The Donroe Doctrine

by | Dec 5, 2025 | Uncategorized | 0 comments

Executive Summary

The “Donroe Doctrine” represents a fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy under President Donald Trump’s second term, officially enshrined in the December 2025 National Security Strategy. This doctrine revives the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine with a “Trump Corollary,” prioritizing Western Hemisphere dominance while potentially diminishing U.S. engagement in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The implications are profound for global security architecture, particularly for Asian allies who have historically relied on American security guarantees.

The term blends Trump’s name with the 1823 Monroe Doctrine and has been formalized through Trump’s December 2025 National Security Strategy, which vows to enforce a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine Toda Peace InstituteNewsweek. The original Monroe Doctrine declared that Latin America was essentially a U.S. sphere of influence, off-limits to European powers.

Key Concerns for Asia

Here’s the critical issue: The original Monroe Doctrine’s logic included that the United States would not interfere in Europe or Asia, with this principle prevailing in U.S. foreign policy for nearly a century American Enterprise Institute.

Critics argue the modern “Donroe Doctrine” has troubling implications:

  1. U.S. Retrenchment from Asia: Following Trump’s logic to its conclusion would mean withdrawing carrier strike groups from Asia and allowing China to fill the vacuum American Enterprise Institute. This represents a potential decline in U.S. engagement with the Indo-Pacific region.
  2. Focus on the Western Hemisphere: The National Security Strategy prioritizes the Western Hemisphere first, aiming to keep it free of hostile foreign ownership of key assets while treating migration control as central to national security Newsweek.
  3. Strategic Withdrawal: Global engagement since FDR created the prosperous international system, and pulling back now would hand the wider world to Beijing 19FortyFive.

For Asian allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines—countries that depend on U.S. security commitments—this shift represents a concerning potential abandonment of America’s traditional role as a Pacific power, leaving them more vulnerable to Chinese influence.

Background: Historical Context

The Original Monroe Doctrine (1823)

President James Monroe declared that the Americas should remain free from European colonization and interference. In return, the United States pledged non-intervention in European affairs and Asia. This principle shaped U.S. foreign policy for nearly a century, contributing to American reluctance to enter World War I.

The Trump Corollary (2025)

On December 2, 2025, Trump proclaimed a new corollary stating that “the American people—not foreign nations nor globalist institutions—will always control their own destiny in our hemisphere.” The accompanying National Security Strategy formalizes this as U.S. policy, prioritizing:

  • Preventing mass migration (“Border security is the primary element of national security”)
  • Combating narco-terrorism and cartels
  • Keeping the hemisphere free of hostile foreign control of strategic assets
  • Maintaining access to critical supply chains and strategic locations

Current Situation Analysis

Policy Implementation

Western Hemisphere Focus:

  • Military deployment of carrier strike group USS Gerald R. Ford with approximately 15,000 sailors in the Caribbean under “Operation Southern Spear”
  • Bombing of vessels suspected of drug trafficking
  • Aggressive tariff policies targeting Latin American countries
  • Demands for control over Panama Canal, threats regarding Greenland
  • Renaming Gulf of Mexico to “Gulf of America”

Global Reorientation: The strategy explicitly calls for “readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere, and away from theaters whose relative import to American national security has declined.” This represents a departure from decades of U.S. policy emphasizing Asia-Pacific focus to counter China.

Asian Allies’ Reactions

Japan:

  • Cancelled July 2025 meeting of U.S.-Japanese defense and foreign ministers after Trump’s defense spending demands
  • Faces pressure to clarify role in potential Taiwan conflict
  • Continues anchoring to U.S. despite uncertainty, similar to response during Nixon’s 1969 Guam Doctrine
  • Concerns about trade tensions with 20% tariffs threatened

South Korea:

  • Publicly defended defense budget against U.S. pressure
  • Faces demands for higher payments to support 30,000 U.S. troops stationed in country
  • Pentagon considering restructuring U.S. Forces Korea to focus on China rather than North Korea, potentially drawing down 4,500 troops
  • Political instability (President Yoon’s martial law crisis) complicates response
  • 25% tariffs imposed despite close alliance

Australia:

  • Prime Minister Anthony Albanese publicly rejected U.S. defense spending demands
  • Pentagon reviewing AUKUS submarine deal, potentially requiring Australia to pay more and guarantee usage in Taiwan conflict
  • Concerns about abandonment if confrontation with China escalates

Philippines:

  • Notable exception: did not publicly express displeasure with U.S. demands
  • However, faces broader regional concerns about U.S. commitment
  • Direct implications from doctrine’s hemispheric focus potentially leaving Philippines more exposed to Chinese pressure

India (quasi-ally):

  • Concerns about U.S. reliability as strategic partner
  • Implications for Quad partnership viability

Chinese Strategic Opportunity

China stands to benefit significantly from U.S. retrenchment in Asia. Critics argue that following the Donroe Doctrine’s logic to its conclusion would mean:

  • Withdrawing carrier strike groups from Asian waters
  • Allowing China to establish dominance in East and South China seas
  • Ceding influence over critical Indo-Pacific trade routes
  • Enabling Chinese infrastructure and economic penetration throughout region without effective counterbalance

European Response

The strategy includes extraordinary language about European allies, warning of “civilizational erasure” and promising to cultivate “resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations.” Germany quickly rejected this, stating it does not need “outside advice.”

Problem Assessment

For Asian Allies

Strategic Vulnerabilities:

  1. Security Guarantee Erosion: Decades-old alliances now carry conditions and uncertainty
  2. Economic Coercion: Tariffs combined with defense spending demands create unprecedented pressure
  3. Chinese Assertiveness: All four major Asian allies face increasing Chinese territorial and economic pressure precisely when U.S. commitment appears weakest
  4. Taiwan Contingency: U.S. demands allies clarify Taiwan defense roles while maintaining its own “strategic ambiguity”

The Dilemma: Asian allies have no viable strategic alternatives to U.S. security guarantees when facing an assertive China. They must comply with American demands while fearing that meeting conditions may provoke Chinese responses without guaranteed U.S. support.

For Global Order

Systemic Risks:

  1. Power Vacuum: U.S. withdrawal from global leadership creates opportunities for Russia (Europe), Iran (Middle East), and China (Asia-Pacific)
  2. Hypersonic Missile Age: Unlike Monroe’s era when oceans provided months of warning, modern threats cross distances in minutes
  3. Economic Integration: Globalization means events in Asia directly impact American prosperity and security
  4. Alliance Credibility: Transactional approach undermines trust in U.S. commitments worldwide

Short-Term Outlook (2025-2027)

Western Hemisphere

  • Continued military operations in Caribbean and Latin America
  • Aggressive enforcement of migration controls
  • Trade deals favoring U.S. interests with countries choosing alignment over China
  • Potential military interventions justified by drug war rhetoric
  • Four-tier Latin American response:
    1. Direct confrontation (Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia)
    2. Accommodation (El Salvador, Guatemala, Ecuador, Argentina)
    3. Regional integration efforts (CELAC members)
    4. Diplomatic compromise seekers (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico)

Asia-Pacific

  • Increased defense spending by Japan, South Korea, Australia under U.S. pressure
  • Accelerated regional integration excluding U.S.:
    • Strengthened RCEP implementation
    • Potential China-Japan-South Korea FTA
    • ASEAN centrality emphasized
  • Mini-lateral security arrangements (Quad under strain, bilateral agreements strengthened)
  • Technology and supply chain realignments away from U.S. dependence
  • Continued U.S.-China economic competition despite reduced military presence

Global Impact

  • NATO expansion effectively frozen
  • Middle East engagement reduced (except Israel security)
  • Africa deprioritized except for critical minerals access
  • Multilateral institutions weakened in favor of bilateral transactional relationships

Short-Term Solutions

For Asian Allies

Immediate Actions:

  1. Defense Autonomy: Accelerate indigenous defense capabilities
    • Japan: Expand counter-strike capabilities, increase defense budget beyond 2% GDP
    • South Korea: Advance domestic weapons production, strengthen missile defense
    • Australia: Develop sovereign defense industrial base, expedite submarine program
  2. Economic Hedging:
    • Diversify trade relationships within Asia-Pacific
    • Strengthen ASEAN+3 economic cooperation
    • Negotiate bilateral trade deals independent of U.S.
    • Reduce supply chain vulnerabilities to both U.S. and China
  3. Diplomatic Flexibility:
    • Maintain alliance with U.S. while building regional alternatives
    • Increase Japan-South Korea cooperation despite historical tensions
    • Engage ASEAN as collective counterweight
    • Develop crisis communication channels with China
  4. Coalition Building:
    • Strengthen bilateral security partnerships (Japan-Australia, Japan-South Korea)
    • Enhance trilateral frameworks that don’t require U.S. leadership
    • Support ASEAN-led security architecture
    • Maintain Quad but develop backup options

For United States

Policy Recalibrations:

  1. Strategic Clarity: Clearly communicate non-negotiable security commitments to prevent miscalculation by China
  2. Burden-Sharing Reform: Negotiate sustainable cost-sharing arrangements that don’t undermine alliance foundations
  3. Economic Incentives: Offer alternatives to Chinese Belt and Road Initiative investments
  4. Integrated Strategy: Coordinate Western Hemisphere and Asia-Pacific policies rather than treating them as zero-sum choices

For International Community

  1. Regional Security Mechanisms: Strengthen ASEAN-centered security dialogue
  2. Economic Integration: Accelerate RCEP implementation, explore additional free trade frameworks
  3. Crisis Management: Establish protocols for managing U.S.-China tensions without U.S. mediation
  4. Multilateral Cooperation: Maintain UN, WTO, and other institutions despite U.S. withdrawal from leadership

Long-Term Outlook (2027-2035)

Scenario 1: Strategic Rebalancing (Optimistic)

Assumptions:

  • U.S. recognizes limits of hemisphere-only focus
  • China overreaches, creating regional backlash
  • Asian allies successfully increase defense capabilities
  • Economic interdependence prevents major conflicts

Outcomes:

  • Modified alliance structure with more equal burden-sharing
  • U.S. maintains reduced but credible presence in Asia-Pacific
  • Regional security architecture emerges with ASEAN at center
  • China contained through collective action rather than U.S. dominance
  • Western Hemisphere stabilizes with effective counter-drug operations
  • Global order becomes multipolar but relatively stable

Scenario 2: Chinese Century (Pessimistic)

Assumptions:

  • U.S. completes withdrawal from Asia-Pacific leadership
  • Asian allies cannot fill security vacuum independently
  • China successfully employs economic and military coercion
  • Taiwan absorbed through pressure or force without U.S. intervention

Outcomes:

  • Chinese sphere of influence extends throughout East and Southeast Asia
  • Japan, South Korea forced into accommodation with Beijing
  • U.S. trade routes through South China Sea subject to Chinese control
  • Global economic system fragments into competing blocs
  • Russian dominance in Europe, Iranian hegemony in Middle East
  • Threats to U.S. homeland increase despite hemisphere focus
  • Democratic governance under pressure throughout Indo-Pacific

Scenario 3: Fragmented Multipolarity (Realistic)

Assumptions:

  • U.S. engagement remains inconsistent and transactional
  • China continues rise but faces internal economic challenges
  • Regional powers develop meaningful but limited autonomy
  • Multiple crises create unpredictable security environment

Outcomes:

  • Patchwork of overlapping security arrangements without clear leader
  • Frequent crises requiring ad-hoc crisis management
  • Economic regionalization with U.S. excluded from some arrangements
  • Arms races in Asia-Pacific, especially naval and missile capabilities
  • Increased risk of miscalculation and accidental conflict
  • U.S. maintains influence but at significantly reduced level
  • Global governance institutions further weakened

Scenario 4: Regional Integration (Alternative)

Assumptions:

  • Asian nations successfully build independent security architecture
  • Economic integration accelerates beyond U.S.-China rivalry
  • Europe develops strategic autonomy simultaneously
  • Multiple power centers balance each other

Outcomes:

  • Asia-Pacific security guaranteed through regional collective mechanisms
  • ASEAN+3 framework becomes primary economic driver
  • U.S. remains important partner but not dominant player
  • Reduced risk of U.S.-China great power conflict
  • More stable international system with multiple poles
  • Innovation in international governance beyond Western models

Long-Term Solutions

Strategic Framework

1. Adaptive Alliance Architecture

For Asian Allies:

  • Transform bilateral alliances into network of mutual defense commitments
  • Develop “Asia NATO” or equivalent collective security mechanism
  • Create common defense industrial base for technology sharing
  • Establish joint military command structures for regional contingencies
  • Implement rotating leadership rather than U.S.-centric model

Implementation Steps:

  • 2026-2027: Form core security partnership (Japan-South Korea-Australia)
  • 2027-2028: Expand to include ASEAN partners and India
  • 2028-2030: Establish permanent secretariat and joint military planning
  • 2030+: Develop independent crisis response capabilities

2. Economic Sovereignty

Regional Economic Integration:

  • Complete China-Japan-South Korea FTA negotiations
  • Enhance RCEP to include more services and investment provisions
  • Develop Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank alternatives to World Bank
  • Create regional payment systems reducing dollar dependence
  • Coordinate technology standards independent of U.S.-China rivalry

Supply Chain Resilience:

  • Map critical dependencies and develop redundancies
  • Invest in semiconductor, rare earth, and advanced manufacturing capacity
  • Establish strategic reserves for essential materials
  • Create early warning systems for economic coercion

3. Technology Leadership

Collaborative Innovation:

  • Pool R&D resources for AI, quantum computing, biotechnology
  • Develop regional technology standards and protocols
  • Create Asian technology platforms independent of U.S. and Chinese control
  • Invest in semiconductor sovereignty (building on Taiwan, South Korea, Japan strengths)
  • Establish cybersecurity cooperation frameworks

4. Diplomatic Transformation

New Multilateralism:

  • Strengthen ASEAN centrality in regional security
  • Develop crisis management protocols with China
  • Maintain dialogue channels during conflicts
  • Create track-two diplomacy networks involving civil society
  • Build institutional memory independent of U.S. leadership

China Engagement Strategy:

  • Acknowledge China’s legitimate regional interests while defending sovereignty
  • Establish clear red lines through collective action
  • Use economic interdependence as stabilizing factor
  • Develop confidence-building measures for South China Sea
  • Create joint frameworks for climate, health, infrastructure challenges

For United States

1. Sustainable Global Strategy

Recognize Interdependence:

  • Accept that Western Hemisphere security requires global stability
  • Understand that Asian trade routes affect American prosperity
  • Acknowledge that technology development is globally distributed
  • Recognize climate, pandemic, and other transnational challenges require cooperation

Reformed Engagement:

  • Shift from dominance to partnership model
  • Focus on areas of comparative advantage (technology, finance, innovation)
  • Accept burden-sharing that preserves rather than undermines alliances
  • Develop consistent bipartisan foreign policy reducing uncertainty

2. Hemisphere Strategy Reform

Beyond Monroe Doctrine 2.0:

  • Replace coercion with investment in Latin American development
  • Address root causes of migration (economic opportunity, governance, security)
  • Partner with regional organizations (OAS, Pacific Alliance)
  • Compete with China through better offerings, not just exclusion
  • Respect sovereignty while maintaining security cooperation

3. Institutional Renewal

Multilateral Leadership:

  • Reform but don’t abandon international institutions
  • Create new frameworks addressing 21st century challenges
  • Bridge developed-developing country divides
  • Lead on climate, technology governance, pandemic preparedness

For International System

1. Governance Innovation

21st Century Institutions:

  • Reform UN Security Council to reflect current power distribution
  • Create regional security councils with real authority
  • Develop frameworks for cyber, space, AI governance
  • Establish mechanisms for technology transfer and capacity building
  • Design climate financing that doesn’t increase dependencies

2. Norm Development

New International Rules:

  • Define acceptable economic statecraft versus coercion
  • Establish principles for technology sovereignty
  • Create standards for intervention in cyber domain
  • Develop codes of conduct for space and maritime commons
  • Build consensus on AI, biotechnology safety and ethics

3. Resilience Building

Systemic Stability:

  • Reduce single points of failure in global systems
  • Create redundancy in critical infrastructure
  • Develop rapid crisis response mechanisms
  • Build early warning systems for conflicts
  • Establish protocols for managing great power competition

Risk Mitigation

Critical Risks to Monitor

Immediate (2025-2026):

  1. Taiwan contingency during U.S. strategic transition
  2. North Korean provocation exploiting alliance uncertainty
  3. South China Sea incidents without clear U.S. response protocols
  4. Economic crisis from simultaneous tariff wars
  5. Leadership changes in allied countries affecting strategic continuity

Medium-Term (2026-2030):

  1. Chinese miscalculation regarding U.S. commitment thresholds
  2. Arms race spiral in Asia-Pacific
  3. Alliance fragmentation if solutions not implemented
  4. Economic decoupling creating hostile blocs
  5. Climate disasters overwhelming weakened cooperation frameworks

Long-Term (2030+):

  1. Major power war through miscalculation
  2. Technological disruption (AI, quantum) creating new asymmetries
  3. Democratic backsliding in allied nations
  4. Irreversible environmental damage from cooperation failure
  5. New pandemics without effective global response

Mitigation Strategies

Confidence-Building Measures:

  • Maintain military-to-military contacts even during tensions
  • Create crisis hotlines and communication protocols
  • Conduct joint exercises on humanitarian, disaster relief
  • Share intelligence on common threats (terrorism, piracy)
  • Establish incident investigation procedures

Flexible Planning:

  • Develop multiple contingency plans for each scenario
  • Build in adaptation mechanisms as situation evolves
  • Maintain options for rapid course correction
  • Create feedback loops from implementation to strategy
  • Preserve relationships across political changes

Stakeholder Engagement:

  • Include business, civil society in policy development
  • Maintain people-to-people exchanges during tensions
  • Support independent media and research
  • Build constituencies for cooperation domestically
  • Create international coalitions of interest on specific issues

Conclusion

The Donroe Doctrine represents both crisis and opportunity for the international system. While it creates immediate risks through alliance uncertainty and potential power vacuums, it may also accelerate necessary transitions toward more sustainable, multipolar governance.

Success depends on:

  1. Asian allies developing genuine strategic autonomy while maintaining productive U.S. relationships
  2. United States recognizing limits of hemisphere-focused strategy and reengaging selectively but reliably
  3. International community building resilient institutions that function regardless of American leadership level
  4. All parties managing U.S.-China competition through frameworks that reduce rather than increase conflict risk

The next decade will determine whether the post-World War II international order transforms peacefully into something sustainable for the 21st century, or fragments catastrophically. The choices made by leaders in Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra, Beijing, and other capitals in response to the Donroe Doctrine will shape global security and prosperity for generations.

Recommendations Summary

For Asian Allies:

  • Accelerate defense autonomy while maintaining U.S. alliance
  • Build regional security architecture as insurance policy
  • Pursue economic integration independent of great power rivalry
  • Develop crisis management capabilities with China
  • Invest in technology sovereignty and innovation

For United States:

  • Recognize global interdependence even with hemisphere focus
  • Provide consistent, reliable security commitments to key allies
  • Compete with China through positive offerings, not just containment
  • Reform multilateral institutions rather than abandoning them
  • Develop bipartisan foreign policy consensus

For International Community:

  • Strengthen regional organizations and multilateral frameworks
  • Develop 21st century governance for emerging challenges
  • Build redundancy and resilience into global systems
  • Create mechanisms for managing great power competition
  • Maintain cooperation channels during political transitions

The Donroe Doctrine need not doom the international system, but successful navigation requires wisdom, flexibility, and commitment to cooperation from all stakeholders.