure. Instead, proactively establish transparent criteria for biotech research governance that distinguish between:

  • Basic research and drug development (generally unrestricted)
  • Research with potential dual-use applications (requiring heightened scrutiny)
  • Research explicitly designed for weapons applications (prohibited)

These frameworks should be established in consultation with international experts, making them credible to both US and Chinese officials.

2. Engage in Quiet Diplomacy: Singapore’s government should discreetly approach senior US and Chinese officials to explain Singapore’s proposed governance framework and its commitment to maintaining balanced relationships while pursuing legitimate biotech research. The message should emphasize mutual benefits of maintaining collaborative research space.

3. Strengthen Research Governance Capacity: Ensure that Singapore’s Health Sciences Authority and A*STAR have sufficient resources and expertise to credibly administer governance frameworks. If Singapore is to be a trusted neutral arbiter, its institutions must be beyond reproach.

4. Diversify Funding Sources: Reduce Singapore’s dependence on any single investor or country. Actively cultivate funding relationships with Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, Europe, and Middle Eastern sovereign funds. A diversified funding base provides resilience against pressure from any single source.

Medium-Term Actions (2027-2029)

5. Develop Sanctuary Hub Infrastructure (if pursuing Scenario 3): If Singapore chooses to position itself as a sanctuary hub for collaborative biotech research, invest in international governance structures, recruit internationally respected scientific leadership, and build facilities designed for cross-border collaboration.

6. Build Regional Partnerships: Develop biotech collaboration with other Southeast Asian nations, positioning Singapore as a hub for regional research and manufacturing. This provides alternatives if US-China tensions make global collaboration difficult.

7. Support Biotech Areas of Distinctive Singapore Advantage: Invest in biotech areas where Singapore has natural advantages—tropical medicine, personalized medicine for Asian populations, marine biotechnology—that don’t implicate direct US-China competition.

8. Maintain Research Excellence: Continue attracting top talent regardless of nationality. Singapore’s value depends on its capacity to do world-class research; if it becomes a secondary hub dependent on either superpower, it loses strategic importance.

Long-Term Positioning (2030+)

9. Invest in Resilience: Ensure that Singapore’s biotech sector has sufficient diversity of funding, partnerships, and research focus that it remains viable regardless of which scenario emerges.

10. Maintain Institutional Independence: Resist pressure to subordinate research institutions to either superpower’s strategic interests. Singapore’s value as a neutral hub depends on demonstrable independence.

11. Contribute to Global Health: Position Singapore’s biotech development as contributing to global health and development, not merely to American or Chinese interests. This provides moral legitimacy and attracts international support.

Conclusion: The Fragility of the Collaborative Model

Singapore’s challenge is profound. The collaborative model that has driven biotech innovation globally depends on open exchange of ideas, freely mobile researchers, and acceptance that science transcends nationality. These conditions are increasingly threatened by geopolitical competition where biotech is viewed as a strategic asset equivalent to semiconductors or artificial intelligence.

Singapore’s greatest strength—its position as a neutral, globally integrated hub—is also its greatest vulnerability in a world increasingly divided into competing blocs. Maintaining this position requires active management, clear communication with both superpowers, and unwavering commitment to research integrity and neutrality. Yet this strategy is fundamentally fragile; it can be disrupted by events beyond Singapore’s control, including escalation in US-China tensions or domestic political pressure within either superpower demanding alignment.

The alternative strategies—explicit alignment with the US (Scenario 4) or positioning as an international sanctuary (Scenario 3)—offer greater clarity but involve different tradeoffs. Alignment with the US provides protection but subordinates research independence. An international sanctuary hub offers attractive ideals but requires unprecedented cooperation between the superpowers.

The coming years will determine which scenario dominates. Singapore’s policymakers must be prepared to navigate whichever path emerges while working persistently to ensure that even in a more competitive world, some space remains for collaborative biotech research that serves global health and scientific progress. The millions of patients worldwide who depend on biotech innovation deserve nothing less.

The Last Collaboration: A Story of Science in a Divided World

Part One: The Proposal

Dr. Sarah Chen stood at the floor-to-ceiling windows of her office at Biopolis, Singapore, watching the sun sink below the horizon. The tropical heat of the afternoon had given way to the relative cool of early evening. Below her, the biotech district of Singapore glowed with the quiet promise of cutting-edge laboratories where researchers from around the world pursued treatments that might save millions of lives.

She turned back to her computer and re-read the email that had arrived that morning. It was from Dr. Marcus Webb, Director of Immunotherapy Research at Stanford University, whom she had known for fifteen years. They had collaborated on dozens of projects, published papers together, attended conferences as panels of two. Their professional friendship transcended the conventional rivalries of academia.

Sarah,

I need to talk to you about something sensitive. I’ve been approached by colleagues at Peking University—specifically Dr. Liu Wei, whose work on checkpoint inhibitors is groundbreaking. We’ve all identified a promising direction for cancer treatment that could genuinely change outcomes for millions of patients with currently untreatable tumors. The three research teams—Stanford, Peking, and potentially your group at ASTAR—could crack this together. The combination of American biotech innovation, Chinese clinical capacity, and Singapore’s regulatory framework and neutral position could be transformative.*

But here’s the problem: the political climate is making this kind of collaboration increasingly difficult. I don’t need to tell you what’s happening in Washington. There’s talk of the BIOSECURE Act, export controls, restrictions on collaboration with China. I don’t know how much longer collaborations like this will even be possible.

Can we talk? I think we need to move quickly if we’re going to do this.

Marcus

Sarah read the email three times. She knew exactly what Marcus meant. Over the past year, she had watched the geopolitical landscape shift beneath her feet. American pharmaceutical companies were quietly withdrawing from collaborative projects with Chinese institutions. Congressional delegations had visited Singapore, gently suggesting that too-close collaboration with Chinese biotech entities might raise concerns. At the same time, Chinese officials had made veiled suggestions that Singapore’s biotech sector’s global integration was somehow compromised by Western influence.

She was caught in the middle, or more accurately, Singapore was caught in the middle, and she was a product of that catch.

Sarah pulled up her calendar and booked a video call with Marcus for the following evening. Then she made an unusual decision. She picked up the phone and called her boss, Dr. Rajesh Patel, the Deputy Director of A*STAR.

“Raj, I need to talk to you about a research opportunity. It’s complicated.”

Forty minutes later, she was in Rajesh’s office, a more spacious suite in the same building, with views of the city skyline. Rajesh listened carefully as she explained the proposal.

“You understand what you’re asking,” he said quietly when she finished. It wasn’t a question.

“Yes,” Sarah replied. “I’m asking whether A*STAR is willing to be part of a three-way collaboration between Singapore, the US, and China. I’m asking whether we’re willing to position ourselves as the bridge.”

Rajesh was quiet for a long moment. He was a careful man, someone who had navigated the complex political landscape of Singapore’s biotech sector for two decades. He had watched the sector grow from a government initiative into one of Asia’s most respected research hubs, and he was acutely aware of the pressures now threatening that status.

“I need to talk to the board,” he said finally. “And almost certainly to people in the government. This isn’t just a research decision anymore, Sarah. It’s a political one.”

Part Two: The Decision

The government consultation happened over three meetings spread across two weeks. Sarah attended two of them, presenting the scientific case for the collaboration. A*STAR’s board unanimously supported proceeding, seeing the research as consistent with Singapore’s mission to advance biotech for global health.

But the government discussions were more fraught. The Ministry of Trade and Industry worried about American pressure. The Foreign Ministry fretted about Chinese reactions. The Health Ministry focused on the scientific merit but acknowledged the political complications.

Finally, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health made the decision. In a closed meeting with Rajesh and Sarah, he explained Singapore’s position.

“We will support this collaboration,” he said, “but only if you can create a governance framework that makes clear to both Americans and Chinese officials that this is legitimate basic research in the global health interest, not technology transfer or espionage in either direction.”

“What would that framework look like?” Sarah asked carefully.

“I don’t know yet. That’s your problem to solve. But I can tell you what it needs to accomplish: it needs to be transparent enough that both sides can believe it’s real, robust enough that neither side can claim they’ve been compromised, and scientifically legitimate enough that it won’t be dismissed as mere political theater.”

He paused, looking directly at Sarah. “If you can do that, Singapore will stand behind this collaboration. We believe in science. We believe in research for human welfare. But we also understand that in this world, you have to do those things in ways that don’t trigger a geopolitical crisis. Can you do that?”

Sarah nodded slowly. “I think so. I’ll need to work with Marcus and Liu Wei to figure out the details.”

Part Three: Building the Framework

The three scientists met via secure video conference the following week. Marcus called from his office at Stanford, Liu Wei from her lab at Peking University, and Sarah from a private meeting room at Biopolis.

“Here’s what we’re thinking,” Sarah said, after explaining Singapore’s requirement for a governance framework. “We establish three parallel research tracks. Track One is fundamental research on immune checkpoint mechanisms—understanding how the immune system recognizes and attacks cancer cells. This research will be published and shared openly among all three institutions.”

“That’s the basic biology,” Marcus noted. “Understanding the mechanism.”

“Exactly,” Sarah continued. “Track Two is translational research—taking the insights from Track One and developing potential therapeutic approaches. This happens primarily in Singapore, with researchers from all three institutions participating. Singapore’s Health Sciences Authority provides oversight to ensure nothing dual-use or weaponizable is happening.”

“And Track Three?” Liu Wei asked.

“Clinical trials and manufacturing development. This happens in Singapore with oversight from the Singapore Health Sciences Authority, but the patient data comes from Singapore, US, and Chinese research hospitals. The clinical trial protocols are reviewed by ethics boards in all three countries. Any breakthrough that emerges is jointly owned, and all three institutions are credited equally.”

There was silence on the video call for a moment.

“The beauty of this,” Sarah continued, “is that it’s completely transparent. There’s no hiding places for espionage, no secrets, no unrestricted data flows. Every step is overseen by the Singapore Health Sciences Authority. And because the research happens in Singapore and is governed by Singapore regulations, we can credibly argue that this is Singapore’s research, conducted by Singapore’s institutions, in Singapore’s regulatory space—even though the research teams are international.”

“It also means no institution can claim proprietary rights over the others’ work,” Marcus said thoughtfully. “Everything is joint. That protects both the US and China from fears that the other side is stealing research.”

“Exactly,” Sarah confirmed. “And it means that if either the US or China objects to specific aspects, there’s a clear governance process for addressing those objections. The Singapore Health Sciences Authority makes determinations about what is and isn’t acceptable.”

“The Singapore government agrees to this?” Liu Wei asked, a hint of skepticism in her voice.

“Yes,” Sarah said. “They’ve committed to supporting this model. They’re betting that by being transparent and well-governed, we can demonstrate that international biotech collaboration doesn’t have to mean compromising national security.”

Part Four: The Pushback

The first challenge came from an unexpected direction. Three weeks after the three scientists had established their framework, an email arrived at Marcus’s Stanford address from someone at the Department of Defense. The meeting was requesting, not requesting, that Stanford officials discuss the China collaboration before it proceeded.

Marcus called Sarah immediately. “We’ve got a problem. The Pentagon is interested in our research.”

Sarah’s heart sank. Pentagon interest in biotech research usually meant one of two things: either they saw potential military applications, or they were worried about military applications being pursued by the other side.

“What did they say?” she asked.

“They want to meet. They want to understand what we’re doing and why. They haven’t explicitly said not to proceed, but the implication is pretty clear: if we don’t satisfy their concerns, there will be consequences.”

Sarah called Rajesh immediately. The government liaison was less surprising; it seemed that both Washington and Beijing had intelligence indicating that the collaboration was proceeding, and both wanted to understand what was happening.

Over the next week, Sarah attended meetings with Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Health Sciences Authority to explain the research program. She also participated in a video conference with American officials where she carefully explained that the research focused on fundamental understanding of immune system mechanisms, with applications to cancer treatment—not to weaponizable biological research.

“The research is being conducted in Singapore, governed by Singapore regulation,” she explained to the American officials. “Every research protocol is reviewed by Singapore’s Health Sciences Authority. Publication is controlled through the same governance process. There’s no uncontrolled data transfer, no secret collaboration, nothing that would compromise American interests.”

“But Chinese researchers will have access to the research,” one American official noted.

“Yes,” Sarah acknowledged. “Just as American researchers will have access to research conducted by the Chinese team, and as all researchers will have access to research conducted by the Singapore team. That’s the nature of collaborative research. The question is whether that access happens in a governed, transparent framework or in ad hoc ways that nobody can oversee.”

It was a delicate argument, and Sarah could see from the officials’ faces that they weren’t entirely convinced. But they also couldn’t articulate exactly what was wrong with the framework.

Then came a more direct warning. During a conversation with a senior American scientist whom Sarah had known for years, she learned that funding from the National Institutes of Health for her research might be in jeopardy if the collaboration proceeded.

She reported this to Rajesh, who escalated it to the permanent secretary. The government’s response was swift and clear: if the Americans tried to withdraw funding as punishment for conducting legitimate research on Singapore soil under Singapore governance, Singapore would diplomatically protest such interference in its sovereign research decisions.

It was a blunt statement, but it had an effect. The threats of funding withdrawal quietly stopped.

Part Five: A Patient’s Perspective

While the political machinations unfolded, Sarah was reminded constantly why the research mattered. One afternoon, her office received a visitor—an American woman named Jennifer, who was participating in a clinical trial at Stanford for late-stage pancreatic cancer. Jennifer had read about the potential Stanford-Peking-Singapore collaboration in a patient advocacy publication and wanted to understand what it meant for her treatment options.

Jennifer was fifty-three, a former music teacher from Portland. She had been given two years to live when her pancreatic cancer was diagnosed three years ago. Advanced immunotherapy had given her an unexpected remission that now lasted eighteen months—eighteen months beyond what her doctors had thought possible.

“I know that the research happening in Singapore might not help me personally,” Jennifer said, sitting in Sarah’s office with the tropical Singapore sun streaming through the windows. “But I also know that my remission came from research that scientists from different countries were able to collaborate on. If that research hadn’t happened, I’d be dead. If the collaboration stops, future patients won’t get that chance.”

She looked directly at Sarah. “I’m going to tell you what I tell every politician who will listen: your job isn’t to win against China. Your job is to save lives. And you can only do that if the world’s best scientists can work together.”

After Jennifer left, Sarah sat alone in her office for a long time. The politics seemed so trivial compared to the stakes. A woman who should be dead was alive because scientists had collaborated across borders. How many others could be saved if that collaboration continued?

Part Six: The Crisis Point

The real test came in late summer, during what should have been a quiet research cycle. The first significant findings had emerged from Track One—the fundamental research on immune checkpoint mechanisms. The results were genuinely interesting, suggesting a novel approach to overcoming tumor resistance to immunotherapy.

The question now was whether to publish.

Publishing the results meant sharing the findings openly with the entire global scientific community. It meant that both American and Chinese researchers would have access to the information. It meant validation that the collaboration was producing real science.

But it also meant potential controversy. Some American officials, when briefed on the findings, worried that Chinese researchers could use the information to develop military applications. Some Chinese officials worried that publishing too openly would allow Americans to build on the work while Chinese institutions got less credit.

Sarah received a call from Marcus. “We need to talk about the publication,” he said. “The Stanford lawyers are getting nervous. They’re worried about export control issues. They’re saying that publishing might violate regulations about technology transfer.”

“Publishing basic science research in an international peer-reviewed journal violates export control laws?” Sarah asked incredulously.

“I know how it sounds,” Marcus said. “But apparently, the Export Administration Regulations are vague enough that some lawyers think they could apply. And nobody wants to test it in court.”

Sarah escalated to Rajesh again. This time, the government’s response was different. Instead of issuing statements, officials quietly worked through diplomatic channels to communicate directly with American counterparts.

The message was carefully calibrated: Singapore understood American security concerns, but Singapore’s sovereignty included the right to conduct research and publish findings in peer-reviewed journals. If Singapore’s scientists were prevented from publishing by export control concerns, it would damage Singapore’s credibility as an independent research nation and would likely push Singapore to strengthen research relationships with China and other partners as alternatives. Nobody wanted that outcome.

The Americans, after internal deliberation, conceded the point. Publishing was permitted, but with an agreement that the researchers would submit the manuscript to both US and Chinese authorities for “security review” before journal submission. The review would take thirty days and would focus on ensuring that nothing patently weaponizable was being published.

It was a compromise. It was slower than open science normally operated. But it worked.

The paper was published six months later in Nature Immunology, with all three institutions—Stanford, Peking University, and A*STAR—as co-authors. The journal highlighted the international collaboration as an example of how scientific research transcended geopolitical divisions in service of human health.

Part Seven: The Turning Point

News of the published research’s success created unexpected momentum. The paper was quickly cited by other researchers. Patient advocacy groups highlighted the work as showing the promise of international collaboration. The global biotech industry watched to see whether the Singapore model of transparent, well-governed international collaboration could become a template for other projects.

Within months, two additional research collaborations emerged using the Singapore framework. One involved Japanese and South Korean researchers with American and European scientists, also coordinated through Singapore’s governance structure. Another brought together researchers from India, Brazil, and developed nations to study treatment approaches for tropical diseases affecting developing regions.

The Singapore government, watching the model take hold, quietly expanded funding for A*STAR and created additional research zones capable of hosting international collaborations. It became clear that Singapore had found a niche: not as a subordinate hub dependent on either superpower, but as a globally recognized center for international collaborative research.

The breakthrough came during a conversation Sarah had with a senior American official who visited Singapore to assess the collaboration firsthand. After touring the research facilities and reviewing the governance protocols, he told her candidly:

“You’ve created something here that actually works. It’s transparent enough that we can verify there’s no improper technology transfer. It’s well-governed enough that we can have confidence in the research integrity. And it’s collaborative enough that it’s advancing science faster than if everyone was working separately. I’m going to recommend to my counterparts that this model is not a threat to American security—it’s actually good for American security, because breakthrough cancer treatments help American patients.”

He paused. “I assume you’re getting similar feedback from the Chinese side?”

“Essentially,” Sarah confirmed. “They’re pleased that Chinese researchers are part of breakthrough research and that Chinese patients are being treated with new therapies developed through this collaboration.”

“So you’ve found a way to make both sides happy,” the American official observed. “In this day and age, that’s almost miraculous.”

Part Eight: Jennifer’s Remission

Two years after the Stanford-Peking-Singapore collaboration’s first publication, Jennifer returned to Singapore. She was now in her late fifties and had maintained her remission for over four years—far longer than any of her doctors had predicted.

She asked to meet with Sarah, and they sat together in Sarah’s office, the same room where they had first met.

“I wanted to come back,” Jennifer said, “to show you that the collaboration worked. I’m part of the next generation of treatment trials based on the Track One findings. The new therapy is even more effective than what I was on. My doctors think I might have many more years ahead.”

She gestured toward the window, where the Biopolis research district sprawled in the afternoon sun. “Every person in this building is probably working on something that could help someone like me. But they can only do that work if they’re allowed to collaborate with the best minds in the world, regardless of where those minds are located.”

Sarah felt tears forming. After so many months of navigating political complications, dealing with government liaisons, and worrying about whether the collaboration would survive geopolitical pressures, she suddenly felt the weight lift. This was why it mattered. This was what it meant.

Jennifer continued. “You know what I think about when I’m scared about the cancer coming back? I think about the fact that if you hadn’t stood firm about this collaboration, I probably wouldn’t be alive. And I think about all the people who will be alive in ten years because of the research happening here now. That’s worth fighting for.”

Epilogue: Five Years Later

Sarah Chen stood once again at the windows of her office at Biopolis. It was now 2030. The world had changed in significant ways since the uncertain days of 2025.

The US-China relationship had continued to deteriorate in many sectors. Semiconductor competition had intensified. Strategic competition in artificial intelligence had become overt. There had been trade tensions and geopolitical confrontations.

But in biotech, something different had happened. The Singapore model had taken root. International collaborations conducted under transparent governance frameworks had become increasingly common. Other countries—Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia—had adopted similar models. A loose network of collaborative biotech research hubs had emerged, all committed to the principle that while nations competed, science could remain fundamentally collaborative.

The first truly transformative treatment to emerge from the Stanford-Peking-Singapore collaboration had been approved for use in patients with pancreatic cancer. It was not a cure, but it had extended median survival from months to years in many patients. Jennifer was one of thousands who had benefited. She had become an advocate for international scientific collaboration and regularly spoke at conferences about the importance of maintaining research bridges across geopolitical divides.

The pandemic that swept through parts of Asia in 2028 had validated the collaborative model once again. Because research networks were already established and governments had experience coordinating through Singapore’s governance frameworks, vaccine development had been dramatically faster than anyone had anticipated. Researchers from the US, China, and allied nations had worked together seamlessly to develop effective treatments, sharing data in real time through established channels. Hundreds of thousands of lives had been saved because scientists could collaborate.

But Sarah also knew that the collaborative model remained fragile. There had been close calls. A security scare in 2027 had nearly derailed the entire framework. Political pressure from hawks on both sides continued. There were still politicians and officials who viewed international scientific collaboration as inherently suspicious, as though advancing human knowledge was somehow a threat to national security.

She thought about the conversation with the American official five years ago—the one who had said that finding a way to make both sides happy was “almost miraculous” in this day and age.

It had taken more than miracles. It had taken courage from scientists willing to stick their necks out. It had taken leadership from Singapore’s government, willing to take a principled stance about research independence. It had taken diplomacy and patient negotiation. And ultimately, it had taken the fundamental human imperative to advance knowledge and save lives, which had proven to be a stronger force than even the most intense geopolitical rivalries.

Sarah pulled up her email and read the latest message from Marcus. Stanford was initiating a new collaboration with researchers in Vietnam and Germany on treatments for antibiotic-resistant infections. Would A*STAR be interested in participating under the Singapore governance framework?

She smiled and began typing her response. The work would continue. The collaborations would persist. Science would endure.

Because in the end, the millions of patients worldwide who depended on biotech innovation deserved nothing less.