A Fragile Ceasefire in Southeast Asia’s Backyard
When Cambodia and Thailand signed their second ceasefire agreement on December 27, 2025, the relief across Southeast Asia was palpable but cautious. After 20 days of the most intense fighting between the neighbors in years, including fighter-jet sorties, artillery exchanges, and air strikes that reached within 50 kilometers of Angkor Wat, both sides have agreed to lay down their weapons. At least 101 people have died, and more than half a million have been displaced.
For Singapore, watching from 1,000 kilometers away, this is far from a distant conflict. The crisis cuts to the heart of Singapore’s strategic interests, economic prosperity, and diplomatic future in a region where stability has long been taken for granted.
The Immediate Stakes: Travel and Safety
Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs moved swiftly, issuing clear guidance for Singaporeans to defer all travel to conflict areas along the Thai-Cambodian border. The message was unambiguous: monitor official sources, heed local government advice, and e-register with MFA.
This wasn’t merely precautionary rhetoric. Thai F-16s were conducting bombing runs deep into Cambodian territory, with ordnance falling dangerously close to major tourist destinations. The war zone spread from forested regions near Laos to coastal provinces on the Gulf of Thailand. For a nation where 2.15 million Thai tourists visited Cambodia in 2024, representing 32% of all visitors to the kingdom, the conflict transformed popular holiday destinations into no-go zones almost overnight.
The Economic Ripple Effects
While Singapore isn’t directly involved in the fighting, the economic reverberations are impossible to ignore. The conflict has disrupted one of Southeast Asia’s most important economic corridors, with implications that extend far beyond the two combatants.
Regional Trade Disruption
Border crossings between Thailand and Cambodia have been effectively sealed. Thai border trade with Cambodia plummeted by 99.9% in October 2025, a staggering collapse that has reverberated through regional supply chains. Markets that once generated 100 billion baht annually now sit eerily quiet, with only 30% of traders remaining at places like the Rong Kluea market.
For Singapore, which ranks among Cambodia’s top five RCEP trading partners alongside China, Vietnam, Thailand, and Japan, these disruptions matter. Cambodia’s total trade within RCEP countries reached $36.38 billion in the first 11 months of 2025, with Singapore serving as both a major investor and trading partner. Any prolonged instability threatens the intricate web of regional commerce that Singapore has helped build and from which it benefits enormously.
The Cambodia Connection
Singapore’s economic ties with Cambodia run deeper than many realize. As of 2024, bilateral trade between Singapore and Cambodia stood at $4.83 billion. More significantly, Singapore ranks as Cambodia’s third-largest foreign investor and the top investor among ASEAN countries.
The conflict threatens these investments. Cambodia’s economy, which expanded by 6% in 2024, is now projected to slow to around 3% in 2025 due to the border crisis, according to Mekong Strategic Capital analysis. The tourism sector, which accounts for a substantial portion of Cambodia’s GDP, has been devastated. Angkor Wat ticket sales from Thai nationals plummeted by 92% in July compared to the previous year.
When Cambodia’s economy stumbles, Singapore’s investments and business interests suffer. Companies operating in sectors from real estate to renewable energy face increased uncertainty. The recent visit by Prime Minister Lawrence Wong to Cambodia in July 2025, where both nations discussed renewable energy cooperation and carbon markets, now seems prescient. Those ambitious plans for regional energy connectivity and the ASEAN Power Grid face delays if conflict continues to destabilize the region.
Strategic Alternative Routes
Interestingly, the crisis has revealed Singapore’s strategic value as an alternative trade route. With land borders closed, Cambodian importers have been forced to reroute goods through maritime channels. Many Thai products that once crossed land borders now flow through Singapore’s Laem Chabang Port and other maritime routes to reach Cambodian shelves. Singapore stands ready to step into the gap created by conflict, though at a cost to efficiency and speed.
Even more striking, when Cambodia banned energy imports from Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam emerged as alternative suppliers. The conflict, while disruptive, has highlighted Singapore’s role as a critical node in regional supply chains, capable of pivoting when traditional routes are blocked.
The ASEAN Credibility Test
Perhaps no aspect of this crisis matters more to Singapore than what it reveals about ASEAN’s capacity to manage regional conflicts. For nearly six decades, ASEAN has promoted itself as a force for regional stability, built on principles of non-interference and consensus. The Cambodia-Thailand border clash represents the most serious test of that framework in years.
Malaysia’s Mixed Performance
Malaysia, as 2025 ASEAN Chair, deserves credit for stepping up. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim successfully brokered the first ceasefire in late July and has remained actively engaged. The establishment of an ASEAN Observer Team to monitor the December 27 ceasefire represents a tangible exercise of the organization’s collective security mechanisms.
However, the breakdown of the first ceasefire in early December, followed by three more weeks of intense fighting, exposed ASEAN’s limitations. Despite Malaysia’s mediation efforts, backed by both the United States and China, the warring parties continued combat operations right up until the final hours before the second truce took effect. Thai F-16s dropped bombs on Cambodian territory on the morning of December 27, just hours before the ceasefire began.
Singapore’s 2027 Challenge
This matters acutely for Singapore because, following the Philippines’ chairmanship in 2026, Singapore assumes the ASEAN Chair in 2027. The Cambodia-Thailand conflict will likely remain unresolved, requiring Singapore to navigate the same treacherous diplomatic waters that have challenged Malaysia.
The pressure will be immense. If the current ceasefire collapses like its predecessor, Singapore will inherit a crisis that threatens ASEAN’s credibility at its core. Success will require Singapore to leverage its diplomatic experience, maintain strict neutrality, and possibly broker innovative solutions that address the root causes of the conflict rather than merely suppressing its symptoms.
This is more than an administrative burden. For a small nation whose security depends on regional stability and the rules-based order, demonstrating that ASEAN can “clean its own house” is existential. If ASEAN cannot resolve disputes among its own members, how can it maintain centrality in an increasingly contested region where great powers vie for influence?
The Great Power Competition Dimension
The conflict has become a theater for broader geopolitical competition. The United States and China have both pursued separate diplomatic initiatives to end the fighting, though neither has yielded lasting results on its own. The fact that Malaysia’s mediation required “backing” from both powers underscores a troubling reality: ASEAN’s effectiveness increasingly depends on great power endorsement.
For Singapore, which has carefully maintained relationships with both Washington and Beijing, this dynamic is familiar but concerning. The nation has long argued for ASEAN centrality in regional security architecture, pushing back against any framework that would reduce Southeast Asian nations to mere proxies in a US-China rivalry.
Yet the Cambodia-Thailand crisis demonstrates how easily regional conflicts can become arenas for superpower competition. China dispatched special envoy Deng Xijun for “shuttle diplomacy” between December 18 and 23, while Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi scheduled a trilateral meeting with Thai and Cambodian counterparts in Yunnan province. Simultaneously, the United States maintained pressure and offered diplomatic support to Malaysian mediation efforts.
Singapore must watch this carefully. If every regional dispute becomes an opportunity for external powers to demonstrate influence, ASEAN’s autonomy erodes. The organization risks becoming a battleground rather than a bulwark against external interference.
Lessons from History: Why This Conflict Matters
The current crisis echoes painful historical patterns that Singapore remembers well. During the Cold War, Southeast Asia was divided into competing blocs, with anti-communist states aligned with the United States facing off against countries in China’s orbit. The division brought devastating consequences, from Vietnam to Cambodia to Laos, leaving legacies of unexploded ordnance, social trauma, and economic devastation.
ASEAN was founded precisely to prevent such divisions from recurring. Singapore, as one of the five founding members in 1967, helped build an organization committed to peace, dialogue, and regional prosperity. The decision to integrate Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam into ASEAN in the 1990s represented a powerful gesture of reconciliation and pragmatic cooperation.
The Cambodia-Thailand conflict threatens that achievement. Border disputes rooted in colonial-era maps and competing territorial claims may seem like bilateral issues, but they create openings for external interference and risk wider destabilization. When ASEAN members fight each other, the organization’s founding purpose is called into question.
The Border Dispute’s Deeper Roots
Understanding the conflict’s persistence requires acknowledging its historical complexity. The tensions stem from disputes over poorly defined borders drawn largely during French colonial rule of Cambodia. The 1907 Franco-Siamese map, which Thailand argues is inaccurate and unjust, has been a source of friction for more than a century.
Both countries claim ancient temples and surrounding areas, invoking historical grievances and national pride. These aren’t merely technical disagreements about boundary markers; they’re intertwined with domestic politics, national identity, and popular sentiment.
For Thailand, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has made a hardline stance on Cambodia a centerpiece of his campaign ahead of elections scheduled for February 8, 2026. The conflict has become politicized, making diplomatic compromises more difficult and military demonstrations of strength more appealing.
For Cambodia, which has suffered devastating losses including the displacement of over 120,000 people in border provinces, the conflict threatens economic progress and social stability. The return of an estimated 750,000 Cambodian migrant workers from Thailand would create a remittance shock of approximately $375 million, equivalent to 1.5% of GDP.
What Singapore Must Do
As the crisis unfolds, Singapore faces several imperatives:
1. Strengthen ASEAN Mechanisms
Singapore should work with Malaysia and the Philippines to develop more robust conflict resolution mechanisms within ASEAN. The current approach, reliant on goodwill and consensus, has proven insufficient. The organization needs enforceable commitments, clear consequences for violations, and independent monitoring capabilities that don’t require great power backing.
2. Prepare for 2027 Chairmanship
Singapore must begin planning now for its 2027 chairmanship. This includes building diplomatic channels with both Thailand and Cambodia, understanding the conflict’s nuances, and developing creative solutions that address root causes. Singapore’s reputation for neutrality and effectiveness will be tested.
3. Protect Economic Interests
Singapore should continue diversifying economic relationships within ASEAN to reduce vulnerability to any single bilateral conflict. The crisis demonstrates how quickly trade routes can be disrupted and why maintaining multiple channels for commerce is essential.
4. Advocate for Lasting Solutions
Rather than merely calling for ceasefires, Singapore should push for comprehensive solutions including:
- Permanent demarcation of disputed borders through neutral third-party arbitration
- Joint development zones in contested areas
- Confidence-building measures that reduce military tensions
- Economic integration initiatives that make conflict more costly than cooperation
5. Maintain Great Power Balance
Singapore must work to ensure that US and Chinese involvement in resolving the conflict strengthens rather than undermines ASEAN centrality. This requires active diplomacy, careful messaging, and a clear vision for what ASEAN-led solutions look like.
The Bigger Picture: Regional Stability at Stake
Beyond immediate economic and diplomatic concerns, the Cambodia-Thailand crisis matters because it tests a fundamental assumption about Southeast Asia: that this is a region where disputes are managed peacefully, where economic development takes precedence over territorial ambitions, and where multilateral cooperation prevails over bilateral conflict.
Singapore’s prosperity and security depend on that assumption holding true. As a small, trade-dependent nation without natural resources or strategic depth, Singapore cannot afford regional instability. The country has invested decades in building institutions, norms, and relationships that promote peaceful coexistence.
When neighboring ASEAN members resort to fighter jets and artillery to resolve disputes, those investments are threatened. If the current ceasefire fails, if fighting resumes, if the conflict drags on or expands, Singapore faces a Southeast Asia that looks increasingly like the Cold War era divisions it worked so hard to overcome.
Will the Ceasefire Hold?
That remains the critical question. The December 27 agreement includes important provisions: no weapons fire, no troop movements, ASEAN monitoring, and Thai commitment to return 18 Cambodian POWs if the ceasefire holds for 72 hours. Cambodia has agreed to resume demining operations and cooperate on combating transnational crimes.
Yet skepticism is warranted. The Thai defense minister characterized the initial 72 hours as a test of Cambodia’s “sincerity,” revealing deep mistrust. The previous ceasefire, brokered with great fanfare in October by Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim and US President Donald Trump, collapsed within weeks. Thailand’s military achieved approximately 90% of its tactical objectives before agreeing to the truce, suggesting they stopped fighting not from exhaustion but from achieving their goals.
Domestic political pressures in Thailand, where the conflict has become an election issue, may incentivize renewed aggression if the ceasefire shows cracks. Cambodia’s prime minister Hun Manet faces pressure to demonstrate strength and protect national sovereignty. Neither side has addressed the fundamental territorial disputes that sparked the conflict.
Conclusion: Singapore’s Stake in Regional Peace
For Singapore, the Cambodia-Thailand border crisis is more than a distant conflict between neighbors. It’s a test of ASEAN’s relevance, a challenge to regional stability, and a preview of the diplomatic landscape Singapore will navigate as 2027 chair.
The nation’s response must be multilayered: protecting citizens and business interests in the immediate term, strengthening ASEAN mechanisms in the medium term, and advocating for lasting solutions that address the conflict’s root causes in the long term.
Most fundamentally, Singapore must demonstrate that small nations committed to multilateralism, rule of law, and peaceful dispute resolution can still shape regional outcomes. If Cambodia and Thailand can find a path to lasting peace through ASEAN-led processes, it validates the regional architecture that Singapore helped build. If they cannot, if the conflict drags on or worsens, it raises profound questions about Southeast Asia’s future.
The next 72 hours will be critical. But so will the next 72 weeks, and the years beyond as Singapore assumes greater responsibility for regional leadership. The border crisis between Cambodia and Thailand is, in many ways, Singapore’s crisis too. How the region responds will define Southeast Asian security for decades to come.