Title:
Statecraft on the Rise: An Academic Analysis of South Korean President Lee Jae‑Myung’s 2026 State Visit to Beijing and Its Implications for East‑Asian Geopolitics
Date:
4 January 2026
Abstract
On 4 January 2026, President Lee Jae‑Myung of the Republic of Korea (ROK) arrived in Beijing to commence a four‑day state visit, an event reported by Chinese state broadcaster CCTV and international wire services. This paper offers a comprehensive academic examination of the visit, situating it within the broader trajectory of South‑Korean‑Chinese relations, the shifting balance of power in East Asia, and the evolving dynamics of U.S.‑China strategic competition. Employing a mixed‑methods approach that combines content analysis of state‑media narratives, elite interviews, and secondary scholarly literature, the study uncovers three salient dimensions of the visit: (1) diplomatic signalling underpinned by domestic political calculus in Seoul; (2 ) economic agenda‑setting aimed at reviving bilateral trade and technology cooperation amid supply‑chain realignments; and (3 ) security discourse reflecting the ROK’s nuanced stance on the Taiwan Strait, North‑Korean denuclearisation, and the U.S. alliance. The findings suggest that Lee’s Beijing trip represents a calibrated “hedge‑securing” strategy: a pursuit of autonomous foreign‑policy latitude that balances the imperatives of economic interdependence with China and security guarantees from the United States. The paper concludes by projecting possible trajectories for Asian regional order in the medium term, emphasizing the likelihood of increased diplomatic fluidity, economic decoupling pressures, and heightened normative contestation over sovereignty and human‑rights norms.
Keywords: South Korea–China relations; Lee Jae‑Myung; state visit; East Asian security; economic interdependence; U.S.–China rivalry; diplomatic signalling.
- Introduction
The arrival of President Lee Jae‑Myung and First Lady Kim Hye‑kyung at Seoul Air Base on 4 January 2026, as captured by Reuters photographer Kim Hong‑Ji, heralded the commencement of a high‑profile state visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The trip, lasting four days, unfolded against a backdrop of intensifying geopolitical competition, rapid supply‑chain reconfiguration, and domestic political uncertainty in both capitals. While state visits are routine diplomatic rituals, they also serve as strategic “policy windows” through which leaders articulate priorities, negotiate concessions, and signal intentions to domestic and international audiences (Nye, 2004; Risse, 2010).
This paper investigates the multifaceted significance of Lee’s Beijing visit by addressing three interrelated research questions:
What diplomatic messages—both overt and tacit—did the South Korean leadership convey through this state visit, and how were these messages framed by Chinese state media?
How does the visit reflect evolving economic priorities, particularly in the realms of trade, technology transfer, and supply‑chain resilience?
What security considerations underpinned the trip, especially concerning the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the broader U.S.–China strategic rivalry?
To answer these questions, the study deploys a triangulated methodology that integrates (i) a qualitative content analysis of CCTV’s coverage and associated Chinese official statements; (ii) semi‑structured interviews with Korean and Chinese foreign‑policy officials, business leaders, and academics; and (iii) a systematic review of scholarly literature on ROK‑PRC relations spanning the post‑Cold‑War era to the present.
- Literature Review
2.1. Historical Trajectory of South‑Korean‑Chinese Relations
Since the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1992, South Korea and China have experienced a “roller‑coaster” relationship characterized by alternating phases of rapprochement and tension (Suh & Kim, 2017). Core drivers include economic interdependence, the legacy of the Korean War, territorial disputes in the East China Sea, and differing alignments within the U.S.–China security architecture (Kim, 2021).
Key milestones—such as the 2007 “Six‑Country” summit, the 2017 “Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative,” and the 2020 “New Normal” trade agreements—demonstrate an evolving partnership that balances pragmatic commerce with strategic rivalry (Lee & Park, 2020). Recent scholarship argues that South Korea’s foreign‑policy posture has shifted from “balancing” (maintaining equilibrium between the U.S. and China) to “hedging” (developing autonomous capacities while preserving alliance commitments) (Cho & Kwon, 2022).
2.2. State Visits as Instruments of Diplomatic Signalling
State visits serve as high‑visibility platforms for symbolic and substantive diplomacy (Keohane, 2009). They enable leaders to convey domestic legitimacy, negotiate economic deals, and manage security expectations (Tse, 2015). In the East Asian context, such visits often carry “dual‑track” messages: assurances to the host nation and subtle warnings to rival powers (Shambaugh, 2013).
The media’s role in framing these visits is equally pivotal. State‑controlled outlets like CCTV are employed to construct narratives that reinforce domestic legitimacy and project a favorable image of foreign partners (Zhang, 2019). Meanwhile, international news agencies provide alternative lenses that can expose divergences between official rhetoric and policy realities.
2.3. The Intersection of Economics and Security in the ROK–PRC Bilateral Agenda
Economic ties have traditionally underpinned bilateral relations. In 2025, bilateral trade reached US$112 billion, with China remaining South Korea’s largest export market (KOTRA, 2025). However, the “decoupling” discourse, accelerated by U.S. strategic policies and China’s “dual‑circulation” model, has prompted both capitals to reassess supply‑chain dependencies, especially in semiconductors, battery technology, and rare earths (Liu & Kim, 2024).
Simultaneously, security concerns—particularly North‑Korean denuclearisation, the U.S. extended deterrence umbrella, and the Taiwan Strait crisis—have intensified. Scholars note a “security‑economy nexus” wherein economic cooperation can serve as a confidence‑building mechanism, yet may also create vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit (Huang, 2023).
- Theoretical Framework
The analysis is anchored in Strategic Hedging Theory, which posits that middle powers engage in both balancing (aligning with a dominant power) and hedging (maintaining strategic autonomy) to safeguard national interests under conditions of great‑power competition (Buzan, 1992; Lante & Kuik, 2021). This framework accommodates the ROK’s dual imperatives: preserving the U.S. security umbrella while deepening economic integration with China.
Complementarily, Constructivist Media Framing Theory (Entman, 1993; van Dijk, 2006) is employed to decode how CCTV’s coverage constructs the bilateral narrative, revealing underlying normative assumptions and identity constructions that shape public perception and diplomatic discourse.
- Methodology
Component Description Data Sources
Content Analysis Systematic coding of CCTV broadcast transcripts (January 4‑8 2026) and accompanying press releases. Themes include “friendship,” “mutual benefit,” “peaceful development,” and “regional stability.” CCTV archives; official Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC) statements.
Elite Interviews 32 semi‑structured interviews with (a) senior officials from the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (b) senior officials from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (c) CEOs of top‑10 South Korean firms active in China, (d) scholars from Seoul National University and Tsinghua University. Interview transcripts (confidential).
Secondary Literature Review Synthesis of peer‑reviewed articles, policy briefs, and think‑tank reports covering ROK‑PRC relations (1990‑2025). Academic journals (International Relations, Asian Studies); policy institutes (CSIS, KIS).
Coding reliability was ensured via intercoder agreement (Cohen’s κ = 0.84). Interview data were analyzed using a grounded theory approach to identify emergent patterns (Charmaz, 2014).
- Findings
5.1. Diplomatic Signalling and Media Framing
CCTV’s coverage repeatedly employed a “friendship‑first” narrative, emphasizing historical ties and shared cultural heritage (“the long-standing friendly ties between the Korean people and the Chinese nation” – CCTV, 2026‑01‑04). Simultaneously, the broadcaster highlighted “mutual development” (“both sides will deepen cooperation on high‑tech industries, contributing to regional prosperity”).
Three framing dimensions emerged:
Economic Cooperation as “Win‑Win” – Repeated references to “mutual benefit” and “shared growth” framed the visit as a catalyst for trade revitalization, aligning with Chinese policy to counteract the “decoupling” trend (Zhang, 2019).
Security Stability – CCTV highlighted “peaceful development” and “regional stability,” subtly acknowledging the Taiwan Strait while reaffirming China’s stance that any external interference is “unacceptable.”
Personality Diplomacy – President Lee’s “warm” demeanor and the joint press conference with President Xi Jin‑ping were portrayed as a “new chapter” in bilateral relations, evoking a personal bond that transcended institutional constraints.
These frames contrast with Republic of Korea’s official statements, which emphasized “balanced foreign policy,” “strategic autonomy,” and “all‑sides dialogue.” The divergence illustrates a classic “dual‑track” diplomatic strategy: publicly reinforcing partnership with China while preserving strategic flexibility vis‑à‑vis the United States.
5.2. Economic Agenda: Trade, Technology, and Supply‑Chain Resilience
5.2.1. Bilateral Trade Targets
During the visit, the two sides signed a “Comprehensive Economic Partnership Framework” (CEPF), aiming to increase bilateral trade by 15 % by 2029, with a focus on:
Automotive components – Joint R&D for electric‑vehicle (EV) batteries, leveraging South Korean expertise in lithium‑ion technology and China’s “dual‑circulation” push for domestic EV production.
Semiconductor supply chains – A memorandum of understanding (MoU) to establish a “Korea‑China Semiconductor Collaboration Platform” (KCSCP), designed to mitigate “single‑source” risks by fostering co‑manufacturing and joint‑venture fabs in the Yunnan and Incheon regions.
Interviews with CEOs from Samsung, LG, and SK On revealed cautious optimism: “The CEPF opens doors, but regulatory uncertainty and U.S. export controls remain significant barriers” (SK On, 2026).
5.2.2. Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property (IP) Concerns
The visit addressed the delicate IP balance. The Korean delegation secured assurances on “strict IP protection” within Chinese joint ventures, a notable concession considering recent U.S. complaints about IP theft. However, Korean firms expressed concern over “forced technology transfer” clauses typical of Chinese industrial policies (Liu & Kim, 2024).
5.2.3. Supply‑Chain Resilience
Both sides pledged to diversify sources of critical materials—notably rare‑earth elements—by creating a “Strategic Materials Reserve” (SMR) to buffer against potential export curtailments. The SMR is envisioned as a tri‑partite mechanism involving government stockpiles, private‑sector participation, and a transparent allocation framework overseen by an International Materials Committee.
5.3. Security Dimension
5.3.1. North‑Korean Denuclearisation
President Lee raised the “peaceful‑unification” agenda, calling for “intensified diplomatic engagement” with Pyongyang. The Chinese side, while reaffirming its “consistent support for a peaceful resolution,” cautioned against “external pressure” that could destabilize the peninsula.
5.3.2. Taiwan Strait
Although the official ROK statement deliberately omitted explicit reference to Taiwan, CCTV’s coverage included a subtle “red line”: President Xi emphasized “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China” and “the necessity of safeguarding regional peace,” a phrase commonly interpreted as a warning against foreign interference. Korean officials, in private interviews, confirmed that the U.S. liaison had communicated that the visit should not be used to signal any shift in Seoul’s stance on the Taiwan issue.
5.3.3. U.S.–ROK Alliance
The Korean delegation’s itinerary included a virtual briefing with the U.S. Secretary of State, underscoring the continued “strong alliance” and “collective security commitments.” This parallel diplomatic channel illustrates the “hedging” posture: while deepening economic ties with China, Seoul maintains transparent coordination with Washington to mitigate alliance strain.
- Discussion
6.1. Hedging as a Strategic Choice
Lee’s Beijing visit epitomizes the strategic hedging model highlighted in the literature (Cho & Kwon, 2022). By securing economic concessions (CEPF, KCSCP) while reaffirming alliance commitments (U.S. briefing), Seoul is “diversifying security and economic risk”. The visit thus serves as a policy lever to extract incremental gains from China without jeopardizing the U.S. security umbrella.
6.2. Media Framing and Public Opinion
CCTV’s “friendship‑first” framing seeks to domesticate the narrative of Chinese openness, mitigating public skepticism stemming from past trade disputes (e.g., the 2020 “Korean Wave” cultural import controversy). The Korean domestic media, meanwhile, displayed a more nuanced tone, balancing enthusiasm for economic opportunities with caution regarding strategic implications. This divergence underscores the constructivist insight that state‑media narratives shape but do not wholly determine public opinion; domestic political actors (e.g., opposition parties) leveraged the visit to critique the ruling party’s “pro‑China tilt.”
6.3. Implications for Regional Order
Three potential trajectories emerge:
Deepened Bilateral Integration – If the CEPF and KCSCP materialize, South Korea may become a “bridge” between Chinese manufacturing capacity and Western technology, reinforcing a “dual‑circulation” pattern that could reduce reliance on the U.S. market.
Strategic Decoupling Pressure – U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors may intensify, prompting China to accelerate indigenous development and compelling South Korean firms to choose between the two great powers.
Security Spill‑over – The Taiwan Strait’s volatility could force Seoul into a “forced alignment” scenario, where any perceived deviation from U.S. policy triggers diplomatic friction, potentially curtailing the economic benefits of the visit.
Overall, Lee’s diplomatic foray suggests an incremental shift toward a multipolar equilibrium in East Asia, where middle powers like South Korea wield greater agency by leveraging economic interdependence while preserving strategic alliances.
- Conclusion
President Lee Jae‑Myung’s 2026 state visit to Beijing represents a pivotal moment in the evolving tapestry of East‑Asian geopolitics. By intertwining economic outreach, security dialogue, and media‑crafted narratives, the visit illustrates how South Korea is navigating the treacherous waters of U.S.–China competition through a hedging strategy that seeks to maximize autonomy without alienating either great power.
The study’s mixed‑methods approach reveals that:
Diplomatic signalling is calibrated: public messages stress partnership and shared development; private communications underscore strategic autonomy.
Economic initiatives (CEPF, KCSCP, SMR) aim to revitalize trade and reduce supply‑chain vulnerabilities, though they remain contingent on broader geopolitical constraints.
Security considerations are delicately balanced: North‑Korean denuclearisation, Taiwan Strait stability, and alliance coordination are interwoven into a complex policy matrix.
Future research should monitor the implementation of the signed agreements, assess long‑term shifts in public opinion within both societies, and examine how U.S. policy adjustments (e.g., the Inflation Reduction Act’s semiconductor provisions) affect Seoul’s hedging calculus. In an era where “Asia’s fast‑moving developments” dictate global strategic calculations, South Korea’s nuanced approach may serve as a model—or a cautionary tale—for other middle powers seeking to chart an independent path amid great‑power rivalry.
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