A bold regulatory gambit aims to revive SGX by linking it directly to Nasdaq, but success hinges on market momentum and execution
When the Monetary Authority of Singapore announced proposals on January 9 to facilitate dual listings between the Singapore Exchange and Nasdaq, it marked the culmination of years of soul-searching about the city-state’s struggling equity markets. The Global Listing Board represents Singapore’s most ambitious attempt yet to reclaim its status as a premier Asian financial hub—but it also exposes just how far the local bourse has fallen from its glory days.
A Market in Need of Revival
The context for these reforms cannot be understated. Singapore’s stock market has languished for years, plagued by thin trading volumes, limited retail participation, and a steady exodus of companies choosing to list elsewhere. While regional rivals like Hong Kong and even newer competitors like Vietnam have attracted high-growth technology companies, SGX has struggled to shake its reputation as a sleepy market dominated by banks, property developers, and commodity traders.
The GLB initiative, first unveiled in November 2025 as part of the MAS Equity Market Review Group’s recommendations, represents a fundamental reimagining of Singapore’s role in global capital markets. Rather than competing head-to-head with New York or Hong Kong, Singapore is positioning itself as a bridge—a gateway that allows companies to access both American capital and Asian investor bases simultaneously.
What’s Actually Changing
The proposed reforms are more radical than they might initially appear. By allowing companies to use a single set of offer documents incorporating US prospectus requirements, MAS is essentially harmonizing Singapore’s listing regime with American standards. This isn’t just administrative streamlining; it’s a philosophical shift that acknowledges the primacy of US capital markets and accepts that Singapore must adapt to American norms rather than the reverse.
The shortened prospectus registration process is particularly significant. Under current rules, Singapore requires IPO prospectuses to be publicly available for at least seven days before registration—a cooling-off period meant to protect investors but one that creates timing mismatches with the faster US process. The proposed change would allow Singapore registration to occur as soon as the US registration statement becomes effective, enabling true simultaneous listings.
Perhaps most tellingly, the introduction of three “safe harbors” mirroring US protections for forward-looking statements, share buybacks, and pre-determined trading plans represents a wholesale import of American legal frameworks. Companies listing on the GLB will essentially operate under US-style rules even when they’re technically listed in Singapore.
The Devil in the Requirements
While MAS and SGX RegCo are rolling out the red carpet, they’re only doing so for a select class of companies. The eligibility criteria reveal much about what Singapore hopes to attract—and what it’s willing to leave behind.
The two billion dollar minimum market capitalization requirement immediately excludes the vast majority of potential issuers. This isn’t about helping Singaporean startups access capital; it’s about attracting large, established companies that are already sophisticated enough to navigate Nasdaq’s requirements. SGX is essentially admitting it can’t compete for smaller IPOs and is focusing its energy on landing bigger fish.
The requirement that GLB companies must already be listed or accepted for listing on the Nasdaq Global Select Market—the exchange’s highest tier—makes the hierarchy even clearer. Singapore isn’t offering an alternative to Nasdaq; it’s offering an add-on for companies that have already made it in America.
The mandatory allocation of at least 5% or $50 million of the offering to Singapore retail brokers is a concession to local investors and a recognition that the GLB needs to deliver tangible benefits to ordinary Singaporeans, not just create another playground for institutional investors. Yet whether retail investors will actually participate in meaningful numbers remains an open question.
Winners and Losers
If the GLB succeeds, the potential benefits for Singapore are substantial. The most immediate impact would be on trading volumes. Even if GLB companies conduct the bulk of their trading in the US, having their shares available in Singapore could significantly boost local market activity, particularly if time zone advantages allow Asian investors to trade during their business hours.
For Singapore’s financial services industry, the GLB represents a lifeline. Investment banks, law firms, accounting practices, and compliance advisers would all benefit from the increased deal flow. As Robson Lee of Legal Solutions noted, there’s an immediate need for professionals knowledgeable in both US and Singapore capital market requirements—exactly the kind of high-value work Singapore wants to attract.
The reputational benefits could be even more significant. If major technology companies or other high-growth businesses choose to dual-list on the GLB, it would signal that Singapore remains relevant in global capital markets. The city-state’s brand as a financial center has always rested partly on perception, and landing prestigious listings could shift momentum in its favor.
But the risks are equally substantial. If the GLB launches to crickets—if few companies choose to participate or if those that do conduct minimal trading in Singapore—it would be a very public failure that could further damage SGX’s credibility. The initiative also faces the chicken-and-egg problem that David Gerald of the Securities Investors Association (Singapore) implicitly acknowledged: investors need to be educated about these new opportunities, but that education only matters if there are actually exciting companies to invest in.
The Execution Challenge
The success of the GLB will ultimately depend on factors largely outside Singapore’s control. As Lee observed, attracting new issuers depends on “the Singapore market sustaining the upswing momentum seen since the second half of 2025.” If global markets turn bearish or if Singapore’s recent rally proves short-lived, companies will have little incentive to add the complexity of a dual listing.
The availability of competent intermediaries is another crucial variable. Conducting a dual listing requires issue managers, underwriters, and placement agents who understand both markets intimately and can navigate the regulatory requirements in both jurisdictions. Singapore’s financial services industry will need to rapidly build this expertise, and there’s no guarantee they can do so before the GLB’s mid-2026 launch.
The safe harbor provisions, while well-intentioned, introduce their own complications. As Lee noted, the provisions “as presently drafted, are not congruent with US requirements, which could be a source of confusion and uncertainty.” If Singapore’s safe harbors are interpreted differently than their American counterparts, companies could face regulatory arbitrage challenges or, worse, find themselves liable in one jurisdiction but not the other.
A Broader Reckoning
The GLB initiative is symptomatic of a broader challenge facing Singapore: how to remain competitive as a financial center when the gravitational pull of larger markets grows ever stronger. The city-state built its success on offering superior infrastructure, lighter regulation, and lower taxes than competitors. But as other Asian jurisdictions have modernized and as the sheer scale of markets like New York and Shanghai has grown, Singapore’s traditional advantages have eroded.
The decision to essentially subordinate Singapore’s listing requirements to American standards is pragmatic but also represents a kind of surrender. Singapore is acknowledging it cannot set the agenda and must instead make itself as easy as possible for companies that have already decided Nasdaq is their primary market.
This raises uncomfortable questions about Singapore’s long-term positioning. If the GLB succeeds, will it revitalize local capital markets or simply turn SGX into a time-zone-adjusted trading venue for American-listed securities? Will Singapore develop its own distinct value proposition, or will it become increasingly dependent on riding the coattails of US market success?
The Geopolitical Dimension
There’s also a geopolitical subtext to the GLB that shouldn’t be ignored. At a time when US-China tensions have made Hong Kong a more complicated choice for international listings, Singapore is positioning itself as a more neutral alternative. A company dual-listed on Nasdaq and SGX can access Asian capital without the political complications of a Hong Kong or Shanghai listing.
This could be particularly appealing for Southeast Asian technology companies or for businesses that want exposure to Asian growth markets while maintaining their primary listing in the US. If trade tensions continue or deepen, Singapore’s role as a bridge between East and West could become increasingly valuable.
However, this positioning also exposes Singapore to risks. If US-China relations deteriorate further, Singapore could find itself pressured to choose sides. The GLB’s dependence on Nasdaq means Singapore’s market is now more directly tied to American regulatory decisions and geopolitical considerations.
What Success Looks Like
For the GLB to be deemed successful, Singapore likely needs to attract at least 10 to 15 substantial dual listings within the first two years. These need to be companies with genuine Asian operations or customer bases—not just US firms conducting token listings to check a box. Trading volumes in Singapore for GLB securities would need to reach meaningful levels, ideally representing at least 10 to 15 percent of global trading in those shares.
More broadly, the GLB needs to spark a wider revitalization of SGX. If it attracts only dual listings while the rest of the market continues to stagnate, it will have failed in its deeper purpose. The goal should be to create momentum that lifts all boats—encouraging more IPOs generally, attracting more retail participation, and increasing trading volumes across the board.
The Road Ahead
The consultation period closes on February 8, and if the proposals proceed as expected, the GLB could launch by mid-2026. The coming months will be crucial for building the infrastructure, training professionals, and—most importantly—convincing companies that a Singapore listing is worth the additional complexity and cost.
Singapore has a history of bold regulatory innovations, from its founding as a financial center to its early embrace of fintech. The GLB is very much in this tradition: a calculated bet that by adapting quickly and creatively to changing market realities, the city-state can create new opportunities for itself.
But history also shows that financial center status is fragile and that markets can shift quickly. Amsterdam and Genoa were once the centers of global finance. London’s dominance has waned. Even Hong Kong’s position, once seemingly unassailable, has been shaken by political upheaval.
Singapore’s challenge is to remain relevant in an era of mega-markets and digital trading, where the traditional advantages of geography and regulation matter less than they once did. The Global Listing Board may be remembered as either the initiative that revived SGX or as a desperate gambit that highlighted just how limited Singapore’s options had become. The answer will likely become clear not in 2026 when the GLB launches, but in 2028 or 2029, when we can see whether it sparked genuine market transformation or merely added another unused tool to the regulatory toolkit.
For now, the financial community watches and waits, hopeful but cautious, aware that Singapore’s aspirations to bridge Wall Street and Asian markets may be exactly what the region needs—or may be asking the impossible of a market that has yet to prove it can compete with the giants on either side of the Pacific.