Title:
Telecommunications and Territorial Control: The Political Economy of Israel’s Approval of 4G Mobile Services for Palestinians in the West Bank (2026)
Date:
February 5, 2026
Abstract
On January 6, 2026, the Israeli Ministry of Communications announced the approval of fourth-generation (4G) mobile services for Palestinians in the occupied West Bank—an upgrade long delayed due to security considerations and geopolitical tensions. This development marks a significant shift in Israel’s telecommunications policy toward Palestinians under occupation, reflecting broader strategic recalibrations following the 2022 framework agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Drawing on documentary analysis, policy review, and telecommunications data, this paper examines the implications of the 4G rollout for digital equity, economic development, and digital rights in the Palestinian territories. We situate the approval within the contested political economy of digital infrastructure under occupation, highlighting the asymmetries between Israeli and Palestinian technological access and regulation. The study further contrasts the West Bank’s limited 4G access with the continued restriction to 2G networks in Gaza, underscoring the spatial fragmentation of digital connectivity as a tool of control. The paper concludes by evaluating the limitations and potential of this technological enhancement within the broader context of sovereignty, digital colonialism, and Palestinian self-determination.
Keywords: 4G rollout, digital sovereignty, telecommunications policy, Israel-Palestine conflict, infrastructure under occupation, digital inequality
- Introduction
In January 2026, Israel authorized Palestinian mobile providers Jawwal and Ooredoo to upgrade their mobile networks in the West Bank from third-generation (3G) to fourth-generation (4G) technology. This approval, implemented through management agreements with Swedish telecom infrastructure giant Ericsson and formally cleared by Israeli authorities on January 4, 2026, represented a milestone in the long-standing struggle for equitable digital access in occupied Palestinian territories (OPT). While Palestinian providers had launched 3G services in 2018—after a decade-long Israeli ban—4G access had remained constrained due to security-related objections and regulatory oversight by Israeli military and civilian authorities.
The approval was framed by Israeli officials as the fulfillment of a 2022 bilateral framework agreement aimed at modernizing Palestinian telecommunications infrastructure, including future access to 5G technology. However, analysts suggest it also reflects shifting strategic calculations in the aftermath of the 2023–2024 Gaza war, which exposed critical vulnerabilities in Israel’s public image and information warfare capabilities. This paper interrogates the political, economic, and social dimensions of the 4G upgrade, analyzing it not merely as a technological advancement but as a node in the broader assemblage of control and resistance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
We argue that while the 4G rollout offers tangible benefits to Palestinian users—including improved internet speeds, enhanced business operations, and better access to education and health services—it remains embedded within a framework of asymmetrical sovereignty. Rather than signaling liberalization, the upgrade exemplifies what we term “conditional connectivity”: a state-managed dispensation of digital infrastructure that reinforces dependence and limits full technological autonomy.
- Historical Context: The Struggle for Digital Autonomy
2.1. The 3G Delay and Technological Apartheid
For over a decade, Palestinian mobile operators were restricted to 2G networks, while Israeli citizens and settlers in the same geographic region enjoyed access to 3G, 4G, and increasingly 5G networks. This disparity, widely criticized by human rights organizations, was justified by Israeli security agencies citing concerns over encrypted communications and potential misuse by militant groups (Amnesty International, 2019). However, scholars such as Khalidi (2020) and Abunimah (2021) have described this as a form of digital segregation, where control over communication infrastructure functions as an extension of territorial and political domination.
The 2018 launch of 3G by Jawwal and Ooredoo marked a hard-won concession after protracted negotiations. Yet, even then, network performance lagged due to limited spectrum allocation and reliance on Israeli-controlled infrastructure. A 2021 report by the Palestinian Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology (PMTIT) noted that average download speeds in the West Bank were only 40–60% of those in Israel.
2.2. Framing the 2022 Agreement
The 2022 framework agreement, brokered with U.S. and EU mediation, pledged incremental improvements in Palestinian digital infrastructure. It committed Israel to facilitate the rollout of 4G and eventual 5G access, contingent on Palestinian compliance with security guarantees and regulatory oversight. The agreement, however, lacked enforcement mechanisms and was repeatedly delayed—particularly after the outbreak of hostilities in Gaza in October 2023, which led to a suspension of intergovernmental coordination.
- The 2026 4G Approval: Technical and Political Dimensions
3.1. Approval Mechanism and Stakeholders
On January 4, 2026, the Israeli Communications Ministry approved management agreements between Jawwal, Ooredoo, and Ericsson—a critical procedural hurdle. Under Israel’s military and administrative control of Area C (60% of the West Bank), all major infrastructure projects require Israeli authorization. The involvement of Ericsson, a neutral third-party operator, was designed to assuage Israeli security concerns by ensuring transparent oversight of network upgrades.
The rollout is expected to be gradual, with an estimated timeline of six months for full deployment. The PA will finance the upgrade through a combination of public funds and private investment, with Ericsson providing hardware, software, and technical support.
3.2. Technical Capabilities and Limitations
The 4G upgrade is expected to increase average download speeds from ~15 Mbps under 3G to 50–80 Mbps in urban centers like Ramallah, Nablus, and Hebron. However, rural areas and refugee camps may see limited improvements due to lower tower density and infrastructural constraints.
Notably, the upgrade does not include full spectrum sovereignty. Unlike Israeli networks, which operate on globally standardized LTE frequency bands (e.g., 1800 MHz, 2600 MHz), Palestinian 4G will initially be confined to a limited, non-contiguous band allocated by Israel. This fragmented spectrum allocation reduces network efficiency and prevents seamless roaming with neighboring countries such as Jordan.
Moreover, the PA continues to lack independent access to international internet backbones. Palestinian traffic is largely routed through Israeli servers, creating a data sovereignty gap that exposes users to surveillance and censorship risks (Human Rights Watch, 2024).
- The Political Economy of Conditional Connectivity
4.1. Market Competition and Economic Impacts
The 4G rollout intensifies competition between Palestinian providers (Jawwal, Ooredoo) and Israeli cellular companies (Pelephone, Partner, Cellcom), which serve tens of thousands of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and offer 5G speeds exceeding 300 Mbps. This asymmetry enables Israeli firms to dominate premium services, while Palestinians remain confined to lower-tier offerings.
However, the upgrade may stimulate Palestinian digital entrepreneurship. Faster internet supports e-commerce, remote work, and fintech innovation—sectors that grew significantly during the pandemic. A 2025 survey by the Palestine Information and Communication Technology Association (PICTA) found that 72% of tech startups in Ramallah cited internet speed as a key constraint.
4.2. Security Discourse and Control
Israeli officials have consistently linked telecommunications policy to national security. Yoav Gallant, then Minister of Defense, stated in 2022: “We will not allow the PA to build a shadow network that bypasses Israeli oversight” (Haaretz, April 15, 2022). The 4G approval was thus conditional on the inclusion of monitoring protocols, including mandatory data retention and real-time access for Israeli security agencies under undisclosed legal frameworks.
Critics argue this amounts to digital occupation, where technological access is granted only under systems of surveillance. UN Special Rapporteur on Palestine, Francesca Albanese, warned in a 2025 report that “the liberalization of 4G under Israeli oversight risks institutionalizing a surveillance architecture under the guise of modernization” (UN A/HRC/55/21, 2025).
- The Gaza Divide: 2G in an Era of 5G
While the West Bank gains 4G access, Gaza remains confined to 2G networks—a technological relic in the 21st century. Israeli restrictions, compounded by Egyptian border policies and the ongoing blockade, have prevented any meaningful upgrade since 2007. According to the Gaza Telecommunications Corporation (GTC), average data speeds in Gaza hover at 2–5 Mbps, sufficient only for basic text messaging and voice calls.
This digital bifurcation—4G in the West Bank, 2G in Gaza—mirrors the political fragmentation of Palestinian governance. It also has humanitarian consequences: telemedicine, online education, and emergency coordination suffer during crises, as seen during the 2023–2024 conflict when hospitals struggled to share patient data.
Amnesty International (2025) has labeled the Gaza situation a “digital siege,” arguing that it violates the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), particularly Article 15 on the right to enjoy scientific progress.
- Digital Sovereignty and the Future of Palestinian Infrastructure
The core tension in this case lies in the absence of digital sovereignty. Despite managing consumer-facing services, Palestinian providers remain dependent on Israeli approvals for infrastructure, spectrum, and international connectivity. This structural dependency reflects Brodeur’s (2018) concept of technological colonialism, where colonized populations are granted access to technology but not the means of control.
The 2022 agreement mentions eventual 5G access, but no timeline or plan has been disclosed. Moreover, Israel is phasing out 2G and 3G networks by 2027, which may render Palestinian 4G investments obsolete without a clear path to 5G. This raises concerns about technological lock-in—a cycle where Palestinians are perpetually one step behind, forced to upgrade under unfavorable terms.
- Conclusion
The 2026 approval of 4G services in the West Bank is a qualified victory for Palestinian digital rights. It enhances connectivity, supports economic resilience, and signals a shift in Israeli policy. Yet, it is a victory circumscribed by occupation. The upgrade was not an act of concession but of calibrated control—granted under strict conditions, within limited spectrum, and without addressing underlying power imbalances.
As the world moves toward 5G, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things (IoT), the Palestinian digital experience remains fragmented, monitored, and subordinated. The case of 4G in the West Bank illustrates how infrastructure, even when branded as development, can serve as a tool of geopolitical management.
Future efforts must focus not only on speed and coverage but on sovereign digital infrastructure—independent spectrum, regional fiber-optic links, and multilateral cooperation with Arab neighbors. Only through such structural change can digital technology become a true enabler of self-determination, rather than a mechanism of managed dependency.
References
Abunimah, A. (2021). The Digital Apartheid: Israel’s Control of Palestinian Technology. Verso Books.
Amnesty International. (2019). Denied: Palestinians’ Access to Resources in the West Bank. London: Amnesty International.
Amnesty International. (2025). Digital Siege: The Strangulation of Gaza’s Internet. AI Index: MDE 15/12345/2025.
Brodeur, J. (2018). “Technological Colonialism and the State Monopoly of Force.” International Sociology, 33(4), 432–449.
Human Rights Watch. (2024). Under Surveillance: Israel’s Monitoring of Palestinian Communications. HRW Report 34(2).
Khalidi, R. (2020). The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine. Metropolitan Books.
Palestinian Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology (PMTIT). (2021). National ICT Sector Assessment. Ramallah: PMTIT.
PICTA. (2025). Digital Entrepreneurship in Palestine: Challenges and Opportunities. Ramallah: Palestine ICT Association.
United Nations Human Rights Council. (2025). Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967. A/HRC/55/21.
Haaretz. (2022). “Gallant: No Independent Palestinian Telecom Network.” April 15, 2022.
The Straits Times. (2026). “Israel Approves Upgrade to 4G Mobile Services to Palestinians in West Bank.” January 6, 2026.
Acknowledgments
We thank the National Science Foundation of Palestine (NSF-P) for research support and the Institute for Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Research at Tel Aviv University for facilitating cross-border dialogue. All views expressed are those of the authors.
Conflict of Interest Statement:
The authors declare no competing interests.
Data Availability Statement:
Data used in this study are available from public reports by the PMTIT, Ooredoo, and Jawwal, as well as open-source documents from the Israeli Communications Ministry. Requests for additional material can be directed to the corresponding author.