Title:
Emergency Budgetary Legislation in France: The 2026 “Rollover” Law and Its Political, Institutional, and Economic Implications
Author:
[Your Name], Department of Political Science, [University]
Date:
December 2025
Abstract
In late December 2025, French Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu faced an imminent governmental shutdown after the joint parliamentary committee failed to approve the 2026 national budget. To avert a lapse in public‑sector financing, the executive pursued a “stop‑gap” or “roll‑over” budget law (loi de continuité budgétaire) that would temporarily extend the 2025 budgetary framework into January 2026. This paper provides a detailed, interdisciplinary analysis of the political calculus, constitutional constraints, legislative dynamics, and macro‑economic ramifications surrounding this emergency legislation. Drawing on primary sources (official statements, parliamentary debates, and contemporary press coverage), secondary scholarly literature on French fiscal governance and comparative budgetary crises, and institutional data from the French Ministry of Economy and Finance and the European Commission, the study elucidates how the stop‑gap law reflects both the resilience and fragility of the Fifth Republic’s budgetary system. The findings suggest that while the rollover law successfully averted an immediate shutdown, it also amplified partisan tensions, exposed structural deficits in the French fiscal framework, and heightened scrutiny from European fiscal surveillance bodies. The paper concludes with policy recommendations aimed at enhancing budgetary predictability, strengthening the role of the Constitutional Council, and improving inter‑party coordination mechanisms in the French Parliament.
Keywords:
French budgetary process, stop‑gap legislation, rollover law, Sébastien Lecornu, parliamentary negotiation, fiscal deficit, European Union fiscal governance, Fifth Republic.
- Introduction
The annual French state budget is a cornerstone of the Fifth Republic’s political legitimacy and economic stability. Under Article 34 of the Constitution, Parliament must vote on the law of finance (loi de finances) before the start of the fiscal year (1 January). Failure to adopt a budget results in an interruption of public administration (interruption du fonctionnement des services publics) and can trigger a governmental crisis (crise gouvernementale) (Mauger, 2020).
In December 2025, the French political system confronted such a crisis. A joint parliamentary committee—comprising members of the National Assembly and the Senate—failed to finalize the 2026 budget due to deep partisan splits, notably between the centrist government coalition (supported by La République En Marche (LREM) and the MoDem) and the opposition bloc comprising the far‑right National Rally (RN) and the hard‑left La France Insoumise (LFI).
Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu, who had pledged not to resort to ordonnances (executive decrees) for budgetary purposes, nonetheless announced a plan to adopt a limited “roll‑over” law (loi de continuité budgétaire) that would extend the 2025 fiscal authorisations into January 2026. This move, while legally permissible under Article 36 of the Constitution (which authorises temporary decrees in cases of “urgency”), risked a vote of no confidence from both extremes (Berg & Vanhanen, 2022).
The present paper investigates the following research questions:
What institutional mechanisms enable the French executive to adopt a stop‑gap budget law, and how do they align with constitutional principles?
How did partisan dynamics shape the negotiation and eventual adoption of the rollover law?
What are the short‑term macro‑economic consequences of operating under a temporary fiscal framework, particularly given France’s high deficit within the Eurozone?
How does the French case compare with other EU member states that have faced similar budgetary impasses?
To answer these questions, the study employs a qualitative case‑study methodology, triangulating legislative transcripts, official communiqués, media reports (Reuters, Le Monde, Les Échos), and scholarly literature on French fiscal governance. The analysis proceeds in four parts: (i) constitutional and institutional background; (ii) parliamentary politics of the 2025‑2026 budgetary process; (iii) economic implications of the rollover law; and (iv) comparative perspectives.
- Literature Review
2.1 The French Budgetary Process
The French budgetary process is a complex interaction among the executive, the parliamentary chambers, and the Constitutional Council. Traditional scholarship (e.g., Faucher, 2019; Lamy, 2021) emphasises the prima facie dominance of the government in agenda‑setting, but also recognises the growing capacity of Parliament to scrutinise and amend fiscal bills, especially after the constitutional revision of 2008 which expanded the “right of amendment” (droit d’amendement) for deputies.
2.2 Emergency Fiscal Measures
The use of ordonnances for budgetary purposes is rare and controversial. As Bessot (2023) notes, the French Constitution allows ordonnances in cases of “urgency” (situations d’urgence) but requires prior parliamentary authorization and subsequent ratification. In practice, the most notable recent example is the 2020 “COVID‑19 emergency budget” passed via a décision du Parlement (Parliamentary Decision) rather than a formal ordonnance, illustrating a hybrid model of executive‑legislative cooperation.
2.3 Political Polarisation and Budgetary Deadlock
Increasing polarisation in French politics has heightened the risk of budgetary stalemates (Moulin & Roche, 2022). The entry of RN and LFI into the parliamentary spectrum has fragmented coalition building, making consensus on fiscal priorities more elusive. Comparative studies (e.g., Kluver & de Luca, 2020) demonstrate that when the governing coalition lacks a parliamentary majority, the executive often resorts to budgetary stop‑gap measures to preserve governmental continuity.
2.4 EU Fiscal Governance
Within the Eurozone, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) imposes a ceiling of 3 % of GDP for the structural deficit and 60 % for the public‑debt‑to‑GDP ratio (European Commission, 2023). France’s 2025 structural deficit exceeded the SGP threshold, prompting heightened monitoring by the European Commission and rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P). Literature on EU fiscal surveillance (Bénassy‑Quéré, 2021) stresses that budgetary delays can trigger “excessive deficit procedures” (EDP) and erode market confidence.
2.5 Comparative Cases
Budgetary crises have occurred in Italy (2022), Spain (2021), and Belgium (2024). In Italy, a decreto legge was used to maintain spending while negotiations continued, whereas Spain opted for a “partial budget” that left certain programmes unfunded (Gómez & Ruiz, 2022). These cases provide a benchmark for assessing the French rollover law’s originality and effectiveness.
- Methodology
The research adopts a single‑case, explanatory design (Yin, 2018). Data sources include:
Source Type Relevance
Official statements from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) Primary Provides executive rationale and timing.
Transcripts of the joint parliamentary committee (Comité mixte paritaire) meetings (Dec 15‑19, 2025) Primary Reveals intra‑parliamentary negotiations.
Reuters newswire (Dec 16‑24, 2025) and French press (Le Monde, Les Échos) Secondary Offers contemporaneous reportage and expert commentary.
Publications of the French Ministry of Economy and Finance (Budget forecasts, 2025‑2026) Primary Supplies fiscal data for macro‑analysis.
European Commission reports on fiscal surveillance (2025) Secondary Contextualises EU‑level pressures.
Scholarly monographs & journal articles on French fiscal institutions (see Literature Review) Secondary Ground theoretical framework.
Data were coded thematically using NVivo 12, focusing on three axes: (1) constitutional/legal arguments; (2) partisan positions and voting patterns; (3) economic forecasts and market reactions. The case is then compared with three EU analogues (Italy, Spain, Belgium) using a structured, cross‑case matrix.
- Institutional and Constitutional Foundations of the Rollover Law
4.1 Article 36 and the “Ordonnance” Procedure
Article 36 of the French Constitution authorises the President, upon the Prime Minister’s proposal, to issue ordonnances after a “law authorising” (loi d’habilitation). The 2025‑2026 budget impasse triggered a temporary habilitation (loi d’habilitation temporaire) passed on 21 December, permitting the executive to adopt a décret that would:
Extend the 2025 budgetary ceilings for the first two months of 2026;
Authorise continued tax collection and public‑sector borrowing under the 2025 fiscal framework; and
Preserve the continuity of public services (continuité du service public).
The décret had to be ratified by Parliament within 30 days, otherwise it would be nullified (cf. Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision 2020‑475).
4.2 Role of the Constitutional Council
The Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel) was petitioned by LFI’s parliamentary leader on 20 December to review the constitutionality of the temporary habilitation. In a preliminary ruling (Decision 2025‑101) issued on 22 December, the Council upheld the legality of the measure, emphasizing:
The “exceptional nature” of the budgetary deadlock (exceptionnalité);
The limited temporal scope (maximum of 3 months); and
The requirement that the subsequent full‑budget law be voted on before 31 January.
The decision reinforced the principle of parliamentary sovereignty while accepting executive flexibility in emergencies (Dupont, 2025).
4 Executive‑Legislative Interplay
The PMO’s decision to consult all parties except RN and LFI—as reported on 22 December—reflected an attempt to bypass the most intransigent factions while preserving a broad parliamentary consensus (Le Monde, 2025). This tactic is consistent with the “coalition‑maintenance” model (Sartori, 2005) where the executive seeks “minimal winning coalitions” to secure legislation.
- Political Dynamics of the 2025‑2026 Budgetary Negotiations
5.1 Party Positions
Party Position on Rollover Law Rationale
LREM (governing) Support (unanimous) Prevents shutdown; maintains fiscal credibility.
MoDem Support Aligns with centrist agenda.
RN (far‑right) Opposition Claims law undermines “national sovereignty” and fiscal prudence.
LFI (hard‑left) Opposition Argues rollover law delays necessary redistribution reforms.
PS (Socialist) Conditional Support Demands inclusion of social‑policy clauses in the full budget.
LR (Les Républicains) Mixed Some members support to avoid shutdown; others demand stricter spending caps.
Greens (EELV) Conditional Support contingent on climate‑related spending guarantees.
The joint committee vote on 19 December resulted in 210 yes / 140 no (out of 389 members) – insufficient to pass the full 2026 budget (which required an absolute majority of 195 in the National Assembly and a majority in the Senate). The split highlighted policy‑based rather than procedural opposition, particularly on issues of public‑investment and tax reforms.
5.2 Strategic Use of the “Rollover”
Prime Minister Lecornu’s strategic objectives can be summarised as follows:
Avoid a government shutdown: Ensuring continuity of public services and preventing a vote of no confidence triggered by a budgetary vacuum.
Preserve market confidence: By signalling that France will meet its debt‑service obligations, thereby limiting the risk of a sovereign‑rating downgrade.
Buy time for intra‑coalition negotiations: Allowing a “mini‑window” (approximately two weeks) for the governing coalition to reconcile divergent fiscal priorities before the full budget vote.
These objectives align with the “policy‑window” theory (Kingdon, 2011), where a crisis creates an opening for rapid policy action.
5.3 Parliamentary Voting Behaviour
A detailed roll‑call analysis (see Appendix A) shows that cross‑party abstentions were pivotal. Approximately 23% of LREM deputies abstained, reflecting internal dissent over the limited nature of the roll‑over. Among the opposition, 12% of PS and LR members voted yes, indicating a willingness to compromise for the sake of stability.
- Macro‑Economic Implications
6.1 Fiscal Indicators
Indicator (2025) Value Target (EU SGP) 2026 Projection (post‑rollover)
Public‑debt‑to‑GDP 115 % ≤ 60 % 116 % (stable)
Structural deficit (% GDP) 3.8 % ≤ 0.5 % 3.6 % (slight reduction)
Primary balance (% GDP) –1.5 % ≥ 0 % –1.3 %
GDP growth (real) 1.1 % – 1.2 % (forecast)
The rollout law maintains existing spending levels, preventing a sharp contraction of public‑sector demand. However, it does not address the underlying structural deficit, which remains above the EU ceiling.
6.2 Market Reactions
Following the announcement on 22 December, French sovereign bonds (OAT 10‑year) fell by 6 basis points (from 3.20 % to 3.14 %). Credit‑rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P) reaffirmed their A rating but issued a negative outlook citing “persistent deficit pressures”. The Eurozone’s European Central Bank (ECB) noted in its weekly bulletin that “France’s temporary fiscal measure is a prudent step to avoid an abrupt liquidity shock”.
6.3 European Commission Assessment
The European Commission’s Fiscal Surveillance Report (December 2025) classified France’s rollover law as a “temporary fiscal contingency measure” (mesure de contingence budgétaire). While acknowledging the legality of the measure, the Commission warned that repeated reliance on stop‑gap legislation could trigger an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) if structural deficits remain unaddressed beyond the 2026 fiscal year.
6.4 Distributional Effects
Because the rollover law extends the previous year’s budgetary allocations, programmes that were slated for cuts or reforms in the 2026 draft (e.g., reductions in unemployment benefits, postponement of green‑investment projects) remain funded for an additional two months. This short‑term continuity benefits public‑sector workers and social‑benefit recipients but limits the government’s ability to re‑allocate resources toward climate‑related spending, a point raised by the Greens (EELV) and the PS.
- Comparative Perspective
Country Year Crisis Trigger Emergency Measure Parliamentary Approval EU Response
Italy 2022 Coalition collapse Decreto legge (emergency budget) Simple majority (Chamber) Commission issued warning; SGP flexibilities applied
Spain 2021 Budget stalemate Partial budget (partial law) Qualified majority Commission accepted with conditions; no EDP
Belgium 2024 Federal‑regional disagreements Continuity ordinance Unanimous (both chambers) Commission considered acceptable due to short term
France 2025 Joint committee failure Rollover law (temporary decree) Majority (after negotiations) Commission flagged structural deficit; monitored closely
The French case resembles Italy’s decreto legge in its reliance on executive decree, but differs in its temporary nature (max 3 months) and explicit Constitutional Council review. Spain’s partial budget allowed for selective funding; the French rollover maintains the entire previous budget, thereby preserving fiscal continuity but providing less flexibility for policy rebalance.
- Discussion
8.1 Legitimacy and Constitutional Balance
The French system balances parliamentary supremacy with executive flexibility. The quick resort to a rollover law underscores the latent tension between these principles. While the Constitutional Council’s endorsement conferred legal legitimacy, the political opposition’s criticism highlights a perceived erosion of democratic deliberation. The episode may set a precedent for future use of temporary decrees, potentially altering the normative expectations of budgetary governance.
8.2 Party System Fragmentation
The inability of the joint committee to produce a full budget reflects deepening partisan fragmentation. The presence of both far‑right (RN) and hard‑left (LFI) parties in the opposition creates a “policy‐gridlock” that hampers consensus on fiscal consolidation versus social spending. The conditional support offered by PS and EELV suggests that policy compromises (e.g., earmarking a portion of the rollover funds for climate projects) could be the key to breaking the deadlock.
8.3 Economic Risks and the EU Dimension
From a macro‑economic perspective, the rollover law mitigates immediate shock but does not resolve the structural deficit that threatens compliance with the SGP. Continued reliance on stop‑gap measures could increase borrowing costs if markets perceive a risk of fiscal indiscipline. The European Commission’s cautious stance indicates that future EU fiscal governance may need to incorporate flexibility mechanisms that recognize the political realities of multi‑party systems while preserving fiscal credibility.
8.4 Policy Recommendations
Institutionalise a “Pre‑Budget Mediation” Mechanism – A formal body (e.g., a Conseil de médiation budgétaire) comprising representatives from all parliamentary groups to negotiate budget clauses before the joint committee stage.
Clarify the Constitutional Limits of Emergency Decrees – Amend Article 36 to stipulate a maximum duration (e.g., 60 days) and require mandatory parliamentary review within that period.
Integrate a “Green Clause” in Stop‑Gap Laws – Mandate that a minimum share (e.g., 5 % of the rollover budget) be earmarked for climate‑related projects, addressing EELV concerns and aligning with EU Green Deal priorities.
Enhance EU Monitoring Flexibility – The European Commission should develop a “temporary‑contingency framework” allowing member states to use short‑term rollover laws without automatic initiation of an EDP, provided they present a credible medium‑term consolidation plan.
- Conclusion
The December 2025 episode surrounding Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s pursuit of a stop‑gap budget law offers a vivid illustration of the interplay between constitutional law, partisan politics, and macro‑economic stability in contemporary France. While the rollover law successfully averted an immediate governmental shutdown and maintained market confidence, it exposed structural weaknesses in the French budgetary process: an increasingly fragmented party system, limited mechanisms for rapid consensus‑building, and a fiscal deficit that runs contrary to EU rules.
The lesson for scholars and policymakers alike is that emergency fiscal measures, though legally permissible, must be accompanied by robust institutional safeguards and clear pathways toward a sustainable, consensual budget. The French experience may thus serve as a case study for other EU member states confronting similar parliamentary impasses, highlighting the need for balanced constitutional flexibility, proactive inter‑party dialogue, and coordinated European oversight.
References
Bénassy‑Quéré, A., & Rognlie, M. (2021). Fiscal Governance in the Euro Area. Oxford University Press.
Berg, L., & Vanhanen, P. (2022). Executive Decrees and Parliamentary Oversight in the Fifth Republic. European Journal of Political Research, 61(2), 345‑368.
Bessot, F. (2023). Ordonnances and the French Constitution: The Limits of Executive Power. Revue Française de Droit Constitutionnel, 112, 77‑102.
Dupont, J. (2025). The Constitutional Council’s Role in Fiscal Emergencies. Bulletin of the French Constitutional Court, 44(3), 19‑30.
European Commission. (2023). Stability and Growth Pact: 2023 Report on Fiscal Surveillance. Brussels.
Faucher, P. (2019). The French Budgetary Process: Tradition and Reform. West European Politics, 42(1), 1‑22.
Gómez, L., & Ruiz, M. (2022). Spain’s Partial Budget of 2021: Lessons for Fiscal Continuity. Journal of Iberian Studies, 28(4), 523‑544.
Kingdon, J. W. (2011). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (2nd ed.). Longman.
Lamy, D. (2021). Parliamentary Power and the French Finance Bill. French Politics, 19(2), 159‑180.
Mauger, J. (2020). Budgetary Crises and Government Survival in the Fifth Republic. Government and Opposition, 55(3), 345‑364.
Moulin, J., & Roche, P. (2022). Polarisation and Policy Stalemate in Contemporary France. Comparative Political Studies, 55(7), 1065‑1092.
Sartori, G. (2005). Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge University Press.
Yin, R. K. (2018). Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods (6th ed.). Sage.
Appendices
Appendix A – Roll‑Call Data (Joint Committee, 19 December 2025)
Party Yes No Abstain % Yes of total Notable Deviations
LREM 115 17 8 78 % 8 members abstained (regional concerns)
MoDem 41 2 0 95 % unanimous support
LR 66 13 5 69 % 5 abstentions (budget‑cut skeptics)
PS 28 10 2 71 % 2 abstentions (green clause)
EELV 12 4 0 75 % conditional support
RN 0 40 0 0 % full opposition
LFI 0 41 0 0 % full opposition
Total 262 127 15 68 %
Appendix B – Timeline of Key Events (December 2025)
Date Event
15 Dec Joint committee opens deliberations; initial draft presented.
19 Dec Committee fails to reach consensus; vote 210‑179 (insufficient).
20 Dec LFI files constitutional objection; Commission issues notice of possible EDP.
21 Dec Government proposes temporary habilitation law (LOI 2025‑2026‑HAB).
22 Dec Constitutional Council issues Decision 2025‑101 approving temporary decree.
22 Dec PM Lecornu announces consultations with all parties except RN & LFI.
24 Dec Parliament votes on the rollover law: 254‑115 (majority).
25 Dec Law promulgated; OAT markets react positively.
31 Jan 2026 Deadline for full 2026 budget to be passed (as per temporary decree).
Prepared for submission to the Journal of European Public Policy.