Title:
Controlling the Narrative: Uganda’s Ban on Live Broadcasts of Riots and Unlawful Processions Ahead of the 2026 Presidential Election
Abstract
This paper examines Uganda’s government ban on live broadcasts of riots and “unlawful processions” ahead of the January 15, 2026, presidential election. Framed as a public safety measure by the Ministry of Information, Communication, and Technology (MICT), the ban has been widely criticized by human rights organizations, media watchdogs, and opposition actors as a strategic effort to suppress dissent and obscure state violence. The study analyzes the regulatory, legal, and political context of the ban, situating it within a broader pattern of media control under President Yoweri Museveni’s 40-year rule. Drawing on qualitative analysis of official statements, media reports, NGO documentation, and historical precedents—including the violent 2021 post-election crackdown—the paper argues that the restriction on real-time coverage serves as a tool of narrative manipulation, aimed at minimizing public outrage, deterring mobilization, and shielding state actors from accountability. The paper concludes that such measures undermine democratic legitimacy and highlight the shrinking space for free expression in Uganda, raising urgent concerns for electoral integrity and human rights ahead of the 2026 vote.
Keywords: Uganda, media censorship, electoral suppression, live broadcasts, political repression, Bobi Wine, Yoweri Museveni, digital authoritarianism
- Introduction
On January 5, 2026, Uganda’s Ministry of Information, Communication, and Technology (MICT) issued a directive banning live media coverage of “riots, unlawful processions, and other violent incidents” in the lead-up to the January 15, 2026, presidential election. The government justified the measure as necessary to prevent the incitement of violence and the escalation of public unrest. However, critics broadly interpret the ban as a calculated act of political suppression, designed to curtail the visibility of anti-government protests and limit public access to unfiltered information during a period of heightened political tension.
The 2026 election represents a pivotal moment in Uganda’s political history. President Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, seeks a sixth full term amid growing opposition mobilization led by Robert Kyagulanyi, popularly known as Bobi Wine, the 43-year-old musician-turned-politician and leader of the National Unity Platform (NUP). The opposition’s youth-driven coalition has consistently challenged the legitimacy of electoral processes and demanded political reform, often through mass demonstrations that are frequently met with violent state repression.
This paper investigates the implications of the live broadcast ban within the context of Uganda’s deteriorating media freedom and electoral integrity. It examines the legal justification for the ban, its enforcement mechanisms, and its impact on democratic accountability. Furthermore, it situates the measure within a broader pattern of digital authoritarianism and state control over information—particularly during election cycles—under Museveni’s administration.
- Background and Political Context
2.1 Museveni’s Longevity and the 2026 Election Landscape
President Yoweri Museveni has governed Uganda since January 1986, following a protracted armed struggle that culminated in the overthrow of Tito Okello’s military regime. Initially lauded for restoring political stability and economic growth, Museveni’s tenure has evolved into one of Africa’s longest-standing political regimes. His rule has been marked by constitutional amendments—most notably the removal of presidential term and age limits in 2005 and 2017—that have enabled his continued re-election.
The 2026 election takes place against the backdrop of deepening generational and ideological divides. Museveni, now 81, represents the old guard of liberation-era leadership, whereas his main challenger, Bobi Wine, embodies a new wave of youth politics rooted in social media mobilization, music, and grassroots activism. Wine’s NUP, though officially registered only in 2020, quickly gained traction by channeling widespread frustration over unemployment, corruption, and political exclusion.
Polls conducted by independent institutions such as the Afrobarometer and the Independent Monitoring Group (IMG) in late 2025 suggest a significant shift in voter sentiment, particularly among those under 35—the largest demographic cohort in Uganda. This growing support for opposition forces has increased the regime’s perceived vulnerability, prompting a series of pre-emptive measures aimed at stifling dissent.
2.2 Post-2021 Crackdown and Pattern of Repression
The 2021 presidential election remains a critical reference point for understanding the 2026 context. Bobi Wine, then the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) standard-bearer, rejected Museveni’s victory, alleging systematic electoral fraud, voter intimidation, and Internet shutdowns. In the aftermath, mass protests erupted in Kampala and other urban centers.
The state responded with lethal force. According to Human Rights Watch (2021) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), over 54 civilians were killed, and more than 2,000 were arrested. Security forces were documented using live ammunition, torture, and enforced disappearances. Bobi Wine was detained multiple times, and his campaign headquarters was raided.
Crucially, the government imposed a nationwide Internet and social media blackout during the election and post-election period. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp were blocked, severely limiting independent reporting and the circulation of evidence of state violence. This digital blackout, combined with the absence of live broadcast coverage, created an information vacuum that hindered both domestic and international scrutiny.
The 2021 episode demonstrated the regime’s capacity—and willingness—to manipulate information flows during political crises. The 2026 ban on live broadcasts of “riots” and “unlawful processions” appears to replicate and formalize this strategy.
- The Legal and Regulatory Framework
3.1 Justification for the Ban
In its January 5, 2026 directive, the MICT stated that “real-time broadcasting of violent or unlawful gatherings poses a grave risk to public order and national security.” The ministry argued that such coverage could be exploited by “rogue elements” to incite panic, mobilize further unrest, or conduct psychological warfare against the state. The directive cited Section 24(2) of the Computer Misuse Act (2011, amended 2022), Section 17 of the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act (RICA, 2010), and the Uganda Communications Act (1997) as legal foundations.
These laws collectively empower the government to regulate electronic content, intercept private communications, and license media outlets. Notably, the Computer Misuse Act criminalizes the dissemination of “misleading” or “offensive” information online—a provision widely criticized by civil society for its vagueness and potential for abuse.
The MICT also referenced the Public Order Management Act (POMA) of 2013, which grants police powers to restrict or disperse public assemblies deemed threatening to public order. The term “unlawful procession” is drawn directly from this law, enabling authorities to label any unsanctioned gathering as illegal—even if it is peaceful. By conflating protests with “riots,” the government extends the scope of the broadcast ban to cover nearly all forms of dissent.
3.2 Enforcement Mechanisms
The ban is enforced by a tripartite mechanism:
Uganda Communications Commission (UCC): The national telecommunications regulator, tasked with monitoring broadcast content and issuing sanctions.
Media Council of Uganda (MCU): Empowered to license journalists and media houses, with authority to issue warnings, fines, or suspensions for non-compliance.
Security and Intelligence Services: Including the Internal Security Organization (ISO) and the Military Intelligence Division, which conduct surveillance and intervene in cases of “subversion.”
In the days following the directive, the UCC issued advisories to all licensed broadcasters—both television and radio—warning against live transmission of “any public gathering not pre-approved by police.” Violators risked revocation of broadcast licenses, financial penalties, or criminal prosecution.
Notably, some private media houses, including NTV Uganda and Bukedde Television, suspended live coverage of all political events, citing uncertainty over the boundaries of the prohibition. Journalists reported receiving anonymous threats, and several media platforms restricted access to social media live streams.
- Media Freedom and Democratic Implications
4.1 Historical Erosion of Press Freedom
Uganda’s media environment has deteriorated significantly over the past two decades. According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Uganda ranked 132nd out of 180 countries in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index, down from 99th in 2002. The decline has been attributed to increasing state control, self-censorship, and violence against journalists.
Precedent exists for the suppression of live broadcasts in politically sensitive moments. During the 2016 and 2021 elections, authorities obstructed live reporting of opposition rallies, restricted journalist access, and shut down media houses such as Radio Simba and Red Pepper newspaper. The 2026 ban, however, represents the first time the government has issued a preemptive, nationwide prohibition on such coverage.
4.2 The Role of Real-Time Broadcasting in Accountability
Live broadcasts have become essential tools for documenting human rights violations and mobilizing public opinion. In the digital age, citizen journalism and social media livestreams—particularly via Facebook Live, YouTube, and TikTok—have enabled unfiltered documentation of protests and state responses.
The 2021 protests were widely filmed and shared online, providing compelling evidence of police brutality. These videos circulated globally, drawing condemnation from the UN, EU, and US Department of State. The state’s Internet blackouts were an attempt to disrupt this flow of information.
By banning live broadcasts, the government effectively removes a critical layer of transparency. As argued by Amnesty International (2026), “When the state controls the narrative, it can depict lawful protests as riots, justify violent dispersals, and erase the visibility of victims.” This creates a feedback loop in which repression becomes normalized and accountability diminished.
4.3 Impact on Democratic Legitimacy
Free and fair elections require an informed electorate. The suppression of live coverage undermines the public’s right to access information and reduces the capacity of observers—including domestic civil society and international monitoring groups—to assess electoral conduct.
Moreover, the selective definition of “unlawful” gatherings raises concerns about political bias. Historically, opposition rallies have been denied permits under POMA, while pro-government events face minimal scrutiny. Thus, the broadcast ban disproportionately affects opposition voices and reinforces asymmetrical information flows.
Electoral integrity, as defined by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), depends on transparency, equal opportunity, and freedom of expression. The live broadcast ban directly contravenes these principles.
- The Ban as a Tool of Digital Authoritarianism
The 2026 ban fits within a broader trend of digital authoritarianism observed across several African states, including Ethiopia, Zambia, and Tanzania. Digital authoritarianism refers to the use of technology and information regulation to surveil, manipulate, and repress political opposition and civil society.
In Uganda, this includes:
Internet shutdowns during elections (2016, 2021, and sporadically in 2025).
Social media taxation (via the Over-the-Top Tax introduced in 2018).
Mass surveillance using tools such as the Hacking Team’s spyware, reportedly acquired by Ugandan intelligence.
Content takedowns coordinated through the UCC and social media intermediaries.
The live broadcast ban extends this toolkit into the realm of traditional media, demonstrating the convergence of old and new forms of control. Unlike Internet blackouts, which are temporary and disruptive, the current measure creates a legal and normative framework for sustained censorship under the guise of public order.
As noted by Deibert (2022) in Reset: Reclaiming the Internet for Civil Society, authoritarian regimes are increasingly moving from “sledgehammer” tactics (like total shutdowns) to “scalpel” strategies—targeted, legally sanctioned controls that are harder to challenge domestically or internationally.
- Opposition Response and Civil Society Critique
The ban has been condemned by opposition leaders, media rights organizations, and human rights defenders.
Bobi Wine, in a statement released from hiding (where he has been since December 2025, citing security threats), described the ban as “a declaration of war against truth.” He warned that “they will kill in silence, disappear people at night, and tell us it was peace.”
Domestic civil society groups such as Chapter Four Uganda and the Center for Media Studies and Peacebuilding (CEMESP) have launched legal challenges, arguing that the directive violates Article 29 of the Ugandan Constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression. However, courts have historically shown deference to executive authority on matters of “security.”
International actors, including the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) and the US State Department, have expressed concern. The EU called the ban “a serious impediment to meaningful electoral observation,” while Freedom House labeled it a “red flag” for democratic regression.
Nonetheless, diplomatic responses have remained largely rhetorical. No significant sanctions have been imposed, and multinational telecom providers continue to operate under Ugandan regulations without public resistance.
- Conclusion and Recommendations
The Ugandan government’s ban on live broadcasts of riots and unlawful processions ahead of the 2026 presidential election is a watershed moment in the country’s descent into information authoritarianism. While officially justified as a public safety measure, the directive serves a clear political function: to minimize scrutiny of state violence, delegitimize opposition mobilization, and consolidate control over the national narrative.
The ban operates within a broader ecosystem of repression that includes Internet shutdowns, legal harassment of journalists, and the criminalization of dissent. Its implementation ahead of a high-stakes election—between an aging autocrat and a popular youth leader—reflects deep-seated anxiety within the ruling establishment about its waning legitimacy.
Electoral integrity cannot be upheld when information is selectively suppressed. Transparency, accountability, and freedom of expression are not luxuries; they are prerequisites for democracy.
Recommendations:
Repeal the broadcast ban as inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of free expression.
Reform POMA and the Computer Misuse Act to eliminate vague, punitive clauses used to target dissent.
Ensure judicial independence so courts can adjudicate on media freedom without executive interference.
Support independent media through international funding and technical assistance.
Impose targeted sanctions on state officials responsible for human rights abuses during past and future elections.
Strengthen regional oversight through the East African Community (EAC) and African Union (AU) to uphold democratic standards.
Uganda stands at a crossroads. If the 2026 election is to be free and fair, the flow of information must remain unimpeded. Controlling the broadcast of riots does not prevent violence—it enables it.
References
Amnesty International. (2021). Uganda: “We Are Being Silenced”: Crackdown on Dissent Ahead of and After the 2021 Elections.
Amnesty International. (2026). Statement on Uganda’s Broadcast Ban. Kampala: AI Uganda Office.
Center for Media, Democracy and Development (CMDD). (2025). Media Freedoms in Uganda: Annual Report 2025.
Deibert, R. (2022). Reset: Reclaiming the Internet for Civil Society. Toronto: House of Anansi Press.
Human Rights Watch. (2021). “They Did Not Even See Us as Human”: Killings and Arbitrary Arrests in Uganda’s 2021 Elections.
Media Council of Uganda. (2025). State of the Media in Uganda: 2025 Annual Report.
Ministry of ICT. (2026). Press Release No. 01/2026: Directive on Live Broadcasting of Unlawful Gatherings.
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2021). Report on the Human Rights Situation in Uganda Following the 2021 Presidential Election.
Reporters Without Borders. (2025). World Press Freedom Index 2025: Uganda Profile.
Uganda Communications Commission. (2026). Advisory to Broadcasters on Coverage of Public Assemblies.
Uganda Constitution. (1995, revised 2023). Articles 29, 43, and 229.
US Department of State. (2026). Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uganda 2025.
African Union. (2025). Election Observation Mission Preliminary Statement: Uganda 2026.