China’s Economic Diplomacy in Europe: Premier Li Qiang’s Pledge of Deeper Cooperation with Ireland Amid Irish Push for Agricultural Market Access
Abstract
This paper examines the diplomatic and economic significance of Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin’s state visit to China in January 2026, with a focus on Premier Li Qiang’s pledge of deeper Sino-Irish cooperation amid Ireland’s strategic push to expand exports of beef and dairy products into the Chinese market. Drawing on official statements, diplomatic protocols, trade data, and geopolitical context, this study analyzes the asymmetries and complementarities in Sino-Irish economic relations. The paper argues that while China positions such bilateral engagement as part of its broader strategy to diversify strategic partnerships within the European Union amid rising Sino-Western tensions, Ireland leverages its soft power and niche economic strengths to secure market access and regulatory recognition. The analysis highlights the growing importance of agricultural diplomacy, health and food safety standards, and China’s evolving approach to EU differentiation in its foreign economic policy.
- Introduction
On January 5, 2026, Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin concluded the first official visit by an Irish head of government to China in over seven years. The visit included a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping and a bilateral meeting with Premier Li Qiang. Although brief, the engagement marked a significant diplomatic milestone in Sino-Irish relations, occurring at a time of deepening geopolitical realignments in Europe and East Asia.
China’s official state media reported that Premier Li Qiang emphasized a “willingness to deepen cooperation” with Ireland, particularly in aircraft leasing, healthcare, innovation, and green technology. Meanwhile, Martin emphasized Ireland’s role as a gateway to the European Union (EU) and advocated strongly for market access for Irish beef and dairy—sectors of critical importance to Ireland’s rural economy.
This paper analyzes the political economy of this bilateral interaction, situating it within broader trends in Chinese foreign economic policy, EU-China trade relations, and the increasing use of agriculture as a tool of diplomatic leverage. It argues that China’s selective engagement with individual EU member states—what has been termed “divide-and-engage” diplomacy—is increasingly evident in its outreach to smaller, economically specialized countries like Ireland.
- Contextual Background: China-Ireland Relations in the 21st Century
2.1 Historical Development
Formal diplomatic ties between China and Ireland were established in 1979, with both nations maintaining low-profile but steadily growing relations over the following decades. Unlike larger EU members such as Germany or France, Ireland has not traditionally been a focal point of Chinese diplomacy in Europe. However, several factors have elevated the bilateral relationship since the mid-2010s:
Ireland’s Economic Profile: As a knowledge-based economy with strengths in pharmaceuticals, technology, and financial services (especially aircraft leasing), Ireland aligns with China’s interest in accessing globalized services and regulatory expertise.
EU’s Trade Policy Framework: As a member of the EU’s common commercial policy, Ireland cannot independently negotiate trade agreements with China. However, bilateral diplomacy continues to play a crucial role in advancing regulatory recognition and market access for Irish goods, particularly in sensitive sectors like agriculture.
2.2 Pre-2026 Trade and Investment Landscape
By 2025, bilateral trade between China and Ireland had reached $14.2 billion, with a strong Irish deficit—largely driven by imports of electronics, machinery, and consumer goods from China. However, Irish exports to China had been growing, led by:
Pharmaceuticals (32% of total exports)
Medical devices (14%)
Dairy products (8%)
Organic chemicals (7%)
Agricultural exports, particularly beef, remained constrained despite numerous lobbying efforts, due to unresolved sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and China’s strict import regulations.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows were lopsided: over 200 Chinese companies operated in Ireland (mainly in tech and renewable energy), while Irish investment in China remained limited, focused on agri-food processing and R&D partnerships.
- The January 2026 Visit: Objectives and Diplomatic Framework
3.1 Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin’s Strategic Agenda
Micheál Martin’s five-day visit (January 2–6, 2026) was framed domestically as one of “economic renewal” and “global market diversification.” With Ireland grappling with post-pandemic economic recalibration and challenges in the UK and EU markets, the government identified Asia—and particularly China—as a high-potential region for export growth.
Key objectives articulated by the Irish government included:
Securing full market access for Irish beef (beyond the limited pilot program initiated in 2022 for boneless beef from approved processors).
Resolving long-standing SPS barriers to Irish dairy, especially infant formula and cheese.
Promoting Ireland as a neutral, English-speaking hub for EU market access, appealing to Chinese multinationals.
Advancing cooperation in climate resilience in agriculture, leveraging Ireland’s research capabilities.
A 48-member business delegation accompanied Martin, including executives from Ornua (dairy), ICS (Irish Cattle Society), and major pharmaceutical firms.
3.2 Chinese Perspective: Economic Diplomacy and EU Fragmentation
For China, the visit aligned with a broader strategy of differentiated engagement with EU member states, particularly those less vocal in criticizing Beijing’s foreign policy or human rights record. With relations between China and the EU strained over issues such as:
Reciprocity in market access
The EU’s anti-subsidy investigations into Chinese electric vehicles (EVs)
Sanctions over Xinjiang and Taiwan
—Beijing has increasingly pursued bilateral overtures to individual EU countries to maintain economic linkages and prevent a unified front.
Ireland, as a smaller EU state with strong trade interests in China and a tradition of neutrality, presents a strategically attractive partner. The invitation for Martin to meet both Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang underscored the symbolic weight China accorded the visit.
- Key Outcomes of the Premier Li Qiang–Micheál Martin Meeting (January 5, 2026)
According to a readout published by the Xinhua News Agency on January 6, 2026, Premier Li Qiang highlighted the need to “elevate the comprehensive strategic partnership” between China and Ireland. Key points included:
Expansion of cooperation in aircraft leasing, where Ireland hosts over 60% of the world’s leased commercial aircraft, including significant Chinese-owned fleets managed through Irish SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles).
Collaboration in healthcare and biopharmaceuticals, including joint research on mRNA technologies and aging populations.
Support for green transition initiatives, including offshore wind and hydrogen energy.
Facilitation of agricultural trade, with a commitment to “enhance communication on inspection and quarantine procedures.”
Notably, Li did not announce immediate market access for Irish beef but reiterated that China would “handle Ireland’s request with a positive attitude and in accordance with procedures.” This cautious language reflected internal bureaucratic resistance within China’s General Administration of Customs and Ministry of Agriculture.
- The Beef and Dairy Conundrum: Agriculture as a Diplomatic Battleground
5.1 Ireland’s Agricultural Export Strategy
Agriculture contributes 8.5% to Ireland’s GDP and employs over 150,000 people. The agri-food sector exports over €14 billion annually, with the EU and UK as primary destinations. However, the UK’s post-Brexit trade barriers and shifting consumer preferences have pushed Ireland to seek new markets.
China represents a high-value but highly regulated opportunity. In 2025, Ireland exported €320 million in dairy products to China, primarily infant formula. However, beef exports were minimal—just €28 million—despite Ireland being ranked among the top five global exporters of beef by the OECD.
Ireland’s appeal lies in:
Grass-fed, high-welfare beef production, increasingly desirable in affluent Chinese urban markets.
Strong traceability systems and EU regulatory compliance.
English-language documentation, easing customs verification.
Martin explicitly cited these advantages in his remarks at the Great Hall of the People: “Irish beef is safe, sustainable, and meets the highest international standards. We ask only for a fair and science-based assessment.”
5.2 China’s Regulatory Hurdles and Strategic Caution
China maintains one of the most stringent SPS regimes in the world. Since 2019, it has gradually reopened to beef imports from several countries (e.g., Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay), but access remains conditional on:
Verification visits by Chinese inspection teams
Approval of individual slaughterhouses and cold chain systems
Bilateral veterinary agreements
Irish officials reported that Chinese technical teams visited Ireland in November 2024 and again in September 2025. While these were seen as positive steps, disagreements persisted over:
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) classification: Ireland is classified as a “controlled risk” country by the OIE, but China historically requires “negligible risk” status for full access.
Use of growth hormones: Although EU law bans hormone use, Chinese authorities have sought additional assurances.
Cold-chain logistics for dairy: China requires end-to-end temperature monitoring, which some Irish exporters argue is prohibitively costly.
Premier Li’s vague commitment suggests that while political will exists at the highest levels, bureaucratic inertia and food safety concerns limit progress.
- Aircraft Leasing: A Symbiotic Industry and China’s Gateway to Global Aviation
One of the most immediate areas of cooperation lies in aircraft leasing—a sector where Ireland holds a global monopoly. Dublin is home to giants such as AerCap, SMBC Aviation Capital, and Avolon, which collectively manage over 4,000 aircraft worldwide.
China accounts for approximately 15–18% of the global commercial aircraft fleet and is projected to surpass the U.S. as the largest aviation market by 2035 (ICAO, 2025). Chinese airlines, including Air China, China Eastern, and Hainan Airlines, lease hundreds of aircraft through Irish-based lessors.
The discussion between Li and Martin included:
Streamlining aircraft re-export procedures from Ireland to China.
Enhancing financing cooperation, including yuan-denominated leasing.
Facilitating technology transfer in aircraft maintenance and digital fleet management.
This sector exemplifies the asymmetry in the bilateral relationship: China needs Irish financial expertise and EU regulatory legitimacy, while Ireland benefits from stable, high-value contracts with Chinese state-owned enterprises.
- Broader Geopolitical Implications: China’s “Divide and Engage” Strategy in the EU
The 2026 visit must be understood within the context of China’s evolving strategy toward the European Union. Since 2022, Beijing has:
Suspended high-level EU-China summits due to disagreements over EV tariffs and Taiwan.
Increased bilateral visits with countries including Hungary, Spain, and Greece.
Supported the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Southeast Europe.
Ireland, though not a BRI participant, shares China’s interest in enhancing connectivity—albeit through digital and financial infrastructure rather than physical corridors.
By engaging smaller EU members with specific economic advantages, China seeks to:
Prevent consensus on critical technology restrictions.
Gain voices supportive of balanced EU-China relations.
Exploit divergent national interests within the EU’s common external policy.
Ireland’s pro-trade, innovation-driven economy makes it a natural partner for China in this calculus. However, Dublin remains cautious about appearing to undermine EU unity, particularly on security or human rights issues.
- Challenges and Constraints
Despite the optimistic rhetoric, several challenges impede deeper cooperation:
8.1 EU-Level Trade Governance
Ireland cannot unilaterally grant or receive trade concessions with China. All SPS and market access decisions are made at the EU level, often following lengthy negotiations. The European Commission must ratify any new agreement, and member states vote in the comitology process.
Some EU officials have expressed concern that bilateral backchannel diplomacy could undermine the EU’s collective bargaining power. A senior EU trade official noted in 2025: “We welcome outreach by member states, but the door to China must open on Brussels’ terms.”
8.2 Chinese Domestic Politics and Food Security
China’s “No. 1 Central Document” of 2026, released in February, emphasized “self-sufficiency in grain and stability in meat supply.” This has led to greater caution about large-scale imports of animal proteins, especially from Western countries.
Additionally, nationalist sentiment within Chinese media often frames agricultural imports as a potential threat to food sovereignty. State-run outlets like Global Times have warned against “over-reliance on foreign meat,” particularly from “Western political allies.”
8.3 Irish Domestic Pressures
Farmers’ organizations, notably the Irish Farmers’ Association (IFA), have criticized Martin’s government for not securing immediate results. “Ten years of promises and photo-ops won’t feed our families,” said IFA president Joe Healy in January 2026.
There is also mounting concern about climate policy incompatibility. Ireland’s commitment to a 30% reduction in agricultural emissions by 2030 under the EU Farm to Fork strategy contrasts with China’s continued focus on increasing meat production.
- Conclusion
The January 2026 meeting between Premier Li Qiang and Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin exemplifies the nuanced dynamics of contemporary China-Europe relations. At a time of heightened strategic competition, bilateral engagements with smaller, economically specialized EU members offer both sides opportunities to advance mutual interests without triggering broader geopolitical friction.
China’s pledge of deeper cooperation—particularly in aircraft leasing, healthcare, and green innovation—reflects its recognition of Ireland’s niche strengths. Meanwhile, Ireland’s persistent advocacy for beef and dairy access underscores its agricultural export ambitions and reliance on high-value international markets.
However, progress remains constrained by institutional frameworks, regulatory incompatibilities, and the overarching tension between unilateral diplomatic outreach and multilateral governance. While the visit did not yield immediate breakthroughs in agriculture, it sustained momentum and elevated Sino-Irish dialogue to the highest levels.
Looking ahead, meaningful advancement in agricultural trade will require not only political goodwill but also technical alignment, third-party verification, and transparent risk assessment. If achieved, Irish beef and dairy could become emblematic of a broader model of science-based, trust-driven agri-diplomacy between China and advanced economies.
Moreover, the engagement highlights a broader trend: the increasing importance of sectoral diplomacy, where international relations are no longer shaped solely by geopolitical rivalry but also by supply chains, food safety protocols, and financial infrastructure. In this evolving landscape, Ireland’s combination of neutrality, expertise, and soft power may yet secure a unique role in bridging East and West.
References
Xinhua News Agency. (2026). Premier Li Qiang Meets Irish PM Micheál Martin. January 6, 2026.
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European Commission. (2025). EU-China Trade and Investment Relations. COM(2025) 142 final.
FAO. (2025). The State of Agricultural Markets: Global Trends in Meat Trade. Rome: FAO.
ICAO. (2025). Global Aviation Outlook 2025–2040. Montreal: ICAO.
OECD. (2025). Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2025. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Zhang, E. (2024). China’s Economic Statecraft in Europe: BRI and Beyond. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Global Times. (2026, January 3). “Beef Imports Must Not Compromise Food Security.” Global Times, Beijing.