The Yemen Crisis and Saudi-UAE Rift: Reshaping Middle East Geopolitics in 2026 - Maxthon

A Strategic Partnership Unravels

The final weeks of 2025 witnessed an unprecedented public confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—two Gulf monarchies that have been close strategic partners for decades. The flashpoint was Yemen, where a military offensive by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) has exposed fundamental differences that analysts say represent the most serious rift between the two powers in modern history.

On December 30, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on the port of Mukalla after intercepting what it claimed were weapons shipments from the UAE destined for STC separatist forces. The kingdom’s response was unequivocal: it demanded all UAE forces leave Yemen within 24 hours, declaring its national security a “red line.” The UAE complied, withdrawing its remaining counterterrorism units, but denied arming the separatists.

This dramatic escalation marks more than a tactical disagreement over Yemen—it signals a fundamental realignment in the Gulf that could reshape regional power dynamics for years to come.

The Southern Offensive: Operation Promising Future

The current crisis began in early December 2025 when STC forces launched “Operation Promising Future,” a rapid military campaign that seized control of most of southern Yemen’s territory. Within days, the separatists had captured:

Hadramout Province: Yemen’s largest governorate, sharing a 700-kilometer border with Saudi Arabia and containing significant oil and gas resources
Al-Mahrah Province: Strategic territory along the Omani border
Mukalla: A major port city on the Arabian Sea
Aden: Yemen’s temporary capital and the STC’s stronghold

By December 9, the STC effectively controlled the territory of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, which existed as an independent state from 1967 to 1990. On January 2, 2026, the group announced a constitution for an independent “State of South Arabia” and declared its intention to hold a referendum on independence within two years.

However, the separatists’ territorial gains proved short-lived. Beginning January 2, Saudi-backed government forces, supported by intensive airstrikes, launched a counteroffensive that rapidly recaptured much of the seized territory, including Mukalla. This military reversal has cast doubt on the viability of the STC’s independence plans, though the group has welcomed Saudi Arabia’s subsequent call for dialogue in Riyadh.

Diverging Visions: Why Saudi Arabia and the UAE Are at Odds

The Saudi-UAE split reflects fundamentally different strategic priorities that have been developing for years:

Saudi Arabia’s Perspective

Riyadh’s primary concern is border security and territorial integrity. The kingdom views any armed presence in Hadramout—which shares a long border with Saudi territory—as a direct security threat. Saudi Arabia supports a unified Yemen under the internationally recognized government, fearing that fragmentation could create ungoverned spaces where extremist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) might flourish.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has also been pursuing a peace agreement with the Iran-backed Houthis to end the decade-long civil war. The STC’s sudden offensive threatened these diplomatic efforts and risked opening a new front in the conflict.

The UAE’s Strategy

Abu Dhabi’s interests are more complex and commercially driven. The UAE has backed southern separatist movements since 2017, viewing them as:

Maritime security assets: Control over southern Yemen’s ports provides strategic access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Horn of Africa
Counterterrorism partners: The STC has been effective at combating AQAP in southern Yemen
Economic opportunities: Southern Yemen’s ports, particularly Mukalla and Aden, are crucial for UAE efforts to establish a maritime corridor linking the Gulf to East Africa

The UAE has established military bases in Eritrea, Berbera (Somaliland), and controlled Yemeni ports, creating a network of influence around the Red Sea. This strategy reflects Abu Dhabi’s pivot toward becoming a maritime and commercial power, less constrained by traditional Gulf unity.

Beyond Yemen: A Broader Pattern of Competition

Analysts point to multiple areas where Saudi-UAE divergence has become apparent:

Sudan’s Civil War

Saudi Arabia and the UAE support opposing sides in Sudan’s brutal conflict. The UAE has been accused of backing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group, while Saudi Arabia supports the Sudanese Armed Forces. In late December, reports emerged that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman planned to lobby President Trump about the UAE’s role in arming the RSF.

OPEC+ Tensions

Within OPEC+, the two oil giants have clashed over production quotas. In 2021, the UAE nearly blocked a production agreement, arguing that quota rules unfairly constrained its expanded capacity. While both countries maintained oil policy cohesion at the January 5 OPEC+ meeting despite Yemen tensions, the underlying disagreement over production baselines remains unresolved.

Economic Models

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pursuing competing visions for economic development:

Saudi Arabia is focused on mega-projects like NEOM and diversifying away from oil through Vision 2030, seeking to become the region’s dominant economic hub
The UAE has established itself as a global financial center, logistics hub, and gateway for international business, with a more liberal social model

Regional Alignments

The shifting allegiances are striking. Qatar, blockaded by a Saudi-led coalition (including the UAE) from 2017-2021, has welcomed Saudi efforts to resolve the Yemen crisis. Meanwhile, Turkey and Egypt—both at odds with the UAE over various issues—appear to be gravitating toward the Saudi position. As one analyst noted, if a coalition against the UAE crystallizes, it would represent “an unprecedented geopolitical shift” in Middle East power structures.

Iran and the Houthis: Beneficiaries of Gulf Disunity

While Saudi Arabia and the UAE clash, the Iran-backed Houthi movement—which controls northern Yemen including the capital Sanaa—stands to benefit enormously. The Houthis have observed former coalition partners who jointly failed to defeat them now turning against one another.

The group continues to launch drone and missile attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, purportedly in solidarity with Palestinians amid the Gaza conflict. These attacks have disrupted global commerce and drawn U.S. and British military responses, but the Houthis remain undeterred. The fracturing of the anti-Houthi coalition removes pressure on the group and potentially strengthens Iran’s hand in the region.

Implications for Ukraine and Global Security Architecture

The Yemen crisis intersects with broader questions about the post-Cold War international order, particularly as the Ukraine war grinds through its third year.

Competing for U.S. Attention

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE are jockeying for influence with the Trump administration, which has adopted an approach to foreign policy described by some analysts as “transactional” and “spheres of influence” oriented. The Yemen dispute may spill over into:

Defense partnerships: Both countries are major purchasers of U.S. weapons
Energy security: The U.S. relies on both as partners in managing global oil markets
Regional security architecture: The breakdown of Gulf unity complicates U.S. efforts to build a regional coalition against Iran

Ukraine Parallels and Divergences

The situation bears some uncomfortable parallels to Ukraine, raising questions about territorial integrity, great power competition, and the rules-based international order:

Territorial sovereignty: Just as Russia seeks to redraw Ukraine’s borders by force, the STC is attempting to partition Yemen. If separatist movements backed by external powers can succeed in Yemen, what precedent does that set?
Proxy conflicts: Both wars feature external powers backing local factions—Russia and the West in Ukraine; Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran in Yemen. But while Western powers largely present a united front on Ukraine, Gulf powers are openly at odds.
Ceasefire negotiations: Trump administration officials are pushing for cease-fires in both conflicts. But as one analyst observed, “a cease-fire can be achieved by exhaustion, but peace requires structure.” Without addressing root causes, both conflicts risk resuming after any pause.
Resource competition: Just as Ukraine’s war has disrupted global grain supplies and energy markets (Yemen imports 45% of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine), the Yemen conflict threatens one of the world’s most critical shipping lanes.

Middle East Impact on Ukraine Diplomacy

The Middle East instability affects Ukraine dynamics in several ways:

Diplomatic bandwidth: The Trump administration’s focus on Yemen, Venezuela, and other crises reduces attention to Ukraine
Regional mediation: Turkey, Qatar, and potentially Gulf states have been mentioned as possible mediators for Ukraine talks—but Gulf disunity complicates their effectiveness
Military resources: Weapons and intelligence assets deployed to the Middle East could otherwise support Ukraine
Oil prices: While OPEC+ maintained policy cohesion for now, Saudi-UAE tensions could eventually impact oil markets, affecting both Russia’s war economy and Western efforts to manage energy prices

The Bab el-Mandeb Crisis: Singapore and Global Trade

For Singapore and the global shipping industry, the most immediate concern is the continued instability around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—the 30-kilometer-wide passage connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean.

The Strategic Chokepoint

The strait is critical for global commerce:

12-15% of world trade passes through it annually
30% of global container traffic transits the corridor
Approximately 7-9 million barrels of oil per day flowed through pre-crisis (down over 50% during 2024)
Shortcut between Asia and Europe via the Suez Canal, saving 10-14 days compared to the Cape of Good Hope route

Houthi Attacks and Shipping Disruptions

Since November 2023, Houthi forces have launched over 190 attacks on commercial vessels, using drones, missiles, unmanned surface vehicles, and explosive boats. These attacks have:

Killed at least nine mariners
Sunk four vessels including the bulk carriers Magic Seas and Eternity C in July 2025
Forced major rerouting of container and tanker traffic around Africa
Increased transit times by 30-50% (adding 10-15 days to journeys)
Spiked insurance premiums into the “tens of thousands of dollars” for single voyages
Driven up shipping costs substantially due to longer routes, extra fuel consumption, and higher insurance

Major shipping companies including Maersk, MSC, and CMA CGM suspended Red Sea transits for most of 2024 and 2025. While Maersk completed its first return transit on December 18-19, 2025 (the Singapore-flagged Maersk Sebarok), the company emphasized this was a cautious first step, not a full resumption of service.

Impact on Singapore

As the world’s largest transshipment hub and a critical node in Asia-Europe trade, Singapore faces both challenges and opportunities:

Challenges

Port congestion: The diversion of shipping around Africa has disrupted schedules and created congestion at major hubs. If Red Sea routes reopen, initial vessel returns could create a surge in traffic that strains capacity.
Supply chain disruption: Extended transit times affect Singapore’s role in just-in-time manufacturing supply chains for electronics, automotive, and other industries.
Increased costs: Higher freight rates and fuel costs flow through Singapore’s economy, affecting import prices and inflation.
Food security concerns: Yemen imports significant quantities of wheat that typically transit through these waters, and disruptions to agricultural trade affect regional food security.

Opportunities

Expanded capacity: PSA Singapore is rapidly expanding Tuas Port, which will have 12 operational berths by end-2025. The facility is expected to become the world’s largest fully automated container terminal when complete in the 2040s.
Enhanced technology: Singapore is deploying advanced analytics and AI tools to predict vessel arrivals more accurately, allowing for more proactive berth planning.
Alternative routing hub: As the primary Asian gateway for rerouted traffic, Singapore could consolidate its position as the indispensable link between East and West.
Resilience investment: The World Bank and other organizations are funding port infrastructure improvements globally. Singapore is well-positioned to attract such investment given its strategic location and efficiency record.

Shipping analysts note that if container lines gradually resume Red Sea transits in 2026—which ING economist Rico Luman calls “not a matter of ‘if’, but ‘when'”—Singapore will play a crucial role in managing the transition and regrouping cargo at key hubs.

Food Security and Humanitarian Dimensions

The confluence of crises creates severe humanitarian pressures, particularly in Yemen itself:

Over 17 million people in Yemen face food insecurity
5.6 million are experiencing emergency-level food insecurity
31,000 face famine-like conditions

The Russia-Ukraine war has already raised food prices globally (the FAO Food Price Index reached a 50-year high in 2011, coinciding with the Arab Spring, and a new high in March 2022). Yemen’s reliance on Russian and Ukrainian wheat (45% of imports) means it faces a perfect storm of conflict-driven supply disruptions and price inflation.

Higher fuel costs from Red Sea disruptions further raise the cost of World Food Programme emergency assistance—already up by $23 billion per month according to some estimates—potentially limiting aid reach precisely when needs are greatest.

What Comes Next: Scenarios for 2026

Best Case: Managed De-escalation

Saudi Arabia’s call for dialogue in Riyadh, welcomed by the STC, could lead to:

A negotiated settlement on southern Yemen’s political status, possibly with expanded autonomy short of independence
Gradual normalization of Saudi-UAE relations around specific issue-by-issue cooperation
Reduced Houthi attacks as Riyadh pursues peace with Sanaa
Phased resumption of Red Sea shipping as security improves
OPEC+ maintaining cohesion despite political tensions

Medium Case: Frozen Conflict

More likely, analysts suggest:

Continued low-intensity conflict in southern Yemen despite dialogue
Saudi Arabia and the UAE maintaining formal relations but operating as competitors rather than strategic partners
Persistent Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping at reduced levels
Shipping companies maintaining contingency plans for both Red Sea and Cape routes
Periodic OPEC+ tensions over production quotas as underlying disputes remain unresolved

Worst Case: Escalation and Fragmentation

A darker scenario would involve:

Renewed heavy fighting in southern Yemen drawing in Saudi and UAE proxies
Complete breakdown of the anti-Houthi coalition
Intensified Houthi attacks potentially expanding to the Strait of Hormuz
OPEC+ policy coordination breaking down, leading to oil price volatility
Yemen fragmenting into multiple de facto states
Increased terrorist activity in ungoverned spaces
Regional arms race as countries like Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar pick sides

Broader Implications for the International Order

The Yemen crisis represents a test case for several critical questions facing the international community:

Can Regional Organizations Manage Local Conflicts?

The Gulf Cooperation Council has proven unable to prevent open conflict between two of its most powerful members. This echoes failures of other regional organizations (the African Union in Sudan, ASEAN regarding Myanmar) to manage internal disputes.

What Role for International Law?

The STC’s plan to hold a referendum on independence within two years raises questions about self-determination, territorial integrity, and the legitimacy of externally backed separatist movements—issues that resonate far beyond Yemen.

Great Power Competition

As the U.S., China, and Russia compete for influence in the Middle East, Gulf disunity creates opportunities for rival powers. China has positioned itself as a mediator (brokering the Saudi-Iran rapprochement in 2023) and could play a role in Yemen. Russia, despite setbacks elsewhere in the region, continues supporting Iran and maintains ties with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The Humanitarian-Security Nexus

Yemen demonstrates how humanitarian catastrophes and security crises feed each other. Food insecurity, conflict, and external intervention create a cycle that no single intervention can break.

Conclusion: A Pivotal Moment

As 2026 unfolds, the Yemen crisis and Saudi-UAE rift represent one of several pivotal tests for the international system. Like Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, and other protracted conflicts, Yemen’s crisis exposes the limits of both regional cooperation and international intervention.

For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the coming months will determine whether their partnership can survive fundamental strategic differences or whether the Gulf is entering a new era of competitive multipolarity. For Yemen, the stakes are existential—whether the country remains unified, fragments into separate states, or continues its descent into failed-state status.

For the international community, including Singapore and other trading nations, the crisis highlights the fragility of global supply chains and the ripple effects of regional conflicts on worldwide commerce. The Bab el-Mandeb remains as strategic today as it was when ancient traders first navigated its waters, and its security—or lack thereof—shapes the prosperity of nations thousands of miles away.

The next few months will reveal whether diplomacy can contain this crisis or whether 2026 marks the beginning of a more volatile and fragmented Middle East, with consequences that reach far beyond the region’s borders.

This analysis is based on developments through January 4, 2026, and the situation continues to evolve rapidly.