An Examination of Conditional Ceasefires and the Challenge of Disarmament in Protracted Conflicts: The Israeli-Hamas Context in October 2025
Abstract: This paper analyzes the complexities inherent in conditional ceasefire agreements within protracted conflicts, specifically focusing on the hypothetical scenario presented in October 2025 concerning Israel, Hamas, and the United States. Drawing from a news report detailing US President Donald Trump’s willingness to allow Israel to resume military operations should Hamas fail to disarm, this analysis explores the critical role of disarmament in securing durable peace. It examines the motivations and strategic positions of the key actors—the US as a mediator and enforcer, Israel’s security imperatives, and Hamas’s dual identity as a governing and militant entity. The paper argues that the operationalization of disarmament clauses remains a significant hurdle in conflict resolution, fraught with issues of trust, legitimacy, and the inherent power dynamics between state and non-state actors. It concludes that without robust enforcement mechanisms, credible security guarantees for all parties, and a clear pathway for political integration or demilitarization, conditional ceasefires risk perpetuating cycles of violence rather than paving the way for lasting stability.
Keywords: Ceasefire, Disarmament, Hamas, Israel, Gaza, US Foreign Policy, Conflict Resolution, Non-State Actors, Protracted Conflict.
- Introduction: The Fragile Equilibrium of Conditional Peace
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict represents one of the most enduring and complex geopolitical challenges of the modern era. Decades of armed conflict, punctuated by sporadic ceasefires and failed peace initiatives, underscore the difficulty of achieving lasting stability. Within this context, ceasefire agreements often serve as temporary respites, their durability frequently contingent upon the adherence of all parties to specific terms. A critical, yet contentious, component of many such agreements involves the disarmament of non-state armed groups. The news report dated October 16, 2025, detailing remarks by US President Donald Trump and Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz, highlights a hypothetical but highly plausible scenario where a ceasefire in Gaza is explicitly conditioned on Hamas’s disarmament (Straits Times, 2025).
This paper aims to provide an academic examination of this hypothetical scenario, analyzing the theoretical and practical challenges associated with conditional ceasefires, particularly those predicated on the disarmament of a well-entrenched non-state actor like Hamas. It will delve into the strategic calculus of the primary stakeholders—the United States, Israel, and Hamas—and explore the implications of a potential resumption of hostilities. By exploring this future-dated event, the paper seeks to illuminate the persistent obstacles to conflict resolution in the Israeli-Hamas context and offer insights into the broader dynamics of peace enforcement in protracted asymmetric conflicts.
- The Context of October 2025: A Ceasefire Under Threat
The news article refers to a ceasefire deal initiated on October 10, 2025, following a period of conflict in Gaza (Straits Times, 2025). The critical juncture arises five days later, on October 15, when both US President Donald Trump and Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz issue explicit warnings: should Hamas fail to disarm and uphold its commitments, Israel reserves the right, with US coordination or approval, to resume fighting. This situation establishes a “conditional peace,” where the absence of hostilities is directly linked to a specific, and highly demanding, action by a non-state actor.
The article further details Hamas’s actions post-ceasefire, which appear to contradict the spirit, if not the direct terms, of disarmament. Hamas’s Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades are reportedly reasserting control in Gaza, deploying security forces and executing individuals deemed “collaborators” or “gang” members (Straits Times, 2025). This reassertion of authority by Hamas, without a public commitment to disarm, sets the stage for a potential breakdown of the fragile ceasefire and underscores the inherent difficulties in enforcing such agreements in environments where power vacuums quickly emerge. The stated goals of Israel—”total defeat of Hamas” and to “change the reality in Gaza”—reveal a strategic intent that extends beyond mere cessation of hostilities to fundamental shifts in the governance and security landscape of the enclave.
- Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Asymmetric Conflicts: Theoretical Frameworks
The concept of disarmament is central to post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding. In scholarly literature, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs are often posited as essential mechanisms for transitioning from armed conflict to sustainable peace (Collier, 2008; Muggah, 2005). However, the applicability and success of DDR vary significantly depending on the nature of the conflict and the actors involved.
In the context of non-state armed groups like Hamas, disarmament presents unique challenges:
Identity and Legitimacy: For many militant groups, particularly those rooted in national liberation or resistance narratives, their arms are integral to their identity and perceived legitimacy among their constituents (Posen, 1993). Ceding them can be seen as an abandonment of their cause or a capitulation.
Security Dilemma: Non-state actors often fear that disarming would leave them vulnerable to attack from their adversaries (Walter, 1997). Without credible and enforceable security guarantees, the incentive to retain arms remains high.
Governance and Power: Groups like Hamas, which also function as governing authorities in their territories, face a dilemma where disarmament could mean relinquishing their ability to maintain internal order and project power, thereby ceding control to rivals or creating a security vacuum. Hamas’s deployment of security forces post-ceasefire, ostensibly for “crime and security concerns,” illustrates this aspect (Straits Times, 2025).
Enforcement and Verification: Verifying the full disarmament of a decentralized, ideologically driven group operating within a dense urban environment is exceptionally difficult. The absence of a trusted third party or robust monitoring mechanisms can undermine the entire process.
The “conditional” nature of the ceasefire, as articulated by Trump and Katz, positions disarmament as a non-negotiable prerequisite rather than a part of a broader, phased DDR process. This “all-or-nothing” approach, while reflecting Israel’s security demands, may inadvertently harden Hamas’s stance, perceiving it as a demand for unconditional surrender rather than a step towards political integration.
- The Actors and Their Strategic Calculus
4.1. The United States: Mediator, Guarantor, and Enforcer
In the hypothetical October 2025 scenario, the United States, under a Trump administration, assumes a pivotal role as both a primary mediator of the ceasefire and a potential enforcer of its terms. Trump’s statement—”Israel will return to those streets as soon as I say the word. If Israel could go in and knock the crap of them, they’d do that”—signals a robust, albeit conditional, endorsement of Israeli military action (Straits Times, 2025). This approach aligns with a historical pattern of strong US-Israel relations and a tendency for US administrations to prioritize Israeli security concerns.
The US military’s Middle East command’s call for Hamas to disarm “without delay” further underscores American strategic objectives (Straits Times, 2025). For the US, ensuring Hamas’s disarmament serves several purposes:
Regional Stability: Removing Hamas’s military capabilities is seen as crucial for preventing future escalations and maintaining a semblance of stability in the volatile Middle East.
Counter-Terrorism: Classifying Hamas as a terrorist organization, the US views disarmament as an essential counter-terrorism measure.
Credibility: The US’s ability to enforce the terms of a ceasefire, particularly those it has helped broker, directly impacts its credibility as a global diplomatic and security actor. A failure to enforce disarmament could be perceived as weakness, undermining future diplomatic efforts.
However, the US’s role as an unequivocal guarantor of Israel’s security, combined with its historical opposition to Hamas, limits its perceived impartiality, potentially hindering its ability to broker a disarmament agreement acceptable to Hamas.
4.2. Israel: Security Imperatives and Strategic Objectives
Israel’s stated objectives are clear: “total defeat of Hamas” and to “change the reality in Gaza” (Straits Times, 2025). These objectives reflect a deep-seated security concern stemming from Hamas’s repeated attacks, its governance of Gaza, and its refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist. For Israel, Hamas’s disarmament is not merely a clause in a ceasefire agreement but an existential necessity.
Israel’s security doctrine often prioritizes proactive military responses to perceived threats. The threat to resume fighting if Hamas fails to comply is a direct manifestation of this doctrine. The “change the reality in Gaza” objective suggests a desire for a fundamental shift in the power structure, potentially aiming for a demilitarized Gaza under a different political authority. This long-term strategic goal makes any partial or superficial disarmament by Hamas unacceptable.
The challenge for Israel lies in balancing its security imperatives with the humanitarian consequences of renewed conflict and the long-term viability of any political solution for Gaza. A full-scale re-engagement in Gaza, while potentially achieving military objectives, risks further entrenching animosity, exacerbating humanitarian crises, and drawing international condemnation.
4.3. Hamas: Resistance, Governance, and Survival
Hamas, as a political movement and a militant organization, faces a complex set of incentives and disincentives regarding disarmament. As the de facto governing authority in Gaza, it has a responsibility to maintain internal order and provide services, which it argues necessitates armed forces (Straits Times, 2025). Simultaneously, its militant wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, is central to its identity as a “resistance movement” against Israeli occupation.
Hamas’s reluctance to disarm stems from several factors:
Loss of Power and Legitimacy: Disarmament would strip Hamas of its primary means of projecting power, both internally within Gaza and externally against Israel. This would likely erode its standing among its support base, who view its armed resistance as legitimate.
Security Concerns: Hamas would likely perceive disarmament as leaving it vulnerable to Israeli military action or internal challenges from rival factions. Without credible international security guarantees, the risk of disarmament outweighs the potential benefits.
Ideology: For Hamas, retaining its arms is integral to its ideological commitment to armed struggle against Israel. A complete disarmament could be seen as a betrayal of its foundational principles.
Negotiating Leverage: Its military capabilities are its primary source of leverage in any negotiations with Israel or international actors. Ceding this leverage prematurely would weaken its position.
Hamas’s post-ceasefire actions—deploying security forces and executing “collaborators”—can be interpreted as an attempt to reassert control in a security vacuum, demonstrate its continued authority, and perhaps signal its unwillingness to fully disarm according to external demands. This behavior reinforces the deep mistrust between the parties and complicates any disarmament efforts.
- The Dynamics of Escalation and the Prospect of Renewed Conflict
The conditional nature of the ceasefire places the onus of de-escalation almost entirely on Hamas’s willingness to disarm. Should Hamas refuse or fail to meet this condition, the reported statements indicate a high probability of resumed hostilities. Such an escalation would carry severe consequences:
Humanitarian Crisis: Gaza, already devastated by previous conflicts, would face an even more dire humanitarian situation, with increased casualties, displacement, and destruction of infrastructure.
Regional Instability: Renewed large-scale fighting could trigger wider regional instability, potentially drawing in other state or non-state actors.
Erosion of Trust: Any breach of a ceasefire, particularly over a core issue like disarmament, would further erode already minimal levels of trust, making future diplomatic efforts exceedingly difficult.
Political Fallout: The US, having explicitly warned of consequences, would face pressure to support Israel’s actions, potentially straining its relations with other international actors and exacerbating anti-American sentiment in the region.
The dilemma is profound: Israel’s security demands for disarmament clash directly with Hamas’s existential and ideological imperatives to maintain its armed capabilities. Without an innovative approach that addresses the fundamental insecurities and political aspirations of both sides, this cycle of conditional ceasefires and threatened escalations is likely to persist.
- Conclusion: The Enduring Challenge of a Disarmed Peace
The hypothetical scenario of October 2025, as presented in the news report, serves as a stark illustration of the enduring challenges in achieving a stable peace in the Israeli-Hamas conflict. The explicitly conditional nature of the ceasefire, with disarmament as its linchpin, highlights a fundamental political and security impasse.
For a conditional ceasefire to transition into a durable peace, several critical elements are required:
Credible Security Guarantees: Hamas requires tangible assurances that disarmament will not result in its vulnerability or political annihilation. Similarly, Israel needs verifiable and enforceable guarantees against future attacks.
Phased and Monitored Process: Disarmament is rarely an instantaneous event, especially for non-state actors. A phased process, coupled with robust international monitoring and verification mechanisms, is essential.
Political Pathway: For Hamas to even consider disarmament, there must be a clear political pathway that offers it legitimacy and a role in a future Palestinian political structure, or at least a viable alternative for its members and leaders. Without such an avenue, retaining arms remains its strongest form of leverage and self-preservation.
Reconstruction and Economic Development: Addressing the underlying socioeconomic drivers of conflict in Gaza, through significant reconstruction and economic development, could alter the incentive structure for engaging in violence.
The statements from US President Trump and Israeli Defence Minister Katz in October 2025 underscore the international community’s frustration with the cycle of violence and its desire for a decisive resolution. However, demanding disarmament from an entrenched non-state actor without addressing its core security concerns and political aspirations risks merely postponing conflict rather than resolving it. The reassertion of Hamas’s authority post-ceasefire, without public commitment to disarmament, indicates the formidable obstacles to translating political demands into tangible shifts on the ground. Ultimately, the path to a disarmed peace in Gaza requires not just threats of renewed force, but a comprehensive strategy that meticulously addresses the complex interplay of security, politics, and humanitarian needs for all parties involved.
References (Illustrative – in a real paper, these would be specific academic works):
Collier, P. (2008). The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. Oxford University Press.
Muggah, R. (2005). No easy exit: The challenges of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Posen, B. R. (1993). The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. Survival, 35(1), 27-47.
Straits Times. (2025, October 16). Trump says Israel could resume fighting in Gaza if Hamas fails to disarm. The Straits Times.
Walter, B. F. (1997). The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement. International Organization, 51(3), 335-364.