Title: Greenland’s Strategic Future: The Case for NATO Defense and the Rejection of Unilateral Takeover
Author: [Your Name]
Affiliation: Department of International Relations, [University Name]
Date: January 15, 2026
Journal: Journal of Arctic Security and Geopolitics
Abstract
This paper examines the evolving security discourse surrounding Greenland, focusing on its government’s recent declaration advocating for NATO-led defense as an alternative to unilateral U.S. military control. In light of increasing geopolitical competition in the Arctic—driven by climate change, resource accessibility, and great power rivalry—Greenland’s autonomous administration has asserted its preference for a multilateral defense framework under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The study analyzes the political, legal, and strategic dimensions of this position, particularly in response to former U.S. President Donald Trump’s repeated calls for the acquisition of Greenland. Drawing on official statements, policy documents, and geopolitical analysis, this paper argues that Greenland’s alignment with NATO reflects not only a strategic calculation but also a reaffirmation of its constitutional status within the Kingdom of Denmark and its commitment to international cooperation. Furthermore, the paper explores the implications of such a defense posture for NATO’s Arctic role and the broader transatlantic security architecture.
Keywords: Greenland, NATO, Arctic security, U.S.-Denmark relations, territorial sovereignty, great power competition, multilateralism
- Introduction
On January 12, 2026, the Government of Greenland issued a formal statement calling for the defense of the Arctic territory to be conducted under the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while explicitly rejecting renewed U.S. ambitions to acquire the island. This declaration marks a significant development in Arctic geopolitics, occurring against a backdrop of heightened strategic competition between the United States, Russia, and China over access to the increasingly accessible Arctic region. As melting ice expands navigation routes and unlocks vast mineral and energy resources, Greenland has emerged as a critical node in the Arctic security landscape.
Despite being an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland’s geopolitical importance has attracted external interest—most notably from former U.S. President Donald Trump, who publicly advocated for the purchase of the island in 2019 and again during his 2024 campaign. In response, Greenland’s coalition government has reaffirmed its sovereignty and opted for collective defense through NATO as the preferred mechanism for ensuring its security.
This paper investigates the motivations behind Greenland’s push for NATO-led defense, evaluates the feasibility and implications of such a policy, and situates the debate within broader discussions on Arctic militarization, sovereignty, and alliance politics. It further considers the European Union’s role in Arctic affairs, particularly through Commissioner Andrius Kubilius’s warning that any unilateral U.S. military takeover of Greenland would jeopardize NATO’s integrity.
- Background: Greenland’s Autonomy and Strategic Significance
2.1 Political Status
Greenland is an autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, having attained Home Rule in 1979 and expanded self-governance under the Self-Government Act of 2009. This act grants Greenland extensive control over internal affairs, including natural resource management, justice, and policing, while foreign policy and defense remain constitutionally the responsibility of Denmark. However, Greenland may negotiate international agreements in areas of self-rule, provided they do not conflict with Denmark’s overarching foreign and security policy.
The 2009 Act also established the possibility of full independence, contingent upon a referendum and resolution of fiscal self-sufficiency, particularly in light of declining Danish block grants and the island’s nascent economic development.
2.2 Geopolitical and Economic Importance
Greenland’s location between North America and Europe renders it strategically vital. Situated across critical air and maritime corridors, it hosts key installations such as Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), a U.S. military facility used for missile warning, space surveillance, and satellite command—functions integral to U.S. and NATO early-warning systems.
Moreover, Greenland is estimated to possess substantial untapped mineral wealth, including rare earth elements (REEs), uranium, and zinc—materials essential for modern technologies and green energy infrastructure. With climate change reducing ice cover, previously inaccessible regions are becoming viable for exploration, drawing interest from global powers seeking supply chain diversification beyond China-dominated REE markets.
- U.S. Interest in Acquiring Greenland: Historical and Contemporary Context
3.1 Historical Precedents
U.S. interest in Greenland dates back to World War II, when the United States established a presence on the island through agreements with Denmark. The 1951 U.S.-Denmark Defense Agreement formalized the American military footprint, allowing for the operation of bases like Thule. During the Cold War, Greenland was a frontline in early-warning and radar systems designed to detect Soviet missile launches.
In 1946, the U.S. government under President Harry Truman reportedly offered $100 million to purchase Greenland from Denmark—an offer swiftly rejected. The proposal reflected U.S. strategic thinking that control over Greenland was essential for hemispheric defense.
3.2 Trump’s Revival of the Purchase Proposal
In 2019, then-President Donald Trump reignited debate by publicly suggesting the United States should buy Greenland. He cited China’s growing investments in the Arctic and potential Russian militarization as justification. While widely dismissed as diplomatically tone-deaf, the proposal underscored a deeper strategic anxiety in Washington about losing influence in the Arctic.
Trump reiterated these ambitions during his 2024 presidential campaign, framing Greenland as a “necessary acquisition” to prevent foreign domination and ensure American dominance in the High North. Such rhetoric, however, provoked sharp rebukes from Danish officials and Greenlandic leaders alike.
- Greenland’s Response: Sovereignty, Autonomy, and the Call for NATO Defense
4.1 Rejection of U.S. Acquisition Attempts
The Government of Greenland responded swiftly to Trump’s overtures, emphasizing that the island “belongs to Greenlanders” and is not for sale. Prime Minister Múte Egede stated in 2019: “We are not for sale and we do not want to be bought.” The renewed discussion in 2026 prompted renewed affirmations of this stance.
In its January 12, 2026, statement, the coalition government declared: “All NATO member states, including the United States, have a common interest in the defence of Greenland.” This phrasing is notable for its inclusion of the U.S. within a collective framework, suggesting a preference for cooperation over coercion.
4.2 Advocacy for NATO as the Defense Framework
Greenland’s endorsement of NATO-led defense represents a strategic pivot toward multilateralism. Instead of aligning bilaterally with the United States—despite deep military and intelligence ties—the government is advocating a defense posture embedded in the alliance’s institutional framework.
This move serves multiple purposes:
Preservation of Sovereignty: By situating defense under NATO, Greenland avoids dependency on any single power, particularly the United States, which could undermine its autonomy or provoke Danish-Greenlandic tensions.
Diplomatic Legitimacy: NATO membership (via Denmark and allied states) provides a legal and collective security umbrella under Article 5, deterring aggression through shared deterrence.
Influence in Decision-Making: Participation in NATO structures—even indirectly—allows Greenland to shape defense policies affecting its territory, ensuring local concerns are considered.
Furthermore, Greenland’s position aligns with Denmark’s broader strategic orientation. Copenhagen has long viewed NATO as the cornerstone of its foreign and defense policy. By advocating for NATO defense, Greenland reinforces its integration into Danish and transatlantic security structures.
- The European Union’s Stance and the Risks to NATO Unity
European Union Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius issued a stark warning on January 12, 2026, stating that a U.S. military takeover of Greenland would signal “the end of NATO.” This dramatic assessment underscores the institutional fragility of the alliance in the face of unilateral actions by major powers.
Kubilius’s concern rests on several foundations:
Violation of Alliance Principles: NATO is founded on consensus, collective defense, and respect for sovereignty. A unilateral acquisition of a territory belonging to a member state (Denmark) would breach these norms, eroding trust.
Precedent Setting: If one member state were to absorb part of another’s territory for strategic reasons, it could open the door to territorial revisionism elsewhere, especially in sensitive regions like the Baltic or Eastern Europe.
Strain on Transatlantic Relations: Such a move would severely damage U.S.-European relations, potentially leading to a realignment of European defense policy independent of Washington.
Kubilius’s remarks also reflect growing EU ambitions to play a greater role in Arctic governance, particularly in areas of environmental protection, scientific research, and sustainable development. While the EU is not an Arctic state, it recognizes climate change and security spillovers as existential concerns.
- NATO’s Evolving Role in the Arctic
6.1 Strategic Shifts
NATO has increasingly prioritized the Arctic in its strategic planning. The 2022 Strategic Concept identified the region as a domain of growing military activity, particularly due to Russian modernization of Arctic forces and increased patrols. In 2023, NATO established the Atlantic Council’s High North Study Group to assess Arctic security challenges.
NATO conducts regular exercises in the High North, including Trident Juncture and Nordic Response, involving Allied forces from Canada, Norway, the U.S., and others. These drills emphasize rapid reinforcement, cold-weather operations, and maritime domain awareness.
6.2 Legal and Logistical Challenges
Despite growing engagement, NATO does not currently have a formal Arctic command or dedicated defense plan for Greenland. Responsibility remains with Denmark and its partners. However, Greenland’s call for NATO-led defense may prompt institutional adjustments.
Key challenges include:
Environmental Sensitivity: Military buildup in fragile Arctic ecosystems risks environmental degradation, potentially undermining public support in Greenland and Denmark.
Indigenous Rights: The Inuit population constitutes the majority in Greenland, and any military expansion must consider their rights, livelihoods, and cultural preservation.
Infrastructure Limitations: Greenland’s vast size and lack of transportation networks complicate military logistics and emergency response.
Nonetheless, NATO could support Greenland through:
Joint surveillance initiatives using space-based assets.
Cyber and hybrid threat defense cooperation.
Capacity-building in search-and-rescue and emergency management.
- Implications for Arctic Governance and International Law
Greenland’s position reinforces the primacy of international law and multilateral institutions in managing Arctic affairs. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the legal foundation for maritime claims and resource rights, while the Arctic Council serves as the primary forum for intergovernmental cooperation among the eight Arctic states.
By advocating for NATO—rather than unilateral military control—Greenland upholds the post-Cold War international order based on rule-based cooperation. This stands in contrast to revisionist approaches that prioritize power politics over institutional legitimacy.
Moreover, the rejection of U.S. acquisition attempts reaffirms the principle of self-determination. While Greenland is not fully independent, its government exercises significant authority over its political trajectory. Any future changes in status must emerge from democratic processes within Greenland, not external pressure.
- Conclusion
Greenland’s January 2026 call for NATO-led defense represents a pivotal moment in Arctic geopolitics. It reflects a mature and strategic approach to security—one that balances the territory’s growing global importance with its commitment to sovereignty, autonomy, and multilateralism. By rejecting unilateral acquisition attempts and advocating for collective defense, Greenland positions itself not as a prize to be claimed, but as a participant in shaping its own future.
The case underscores several broader trends:
The Arctic is no longer a frozen periphery but a central theater of global strategic competition.
Small and autonomous territories are asserting agency in international affairs.
Alliances like NATO face both opportunities and stresses as they adapt to new domains.
For NATO, Greenland’s appeal offers a chance to deepen its Arctic role while reinforcing alliance cohesion. For the United States, it is a reminder that leadership requires partnership, not possession. And for Greenland, the path forward lies not in isolation or annexation, but in integration—within Denmark, within NATO, and within the global community.
References
Government of Greenland. (2026, January 12). Statement on Greenland’s Defense and Sovereignty. Nuuk: Office of the Prime Minister.
Kubilius, A. (2026, January 12). Remarks at EU Defence Summit, Brussels. European Commission.
U.S. Department of State. (1951). Agreement between Denmark and the United States of America relating to the Defense of Greenland.
Danish Parliament. (2009). Act on Greenland Self-Government, Act No. 473 of 12 June 2009.
NATO. (2022). Strategic Concept 2022. Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division.
Reuters. (2025, April 2). NATO Flag at Headquarters in Brussels. [File Photo: Yves Herman]
Pew Research Center. (2019). Trump’s Greenland Comments Spark International Debate.
Lanteigne, M. (2023). China and the Arctic: Ambitions and Challenges in Polar Governance. Palgrave Macmillan.
Heininen, L., & Southcott, C. (2021). The Arctic Yearbook 2021: Arctic Geopolitics and Security. Akureyri: Northern Research Forum.
United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).