Title: Consolidating Power in Fragile States: The 2025 Re-Election of President Faustin-Archange Touadera in the Central African Republic
Abstract
This paper examines the re-election of President Faustin-Archange Touadera in the December 2025 presidential election in the Central African Republic (CAR), analyzing the political, institutional, and security dynamics that enabled his victory amid widespread domestic and international controversy. Drawing on official results, opposition statements, civil society reports, and regional geopolitical shifts, this study explores how constitutional reforms, reliance on foreign military support—particularly from Russia—and strategic co-optation of former adversaries contributed to a third-term bid under contested democratic legitimacy. The election represents a broader trend across sub-Saharan Africa where incumbents leverage constitutional ambiguity, security crises, and foreign alliances to extend tenure. While Touadera’s government touts electoral legitimacy and improved security, the boycott by a major opposition coalition, allegations of fraud, and low voter turnout raise critical questions about the resilience of democratic institutions in post-conflict states. This case underscores the challenges of balancing stability and sovereignty with democratic governance in fragile polities.
- Introduction
On December 28, 2025, the Central African Republic held its fourth presidential election since gaining independence in 1960. Incumbent President Faustin-Archange Touadera was declared the winner with 76.15% of the vote, securing a third term in office according to provisional results released by the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) on January 5, 2026. The victory, however, was met with immediate rejection by key opposition figures, including former Prime Ministers Anicet-Georges Dologuele (14.66%) and Henri-Marie Dondra (3.19%), as well as the broader opposition coalition known as the Bloc pour le Rassemblement et la Démocratie en Centrafrique (BRDC). With a reported 52.42% voter turnout and no credible international election observation mission, concerns have been raised regarding the transparency, inclusivity, and procedural fairness of the electoral process.
This paper situates the 2025 election within the broader political trajectory of the CAR under Touadera’s leadership since 2016. It investigates the role of the 2023 constitutional referendum that abolished presidential term limits, the impact of ongoing conflict and the country’s reliance on Russian paramilitary forces, and the strategic marginalization of opposition voices through institutional manipulation and electoral boycotts. Using a qualitative analysis of media reports, government statements, opposition critiques, and regional political trends, this study contributes to scholarly debates on democratic backsliding, hybrid regimes, and the international dimensions of electoral authoritarianism in Africa.
- Historical Context: Conflict, Instability, and Institutional Fragility
The Central African Republic has long suffered from cycles of political instability, ethnic and religious violence, and weak state institutions. Since independence from France in 1960, the country has experienced numerous coups, civil wars, and periods of authoritarian rule. The most recent phase of conflict began in 2013 when the predominantly Muslim Seleka coalition overthrew President François Bozizé, leading to sectarian violence between Muslim and Christian communities and the rise of Christian self-defense militias known as the Anti-Balaka.
Despite peace efforts, including the Bangui Forum in 2015 and the 2019 Khartoum Agreement, armed groups have continued to control large swaths of territory. By 2025, over a third of CAR’s territory remained outside government control, with more than 700,000 people internally displaced and humanitarian access severely restricted.
Touadera, a former mathematics professor and minister under Bozizé, first came to power in 2016 following elections organized under a transitional government backed by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). His initial mandate emphasized state rebuilding, national reconciliation, and electoral reform. However, governance challenges, persistent insecurity, and accusations of corruption eroded public confidence, setting the stage for a contested re-election bid in 2020 and an even more polarized contest in 2025.
- Constitutional Engineering and the Path to a Third Term
A pivotal turning point in Touadera’s consolidation of power was the 2023 constitutional referendum, which abolished presidential term limits and extended the presidential term from five to seven years. The referendum passed with an official 91% “yes” vote on a 49% turnout—a figure widely disputed by civil society groups and opposition parties. Critics argued that the process was neither free nor fair and accused the government of restricting debate, intimidating dissenters, and manipulating results.
The revised constitution allowed Touadera to run for a third term despite the original two-term limit established in the 2016 constitution. International legal experts, including the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), warned that the amendment undermined democratic principles and set a dangerous precedent for other African leaders seeking extended rule.
Touadera defended the change as necessary for continuity in the face of enduring security threats, stating: “The fight against terrorism and banditry requires long-term vision and stability of leadership.” This framing echoed narratives used by other African leaders, such as Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire, who justified extended terms through appeals to national security and development.
- The 2025 Presidential Election: Process and Results
The 2025 presidential election was scheduled for December 28, 2025, alongside legislative and local polls. The electoral framework was administered by CENI, whose leadership has long faced allegations of partisanship. Only 18 candidates were approved to run for president, excluding several prominent opposition figures on technical grounds such as unpaid registration fees or incomplete documentation—an exclusion pattern noted by local watchdogs like the Collectif des Observateurs Électoraux (COEC).
The BRDC, a coalition comprising 13 opposition parties including Dologuele’s Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (UNDP), announced a total boycott in October 2025, citing the absence of an independent electoral commission, lack of transparency in voter registration, and the absence of a neutral security environment. The coalition called on citizens to reject the election as illegitimate.
Despite the boycott, Touadera campaigned extensively, utilizing state media and public infrastructure to amplify his message. His campaign focused on three main themes:
Security and Stability: He emphasized progress in reclaiming territory from rebel groups, attributing gains to partnerships with Russian military trainers and Rwandan peacekeepers deployed under bilateral agreements.
Reconciliation: Touadera highlighted peace accords signed in 2024 and 2025 with several armed factions, including the FPRC (Popular Front for the Renaissance of Central Africa) and MPC (Movement of Central African Patriots).
Development and Infrastructure: Campaign materials touted road construction, school rehabilitation, and improved access to electricity in Bangui.
On election day, international observers were scarce. The African Union (AU) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) decided not to send full observer missions due to logistical constraints and security concerns. Only a limited number of domestic observers were deployed, raising concerns about oversight and accountability.
On January 5, 2026, CENI President Mathias Morouba announced provisional results:
Faustin-Archange Touadera (United Hearts Movement – MUC): 76.15%
Anicet-Georges Dologuele (UNDP): 14.66%
Henri-Marie Dondra (Independent, former PM): 3.19%
Others: Combined ~5%
Turnout: 52.42%
The overwhelming margin and higher-than-expected support in historically opposition-held regions sparked immediate skepticism.
- Allegations of Electoral Fraud and Opposition Response
Opposition leaders rejected the results before they were formally released. Anicet-Georges Dologuele, who won 21.5% in the first round of the 2020 election, held a press conference on January 3, declaring:
“The Central African people spoke on December 28. They expressed a clear desire for change. But their voices have been drowned out by a methodical attempt to manipulate the electoral process.”
Dologuele cited irregularities such as ballot stuffing, phantom polling stations, and lack of access for party agents in certain provinces. Dondra echoed these claims, warning of a “constitutional coup” and calling for regional intervention.
Domestic civil society organizations reported numerous incidents, including:
Closure of polling stations in opposition strongholds in Ouham and Ouaka.
Ballot box seizures in Bambari and Kaga-Bandoro.
Intimidation of voters by armed men in Russian-style uniforms near several voting sites.
Social media posts, later corroborated by satellite imagery and local journalists, showed empty ballot boxes being transported at night, raising suspicions of pre-filled votes.
The government and CENI dismissed all allegations, asserting the integrity of the process. Minister of Territorial Administration Simplice Sarandji stated: “These are the same losers who lost fairly in 2020. Their cries are not of injustice but of bitterness.”
- The Role of Foreign Military Alliances: Russia’s Growing Footprint
One of the most significant geopolitical developments during Touadera’s tenure has been the deepening alliance with the Russian Federation. Since 2018, the CAR has hosted hundreds of military contractors from the Wagner Group—later succeeded by the Africa Corps—and received military equipment, training, and logistical support from Moscow.
By 2025, Russian personnel were embedded in key government institutions, provided personal security to top officials, and participated directly in combat operations against rebel groups. In return, Russia gained access to strategic mineral resources, particularly gold and diamonds, with several mining sites reportedly under Russian control.
This partnership has bolstered Touadera’s regime but at a cost. Human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch and the United Nations Panel of Experts on the CAR, have documented widespread abuses allegedly committed by Russian forces, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and attacks on civilians. A 2024 UN report detailed at least 650 civilian deaths linked to Russian mercenaries.
Nevertheless, Touadera has defended the partnership as essential for counterterrorism and sovereignty, framing Western criticism as neo-colonial interference. Russia, in turn, has consistently supported the CAR government at the UN Security Council and praised the 2025 election as “free and transparent.”
Rwandan troops, deployed under a bilateral agreement in 2023, have also played a significant role in securing urban centers, particularly in the west and south of the country. Their presence, while less controversial than the Russian forces, has sparked debate about foreign influence in CAR’s internal affairs.
- Regional and International Reactions
The international response to the election has been divided:
African Union (AU): Issued a cautious statement calling for dialogue and urging all parties to await the Constitutional Court’s certification of results.
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS): Expressed “concern” over the low turnout and opposition boycott but stopped short of condemning the outcome.
France: Traditionally the former colonial power with waning influence, France described the process as “imperfect” and reiterated support for MINUSCA’s role in protecting civilians.
United States and European Union: Jointly issued a statement noting “serious irregularities” and calling for an independent audit. Both suspended budgetary aid pending further review.
Russia and China: Congratulated Touadera immediately after the results were announced. Russia hailed the election as a “sovereign decision of the Central African people.”
The lack of a unified international stance reflects broader geopolitical competition in Africa, where strategic interests increasingly outweigh democratic conditionality.
- Judicial Review and the Final Certification Process
Under CAR law, the Constitutional Court has 15 days from the announcement of provisional results to adjudicate challenges and certify the final outcome. Opposition candidates have 72 hours from the announcement to file complaints. Dologuele and Dondra submitted formal appeals on January 6, 2026, alleging fraud and irregularities in vote tabulation.
However, the Court has been widely perceived as politically aligned with the executive. Four of its nine judges were appointed by Touadera, and none have ever ruled against a presidential election result since the Court’s re-establishment in 2016. Legal scholars fear the appeals will be dismissed on technical grounds.
The Court’s final decision is expected by January 20, 2026. If it upholds the results, Touadera is expected to be inaugurated in early February for a seven-year term ending in 2033.
- Discussion: Democracy, Stability, and the Hybrid Regime
Touadera’s re-election exemplifies what scholars term a “hybrid regime”—a political system that maintains the façade of democratic institutions while systematically undermining their substantive functioning. Elections are held, but opposition is marginalized, oversight is weakened, and security forces serve regime interests over public accountability.
The CAR case highlights several key trends in contemporary African politics:
Securitization of Politics: Incumbents increasingly justify authoritarian measures as necessary for stability, especially in conflict zones.
Constitutional Manipulation: Leaders use legal reforms to bypass term limits, often with public referenda of questionable legitimacy.
Foreign Patronage: Authoritarian-leaning regimes ally with extra-regional powers (e.g., Russia, China) that offer unconditional support in exchange for strategic or economic benefits.
Erosion of Opposition Unity: Boycotts, while a tactic of protest, often lead to electoral wipeouts and further entrenchment of power.
While Touadera’s government may argue that his victory reflects popular endorsement of stability, the absence of a level playing field, credible oversight, and inclusive participation undermines democratic legitimacy. Moreover, the reliance on foreign mercenaries risks long-term sovereignty erosion and perpetuates cycles of violence.
- Conclusion
The 2025 re-election of Faustin-Archange Touadera marks a critical juncture in the political evolution of the Central African Republic. While the official results depict a sweeping mandate, the reality is far more complex: a nation fractured by conflict, manipulated by constitutional engineering, and reliant on foreign forces for internal security. The election did not resolve CAR’s deep-seated governance challenges but instead reinforced a trajectory toward personalized, insecure, and externally dependent rule.
For the international community, the CAR presents a moral and strategic dilemma: how to promote stability without legitimizing authoritarianism. Supporting peace and development is essential, but so is upholding the principles of democratic governance and human rights.
Moving forward, efforts must be directed toward:
Supporting independent institutions, including the judiciary and electoral commission.
Facilitating inclusive national dialogue that incorporates marginalized voices.
Holding security actors—domestic and foreign—accountable for abuses.
Encouraging a gradual exit strategy from reliance on mercenary forces.
Without such measures, the Central African Republic risks becoming a permanent client-state caught between internal fragility and external domination—a cautionary tale for fragile democracies across the continent.
References
African Union Commission. (2025). Statement on the Central African Republic Presidential Election. Addis Ababa: AU.
Bangui, CENI. (2026). Provisional Results of the Presidential Election, December 28, 2025. Central Electoral Commission.
Human Rights Watch. (2024). “They Came to Kill”: War Crimes in Central African Republic by Russian Forces. New York: HRW.
International Crisis Group. (2025). The Central African Republic: At the Crossroads of Conflict and Reform. Africa Report No. 321.
Jelleff, A. (2023). Term Limit Erosion in Africa: Causes, Consequences, and Resistance. Journal of Democracy, 34(2), 45–59.
MINUSCA. (2025). Quarterly Human Rights Report: October–December 2025. United Nations.
Reuters. (2026). Touadera wins third term in Central African Republic election, results show. January 6, 2026.
United Nations Security Council. (2024). Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic. S/2024/102.
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Keywords: Central African Republic, Faustin-Archange Touadera, electoral authoritarianism, democratic backsliding, Russia-Africa relations, term limits, hybrid regimes, constitutional referendum, election fraud, security governance.