Pacts, Patronage and Fear: How Myanmar’s Junta Chief Holds On to Power: An Analysis of Authoritarian Strategy and Survival in Contemporary Myanmar

Abstract

This paper examines the mechanisms by which Myanmar’s junta chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, has consolidated and sustained power since the 2021 coup. Drawing on public discourse, regional analysts’ insights, and historical parallels, the study identifies three core strategies underpinning his regime: elite pacts, economic patronage, and institutionalized fear. The analysis situates these tactics within broader debates on authoritarian resilience, coup dynamics, and the interplay of military governance in Southeast Asia. It concludes that while Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership has mitigated immediate rebellion through strategic alliances and repression, the junta’s long-term stability remains contingent on external alliances, ethnic conflict outcomes, and evolving public sentiment.

Introduction

Myanmar’s 2021 coup, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, marked a dramatic rupture in the country’s precarious democratic experiments since 2010. Despite escalating civil conflict, international condemnation, and widespread domestic resistance, the junta chief has retained authority through a calculated blend of coercion, calculated political maneuvering, and economic leverage. This paper analyzes how Min Aung Hlaing has institutionalized his grip on power, focusing on the interplay of elite pacts, military patronage, and fear-based governance. By situating his strategies within broader scholarly frameworks on authoritarian survival, the paper contributes to understanding how military regimes navigate crises of legitimacy in the 21st century.

The Junta Chief’s Ascent and Contextual Challenges

Min Aung Hlaing, a 69-year-old general with a law degree and decades of military experience, became commander-in-chief of Myanmar’s armed forces in 2010—a period marked by the military’s gradual disengagement from direct political control. Yet, unlike his predecessors, Min Aung Hlaing cultivated networks beyond the barracks, engaging ethnic leaders, Buddhist monks, and regional elites even before the 2021 coup [1]. His decision to seize power in February 2021 followed the electoral victory of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), which the junta accused of electoral fraud. The coup triggered an unprecedented civil war, displacing over 3 million people and entrenching armed resistance from ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and anti-junta militias [2].

By 2026, the junta faces a fragmented nation: rebel forces control borderlands, NLD-aligned parties are dissolved or exiled, and international sanctions isolate the regime. Yet Min Aung Hlaing’s strategic flexibility has enabled him to avoid total collapse.

Strategies of Power: Pacts, Patronage, and Fear

  1. Elite Pacts and Institutional Loyalty

Min Aung Hlaing has preserved military unity through a combination of institutional pacts and selective repression. As Naing Min Khant, a Myanmar-focused analyst, notes, “Power-sharing is managed through elite pacts embedded within the officer corps, where regime survival is closely tied to collective officer survival” [3]. This strategy includes:

Patronage to loyalists: High-ranking generals are appointed to lucrative positions in state-linked businesses, ensuring financial incentives for compliance.
Suppression of rivals: Potential successors within the military, such as rival commanders, are periodically court-martialed or detained, deterring internal dissent [4].
Ethnic alliances: The junta has selectively engaged ethnic ceasefire groups, leveraging negotiations to fragment anti-regime coalitions and buy time.

These pacts reflect a transactional model of authority, where loyalty is secured through material rewards and the threat of exclusion.

  1. Economic Patronage and Resource Control

Myanmar’s junta has retained oligarchic control over critical economic sectors, including jade and gemstone trade, telecommunications, and banking. By channeling profits to military-linked enterprises and key allies, Min Aung Hlaing sustains a corruption-fueled patronage network. This “resource-dependent oligarchy” allows the regime to placate elites and essential personnel despite the economy’s collapse [5]. For example, junta-aligned businesses reportedly generated over $2 billion annually from illicit trade by 2023 [6].

Patronage also extends to diplomatic allies, particularly China and Russia. Beijing’s tacit support, including arms sales and bypassing sanctions, has been pivotal in averting junta collapse [7]. In return, Min Aung Hlaing has aligned with Chinese interests, such as maintaining stability in border regions critical to Beijing’s infrastructure projects.

  1. Fear-Based Governance and Repression

Coercion remains the regime’s blunt instrument. The Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) has executed summarily, displaced communities, and deployed counterinsurgency tactics against civilian populations. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) records over 16,600 civilian deaths since 2021 [8]. This violence serves two purposes:

Deterrence: Demonstrating the junta’s capacity to retaliate against dissent.
Control: Eroding trust within anti-junta networks through fear of retribution.

Fear is institutionalized via state-controlled media and religious rhetoric. Buddhist nationalism, amplified by the regime, frames the conflict as a defense against “foreign” ethnic and religious threats, rallying moderate support and justifying brutality [9].

Resistance, Fragmentation, and the Limits of Authority

Despite his strategies, Min Aung Hlaing faces systemic challenges. The ethnic dimension of the conflict, with EAOs like the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) gaining terrain, has exposed the junta’s weakening grip on peripheral regions. Urban uprisings, such as Myitsone and Mong La, reveal a disillusioned middle class [10]. Additionally, the junta’s “pseudo-election” in 2026, criticized as a farce, did little to restore legitimacy, as Suu Kyi’s NLD and other opposition forces boycotted the polls [11].

Min Aung Hlaing’s reliance on militarization and patronage creates inflexibility. As former military officials note, “The regime cannot adapt to modern governance because its legitimacy is tied to war” [12]. Without reconciliation with the NLD, ethnic groups, or international bodies, the junta’s survival may depend on external factors like Chinese appeasement or ASEAN inaction.

Conclusion

Min Aung Hlaing’s survival hinges on a precarious balance of elite management, economic plunder, and terror. While his tactics have averted immediate collapse, they have also deepened Myanmar’s divisions and entrenched the junta as a pariah regime. The interplay of pacts, patronage, and fear mirrors broader patterns in authoritarian survival, yet Myanmar’s case is unique in its confluence of ethnic strife, resource dependency, and democratic backsliding. The longevity of his regime will likely depend not on domestic transformation but on the junta’s ability to exploit external buffers and fragment opposition. Future research should explore how asymmetric warfare and transnational networks of dissent might further challenge this equilibrium.

Footnotes
Naing Min Khant, Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar, interview with Reuters, 2026.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Humanitarian Action Plan for Myanmar,” 2023.
ibid.
Reuters interviews with six sources familiar with junta dynamics, 2026.
Moe Thaw, “Resource Wars and Regime Sustainability in Myanmar,” Asian Survey, 2025.
Financial Transparency Coalition, “Illicit Flows in Post-Coup Myanmar,” 2023.
BBC Monitoring, “China’s Role in Sustaining Myanmar’s Junta,” 2025.
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 2026.
David I. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know, 2021.
Reuters, “Urban Uprisings and the Limits of Junta Power,” 2026.
BBC News, “Myanmar’s Rigged Election: A Proxy of Authoritarian Control,” 2026.
Former foreign official, interviewed by Reuters, 2026.]