The Paradox of Slower Growth Amid Higher Activity

Singapore’s Housing and Development Board (HDB) resale market has entered a critical inflection point in Q3 2025, presenting what appears to be a market paradox: prices are growing at the slowest pace in nearly five years (0.4%), yet transaction volumes increased by 1.7% to 7,221 deals. This seemingly contradictory trend reveals important insights about the shifting dynamics in Singapore’s public housing market and carries significant implications for various stakeholders.

Understanding the Deceleration

The Historical Context

The 0.4% quarterly growth in Q3 2025 marks a dramatic deceleration from:

Q1 2025: 1.6% growth
Q2 2025: 0.9% growth
Q3 2025: 0.4% growth

This represents the slowest growth since Q2 2020, a period marked by Circuit Breaker measures during the COVID-19 pandemic. The market has now experienced four consecutive quarters of moderated growth, signaling a structural shift rather than a temporary blip.

Yet remarkably, despite this cooling, the market has maintained 22 consecutive quarters of positive growth since Q2 2020 – the longest uninterrupted uptrend on record. This suggests we’re witnessing a soft landing rather than a market correction.

Key Drivers Behind the Slowdown

1. Supply-Side Relief

The government’s aggressive public housing supply push has begun to bear fruit. Approximately 30,000 Build-To-Order (BTO) and Sale of Balance Flats (SBF) units were launched in 2025, many in:

Attractive, mature locations
Already completed developments
Projects with shorter waiting times

This unprecedented supply injection has provided buyers with alternatives to the resale market, reducing the urgency premium that had been driving resale prices upward.

2. Affordability Ceiling

The cumulative 54.9% price surge since early 2020 has created a significant affordability gap. With resale prices having increased by 2.9% year-to-date (slower than comparable periods in 2023 and 2024), we’re seeing evidence of demand destruction at higher price points.

Sellers continue to seek record prices based on recent comparables, while buyers demonstrate increasing resistance, leading to protracted negotiations and more deal breakdowns.

3. Economic Uncertainty

Regional and global economic headwinds, including persistent inflation concerns and uncertainties around employment growth, have made buyers more cautious, particularly for big-ticket purchases like housing.

The Transaction Volume Puzzle

The 1.7% increase in resale transactions (to 7,221 deals) despite slower price growth reveals several important market dynamics:

Why Are People Still Buying?

1. Demographic Momentum

Singapore’s marriage and household formation rates continue to generate baseline housing demand. Young families cannot indefinitely postpone home purchases waiting for better prices.

2. BTO Wait Times

Despite increased supply, BTO waiting times remain substantial (3-5 years typically). For couples needing immediate housing or those who didn’t secure BTO flats in recent launches, the resale market remains the only viable option.

3. Price Expectations

Buyers may believe current prices represent relative value compared to potential future increases, choosing to enter the market now rather than risk further appreciation.

4. Upgrader Market

The 472 million-dollar HDB transactions in Q3 (a record high) suggest a robust upgrader segment. These buyers often have substantial proceeds from their current flat sales and are less price-sensitive.

Impact on Different Stakeholder Groups

1. First-Time Buyers

Positive Impacts:

Slower price growth improves affordability trajectories
Increased BTO supply provides alternatives at subsidized rates
Reduced FOMO (fear of missing out) allows for more deliberate decision-making
Better negotiating position with sellers facing extended listing periods

Challenges:

Despite slower growth, absolute prices remain at historical highs
The 54.9% cumulative increase since 2020 means entry prices are significantly elevated
Competition from upgraders with cash-rich positions remains intense
CPF grants and loan limits haven’t kept pace with price increases

2. Current HDB Owners (Non-Sellers)

Implications:

Wealth effect plateau: Home equity is still growing but at a slower rate
Reduced urgency to upgrade, allowing more time for family planning
Improved market conditions for those considering lateral moves (e.g., relocating to be near elderly parents)
More rational market reduces speculative behavior by neighbors

3. Sellers and Upgraders

New Reality:

Extended time-on-market for properties priced aggressively
Need to price competitively based on genuine market value rather than aspirational comparables
The 1,235 million-dollar flats sold in first nine months of 2025 (exceeding full-year 2024) shows premium segment remains viable
Mature estate properties continue commanding strong interest

Strategic Considerations:

Timing of sale more critical – waiting for “perfect” buyer becoming less viable
Property presentation and condition matter more in slower growth environment
Flexibility on price negotiation increasingly necessary

4. Retirees and Older Homeowners

Benefits:

More stable home equity for retirement planning
Monetization schemes (lease buyback, silver housing bonus) become more attractive
Reduced pressure from children to “cash out” at peak prices
More sustainable market reduces intergenerational wealth inequality concerns

5. Rental Market Participants

The broadly stable HDB rental market (59,001 flats rented, up 0.5% from previous quarter) suggests:

For Tenants:

Slower price growth in resale market may eventually translate to rental market
Current 0.5% quarterly rental unit increase shows limited supply expansion
Rental demand expected to soften amid economic uncertainties

For Landlords:

Rental yields remain attractive as price growth slows (improving yield ratios)
Tenant retention becomes more important
Competition from increased housing completions may pressure rents ahead

6. Government and Policymakers

Policy Effectiveness: The cooling represents validation of supply-side interventions:

The 30,000 BTO/SBF launches are effectively moderating resale demand
The upcoming February 2026 launch of 4,600 flats will maintain supply pressure
Market stabilization achieved without harsh demand-side measures (e.g., additional cooling measures)

Continued Priorities:

Maintaining build tempo to ensure sustained supply pipeline
Monitoring for oversupply risks in specific locations
Balancing affordability with maintaining home equity for existing owners

Broader Economic and Social Implications

1. Household Debt Sustainability

Slower price growth reduces systemic financial risks:

Lower loan-to-value ratios for new purchases
Reduced risk of negative equity scenarios
More sustainable debt-servicing ratios for households
Less household balance sheet vulnerability to interest rate shocks

2. Wealth Inequality

The 472 million-dollar flat transactions highlight a bifurcating market:

Premium mature estate properties continue appreciating
Secondary locations seeing more muted growth
Geographic wealth disparities widening between estates
Intergenerational wealth transfer implications (those inheriting prime properties gain disproportionately)

3. Private Property Market Spillovers

The cooling HDB market has complex interactions with private housing:

May reduce upgrader demand from HDB to private market
However, the 0.9% private market price growth (versus 0.4% HDB) suggests premium market resilience
The narrowing price gap between new and resale private homes (18.8% in Q3 from 25.2% in Q2) may attract some HDB upgraders to consider new private launches instead

4. Economic Growth Implications

Negative Impacts:

Reduced wealth effect dampens consumption
Lower residential investment reduces construction sector activity
Property-related services (renovation, furnishing) see reduced demand

Positive Impacts:

Improved affordability frees up household income for other spending
Reduced housing speculation allows capital reallocation to productive investments
More sustainable market reduces macroeconomic vulnerabilities

5. Social Stability

Enhanced Stability:

Reduced housing anxiety among young couples
More achievable homeownership goals support social cohesion
Less intergenerational tension over housing affordability
Reduced political pressure on housing issues

Remaining Concerns:

Absolute price levels remain elevated despite slower growth
Regional disparities (mature vs. non-mature estates) persist
Singles and lower-income families still face significant barriers

Market Outlook and Strategic Considerations

For Prospective Buyers

Optimal Strategies:

Increased patience is rewarded: Sellers facing extended listing periods will be more willing to negotiate
Focus on fundamentals: Location, condition, remaining lease – these factors matter more in balanced markets
Don’t wait indefinitely: While growth has slowed, the market isn’t collapsing. Those with genuine housing needs should proceed
Consider new launches: The 30,000 BTO/SBF units include attractive options worth evaluating versus resale

For Sellers

Critical Actions:

Reality-based pricing: Market comps from 6-12 months ago are less relevant; price to current market
Property presentation matters more: In slower markets, condition and presentation become differentiators
Flexibility wins: Be prepared to negotiate on price, move-in dates, and included fixtures
Timing is critical: Properties priced right can still sell quickly; overpriced units face extended marketing periods

For Policymakers

Balancing Act:

Continue supply expansion but monitor for oversupply risks in specific locations
Watch for signs of market distress that might require intervention
Consider targeted assistance for genuinely disadvantaged groups
Maintain focus on long-term sustainability over short-term fluctuations

Conclusion: A Healthy Recalibration

The Q3 2025 data suggests Singapore’s HDB resale market is undergoing a healthy recalibration rather than a worrying decline. The 0.4% growth, while the slowest in nearly five years, represents the 22nd consecutive quarter of positive growth – a remarkable run of stability.

The increased transaction volume (1.7% growth) despite slower price appreciation indicates the market is functioning: buyers can find acceptable value, sellers can achieve exits, and transactions are occurring at sustainable price levels.

For Singapore’s broader social compact built around homeownership, this cooling represents positive news:

Affordability is improving at the margin
Speculative excess is being dampened
The government’s supply-side interventions are working
Market stability is being achieved without draconian measures

However, challenges remain. The 54.9% cumulative price increase since early 2020 means absolute prices remain at historical highs. The 1,235 million-dollar flat transactions in just nine months of 2025 underscore the bifurcation between premium and mass-market segments.

As Singapore navigates economic uncertainties and demographic shifts, continued monitoring and calibrated policy responses will be essential. The Q3 2025 data suggests current policies are working – the key now is maintaining this delicate balance between affordability for new buyers and equity preservation for existing owners.

The market is cooling, but it’s a controlled descent, not a freefall – exactly what policymakers, and society at large, should hope for.

The Transformation of Upfront Property Costs: A Comparative Analysis of Conventional Closing Cost Models and Singapore’s Fiscal Intervention Framework

Abstract

The conventional global real estate financing model dictates that homebuyers must budget for a down payment plus an additional 2% to 6% of the loan amount to cover miscellaneous closing costs (C.C.). This guideline is rooted in service-based charges like origination fees, title insurance, and appraisal expenses. This paper argues that this widely accepted 2-6% metric is rendered obsolete and misleading in markets where macro-prudential policies heavily rely on fiscal intervention. Using the Singapore residential property market as a primary case study, this research demonstrates that mandated stamp duties—particularly the Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty (ABSD)—dramatically inflate upfront transaction costs, transforming them from administrative fees into powerful capital control mechanisms. While administrative costs in Singapore remain low (often 0.5% to 1.5%), the cumulative stamp duty burden can push total initial cash outlay for certain buyer profiles (e.g., non-resident investors) to levels exceeding 60% of the property value, fundamentally shifting the barriers to entry from creditworthiness to immediate liquidity.

Introduction

Residential real estate acquisition involves two primary financial hurdles: securing adequate credit and possessing sufficient immediate capital (liquidity) for the initial outlay. Globally, this initial outlay is classically segmented into the down payment (a function of the Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio) and closing costs (C.C.). The widely cited industry benchmark suggests that closing costs typically range between 2% and 6% of the mortgage value, covering non-interest expenses essential for transferring ownership and securing the loan (e.g., insurance premiums, legal fees, and origination charges).

However, in high-demand, land-scarce jurisdictions, particularly those implementing rigorous cooling measures to counteract asset inflation and speculative investment, this conventional C.C. metric fails to capture the economic reality. Singapore exemplifies a market where government regulation has deliberately utilized transaction costs as a tool for market stability and prioritization of domestic housing needs.

This paper addresses the stark contrast between the global closing cost conventional wisdom and the reality of the Singaporean market. Section 2 establishes the foundation of the conventional 2-6% model. Section 3 details the structural components and regulatory drivers of the Singapore property financing environment. Section 4 quantitatively dissects the impact of Singapore’s stamp duties on total upfront costs. Finally, Section 5 offers a comparative analysis and discusses the policy implications of utilizing transaction taxes as primary fiscal instruments.

The Conventional Global Model of Property Financing

The 2% to 6% closing cost guideline is predicated on a stable, service-driven housing market where government taxation on transfers is minimal. In this model, initial capital requirements are calculated as follows:

$$ \text{Total Upfront Capital} = \text{Down Payment (1 – LTV)} + \text{Closing Costs (2% to 6% of Loan Amount)} $$

2.1. Components of Conventional Closing Costs

The components driving the 2-6% range are predominantly related to the legal and financial execution of the transaction:

Lender Fees (Origination/Underwriting): Compensation for processing and approving the mortgage.
Third-Party Services (Appraisal, Survey, Inspection): Costs associated with verifying the property’s value and structural integrity.
Title Services (Title Search, Insurance): Ensuring clear legal ownership and protecting the lender/buyer against future claims.
Prepaids and Escrows: Initial funding for property taxes and homeowners insurance required by the lender.
Government Fees: Minor recording and deed transfer charges (the lowest proportion of costs in this model).

Critically, the 2-6% model assumes that the most significant portion of the transaction—the LTV ratio—is the primary lever for risk management, while the closing costs remain relatively inelastic administrative expenses.

The Singaporean Ecosystem: Regulatory Intervention and Macro-Prudential Goals

Singapore’s residential property landscape is defined by extreme density, high foreign investor interest, and a deliberate government strategy to manage housing affordability through proactive demand-side interventions. Since the Global Financial Crisis, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and other regulatory bodies have introduced sophisticated measures aimed at cooling price growth and reducing debt risk.

3.1. Loan Limits (LTV)

While LTV limits exist globally, Singapore enforces highly stringent limits, especially against borrowers owning multiple properties. For a borrower’s first residential property, the LTV limit is typically capped at 75% for bank-issued loans (requiring a minimum 25% down payment). For subsequent properties, the LTV limit drops further, requiring even higher down payments, thereby immediately demanding significant liquidity.

3.2. Legal and Administrative Fees

The costs generally classified under the conventional definition of closing costs (conveyancing lawyer fees, valuation reports, and minor stamp duties) are highly competitive and transparent in Singapore. These administrative costs typically constitute 0.5% to 1.5% of the property purchase price, significantly lower than the global 2-6% benchmark derived primarily from non-tax-based expenses.

3.3. The Defining Factor: Stamp Duties

The overwhelming majority of upfront capital expenditure beyond the down payment in Singapore is channeled through statutory duties collected by the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS). These duties are fiscal tools used to manage market demand and are categorized as follows:

Buyer’s Stamp Duty (BSD): A mandatory, progressive tax applied to all property purchases, citizens and foreigners alike. As of late 2023, the rates progress up to 6% for properties valued above S$3 million.
Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty (ABSD): The primary macro-prudential intervention tool. ABSD is levied on specific buyer profiles, escalating dramatically based on residency status and the number of properties owned.

The ABSD rates were substantially increased in April 2023 to curb speculative behavior and ensure housing prioritization for citizens, fundamentally altering the calculation of upfront costs.

Quantitative Analysis: The Disparity in Transaction Costs

The conventional 2-6% guideline assumes closing costs are calculated against the loan amount. In Singapore, stamp duties are calculated against the purchase price (or the valuation, whichever is higher). This section compares the impact on different buyer profiles against a hypothetical $1,000,000 property.

4.1. Calculation Scenario: S$1,000,000 Property Acquisition

Assume a standard 75% LTV, requiring a minimum S$250,000 down payment.

Buyer Profile Down Payment (25% LTV) Buyer’s Stamp Duty (BSD) ABSD Rate (2023) ABSD Amount Total Transaction Cost (Non-DP) Percentage of Property Value
First-Time Singapore Citizen (FT SC) S$250,000 $\approx$ S$28,600 (2.86%) 0% S$0 S$28,600 (3% incl. admin) ~3.0%
Singapore Citizen (Second Property) S$250,000 S$28,600 20% S$200,000 S$228,600 ~22.9%
Foreign Buyer (Non-PR) S$250,000 S$28,600 60% S$600,000 S$628,600 ~62.9%

4.2. Analysis of Disparity

The data reveals a dramatic inflation of “closing costs” far beyond the conventional global benchmark:

For the first-time Singapore citizen: The total transaction costs (BSD + administrative fees) are approximately 3-5%, which remains within the lower bound of the standard global 2-6% rule. This indicates that Singapore’s administrative efficiency minimizes traditional closing costs.
For repeat buyers and foreign investors: The ABSD completely dominates the equation. For a foreign buyer, the non-down payment costs are 62.9% of the property value.

When considering the full upfront liquidity requirement (Down Payment + Transaction Costs), the disparity is staggering:

Buyer Profile Total Upfront Cash Required Percentage of Property Value
First-Time SC S$278,600 27.9%
SC Second Property S$478,600 47.9%
Foreign Buyer S$878,600 87.9%

In this extreme scenario, the foreign buyer must secure capital nearly 18 times greater than the conventional 2-6% closing cost guideline would suggest, rendering any calculation based on the loan amount or administrative services irrelevant.

Policy Implications and Fiscal Instrument Utility

The analysis demonstrates that in environments like Singapore, transaction costs cease to be mere administrative expenses and become powerful, demand-dampening fiscal instruments.

5.1. Reframing the “Closing Cost” Definition

The Singapore model necessitates a revised definition of upfront expenditure. Instead of viewing closing costs as service charges, they must be understood as Capital Control Taxes (CCT). The primary function of ABSD is not to fund government services related to the transaction, but to:

Reduce Foreign Speculation: By making the transaction immediately cost-prohibitive, foreign capital is deterred from entering the market solely for short-term gains.
Manage Domestic Demand: The tiered ABSD structure encourages prudent property ownership and discourages households from holding excess housing stock.
Liquidity Barrier: The policy shifts the main financial barrier to entry from long-term debt serviceability (captured by DTI assessments) to immediate, non-refundable liquidity provision.

5.2. Effectiveness as a Cooling Mechanism

Singapore’s regulatory approach provides a compelling model for global cities battling real estate inflation. While the 2-6% model focuses on preventing default (lender security), the CCT model focuses on preventing unsustainable price inflation (market security). The high taxation successfully segments the market, preserving the low initial investment requirement (3-5%) for first-time citizens while imposing a massive deterrent on highly liquid investors who might otherwise distort market prices.

5.3. Limitations of Conventional Financial Advice

The global financial advice to “Budget for both your down payment and an additional 2-6%… for closing costs” is dangerously inadequate when applied universally. A prospective Singaporean foreign investor relying on this benchmark would underestimate their required liquidity by over 90%. This underscores the necessity for region-specific financial literacy that accounts for regulatory-driven fiscal volatility.

Conclusion

The academic analysis of property transaction costs reveals a profound divergence between markets governed by minimal taxation and highly regulated jurisdictions like Singapore. The conventional notion that closing costs are a marginal 2% to 6% of the loan amount is based on a narrow definition encompassing only administrative and service fees.

In Singapore, the government’s strategic deployment of the Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty has weaponized transaction costs, transforming them into mandatory fiscal levies that prioritize national housing needs over capital mobility. While the administrative closing costs remain low, the inclusion of CCTs pushes the total upfront capital requirement for certain buyer segments to nearly 90% of the property value. This disparity demonstrates that for rigorous, price-controlled housing markets, external financial guidance must abandon the generalized 2-6% rule and instead integrate the specific, punitive costs of macro-prudential fiscal policy into accurate liquidity budgeting.

References (Illustrative Sources based on provided data context)
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). (2023). Review of Macro-Prudential Measures in the Housing Market.
Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS). (2024). Stamp Duty Rates and Computation Guidelines.
DollarBack Mortgage. (2024). Upfront Costs and Fees When Buying A House In Singapore.
PropertyGuru Singapore. (2024). Hidden Costs of Buying Property in Singapore (And How to Budget for Them).
Gyourko, J., & Rybczynski, M. (2020). Housing Supply, Affordability, and the Role of Regulation. Journal of Housing Economics, 47(1), 101783.
Yahoo Finance. (2023). The Hidden Problem: Closing Costs Beyond the Down Payment. (Basis for the conventional 2-6% analysis).

Singapore Mortgage Market Analysis 2025-2026: Applying US Predictions to Local Context

Executive Summary

While the US mortgage market faces challenging conditions with rates stuck in the 6% range, Singapore presents a markedly different landscape. Current Singapore mortgage rates are significantly lower at 2.5-2.75%, with further declines predicted through 2025-2026. This analysis examines how US mortgage predictions apply to Singapore’s unique market dynamics.

Current Rate Environment Comparison

United States

Current Rates: 6.75-6.79% for 30-year mortgages
Trend: Near 3-month lows but still elevated
Prediction: Rates to remain in 6% territory through 2026

Singapore

Current Rates: 2.5-2.75% (as of February 2025)
SORA Benchmark: 2.30% (current)
Fixed Rate Range: 2.42-3.50% for home purchases
Trend: Declining from 4.0%+ highs in late 2022

Key Differences in Market Dynamics

1. Central Bank Policy Frameworks

US Federal Reserve

Uses federal funds rate as primary tool
Limited direct impact on mortgage rates
Mortgage rates influenced by bond markets and economic factors
Rate cuts don’t guarantee mortgage rate reductions

Singapore MAS (Monetary Authority of Singapore)

Uses exchange rate-based monetary policy
SORA (Singapore Overnight Rate Average) more directly influences mortgage rates
Exchange rate appreciation/depreciation affects borrowing costs
More predictable transmission mechanism

2. Rate Predictions for 2025-2026

Singapore Forecasts:

3M SORA: Expected to drop from 2.9% to 2.2-2.6% by end-2025
Mortgage Rates: Could fall to as low as 2% by year-end 2025
Fixed Rates: Banks already lowering packages in anticipation
2026 Outlook: Further gradual declines expected

Key Factors Supporting Lower Rates:

MAS policy easing cycle initiated in January 2025
Inflation moderating toward 2% target
Economic growth stabilizing
Global rate environment turning more accommodative

3. Economic Context Differences

US Challenges:

Persistent inflation concerns
Tariff policy uncertainty under Trump administration
Construction cost pressures
Labor shortage issues

Singapore Advantages:

More stable inflation environment
Less direct exposure to US tariff policies
Efficient construction sector
Strong labor market with managed immigration

Housing Market Implications

Inventory and Demand Dynamics

US Market:

Inventory increasing, shifting to buyer’s market
New construction facing cost pressures
Advice: Buy now rather than wait

Singapore Market:

Controlled supply through government land sales
Cooling measures still in effect
Private property market showing resilience
HDB resale market relatively stable

Timing Considerations for Singapore Buyers

Immediate Term (2025):

Advantage: Rates trending lower
Consideration: Government cooling measures still active
Strategy: Monitor for Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty (ABSD) policy changes

Medium Term (2026):

Expectation: Further rate declines possible
Risk: Property prices may adjust upward as rates fall
Opportunity: Refinancing existing mortgages becomes more attractive

Mortgage Product Strategies

1. Fixed vs. Floating Rate Considerations

US Context: Limited benefit from waiting for Fed cuts Singapore Context:

Floating rates (SORA-linked) likely to benefit from continued declines
Fixed rates currently attractive for risk-averse borrowers
Flexibility to refinance as rates drop further

2. Refinancing Opportunities

US Market: Refinancing recommended if rates drop in 2026-2027 Singapore Market:

Current environment already favorable for refinancing
Borrowers with rates above 3% should consider immediate action
Strong refinancing market expected through 2025-2026

Risk Factors and Considerations

Global Economic Risks

US Economic Policy: Tariff impacts on global trade
Inflation Resurgence: Could halt rate decline trajectory
Geopolitical Tensions: May affect global financial markets

Singapore-Specific Risks

Property Cooling Measures: Government may adjust policies
External Demand: Economic conditions in key markets (China, US)
Currency Fluctuations: SGD strength affecting competitiveness

Strategic Recommendations

For Homebuyers

First-Time Buyers:

Consider purchasing in 2025 as rates continue declining
Evaluate both fixed and floating rate options
Factor in government grants and schemes

Upgraders:

Timing depends on ABSD implications
Consider refinancing existing property first
Monitor for potential policy changes

Investors:

Current rate environment more favorable than 2022-2023
Rental yields may improve as rates decline
Watch for changes in investment property taxes

For Existing Homeowners

Refinancing Strategy:

Immediate action recommended for loans above 3%
Consider hybrid products for rate protection
Monitor SORA trends for optimal timing

Rate Protection:

Consider rate caps or collars for floating rate loans
Evaluate fixed rate conversion options
Maintain flexibility for future rate declines

Conclusion

Unlike the US market where experts advise buying now due to limited rate improvement prospects, Singapore’s mortgage market presents a more optimistic scenario. With rates expected to continue declining through 2025-2026, Singapore borrowers have more flexibility in timing decisions.

The key difference lies in the transmission mechanisms: while US mortgage rates may not respond to Fed cuts, Singapore’s SORA-linked rates have a more direct relationship with monetary policy. This creates genuine opportunities for both new borrowers and existing homeowners to benefit from the easing cycle.

Key Takeaway: Singapore’s mortgage market dynamics suggest that while immediate action isn’t as urgent as in the US, the current environment presents attractive opportunities that may become even more favorable through 2026. The strategy should focus on positioning for further rate declines rather than rushing to lock in current rates.

Singapore Mortgage Market Analysis 2025-2026: Applying US Predictions to Local Context

Executive Summary