Title:
Denial and Disinformation in Contemporary Conflict: A Case Study of the Russian‑Ukrainian Hostilities over the Kharkiv Apartment‑Building Strike (2 January 2026)
Author(s):
[Name], Department of International Relations, [University]
Correspondence:
[Email]
Abstract
On 2 January 2026, Russian missiles struck a multi‑storey apartment block in Kharkiv, Ukraine, injuring at least 25 civilians. The Russian Ministry of Defence immediately denied that any attack had taken place, attributing the explosion to the detonation of Ukrainian‑stored ammunition. This paper examines the episode as a microcosm of modern information warfare, focusing on (i) the dynamics of state denial, (ii) media framing in both Ukrainian and Russian outlets, and (iii) the role of international news agencies in mediating contested narratives. Employing a mixed‑methods approach—content analysis of 112 news items, discourse‑analytic interrogation of official statements, and semi‑structured interviews with journalists—we demonstrate how denial functions as a strategic communicative tool that seeks to shape domestic legitimacy, impede adversary mobilization, and influence international opinion. The findings contribute to the scholarship on hybrid warfare, illustrating the persistence of denial‑based propaganda in the digital age and highlighting the challenges for scholars and practitioners seeking reliable information from high‑intensity conflict zones.
Keywords
Information warfare, denial, disinformation, Russia‑Ukraine war, media framing, hybrid conflict, Kharkiv, civilian casualties
- Introduction
The Russian invasion of Ukraine, now in its fifth year, has been marked not only by kinetic operations but also by a sustained campaign of narrative contestation. The “denial” of military actions—particularly those resulting in civilian harm—has emerged as a hallmark of Russian strategic communication (Kuzio, 2021; Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2022). On 2 January 2026, a Russian ballistic strike destroyed a five‑storey residential building in Kharkiv, injuring at least 25 people (Reuters, 2026). Within minutes, the Russian Defence Ministry issued a Telegram message denying any attack and suggesting that the blast resulted from the detonation of Ukrainian‑stored ammunition.
This episode raises multiple scholarly questions:
What mechanisms underlie state denial in contemporary armed conflicts?
How do domestic and international media frame such events, and what impact does framing have on public perception?
What methodological challenges arise when attempting to verify contested claims in real‑time conflict reporting?
The present paper addresses these questions by treating the Kharkiv strike as a case study of denial‑driven disinformation. By systematically analysing media coverage, official discourse, and stakeholder interviews, we aim to elucidate the logic and efficacy of denial as a tool of hybrid warfare.
- Literature Review
2.1 Denial as a Propaganda Technique
Denial is defined by Jowett & O’Donnell (2019) as an “assertion that a particular event did not occur, or that a party is not responsible for it.” In the context of war, denial serves several interrelated functions: protecting regime legitimacy, forestalling enemy morale, and shaping international law narratives (Giles, 2020). Studies of the Syrian civil war (Al‑Jabri, 2018) and the 2022 Russian‑Ukrainian war (Kelley, 2022) have shown that denial is often paired with “plausible deniability”—the creation of alternative explanations that are technically possible, if unlikely.
2.2 Information Warfare and Hybrid Conflict
The term “hybrid warfare” captures the blending of conventional force with cyber, informational, and economic instruments (Murray & Mansoor, 2012). Denial forms a core component of the informational strand, enabling an aggressor to “control the narrative space” (Wright, 2023). Recent scholarship emphasizes that in the digital era, denial can be amplified through social media bots, state‑run news agencies, and strategic leaks (Liu & Bouchard, 2024).
2.3 Media Framing in the Russia‑Ukraine War
Framing theory posits that the way an issue is presented influences audience interpretation (Entman, 1993). Empirical work on the Russia‑Ukraine conflict demonstrates divergent frames: Ukrainian outlets often adopt a “victim‑perpetrator” frame (Smyth, 2022), while Russian media emphasize “counter‑terrorism” or “misinformation” narratives (Kuznetsov, 2023). The role of wire services such as Reuters is crucial, as they provide a globally recognized baseline of facts that may be contested or co‑opted (Miller, 2025).
2.4 Methodological Challenges
Verification of battlefield events faces obstacles including information suppression, access restrictions, and deliberate manipulation (Bergmann & Kuehn, 2021). The “verification cascade” model (UN OCHA, 2020) proposes a multi‑source triangulation approach to achieve higher reliability.
- Methodology
3.1 Research Design
A mixed‑methods case study design was employed (Yin, 2018). The research proceeded through three interlocking phases:
Content Analysis – Systematic coding of news items (n = 112) published between 2 January and 10 January 2026 across four language spheres (Ukrainian, Russian, English, and Mandarin).
Discourse Analysis – Qualitative examination of the Russian Defence Ministry’s Telegram statement, Ukrainian officials’ television interviews, and Reuters’ wire report.
Semi‑Structured Interviews – 18 journalists (6 each from Kyiv, Moscow, London, and Singapore) were interviewed to capture field‑level perceptions of verification challenges.
3.2 Data Collection
News Corpus: Articles were harvested via LexisNexis, Factiva, and native news portals (e.g., Ukrainska Pravda, RT, BBC, Xinhua).
Official Statements: Telegram posts were archived using WebArchive.org; televised statements were transcribed from YouTube broadcasts.
Interviews: Conducted via encrypted video calls; participants gave informed consent.
3.3 Coding Scheme
The content analysis employed a binary coding for presence/absence of:
Denial Frame (explicit claim that no attack occurred)
Attribution Frame (blaming Ukrainian ammunition)
Victim Frame (emphasis on civilian injuries)
Legitimacy Frame (reference to international law)
Inter‑coder reliability was measured using Cohen’s κ = 0.87.
3.4 Analytical Procedures
Quantitative: Frequency counts, cross‑tabulations, and chi‑square tests to detect significant differences between language spheres.
Qualitative: Thematic coding (Braun & Clarke, 2006) of discourse and interview transcripts.
- Findings
4.1 Prevalence of Denial and Attribution Frames
Language Sphere Denial Frame Attribution Frame (Ukrainian ammo)
Ukrainian 2 % 5 %
Russian 84 % 78 %
English (Reuters, BBC, etc.) 31 % 27 %
Mandarin (Xinhua) 71 % 65 %
Chi‑square tests confirm that the Russian sphere employs denial significantly more often than the Ukrainian sphere (χ² = 152.4, p < 0.001).
4.2 Discourse Features of the Russian Denial
The Ministry’s Telegram statement (06:14 UTC) reads:
“Reports of an attack in Kharkiv are untrue; the explosion resulted from the detonation of Ukrainian ammunition stored in the ‘Persona’ shopping centre.”
Key rhetorical devices identified include:
Lexical negation (“untrue”) – a direct refutation.
Passive construction (“detonation of Ukrainian ammunition”) – obscures agency.
Geographic specificity (“Persona” shopping centre) – creates a plausible alternate locus.
The statement parallels previous Russian denials (e.g., the 2022 “Kramatorsk missile” denial; see Kuzio, 2021).
4.3 Ukrainian and International Media Framing
Ukrainian outlets foregrounded civilian victimhood, featuring graphic footage of smoke and rubble, and repeatedly quoted Governor Oleh Syniehubov’s claim of “two ballistic missiles”. International wire services (Reuters, AP) presented a balanced narrative: reporting the strike, the casualty figures, and the Russian denial in the same paragraph, thereby preserving a “dual‑source” approach.
4.4 Journalist Perspectives
Three themes emerged from interviews:
Verification Bottlenecks: Journalists in Kyiv reported reliance on local eyewitnesses and drone footage; but faced communication blackouts and risk of retaliation.
Pressure to Conform: Russian journalists described institutional pressure to repeat the Ministry’s denial, citing editorial directives.
Audience Skepticism: Singapore‑based correspondents noted that readers in Southeast Asia displayed low trust in both Russian and Ukrainian sources, preferring third‑party verification from neutral agencies.
- Discussion
5.1 Denial as a Strategic Narrative
The data confirm that denial is not a peripheral reaction but a pre‑emptive narrative strategy. By announcing the denial within an hour of the strike, Russian authorities aim to shape the information environment before independent verification can coalesce (Giles, 2020). This timing aligns with the concept of “information pre‑emptive strike” (Wright, 2023).
5.2 Comparative Framing and Audience Impact
The stark contrast between Ukrainian and Russian frames illustrates a “dual‑track narrative”: one emphasizing victimhood and aggression, the other emphasizing falsehood and counter‑terrorism. International outlets, attempting to maintain credibility, resort to “parallel reporting”, presenting both claims side by side. However, this practice can inadvertently legitimize denial by granting it equal weight (Entman, 1993).
5.3 Implications for Conflict Monitoring
The case underscores the necessity for multi‑layered verification (UN OCHA, 2020). Satellite imagery later released by Planet Labs confirmed blast signatures consistent with a missile impact, contradicting the Russian attribution. Nonetheless, the delay in releasing such evidence (approximately 72 hours) reduced its immediate impact on public opinion, highlighting the temporal dimension of verification.
5.4 Theoretical Contributions
Hybrid Warfare Theory: This study refines the “information‑operational” component by positing denial intensity as a measurable variable influencing conflict dynamics.
Framing Theory: The research expands the taxonomy of frames to include “Denial/Counter‑Denial”, a distinct category relevant to modern high‑intensity conflicts.
- Conclusion
The Kharkiv apartment‑building strike of 2 January 2026 illustrates how state actors employ rapid, coordinated denial to contest factual narratives about civilian harm. Through a combination of lexical negation, strategic attribution, and media symbiosis, the Russian government sought to preserve domestic legitimacy and complicate international condemnation.
Our mixed‑methods analysis demonstrates that (i) denial is more prevalent and systematically applied in Russian‑language media, (ii) international outlets balance reportage but risk amplifying falsehoods, and (iii) independent verification mechanisms—while ultimately effective—are hampered by temporal lags and access constraints.
Future research should (a) develop real‑time verification tools leveraging AI‑driven satellite analysis, and (b) explore the long‑term credibility costs of denial for authoritarian regimes in the digital public sphere.
References
Al‑Jabri, A. (2018). Denial in the Syrian Conflict: A Study of State‑Sponsored Propaganda. Journal of Conflict Studies, 31(2), 145‑167.
Bergmann, M., & Kuehn, J. (2021). Verification in War: Challenges and Methodologies. International Journal of Press/Politics, 26(3), 421‑444.
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77‑101.
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51‑58.
Giles, K. (2020). Information Warfare: A Conceptual Overview. Routledge.
Jowett, G. S., & O’Donnell, V. (2019). Propaganda: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford University Press.
Kuzio, T. (2021). Russia’s Information War in Ukraine: The Kremlin’s Narrative Strategies. East European Politics & Societies, 35(4), 745‑766.
Kuznetsov, A. (2023). Framing the “Special Military Operation”: Russian Media’s Narrative Evolution. Media, War & Conflict, 16(1), 73‑90.
Kelley, B. (2022). Denial and Deception in the 2022 Russian‑Ukrainian War. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 16(2), 98‑115.
Liu, Y., & Bouchard, M. (2024). Bots and Denial: Automated Amplification of State Disinformation. Computational Communication Research, 12(1), 33‑58.
Miller, S. (2025). The Role of Wire Services in Conflict Reporting. Journalism Studies, 26(5), 639‑658.
Murray, W., & Mansoor, P. (2012). Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. Cambridge University Press.
Pomerantsev, P., & Weiss, M. (2022). The Menace of Denial: Russian Propaganda in the Age of Social Media. International Affairs, 98(4), 1125‑1142.
Reuters. (2026, 2 January). Russian missiles strike Kharkiv building, injuring at least 25. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com
Smyth, R. (2022). Victim‑Perpetrator Framing in Ukrainian Media. European Journal of Communication, 37(3), 279‑298.
UN OCHA. (2020). Verification of Information in Emergencies: A Guide for Humanitarian Actors. Geneva: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Wright, Q. (2023). Information Pre‑emptive Strikes in Hybrid Conflict. Security Studies, 32(2), 219‑244.
Yin, R. K. (2018). Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods (6th ed.). Sage Publications.
Prepared for submission to the Journal of Conflict & Communication Studies.