In November 2025, residents of 29 historic Housing and Development Board blocks in Tiong Bahru cast their ballots on a seemingly straightforward question: Should their aging flats undergo government-funded improvements? For 27 blocks, the answer was yes. But for two small buildings—Block 34 Kim Cheng Street and Block 35 Lim Liak Street—the outcome exposed a fundamental flaw in how Singapore manages its oldest public housing.
Block 34 needed just two more votes. Block 35, a mere single vote. Despite overwhelming majority support, these decades-old flats built in 1949 will remain without critical upgrades, their residents left to manage leaking pipes and crumbling concrete on their own. This razor-thin failure has sparked a national conversation about democratic thresholds, the unique challenges of small housing blocks, and the looming question of what happens when Singapore’s public housing truly grows old.
The Mathematics of Frustration
The numbers tell a stark story. At Block 34 Kim Cheng Street, which houses only 24 units, 16 households voted in favor of the Home Improvement Programme, two voted against, and six did not vote at all. That translates to a 67% approval rate among eligible voters—substantial support by any reasonable measure, yet falling short of the mandatory 75% threshold by the narrowest of margins.
Block 35 Lim Liak Street presents an even more agonizing scenario. With just 15 units, 11 residents voted yes while four didn’t vote. Had a single additional household cast a ballot in favor, the entire block would have qualified for comprehensive upgrades including structural repairs, plumbing replacements, and elderly-friendly modifications.
Robin Loi, 70, has lived in his three-room flat at Block 34 since the 1970s. The cast-iron pipes in his service yard, hastily patched when they burst three years ago, continue to leak. “Rather than having a re-poll,” he told reporters, “I hope the authorities could carry out some improvements in the flats that need sprucing up, as a compromise.”
His frustration is understandable. These aren’t ordinary HDB blocks—they’re four-storey walk-up flats constructed 76 years ago by the Singapore Improvement Trust, the colonial-era predecessor to HDB. They represent some of the oldest public housing in Singapore, buildings that have housed generations of families and witnessed the nation’s entire modern history.
Why Small Blocks Face Impossible Odds
The 75% voting threshold, while seemingly reasonable for larger blocks, becomes mathematically punishing for smaller ones. In a typical 100-unit block, 25 households can abstain or vote no while still allowing the measure to pass. But in a 15-unit block like Block 35, just four non-participating households can derail the entire process.
Several factors make voting particularly challenging in these smaller, older blocks. Many units are tenant-occupied, and while tenants cannot vote, absentee landlords—often living overseas—may be difficult to reach or simply unresponsive to polling efforts. Some owners have recently renovated their flats and question whether government-subsidized improvements would benefit them. Others intended to vote but couldn’t attend on polling day, and their support went uncounted.
The result is a perverse outcome where overwhelming community support proves insufficient. When 67% or 73% of residents actively support improvements but fall short of the threshold, the program designed to help them instead leaves them stranded.
This isn’t the first time HDB has confronted this problem. In 2017, Block 316 Serangoon Avenue 2 failed its initial poll but was granted a second chance, eventually passing with enough votes to proceed with upgrading works. Similarly, three blocks in Lengkong Tiga that initially fell short were re-polled in 2023, ultimately gaining approval. The precedent for re-voting exists, though it’s not automatic.
The Essential vs. The Impossible
Understanding what’s at stake requires examining what the Home Improvement Programme actually delivers. Launched in 2007 to address common maintenance problems in aging HDB estates, HIP has allocated over $4 billion to upgrade nearly 381,000 flats across Singapore.
The program consists of three components. Essential improvements—fully government-funded for Singapore citizens—address critical safety and structural issues including spalling concrete repair, ceiling leak repairs, replacement of deteriorating pipes, and water tank upgrades. These aren’t cosmetic enhancements; they’re fundamental maintenance that becomes increasingly necessary as buildings age.
Optional improvements, heavily subsidized at up to 95%, allow residents to upgrade toilets, replace entrance doors, and modernize their living spaces. The Enhancement for Active Seniors program provides grab bars, slip-resistant flooring, and wheelchair ramps to help elderly residents age safely in place.
For the residents of Blocks 34 and 35, the failure to meet the voting threshold means none of these improvements will materialize through HIP. They’ll continue managing aging infrastructure on their own, likely at greater individual expense and with less systematic coordination than the comprehensive government program would have provided.
A System Under Scrutiny
National Development Minister Chee Hong Tat’s response to the Tiong Bahru situation signals that change may be coming. Speaking to reporters in early January 2026, he acknowledged the need to “strike a balance between upgrading older flats and respecting the decisions of flat owners,” noting that blocks with fewer units face particular challenges in meeting the threshold.
“What’s the best way to design the voting process so that we are able to achieve a good outcome?” Chee posed the question publicly, committing the Ministry of National Development and HDB to studying the voting process and consulting stakeholders on better ways to manage it.
This review couldn’t come at a more critical time. Singapore’s public housing is aging rapidly, and HIP represents just one piece of a larger puzzle involving how the nation manages the lifecycle of buildings designed to last 99 years. The challenge extends far beyond these two Tiong Bahru blocks—it’s a harbinger of issues that will affect hundreds of thousands of flats as they enter their sixth, seventh, and eighth decades.
Consider the scope: HDB flats built in 1997 or earlier are now eligible for their first round of HIP upgrades. In February 2025, the government announced that 29,000 additional flats across Choa Chu Kang, Pasir Ris, Tampines, and Jurong West would undergo HIP improvements, with over $407 million allocated for the work.
But what happens to flats that are even older? This is where HIP II enters the picture—a second round of more extensive upgrades planned for flats reaching the 60-to-70-year mark. Details remain scarce, but the program aims to ensure buildings remain safe and livable until the end of their 99-year leases.
The VERS Connection: Democracy’s Double Edge
The voting threshold question takes on heightened significance when considering the Voluntary Early Redevelopment Scheme, Singapore’s planned successor to the limited Selective En-bloc Redevelopment Scheme. While VERS won’t roll out until the early 2030s, the government is already studying what voting threshold would be appropriate.
VERS will allow residents of flats aged 70 years and older to vote on whether the government should buy back their homes before the 99-year leases expire, enabling comprehensive redevelopment. Unlike the highly selective SERS, which covered only about 5% of flats in high-value locations, VERS is designed to be more inclusive, potentially affecting major estates like Queenstown, Toa Payoh, and Bukit Merah.
Minister Chee has emphasized his desire to avoid a “bunching effect” where many flats of similar age are redeveloped simultaneously. “It will be very disruptive for the residents and for the businesses,” he explained. “Instead, what we want to do is to spread this out so that we do it in an orderly manner.”
The democratic principle underlying both HIP and VERS—that residents should have a say in their housing’s future—is admirable. But democracy can produce frustrating outcomes when supermajority requirements collide with small populations. If a 15-unit block requires 75% approval for HIP improvements, what threshold should govern a decision as consequential as whether an entire precinct undergoes early redevelopment?
Set the bar too high, and willing participants may be held hostage by a small minority. Set it too low, and dissenting residents could be forced into life-altering decisions they oppose. The Tiong Bahru case suggests Singapore may need different thresholds for different block sizes, or alternative mechanisms that account for the mathematical realities of small communities.
The Broader Housing Crisis Lurking
The immediate story is about two blocks and a flawed voting system. But zoom out, and what emerges is a preview of challenges that will intensify dramatically over the coming decades.
Singapore’s first major wave of HDB construction occurred in the 1960s through 1980s, a frantic push to house a rapidly growing population. The oldest of these flats are now crossing into territory where serious structural concerns emerge. Reinforced concrete, even in well-maintained buildings, degrades over time. Plumbing systems fail. Electrical infrastructure becomes outdated and potentially dangerous.
Between 2030 and 2050, tens of thousands of HDB flats will reach ages where comprehensive redevelopment becomes not just desirable but potentially necessary. The government estimates this will require carefully staged interventions stretched over two to three decades to avoid overwhelming the housing system.
This creates a multi-layered challenge. First, there’s the physical challenge of maintaining aging buildings while ensuring resident safety. Second, there’s the financial challenge—both for the government funding these programs and for residents who may need to relocate or contribute to upgrading costs. Third, there’s the social challenge of managing disruption to established communities.
And underlying all of it is the fundamental question of lease decay. HDB flats are sold on 99-year leases, meaning that as buildings age, the remaining lease shortens and theoretical value declines. For many Singaporeans, their HDB flat represents their largest asset and a key component of retirement planning. What happens when that asset depreciates simply because of time passing?
VERS is designed partly to address this, providing an exit strategy before leases completely expire. But it’s voluntary and dependent on majority voting—creating uncertainty for owners trying to plan their financial futures. Flats in their 50s and 60s may see reduced buyer interest as potential purchasers worry about lease decay and unclear VERS prospects.
International Lessons and Local Realities
Singapore’s situation is relatively unique globally. Most developed nations with significant public housing stocks operate on rental rather than ownership models, or have freehold rather than leasehold arrangements. The combination of widespread homeownership, 99-year leases, and an entire nation built largely on public housing creates challenges few other countries face.
Hong Kong offers some parallels with its extensive public housing, but properties there are primarily rentals. The United Kingdom sold off much of its council housing to tenants in the 1980s, but those buildings were typically transferred as freehold properties. Singapore’s model—mass homeownership through long-term leases on government land—is distinctive.
This means Singapore is, in many ways, charting new territory. The solutions it develops for managing aging leasehold public housing at scale could provide lessons for other rapidly urbanizing nations, particularly in Asia, where similar models exist or are emerging.
Voices from the Ground
The human dimension of these policy questions emerges in the voices of affected residents. They’re not debating abstract housing policy—they’re watching their homes deteriorate while navigating bureaucratic processes that seem to work against their interests.
At a preliminary poll conducted earlier in 2025, all 29 Tiong Bahru blocks appeared likely to meet the threshold. A previous poll in 2019 had suggested 10 blocks would fall short, leading to a decision to defer HIP at that time. The November 2025 vote was supposed to be the long-awaited green light for comprehensive improvements.
That two blocks came so close only to fall short has left residents in limbo. They know their flats need work. They know government subsidies would make that work affordable and comprehensive. They voted yes in substantial numbers. And yet the system said no.
Tanjong Pagar GRC Member of Parliament Foo Cexiang has indicated that affected residents could get a second chance to vote in 2026, depending on the level of support. A town hall was planned for early December 2025 to discuss options. But even the possibility of re-polling doesn’t resolve the underlying structural problem—that the current threshold is poorly calibrated for small blocks.
Possible Solutions and Their Trade-offs
Several potential reforms could address the challenges exposed by the Tiong Bahru case, each with distinct advantages and drawbacks.
Variable thresholds based on block size: Smaller blocks could have lower thresholds—perhaps 60% or 65%—acknowledging that a few dissenting or absent households shouldn’t be able to block overwhelming majority support. However, this risks seeming arbitrary and could be seen as undermining minority rights in small communities.
Absolute vote requirements: Instead of percentages, require a minimum number of “no” votes to block a measure. For instance, HIP could proceed unless at least five households actively vote against it. This would distinguish between active opposition and mere non-participation. The challenge is determining appropriate numbers and explaining why non-votes shouldn’t count.
Differentiated programs: Essential safety improvements could proceed with lower thresholds than optional cosmetic upgrades, recognizing that some maintenance is genuinely necessary regardless of preferences. This adds complexity but might better balance community input with practical needs.
Block clustering: For very small blocks, voting could occur at a neighborhood level rather than building-by-building, pooling votes across multiple structures. This would reduce the impact of individual non-participation but might force improvements on buildings where residents are genuinely opposed.
Financial incentives: Non-participating households could be required to contribute a higher share of costs if improvements eventually proceed, incentivizing participation. This might increase voting rates but could also feel punitive.
Each approach involves philosophical questions about democratic legitimacy, practical questions about implementation, and political questions about fairness and perception. There’s no obvious right answer—only trade-offs between competing values.
The Path Forward
Minister Chee’s commitment to reviewing the voting process represents an important acknowledgment that current mechanisms aren’t working optimally. The consultation with stakeholders he’s promised will be crucial—these decisions affect not just policy experts but hundreds of thousands of residents whose homes and neighborhoods are at stake.
The review should examine not just voting thresholds but the entire engagement process. Are residents receiving adequate information about what HIP provides and why it matters? Are there barriers to voting that could be addressed through better accessibility or alternative voting methods? How can the process distinguish between residents who actively oppose improvements and those who simply didn’t engage?
International examples of community decision-making around building maintenance and improvements could provide useful models, even if Singapore’s specific context is unique. Condominium management corporations in Singapore itself deal with similar issues when deciding on major capital improvements, though their governance structures differ from HDB’s public housing framework.
Most importantly, any reforms must be completed relatively soon. With HIP II on the horizon and VERS scheduled to begin rolling out in the 2030s, the stakes for getting community decision-making processes right are only increasing. The two Tiong Bahru blocks that narrowly missed their chance at improvements are canaries in the coal mine—signals of a system that needs refinement before it faces much larger challenges.
Beyond Two Blocks
The story of Blocks 34 and 35 is, in one sense, about a minor administrative hiccup affecting a few dozen households in a historic Singapore neighborhood. The buildings will continue standing, residents will continue living there, and life will go on much as it has for decades.
But in another sense, this episode is about something much larger: how Singapore manages the inevitable aging of infrastructure built during the nation’s formative decades. It’s about balancing democratic principles with practical governance needs. It’s about ensuring that well-intentioned systems don’t produce absurd outcomes. And it’s about preparing for a future where these questions will only become more urgent and more widespread.
The government’s decision to study the voting process is encouraging. More important will be the solutions that emerge from that study—whether they address not just the technical question of thresholds but the deeper challenge of enabling communities to collectively care for their aging homes in ways that are both democratic and functional.
For Robin Loi and his neighbors at Block 34, for the residents of Block 35, and for the thousands of Singaporeans living in similarly aging flats across the island, these aren’t academic questions. They’re about whether the leaking pipes will be fixed, whether the crumbling concrete will be repaired, whether their homes will receive the care needed to last their remaining decades.
Two votes shouldn’t make all the difference. The fact that they do reveals not a catastrophic failure but a design flaw—one that Singapore, with its characteristic approach to solving problems through careful study and systematic reform, seems positioned to address. The question is whether solutions will come quickly enough, and whether they’ll be adequate for the much larger challenges looming on the horizon.
The future of Singapore’s public housing depends not just on concrete and steel, but on the processes and policies that determine how decisions get made. Tiong Bahru’s two blocks have provided a valuable lesson. Now comes the harder work of learning from it.