Case Study: The January 2026 Iranian Uprising

Background and Triggers

The current wave of protests erupted on December 28, 2025, initially driven by traders in Tehran protesting a severe currency crisis. The Iranian rial collapsed, losing nearly 80% of its value over the preceding year, devastating purchasing power and living standards for ordinary Iranians. What began as economic grievances rapidly transformed into the largest anti-government demonstrations Iran has witnessed in years, potentially rivaling the scale of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Key Characteristics

Economic Catalyst, Political Evolution: The protests followed a familiar pattern in Iranian unrest where economic hardship serves as the initial spark, but underlying political grievances against the regime quickly dominate. Chants evolved from economic complaints to explicit calls for regime change, including “Death to the dictator” and direct references to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Nationwide Scope: Unlike localized protests, demonstrations spread across all 31 provinces, suggesting deep and widespread discontent that transcends regional, ethnic, or sectarian divisions. Footage showed participation from diverse demographics, notably including many elderly protesters, indicating broad societal frustration.

Opposition Leadership: Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last shah, attempted to coordinate protest activities from abroad, calling for demonstrators to occupy city centers and urging strategic strikes in critical sectors including oil, gas, and transportation. This represents an effort to provide organized direction to what might otherwise remain spontaneous uprisings.

Government Response

The Iranian authorities deployed a multi-layered suppression strategy:

Information Blackout: A nationwide internet and telecommunications shutdown was imposed on January 8, 2026, effectively cutting Iran off from the outside world and preventing protesters from coordinating or documenting government actions.

Violent Crackdown: Security forces employed live ammunition against protesters. Death toll estimates vary significantly, from at least 28 documented by Amnesty International to 65 reported by the Human Rights Activists News Agency, with some sources citing over 200 fatalities in Tehran alone.

Legal Intimidation: Iran’s prosecutor general declared all protesters would be charged as “enemies of God,” a broadly defined offense punishable by death under Islamic law, with trials to proceed “without leniency, compassion, or indulgence.” Nearly 200 alleged protest leaders were arrested.

Military Mobilization: Iran’s regular army publicly pledged loyalty to Supreme Leader Khamenei and committed to protecting strategic infrastructure, while state media blamed “armed terrorists” for the violence.

International Dimension

The protests have attracted significant international attention. President Donald Trump warned Iran against killing protesters, while European leaders called for restraint. Oman’s Foreign Minister visited Tehran on January 10, potentially serving as a mediator, continuing Oman’s historical role as an intermediary between Iran and Western powers.

Outlook: Three Scenarios

Scenario 1: Regime Survives Through Suppression (Most Likely – 60% probability)

Iran’s security apparatus remains formidable. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Basij militia, and regular army have historically demonstrated willingness to use lethal force to preserve the regime. The current protests, despite their scale, face several challenges:

• Lack of unified leadership within Iran: While Pahlavi provides external coordination, no single charismatic leader has emerged domestically to rally protesters around a coherent alternative vision.
• Organizational disadvantages: The internet blackout severely hampers coordination, while security forces maintain command-and-control infrastructure.
• International support limitations: Western nations express rhetorical support but show little appetite for direct intervention that might tip the balance.
• Historical precedent: The regime successfully suppressed the 2009 Green Movement and 2019-2020 protests using similar tactics.

Outcome: Protests gradually subside over 2-4 weeks as fatigue sets in, arrests decimate leadership, and violent suppression raises the cost of participation. The regime emerges weakened but intact, potentially implementing minor economic concessions while intensifying domestic surveillance and control.

Scenario 2: Prolonged Instability and Erosion (30% probability)

The protests persist at varying intensities, creating rolling waves of unrest that the regime cannot fully extinguish but protesters cannot convert into decisive change:

• Economic strikes materialize: If workers in Iran’s oil sector heed Pahlavi’s call for strikes, this could significantly damage government revenues and demonstrate organized resistance capacity.
• Security force defections: Even limited defections or refusals to fire on protesters could embolden demonstrations and create cascading loyalty crises.
• Regional spillover: Ethnic minority regions, particularly Sunni-majority areas like Zahedan and Kurdish regions, could sustain parallel resistance movements.

Outcome: Iran enters a period of chronic instability lasting 6-18 months, with episodic protests, economic dysfunction, and gradual erosion of regime legitimacy. This scenario might eventually transition to either regime collapse or successful suppression, but creates an extended period of uncertainty.

Scenario 3: Regime Collapse and Transition (10% probability)

A confluence of factors triggers rapid regime disintegration:

• Military splits: Senior military commanders defect or refuse orders to fire on civilians, fracturing the security apparatus.
• Mass general strikes: Nationwide work stoppages in critical sectors paralyze government functions and oil exports.
• Supreme Leader incapacitation: Ayatollah Khamenei, age 86, suffers health crisis or dies, creating succession uncertainty that protesters exploit.

Outcome: The Islamic Republic falls within 3-6 months, but what follows remains highly uncertain. Possibilities range from Pahlavi’s return and restoration of constitutional monarchy, to a military transitional government, to factional civil conflict, to emergence of a democratic movement. Regional powers (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel) and global actors (US, Russia, China) would actively maneuver to shape outcomes.

Impact on Singapore

Economic and Trade Relations

Direct Trade Exposure (Limited): Singapore’s direct trade with Iran is minimal due to longstanding international sanctions. According to Singapore Customs data, bilateral trade has remained below $500 million annually in recent years, representing less than 0.1% of Singapore’s total trade. The immediate economic impact on Singapore from Iranian instability is therefore limited.

Energy Market Implications (Moderate): While Singapore does not import oil from Iran, instability in Iran affects global energy markets:

• Oil price volatility: Prolonged Iranian unrest, particularly if it disrupts oil production or threatens Strait of Hormuz transit, could push crude oil prices upward. Singapore, as a major oil refining and trading hub, would experience both opportunities (higher refining margins) and challenges (increased costs for businesses and consumers).
• LNG market effects: Uncertainty in Middle Eastern gas supplies could tighten Asian LNG markets, potentially affecting Singapore’s gas imports and electricity costs.
• Bunkering impact: Higher fuel prices could affect Singapore’s maritime bunkering industry, though the city-state’s strategic position would likely preserve its competitive advantage.

Geopolitical and Regional Security

Wider Middle East Stability: Iranian regime change or prolonged instability would fundamentally reshape Middle Eastern geopolitics:

• Regional proxy conflicts: Iran’s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq and Syria, and Houthis in Yemen could weaken or intensify depending on circumstances, affecting regional stability that indirectly impacts global trade routes Singapore depends on.
• Nuclear program uncertainty: A collapsing regime might accelerate nuclear weapons development as a survival strategy, or alternatively, a successor government might abandon the program, dramatically altering regional security calculations.
• Refugee flows: Major instability could generate significant refugee movements, potentially affecting Southeast Asian nations and testing regional migration management.

US-China Dynamics: Iran represents a potential flashpoint in US-China competition:

• Chinese interests at risk: China is Iran’s largest trading partner and has significant investments in Iranian infrastructure and energy sectors. Iranian instability would damage Chinese economic interests and complicate Beijing’s Middle East strategy.
• US strategic opportunity: Washington would view Iranian regime change as a major geopolitical victory, potentially shifting focus and resources toward other priorities, including the Indo-Pacific.

Singapore must navigate these great power dynamics carefully, maintaining its principles of non-interference while preserving relationships with all major powers.

Financial and Business Hub Implications

Sanctions and Compliance: Singapore’s position as a global financial center requires strict adherence to international sanctions regimes. Iranian regime change could create several scenarios:

• Sanctions relief: A pro-Western successor government could lead to sanctions removal, opening new business opportunities for Singapore companies in Iranian reconstruction and trade.
• Sanctions intensification: Prolonged chaos might trigger additional sanctions or asset freezes affecting entities connected to Iran, requiring enhanced compliance vigilance from Singapore’s financial institutions.
• Secondary sanctions risk: Singapore companies with any Iranian exposure must remain alert to potential secondary sanctions from the US or EU.

Regional Business Confidence: Prolonged Middle Eastern instability could affect business confidence in emerging markets more broadly, potentially redirecting investment flows toward stable hubs like Singapore. This could benefit Singapore’s real estate, financial services, and corporate services sectors.

Diplomatic and Foreign Policy Considerations

ASEAN Coordination: Singapore would likely coordinate closely with ASEAN partners on any collective response, particularly if instability generates humanitarian crises or affects ASEAN citizens in Iran or the broader region.

Multilateral Engagement: As a strong supporter of international law and the UN system, Singapore would advocate for peaceful resolution and may support humanitarian assistance initiatives while maintaining its principle of non-interference in internal affairs.

Diaspora Considerations: Singapore hosts Iranian expatriates and businesses. Regime change could affect this community’s status, remittances, and connections to Iran, requiring sensitive management.

Strategic Recommendations for Singapore

Energy Security: Continue diversifying energy sources and supply routes to reduce vulnerability to Middle Eastern disruptions. Accelerate investments in renewable energy and regional gas pipeline connections.

Economic Monitoring: Financial authorities should monitor potential spillover effects on oil prices, currency markets, and regional trade flows, maintaining readiness to deploy stabilization measures if needed.

Diplomatic Preparedness: Develop scenario-based diplomatic responses for various outcomes in Iran, including plans for humanitarian assistance, sanctions compliance adjustments, and business opportunity assessment.

Business Advisory: Trade promotion agencies should provide regular updates to Singapore companies with Middle East exposure, helping them navigate risks and identify opportunities as the situation evolves.

Regional Coordination: Strengthen intelligence sharing and policy coordination with ASEAN partners, Australia, and other regional stakeholders to ensure collective preparedness for various scenarios.

Conclusion

The January 2026 Iranian protests represent a potential inflection point for the Islamic Republic, though history suggests the regime’s survival remains the most likely outcome. For Singapore, direct impacts are limited given minimal bilateral economic ties, but indirect effects through energy markets, regional stability, and great power competition warrant careful monitoring. Singapore’s strategic interests lie in stability and predictability, but the city-state must prepare for multiple scenarios while maintaining its principled, non-interventionist foreign policy stance. The situation remains fluid and requires continued vigilance across diplomatic, economic, and security dimensions.