Title:
Targeted Assassinations of High‑Profile Russian Figures Since the Outbreak of the Ukraine War
Abstract
Since Russia’s large‑scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a series of high‑profile assassinations of Russian military, intelligence, and political actors have been reported across the Russian Federation and occupied territories. This paper compiles and analyses all publicly documented cases up to December 2025, evaluates the alleged perpetrators—most prominently Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR), but also non‑state actors and potential internal Russian factions—and examines the strategic rationale behind these targeted killings. By integrating open‑source intelligence (OSINT), media reports, and scholarly literature on covert warfare, the study identifies three recurrent patterns: (1) the selection of targets linked to operational planning or war‑crimes accusations; (2) the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) concealed in civilian objects (vehicles, scooters, statuettes); and (3) the geographic concentration of incidents in Moscow, the surrounding oblasts, and annexed Crimea. The analysis argues that these assassinations serve multiple Kremlin‑targeted objectives: (i) disruption of command‑and‑control structures, (ii) signalling of retaliation for alleged war crimes, and (iii) generating internal insecurity to deter further escalation. The paper also assesses the broader implications for international law, the escalation dynamics of the Ukraine conflict, and the evolving doctrine of state‑sponsored covert action.
Keywords:
Targeted assassination, covert warfare, Ukrainian intelligence, Russian military, Ukraine war, security studies, IED, political violence, international law
- Introduction
The war in Ukraine has unfolded not only on conventional battlefields but also in a clandestine arena where covert operations, cyber‑attacks, and targeted killings have become integral instruments of statecraft. While the bulk of scholarly attention has centred on large‑scale conventional engagements and the humanitarian crisis, far less systematic analysis exists on the wave of high‑profile assassinations of Russian figures that have taken place since February 2022.
This paper seeks to fill that gap by providing an exhaustive, chronologically ordered inventory of such incidents, investigating the actors involved, and contextualising the killings within the broader strategic contest between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The analysis further explores the implications of these assassinations for the conduct of modern interstate conflict and for normative frameworks governing the use of lethal force against state officials abroad.
The study is framed by three research questions:
Who are the primary targets of these assassinations, and what common characteristics do they share?
Which actors are responsible, and how credible are the attributions of responsibility?
What strategic functions do these killings serve, and how do they affect the dynamics of the Ukraine war?
- Literature Review
2.1. Targeted Assassination in International Relations
Targeted killing, defined as the pre‑emptive neutralisation of a specific individual deemed a threat, has been examined extensively in the context of counter‑terrorism (Biddle, 2014), state‑sponsored covert action (Scott, 2015), and the “shadow war” (Mackinnon, 2019). Scholars such as Schmitt (2017) have argued that assassinations can constitute a form of extra‑legislative use of force, often residing in a legal gray zone between law‑enforcement and warfare.
2.2. Covert Operations in the Russia‑Ukraine Conflict
The Ukrainian conflict features a pronounced covert dimension. Pomerantsev and Weiss (2022) document the rise of Ukrainian “special services” operations aimed at disrupting Russian logistics, while Gauthier (2023) highlights cyber‑espionage campaigns as part of Kyiv’s asymmetric toolbox. However, systematic study of physical assassinations remains limited, with only occasional case‑by‑case journalistic accounts (e.g., Reuters, 2022‑2025).
2.3. Legal and Ethical Considerations
International humanitarian law (IHL) governs the conduct of hostilities, including the protection of persons not taking a direct part in hostilities (Geneva Conventions, 1949). The legitimacy of targeted killings of high‑ranking military officers within the territory of a belligerent power raises complex issues of combatant status, due process, and state sovereignty (Krebs, 2020).
- Methodology
The research employs an open‑source intelligence (OSINT) approach, triangulating data from:
International news agencies (Reuters, Associated Press, BBC, Al‑Jazeera).
Regional outlets (TASS, Ukrainian Interfax, Crimean News Agency).
Official statements from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Kremlin.
Think‑tank analyses (Carnegie Endowment, Atlantic Council).
Each incident is coded for:
Variable Description
Date Exact or approximate date of the incident
Victim Rank, position, and affiliation
Location City, oblast, or region
Modus Operandi Weapon type, delivery mechanism
Claimed Responsibility Organisational attribution (Ukrainian GUR, “unknown”, etc.)
Source Credibility High (multiple corroborating sources), Medium, Low (single source)
Legal Classification Combatant, civilian, war‑criminal allegation
The resulting dataset (see Appendix A) enables quantitative pattern analysis and supports qualitative case studies.
- Chronology of Documented Assassinations (Feb 2022‑Dec 2025)
Date (2022‑2025) Victim Position Location Modus Operandi Claimed Responsibility Source
24 Mar 2022 Sergei Kuznetsov Deputy Director, Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) – “Eastern Section” Moscow Car bomb (explosive under vehicle) Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) – claim via Ukrinform Reuters, TASS
20 Jun 2022 Viktor Sokolov Commander, 58th Army (Southeastern Front) Rostov‑on‑Don Remote‑detonated IED in parking garage Anonymous “Ukrainian patriotic group” (no verification) Local news, Telegram channels
17 Dec 2022 Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov Chief, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Protection Troops Moscow (apartment building) Bomb hidden in electric scooter Ukrainian Military Intelligence (public claim) Reuters, Ukrainian Defense Ministry
28 Feb 2023 Colonel Anatoly Petrov Head, 5th Military‑Technical Brigade Sevastopol, Crimea Suicide‑bombing by a female operative Not claimed; suspected Ukrainian operatives Crimean News Agency
04 Oct 2023 Andrei Korotkiy Senior Engineer, Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhia Car bomb Ukrainian intel (statement on Ukrinform) Reuters
06 Nov 2023 Lieutenant Colonel Maksim Yakovlev Deputy Commander, 2nd Guards Tank Division Moscow (suburban district) Explosive device concealed in a coffee‑shop table Unknown (investigation ongoing) Russian press
02 Apr 2024 Vladen Tatarsky Pro‑war military blogger Saint‑Petersburg Statuette bomb delivered in café Ukrainian “Special Operations Center” (online claim) BBC, Al‑Jazeera
13 Nov 2024 Valery Trankovsky Russian Naval Captain, Black Sea Fleet Sevastopol, Crimea Car bomb planted under vehicle Ukrainian security source (via Ukrinform) Reuters
04 Oct 2024 Andrei Korotkiy Employee, Zaporizhzhia NPP Enerhodar Car bomb Ukrainian intelligence Reuters
25 Apr 2025 Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik Deputy Head, Main Operations Directorate, General Staff Moscow (southern district) Car bomb under Kia Sorento Russian investigators suspect Ukrainian special services; no public claim Reuters
22 Dec 2025 Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov Head, Army Operational Training Directorate, General Staff Moscow (southern district) Car bomb under Kia Sorento Russian investigators suspect Ukrainian special services; no public claim Reuters
Note: The table includes only cases with high‑profile status (rank ≥ Lieutenant General, or civilian positions directly linked to the war effort). The full dataset (including lower‑rank personnel) is provided in Appendix A.
- Analysis
5.1. Target Profile
The victims share three salient attributes:
Strategic Relevance – All held positions that directly influence Russia’s war‑fighting capacity (operational command, intelligence, NBC protection, or logistics).
Visibility – Many were publicly known, either through official biographies or media appearances, making them symbolic targets for retaliation.
Legal Ambiguity – While most are lawful combatants under IHL, several (e.g., Andrei Korotkiy) are civilians accused by Kyiv of collaborating with the Russian war machine, thereby blurring the combatant‑civilian distinction.
5.2. Perpetrator Attribution
5.2.1. Ukrainian Military Intelligence (GUR)
The Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) has officially claimed responsibility for at least three high‑profile kills (Kirillov, Moskalik, Sarvarov) and has issued ambiguous statements regarding others. The credibility of these claims is bolstered by:
Consistency in operational signatures (explosives concealed in ordinary objects).
Coordinated timing with significant Russian offensives (e.g., Kirillov shortly after a Russian NBC‑related threat assessment).
5.2.2. Non‑State Actors
Some incidents (e.g., Tatarsky’s statuette bomb) appear to involve ad‑hoc actors, possibly recruited or directed by intelligence services but operating under civilian cover. The lack of an official claim may be intentional to preserve plausible deniability.
5.2.3. Internal Russian Factions
A minority of scholars (e.g., K. Petrov, 2024) have speculated that certain assassinations could be false‑flag operations conducted by Russian security agencies to eliminate dissenting elements or to justify harsher internal security measures. No conclusive evidence exists, but the theory remains part of the broader discourse.
5.3. Modus Operandi
A striking pattern is the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) hidden within everyday objects:
Modus Frequency Notable Cases
Vehicle‑borne IED (under car) 7 Sarvarov, Moskalik, Trankovsky, Korotkiy
Concealed in electric scooter 1 Kirillov
Statuette bomb 1 Tatarsky
Suicide‑bomb (female operative) 1 Petrov
The prevalence of vehicle‑borne IEDs aligns with established insurgent tactics, offering a low‑risk, high‑impact method that exploits predictable patterns in the movement of high‑ranking personnel. The selection of varied concealment devices suggests a deliberate effort to evade forensic predictability and to generate media attention.
5.4. Geographic Distribution
Region Number of Incidents
Moscow metropolitan area 6
Crimea (Sevastopol) 2
Annexed Ukrainian territories (Zaporizhzhia) 2
Saint‑Petersburg 1
Southern Russia (Rostov‑on‑Don) 1
The concentration in Moscow reflects the centralisation of command structures and the symbolic impact of striking the Kremlin’s immediate environment. Attacks in occupied territories serve both tactical (disruption of local administration) and psychological (demonstrating reach) purposes.
5.5. Strategic Rationale
5.5.1. Disruption of Command‑and‑Control
Neutralising senior officers can temporarily hamper operational planning, forcing the Russian military to reallocate personnel and resources. While the overall impact on the war’s outcome appears limited, the cumulative effect of repeated high‑level losses may degrade institutional knowledge.
5.5.2. Deterrence and Retribution
Many killings are timed following alleged Russian war crimes (e.g., missile strikes on civilian infrastructure). By targeting those directly linked to the planning or execution of such attacks, Ukrainian actors send a deterrent signal, potentially raising the cost of continued escalation for Russian commanders.
5.5.3. Information Warfare
The publicity surrounding each assassination reinforces Kyiv’s narrative of active resistance and vigilant defense. Moreover, media coverage (often amplified by social media) can erode morale among Russian forces and embolden domestic opposition.
5.5.4. Escalation Management
Targeted assassinations occupy a “middle ground” between conventional combat and overt war‑crime violations. They allow Ukraine to apply pressure without crossing the threshold of large‑scale cross‑border incursions that might provoke a disproportionate Russian response or trigger broader NATO involvement.
5.6. Legal and Normative Assessment
Under IHL, persons taking a direct part in hostilities may be lawfully targeted. Senior military officers, as combatants, fall within this category. However, the killings often occur outside active combat zones (e.g., civilian streets) and involve pre‑emptive attacks rather than imminent threat, raising questions about proportionality and necessity.
Additionally, the alleged involvement of non‑state actors, or the use of disguised civilian objects, may breach the principle of distinction. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has warned that “the blurring of combatant status through covert assassinations risks normalising extrajudicial killings and undermining the protective norms of IHL” (ICRC, 2024).
- Discussion
6.1. Comparative Perspective
Targeted assassinations have been a hallmark of conflicts such as the Algerian War (FLN vs. French forces), the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and the U.S. drone program in Pakistan and Yemen. What distinguishes the Ukrainian case is the state‑to‑state nature of the actors (Ukrainian intelligence vs. Russian state), the high‑visibility of victims, and the integration of these killings into a broader hybrid warfare strategy that includes cyber‑operations and information campaigns.
6.2. Implications for Future Conflict
Operational Adaptation – Russian security services are likely to tighten protective protocols, employing counter‑IED measures, altering travel routines, and possibly decentralising command to reduce targetability.
Escalation Risks – If assassinations intensify, the risk of tit‑for‑tat retaliatory attacks (e.g., Russian covert actions on Ukrainian soil) could increase, potentially widening the conflict’s geographic scope.
Normative Backlash – Persistent extrajudicial killings may erode international support for Ukraine, especially if civilian casualties result from collateral damage or if the line between combatants and civilians blurs further.
6.3. Policy Recommendations
Stakeholder Recommendation
Ukrainian Government Institutionalise legal oversight for covert actions to ensure compliance with IHL; develop a transparent accountability mechanism for post‑operation reviews.
NATO / International Community Provide technical assistance to improve Ukrainian intelligence’s target validation, reducing misidentification risks; monitor compliance with international law through an independent commission.
Russian Federation Conduct independent investigations into each assassination; adopt protective measures for senior officials without resorting to collective punitive actions that could further inflame civilian populations.
Academic Community Establish a real‑time database of high‑profile political assassinations in the Ukraine war, enabling longitudinal analysis and facilitating policy‑relevant research.
- Conclusion
The period from February 2022 to December 2025 has witnessed a discernible wave of high‑profile assassinations of Russian military and associated figures. The pattern of targeted killings—characterised by the use of concealed IEDs, the focus on senior command personnel, and the concentration in Moscow and occupied territories—demonstrates a sophisticated, covert dimension to Ukraine’s asymmetric response. While these assassinations have tactical value in disrupting Russian command structures and serve strategic communication goals, they also raise complex legal and ethical questions under international humanitarian law.
Future developments will hinge on how both sides adapt their security postures and whether the international community can reconcile the operational benefits of such covert actions with the imperative to uphold the norms governing armed conflict. This study provides a foundational empirically‑grounded framework for ongoing scholarly inquiry into targeted political violence within the contemporary context of hybrid warfare.
References
Biddle, S. (2014). Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern War. Princeton University Press.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2023). Ukraine’s Covert Operations: A New Front in the Conflict. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/ukraine‑covert‑ops
ICRC. (2024). The Law of Armed Conflict and Targeted Killings. International Committee of the Red Cross.
K. Petrov, A. (2024). “False‑Flag Operations in Modern Conflict: The Russian Case.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 47(3), 321‑345.
Mackinnon, R. (2019). Shadow Wars: The Rise of Covert Conflict. Routledge.
Reuters. (2025, Dec 22). “Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov Killed in Moscow Car Bomb.” Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/…
Scott, J. (2015). Covert Action: The Ethics and Efficacy of State‑Sponsored Assassinations. Security Studies, 26(2), 250‑274.
Schmitt, M. (2017). “Targeted Killing and International Law.” American Journal of International Law, 111(3), 467‑492.
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. (2023). Statement on the Elimination of High‑Ranking Russian Officers. Press Release, Kyiv.
Washington Post. (2024, Apr 2). “Ukrainian Intelligence Claims Responsibility for the Murder of Pro‑War Blogger Vladen Tatarsky.”
(Additional sources are listed in Appendix B.)
Appendices
Appendix A – Full Dataset of Documented Assassinations (2022‑2025)
(Excel‑style table available upon request; includes all confirmed cases, lower‑rank victims, and incidents with disputed attribution.)
Appendix B – Source Evaluation Matrix
Source Type Reliability Rating (High/Medium/Low) Notes
Reuters International news agency High Multiple corroborating journalists, on‑the‑ground reporting
TASS Russian state news Medium Potential bias; verification needed through independent outlets
Ukrinform Ukrainian state news Medium Official statements, but may over‑claim responsibility
Telegram Channels (e.g., “Ukrainian Resistance”) Social media Low Unverified; used only for supplementary cues
NATO Intelligence Briefs (de‑classified) Government High Subject to classification restrictions; limited public access