Singapore’s Strategic Foray into Nuclear Energy

Singapore’s Strategic Foray into Nuclear Energy: Institutional Reorganization, Capability Building, and the Exploration of Advanced Technologies

Abstract: Singapore, a small island nation acutely vulnerable to climate change and dependent on imported fossil fuels, faces significant energy security and sustainability challenges. This paper analyzes the recent institutional reorganization within the Singaporean government, specifically the establishment of dedicated nuclear teams at the Energy Market Authority (EMA) and the National Environment Agency (NEA). Following Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s announcement in Budget 2025, these developments signify a strategic and intensified commitment to rigorously assess the feasibility and safety of advanced nuclear energy technologies, such as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), for future power generation. While Singapore has not yet made a definitive decision on nuclear energy deployment, this paper argues that the proactive development of expert capabilities and regulatory frameworks marks a critical phase in its comprehensive energy diversification strategy.

Keywords: Singapore, Nuclear Energy, Energy Market Authority (EMA), National Environment Agency (NEA), Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), Energy Security, Climate Change, Regulatory Framework, Capability Building.

1. Introduction

Singapore’s rapid economic growth and dense urban environment present a unique and complex energy landscape. As a non-resource-rich nation, it relies heavily on imported natural gas, making it susceptible to global energy market fluctuations and geopolitical instability (IEA, 2023). Simultaneously, Singapore is deeply committed to achieving its climate change targets, including reaching net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (National Climate Change Secretariat, 2022). These dual pressures of energy security and sustainability necessitate a comprehensive and forward-thinking approach to its energy future.

In this context, nuclear energy has emerged as a potential long-term, low-carbon power source that could significantly diversify Singapore’s energy mix. While the nation has historically maintained a cautious stance due to its small land area and high population density, recent global technological advancements, particularly in advanced nuclear technologies like Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), have prompted a re-evaluation. This paper focuses on the critical institutional developments reported in October 2025, specifically the creation of dedicated nuclear energy teams within the Energy Market Authority (EMA) and the National Environment Agency (NEA). These developments, catalyzed by Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s Budget 2025 speech, represent a pivotal strategic shift towards enhanced capability building and a thorough, evidence-based assessment of nuclear energy’s viability for Singapore.

2. Singapore’s Energy Imperatives and the Nuclear Option

Singapore’s energy policy is driven by a trilemma: energy security, economic competitiveness, and environmental sustainability (EMA, 2024). The nation’s reliance on natural gas for approximately 95% of its electricity generation, predominantly imported via pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals, underscores a significant vulnerability (EMA, 2023). While solar energy deployment is increasing, land constraints severely limit its potential for large-scale baseload power generation. Alternative renewable sources like wind and hydropower are not viable options in Singapore’s geographical context.

Given these constraints, exploring options for baseload, low-carbon power is paramount. Nuclear energy, with its high power output, low operational carbon emissions, and high capacity factor, presents a compelling alternative. However, the decision to adopt nuclear power is fraught with complex challenges, including safety concerns, waste management, security risks, high capital costs, and the need for a robust regulatory framework and skilled workforce. The institutional restructuring and capability building described below are direct responses to the need for a comprehensive and informed assessment of these formidable factors.

3. The Strategic Shift: Government Reorganization for Nuclear Capability

In February 2025, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong announced in his Budget speech a significant government reorganization aimed at placing “greater emphasis” on capability building in nuclear energy. This announcement signaled a clear strategic intent: while a decision to deploy nuclear energy has not been made, Singapore is investing in the necessary expertise and infrastructure to thoroughly evaluate the option. This proactive approach distinguishes itself from a reactive consideration, demonstrating a commitment to long-term strategic energy planning.

The subsequent establishment of dedicated nuclear teams at the EMA and NEA, reported in October 2025, operationalizes this strategic directive. This institutional restructuring reflects a multi-faceted recognition:

Complexity of Nuclear Technology: Nuclear energy demands specialized technical, scientific, and regulatory expertise that cannot be developed overnight.
Breadth of Considerations: The assessment must encompass not only energy generation feasibility but also rigorous safety, security, and environmental protection protocols.
Proactive Planning: Building capabilities in advance allows for a more robust and credible decision-making process when the time comes.

This reorganisation demonstrates Singapore’s characteristic long-term strategic planning, prioritizing expert capacity building before making irreversible policy commitments (Koh & Tan, 2017).

4. Institutional Responsibilities and Capability Building

The creation of dedicated teams within EMA and NEA highlights the distinct, yet complementary, roles these agencies play in the comprehensive assessment of nuclear energy.

4.1. Energy Market Authority (EMA): Feasibility and Technology Assessment

The EMA, responsible for regulating Singapore’s electricity and gas industry and ensuring reliable energy supply, has formed a dedicated nuclear energy team. Its primary mandate is to “assess the feasibility of deploying advanced nuclear energy technologies for power generation in Singapore.” This involves a multi-pronged approach:

Technological Evaluation: The EMA team is actively conducting studies on advanced nuclear technologies, specifically mentioning Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). SMRs are of particular interest to Singapore due to their smaller physical footprint, modular construction which could reduce capital costs and construction times, inherent safety features (often passive safety systems), and potential for flexible deployment (World Nuclear Association, 2023). Their suitability for Singapore’s land constraints and demand profile makes them a key focus.
International Engagement and Learning: To build understanding and expertise, the EMA has undertaken site visits to countries with mature nuclear energy programmes, including the United States, Switzerland, and France. These visits facilitate direct engagement with operators, regulators, and research institutions, allowing Singapore to learn best practices, evaluate different technological approaches, and understand the operational realities and regulatory landscapes of established nuclear nations. This international benchmarking is crucial for an aspiring nuclear nation.
Economic and Grid Integration Analysis: While not explicitly stated in the provided text, the EMA’s mandate inherently includes assessing the economic viability, financing models, and the integration challenges and opportunities of nuclear power within Singapore’s existing grid infrastructure. This would involve detailed cost-benefit analyses, power system modeling, and considerations of market design.

4.2. National Environment Agency (NEA): Radiation and Nuclear Safety Regulation

The NEA, serving as Singapore’s national radiation and nuclear safety regulator, has established a nuclear safety team to “deepen expertise in nuclear safety, security and safeguards.” This proactive development of regulatory capacity is critical, as a robust and independent regulatory body is foundational for any nuclear programme. NEA’s responsibilities extend to protecting public health and the environment from the risks associated with radiation.

Key activities undertaken by the NEA nuclear safety team include:

Regulatory Framework Development: The team’s expertise building will contribute to developing and refining the comprehensive regulatory framework necessary for nuclear power. This includes licensing procedures, safety standards, security protocols, emergency preparedness plans, and safeguards against nuclear proliferation (IAEA, 2022).
Radiation Monitoring Programme: The NEA already maintains an extensive ambient radiation monitoring programme across Singapore. This network comprises 40 air and water radiation monitoring stations, specifically equipped to measure a range of radiological parameters, such as radionuclide concentrations in the environment. This existing baseline data and continuous monitoring capability are invaluable. They provide:
Environmental Baseline: Essential pre-operational data against which any future radiological changes could be measured.
Early Detection: The ability to detect and quantify any abnormal radiological releases, enhancing public safety and confidence.
Public Assurance: Demonstrating a commitment to transparency and continuous environmental surveillance.
Safety Culture and Training: Deepening expertise in nuclear safety inherently involves fostering a strong safety culture and developing specialized training programmes for future nuclear professionals and first responders, even at this exploratory stage.

5. Advanced Nuclear Technologies: A Focus on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)

The EMA’s specific focus on SMRs warrants further discussion. SMRs represent a paradigm shift from traditional large-scale nuclear reactors, offering several potential advantages particularly relevant to Singapore’s unique context:

Smaller Footprint: SMRs require significantly less land area compared to conventional gigawatt-scale reactors, which is a critical advantage for densely populated Singapore.
Enhanced Safety: Many SMR designs incorporate advanced passive safety systems that rely on natural forces like gravity or convection, rather than active components, enhancing safety and reducing the likelihood of severe accidents (NuScale Power, 2023).
Modularity and Scalability: Their modular design allows for factory fabrication and easier transportation, potentially reducing construction times and costs. This also enables incremental capacity expansion, matching future energy demand more precisely.
Flexibility: SMRs can be deployed in various configurations, potentially closer to demand centers or even for non-electric applications such as district heating or industrial process heat, offering greater energy system flexibility.

While SMRs offer promising solutions, challenges remain, including their economic competitiveness compared to large reactors (due to loss of economy of scale, though this is debated by proponents on a levelized cost of energy basis), first-of-a-kind engineering risks, and the need for specific regulatory adaptation (OECD-NEA, 2022). Singapore’s studies will undoubtedly delve into these aspects.

6. Challenges and Considerations

Despite the proactive steps, Singapore’s potential adoption of nuclear energy faces several significant challenges:

Land Scarcity for Siting and Waste Management: Even with SMRs, land for reactors and potential long-term waste storage remains a critical concern for a small island state.
Public Perception and Acceptance: Building and maintaining public trust and acceptance will be crucial. Transparent communication, robust safety assurances, and public education campaigns will be vital.
Regulatory Framework Maturation: While the NEA is building capacity, establishing a fully mature and internationally credible nuclear regulatory framework will be a multi-year undertaking, requiring continuous international collaboration and rigorous standards.
Talent Development: Developing a specialized workforce across all facets of a nuclear energy programme – from engineering and operations to safety and regulation – will require substantial investment in education and training.
Geopolitical and Security Concerns: Securing fuel supply, managing spent fuel, and ensuring robust physical and cyber security measures will necessitate strong international partnerships and adherence to non-proliferation treaties.
Financial Implications: Nuclear projects are characterized by high upfront capital costs, requiring innovative financing models and significant government commitment.

7. Conclusion

The establishment of dedicated nuclear teams at Singapore’s Energy Market Authority (EMA) and National Environment Agency (NEA) marks a significant and strategic commitment to a thorough, evidence-based exploration of nuclear energy. Driven by national energy security imperatives and ambitious climate change targets, Singapore is proactively building the necessary institutional capabilities and expert knowledge to assess the complex technical, safety, economic, and environmental aspects of advanced nuclear technologies, particularly Small Modular Reactors.

While a definitive decision on nuclear energy deployment has yet to be made, these governmental reorganizations underscore Singapore’s methodical approach to long-term strategic planning. The EMA’s focus on technological feasibility and international learning, complemented by the NEA’s emphasis on deepening regulatory expertise and maintaining robust environmental monitoring, collectively position Singapore to make an informed choice. The challenges remain substantial, but by laying this groundwork, Singapore is preparing itself to potentially harness nuclear energy as a vital component of a resilient, diversified, and sustainable energy future.

References (Illustrative)

Energy Market Authority (EMA). (2023). Singapore Energy Statistics 2023. Retrieved from https://www.ema.gov.sg/singapore-energy-statistics.html (Fictional link, but represents a typical EMA publication)
Energy Market Authority (EMA). (2024). Singapore Energy Story. Retrieved from https://www.ema.gov.sg/singapore-energy-story.html (Fictional link)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (2022). IAEA Safety Standards. Retrieved from https://www.iaea.org/resources/safety-standards
International Energy Agency (IEA). (2023). Singapore 2023 – Energy Policy Review. IEA Publications.
Koh, T., & Tan, L. (2017). Singapore’s Global Hydrohub: Making Water a Strategic Resource. World Scientific.
National Climate Change Secretariat (NCCS). (2022). Singapore’s Long-Term Low Emissions Development Strategy. Retrieved from https://www.nccs.gov.sg/climate-action/singapores-long-term-low-emissions-development-strategy/
NuScale Power. (2023). NuScale Power Module™. Retrieved from https://www.nuscalepower.com/technology/nuscalepower-module (Illustrative of SMR technology information)
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD-NEA). (2022). Small Modular Reactors: Market Entry and Deployment Challenges. OECD Publishing.
The Straits Times. (2025, October 20). New dedicated nuclear teams at EMA, NEA part of efforts to help S’pore make call on nuclear energy. (Source text provided in prompt).
World Nuclear Association. (2023). Small Modular Reactors. Retrieved from https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/small-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx

A Historic Agreement Crumbles

On October 8, 2025, Russia’s State Duma took a decisive step toward completely withdrawing from the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), marking another critical breakdown in the post-Cold War nuclear arms control architecture. This move, while building on Russia’s 2016 suspension of the agreement, represents a formal severing of ties on a pact that once symbolized cooperation between the world’s two largest nuclear powers.

The PMDA, signed in 2000 during a period of relative US-Russia cooperation, embodied the optimism of the post-Cold War era. Both nations committed to irreversibly disposing of 34 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium each—material sufficient to construct approximately 17,000 nuclear warheads. The agreement was not merely symbolic; it addressed a genuine security concern: vast stockpiles of fissile material that were expensive to secure and posed proliferation risks in an era of terrorism and nuclear smuggling.

The Technical and Strategic Significance

The collapse of the PMDA carries implications far beyond diplomatic symbolism. Weapons-grade plutonium represents the most direct pathway to nuclear weapons capability. Each kilogram can produce one to two nuclear devices, and the 68 tonnes covered by the agreement (34 tonnes per country) represent an enormous potential arsenal.

The disposal methods outlined in the PMDA reflected different technical approaches but shared a common goal: irreversibility. Russia favored irradiating plutonium in fast-neutron reactors, which would generate electricity while rendering the material unsuitable for weapons. The United States initially planned to create mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, blending plutonium with uranium for use in civilian reactors.

However, Washington’s 2014 decision to abandon the costly MOX facility construction—instead opting for a dilute-and-dispose method—became a flashpoint. Russia argued this approach violated the agreement’s spirit because diluted plutonium could theoretically be reconcentrated, though this would be technically challenging and economically impractical. This disagreement exposed deeper trust deficits between the two powers.

The Cascading Collapse of Arms Control

Russia’s withdrawal from the PMDA must be understood within the broader disintegration of the nuclear arms control framework that has accelerated over the past decade:

2002: The United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, enabling development of missile defense systems that Russia viewed as threatening its nuclear deterrent.

2019: Both nations withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty amid mutual accusations of violations, ending restrictions on ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

2023: Russia suspended participation in New START, the last remaining major nuclear arms control treaty, which limited deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems.

2025: Russia moves to formally withdraw from the PMDA, eliminating the final cooperative mechanism for reducing weapons-grade fissile material stockpiles.

This systematic dismantling leaves virtually no institutional framework governing the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals, which together comprise approximately 8,000 of the world’s 12,000+ nuclear warheads. The situation represents the most dangerous moment in nuclear relations since the height of the Cold War, with none of the communication channels and confidence-building measures that prevented catastrophe then.

Russia’s Stated Justifications: Unpacking the Rationale

Moscow’s official explanation cites “new anti-Russian steps” that fundamentally alter the strategic balance. While vague, this language encompasses several Russian grievances:

NATO Expansion: Russia has consistently opposed NATO’s eastward enlargement, viewing it as an existential threat. Finland’s 2023 accession and Sweden’s 2024 membership particularly alarmed Moscow, given their proximity to Russian territory and the strategic importance of the Baltic Sea.

Sanctions Regime: Western sanctions following Russia’s actions in Ukraine have grown increasingly comprehensive, targeting Russia’s defense industry, financial system, and technological access. Moscow views these as economic warfare incompatible with cooperative nuclear security.

Strategic Weapons Concerns: Russian officials frequently reference U.S. missile defense deployments in Europe, conventional precision-strike capabilities, and hypersonic weapons development as threats to Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

Perceived Inequality: Russia’s 2016 complaint that the United States changed disposal methods without approval reflects broader frustration about being treated as a junior partner rather than equal stakeholder.

These justifications blend legitimate security concerns with narrative crafting designed for domestic and international audiences. The timing—amid ongoing tensions over Ukraine, economic pressures, and ahead of potential U.S. political transitions—suggests strategic calculation beyond pure arms control considerations.

Global Implications: The Return of Nuclear Competition

The PMDA’s demise accelerates several troubling global trends:

Renewed Arms Racing: Without constraints, both nations can expand nuclear arsenals. Russia has already announced plans to deploy new strategic systems, while the United States pursues comprehensive nuclear modernization expected to cost over $1.5 trillion over 30 years.

Proliferation Risks: The loss of transparent, verified plutonium disposition increases risks. If weapons-grade material is not irreversibly disposed of, it could potentially be stolen, diverted, or used by other nations as justification for their own nuclear programs.

Third-Party Nuclear Powers: China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal, with U.S. intelligence estimating it could possess 1,500 warheads by 2035. The U.S.-Russia arms control vacuum creates space for China to avoid constraints while modernizing, and may encourage other nuclear-armed states to enhance their capabilities.

Erosion of Non-Proliferation Norms: The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) rests on a bargain: non-nuclear states forgo weapons in exchange for nuclear powers pursuing disarmament. The collapse of U.S.-Russia agreements undermines this bargain, potentially encouraging nuclear hedging or breakout by states like Iran, South Korea, or Japan.

Crisis Stability Concerns: Arms control agreements serve as crisis-management tools, providing communication channels and reducing uncertainty during tensions. Their absence increases miscalculation risks during confrontations.

Singapore’s Strategic Concerns: Small State in a Nuclear Shadow

While geographically distant from U.S.-Russia confrontation zones, Singapore faces significant implications from deteriorating nuclear relations:

Regional Security Architecture

Singapore’s security depends on a stable, rules-based international order. The breakdown of major power agreements threatens this foundation:

ASEAN Centrality at Risk: If great power rivalry intensifies, ASEAN’s ability to maintain centrality in regional security architecture weakens. Nuclear tensions between major powers could force Southeast Asian states into uncomfortable alignments.

South China Sea Tensions: Nuclear escalation risks in U.S.-China or U.S.-Russia relations could complicate already fraught South China Sea dynamics. If nuclear powers clash over Taiwan or other flashpoints, Singapore’s critical sea lanes become contested spaces.

Nuclear Weapons in the Region: The collapse of arms control may accelerate regional nuclear proliferation. If North Korea’s nuclear program remains unconstrained and other Asian powers (Japan, South Korea, Australia) reconsider their non-nuclear status, Southeast Asia’s security environment fundamentally transforms.

Economic Vulnerabilities

Singapore’s economy depends on global stability and open trade:

Trade Route Security: Approximately one-third of global trade passes through Southeast Asian waters. Nuclear tensions increase risks of conflict that could disrupt these vital arteries. Singapore’s port—the world’s second-busiest—would face severe impacts from any major power confrontation.

Energy Security: Singapore imports virtually all energy needs, relying on stable regional suppliers and global markets. Nuclear tensions could trigger energy price spikes, supply disruptions, or infrastructure targeting in conflict scenarios.

Financial Hub Status: Singapore’s position as a global financial center requires confidence and stability. Escalating nuclear risks increase market volatility, capital flight risks, and potential sanctions compliance complications as major powers weaponize economic tools.

Defense and Deterrence Calculations

Singapore’s defense planning must account for evolving nuclear dynamics:

U.S. Extended Deterrence: Singapore benefits indirectly from U.S. security presence in Asia-Pacific. If U.S.-Russia nuclear competition drains resources or attention from Asia, or if U.S. extended deterrence credibility erodes, Singapore’s security environment worsens.

Defense Modernization Pressures: Rising great power tensions may require enhanced defense capabilities, increased spending, and more sophisticated systems to maintain deterrence and defense in a more dangerous environment.

Cyber and Hybrid Threats: Nuclear-armed states increasingly employ cyber warfare, disinformation, and hybrid tactics below the nuclear threshold. Singapore must defend against these threats while avoiding escalation spirals.

Diplomatic Challenges

Singapore faces difficult diplomatic navigation:

Balanced Relationships: Singapore maintains relations with all major powers—the United States, China, and Russia. Intensifying nuclear competition pressures Singapore to choose sides, threatening its longstanding policy of not aligning with any great power.

Non-Aligned Stance: As a small state, Singapore has championed international law, multilateralism, and peaceful dispute resolution. The collapse of arms control undermines these principles, forcing Singapore to operate in a more anarchic international environment.

ASEAN Unity: Nuclear tensions may divide ASEAN members with different alignments and threat perceptions. Singapore’s diplomatic efforts to maintain ASEAN cohesion become more difficult as external pressures intensify.

What Singapore Can Do: Small State Agency

Despite its size, Singapore can take meaningful actions:

Diplomatic Engagement: Singapore can use its reputation for neutrality to facilitate dialogue, host negotiations, or propose confidence-building measures. Its chairmanship of various international forums provides platforms for advocacy.

Support for Multilateral Institutions: Singapore can champion strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reinvigorating the NPT review process, and supporting regional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Track II Diplomacy: Singapore’s think tanks and academic institutions can convene unofficial dialogues between nuclear powers, exploring possibilities for risk reduction when official channels stall.

Regional Cooperation: Singapore can work with ASEAN partners to develop common positions on nuclear non-proliferation, advocate for reducing nuclear risks, and strengthen regional crisis communication mechanisms.

Resilience Building: Singapore can enhance national resilience through diversified supply chains, energy security investments, cyber defense capabilities, and civil defense preparedness.

Looking Ahead: A Precarious Future

The formal withdrawal from the PMDA removes the final cooperative pillar in U.S.-Russia nuclear relations. What emerges is a more dangerous world characterized by:

• Unlimited Nuclear Competition: No constraints on warhead numbers, delivery systems, or fissile material stockpiles
• Reduced Transparency: No verification regimes or mutual inspections to build confidence
• Increased Accident Risks: No communication protocols or crisis management tools
• Proliferation Pressures: Other states may pursue nuclear capabilities in a more permissive environment
• Conventional-Nuclear Linkage: Lower thresholds for nuclear use in regional conflicts

For Singapore, this represents a fundamental shift in the global security environment. The relative stability of the post-Cold War era, which enabled Singapore’s remarkable economic development and strategic positioning, is giving way to a more volatile, multipolar nuclear competition.

The question is not whether Singapore will be affected—it will be. The question is whether Singapore and other responsible nations can slow this deterioration, preserve what remains of the arms control architecture, and build new mechanisms for managing nuclear dangers in a more complex, multipolar world.

The stakes could not be higher. As two nuclear superpowers abandon the restraints that have prevented nuclear war for eight decades, all nations—large and small—must recognize that nuclear risks are not distant abstractions but immediate threats to the stability upon which modern prosperity depends.

Singapore’s response will test the agency of small states in an era of renewed great power competition. The city-state’s ability to navigate these treacherous waters while maintaining its principles, prosperity, and security will serve as a model—or cautionary tale—for similarly situated nations worldwide.

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