Title: Regulating Digital Dominance: An Analysis of China’s Antitrust Probe into Trip.com and the Broader Implications for the Online Travel Industry
Abstract
This paper examines the antitrust investigation launched by China’s State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) into Trip.com, the country’s largest online travel agency (OTA), in January 2026. The probe, initiated over allegations of monopolistic practices, including abuse of dominant market position, coercive contract terms, arbitrary commission increases, and traffic manipulation, marks a significant development in China’s ongoing campaign to regulate digital platform dominance. Drawing on legal, economic, and policy frameworks, this study analyzes the factual and regulatory context of the investigation, evaluates Trip.com’s market conduct in relation to China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), and situates the case within broader trends of digital market regulation in China and globally. The paper also explores the implications for platform governance, small business protection, and competitive fairness in the digital economy. It concludes with policy recommendations aimed at balancing innovation, market efficiency, and equitable competition.
I. Introduction
On January 14, 2026, China’s antitrust watchdog, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), announced the launch of a formal investigation into Trip.com Group Ltd., the nation’s leading online travel platform, on suspicion of monopolistic behavior (SAMR, 2026). While SAMR did not disclose specific details of the alleged violations, the inquiry is grounded in preliminary reviews under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), which prohibits abuse of a dominant market position, anti-competitive agreements, and abusive concentration of market power (National People’s Congress, 2007). Trip.com, in response, stated it was “actively cooperating” and would “fully implement regulatory requirements” (Trip.com, 2026a).
The investigation follows a wave of complaints from the Yunnan Homestay Operators Association, which in December 2025 accused Trip.com and other OTAs of engaging in coercive practices such as unilateral commission hikes, algorithmic traffic suppression, and unfair contractual clauses (YHOA, 2025). These allegations highlight growing tensions between dominant digital platforms and small-to-medium-sized tourism enterprises in China’s rapidly digitizing travel economy.
This paper provides a comprehensive academic analysis of the Trip.com antitrust probe, assessing its legal foundations, economic implications, and policy significance. It situates the case within the broader context of China’s intensified regulatory scrutiny of digital platforms, a trend exemplified by past actions against Alibaba, Meituan, and Tencent, and explores the implications for market fairness, regulatory legitimacy, and the future of platform capitalism in Asia.
II. Background: The Rise of Trip.com and Market Concentration in China’s OTA Sector
A. Trip.com’s Market Dominance
Trip.com Group, formerly Ctrip, is the largest online travel platform in China and one of the most prominent globally. Formed through a series of mergers and acquisitions—most notably the 2015 merger with Qunar and the acquisition of Skyscanner in 2016—Trip.com has achieved dominant market share in key segments of China’s digital travel ecosystem. According to iResearch (2025), Trip.com controls approximately 48% of China’s online hotel booking market and 42% of flight ticket sales via digital platforms. Its dominance is further reinforced by vertical integration across accommodation, transportation, tours, and enterprise travel services.
In the third quarter of 2025, Trip.com reported a 16% year-on-year increase in net revenue, with accommodation reservations rising 18% year-on-year (Trip.com, 2025). This sustained growth, particularly in a post-pandemic recovery phase, reflects its strong brand recognition, expansive technological infrastructure, and strategic partnerships with domestic and international tourism providers.
B. Market Structure and Competitive Landscape
China’s OTA market is highly concentrated. The “Big Three”—Trip.com, Meituan, and Alipay Travel—control over 85% of digital travel transactions (iResearch, 2025). This concentration raises structural concerns about barriers to entry, pricing power, and ecosystem lock-in. Smaller platforms and independent operators increasingly depend on these gatekeepers for visibility and access to customers.
Trip.com’s integration with Baidu, UnionPay, and local government tourism portals further entrenches its position as a central node in the digital travel value chain. Meanwhile, algorithmic ranking, promotional placements, and proprietary booking systems give the platform significant influence over consumer choice and supplier revenue.
III. Legal Framework: China’s Anti-Monopoly Law and Digital Platforms
A. The Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) and Abuse of Dominance
China’s AML, enacted in 2008 and amended in 2022 to address digital economy challenges, establishes a comprehensive regime for antitrust enforcement. Article 17 prohibits any enterprise in a dominant market position from engaging in abusive conduct, including:
Selling goods below cost to eliminate competitors (predatory pricing);
Imposing unfair prices or trading conditions;
Refusing to deal with certain counterparties without justification;
Forcing exclusive dealing;
Implementing discriminatory treatment;
Bundling or tying products or services.
The 2022 amendments explicitly recognized digital platforms as entities subject to special scrutiny, particularly in relation to data-driven market power, self-preferencing, and algorithmic manipulation (State Council, 2022).
B. Determination of Market Dominance
Under AML guidelines, dominance is assessed through market share, financial strength, technological capability, access to data and user networks, and dependency of counterparties. The 2022 Guidelines on Anti-Monopoly in the Platform Economy clarify that a market share exceeding 50% in a relevant market may be considered prima facie evidence of dominance (SAMR, 2022a).
In Trip.com’s case, its control over key distribution channels for lodging and flights, combined with its ecosystem integration and first-party data advantages, suggests a strong likelihood of dominant status in several narrowly defined markets, such as mobile-based hotel booking in tier-1 Chinese cities.
IV. Allegations and Evidence: Practices Under Scrutiny
A. Coercive Contractual Clauses
Complaints from the Yunnan Homestay Operators Association (YHOA) allege that Trip.com imposes unilateral terms on lodging providers, including:
Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clauses: Requiring homestays to offer identical or lower prices on Trip.com than on competing platforms.
Exclusive booking incentives: Pressuring small operators to prioritize Trip.com through preferential commission structures.
Unilateral commission increases: Raising service fees without negotiation or advance notice, sometimes from 10% to 25% overnight (YHOA, 2025).
These practices may constitute “unfair pricing” and “abuse of counterparty dependency” under AML Article 17.
B. Algorithmic Manipulation and Traffic Blocking
YHOA and independent analysts allege that Trip.com manipulates search rankings and suppresses visibility for providers who resist commission hikes or use rival platforms. This includes:
Delisting or burying listings in search results;
Downgrading user ratings algorithmically;
Reducing promotional exposure for non-compliant suppliers.
Such behavior mirrors findings in the European Commission’s case against Google Shopping, where algorithmic bias was deemed illegal under EU competition law (Case C-23/14, 2017).
While not yet proven, these allegations—if substantiated—could violate Article 17’s prohibition on “refusal to deal” and “discriminatory treatment.”
C. Predatory Expansion and Lock-In Strategies
Trip.com’s aggressive bundling of services (e.g., flights + hotels + insurance) and integration with financial products (e.g., travel credit, installment plans) may raise concerns about tying and leveraging dominance across markets. The 2022 AML Guidelines explicitly caution against such practices in digital ecosystems.
V. Regulatory Context: China’s Crackdown on Platform Monopolies
The Trip.com probe is part of a broader regulatory push that began in 2020, targeting perceived excesses in China’s tech sector. Key milestones include:
2021: SAMR fined Alibaba RMB 18.2 billion ($2.8 billion) for enforcing exclusive dealing agreements with merchants (anti-competitive agreements under AML Article 14).
2022: Meituan was fined RMB 3.4 billion for predatory pricing and MFN clauses in food delivery.
2024–2025: Regulatory actions against Tencent, ByteDance, and Didi for data misuse and anti-competitive practices.
More recently, Chinese authorities have shifted focus from punitive enforcement to systemic market reform, emphasizing “fair competition” as a prerequisite for innovation and common prosperity (Xi, 2023). In late 2025, SAMR announced a “Year of Fair Competition” initiative, targeting excessive price wars, predatory discounting, and supplier exploitation in e-commerce, livestreaming, and travel (SAMR, 2025b).
The Trip.com investigation signals the government’s intent to extend this agenda to the tourism sector, where digital platforms now mediate over 75% of bookings (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2025).
VI. Economic and Policy Implications
A. Market Efficiency vs. Competitive Fairness
While dominant platforms generate economies of scale, reduce transaction costs, and enhance consumer convenience, their market power can distort competition. High commission fees (often 15–25%) squeeze margins for small homestays and rural guesthouses, many of which operate on narrow profit margins.
Evidence from Yunnan and Guizhou suggests that some operators have been forced to exit the market or shift to offline-only models due to platform fees and visibility constraints (Chen & Liu, 2025).
B. Innovation and Entrepreneurial Entry
Excessive platform control may deter innovation. Startups developing niche travel services (e.g., eco-tourism, cultural experiences) must negotiate unfavorable terms to gain visibility, reducing incentives for product differentiation.
Moreover, reliance on closed algorithmic ecosystems limits data portability and interoperability, raising concerns about long-term market resilience.
C. Consumer Impact
While consumers benefit from price transparency and convenience, algorithmic manipulation and bundled pricing may reduce genuine choice. If platforms prioritize high-commission products or exclusive partners, users may be steered away from better-value alternatives.
VII. Comparative Perspectives: Global Antitrust Trends
China’s probe reflects wider global scrutiny of digital gatekeepers:
European Union: The Digital Markets Act (DMA) designates “gatekeeper” platforms and bans self-preferencing, unjustified data use, and anti-competitive bundling.
United States: The FTC has filed lawsuits against Amazon and Apple for similar practices, though enforcement remains fragmented.
India: The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has investigated MakeMyTrip and OYO for exclusive contracts and unfair pricing.
China’s approach is distinctive in its speed, administrative authority, and integration with industrial policy. Unlike adversarial litigation models in the West, SAMR’s investigations are administrative, allowing rapid intervention based on preliminary evidence.
VIII. Trip.com’s Response and Corporate Governance
Trip.com has publicly committed to full cooperation and regulatory compliance (Trip.com, 2026a). The company also announced the formation of a “Fair Marketplace Task Force” to review supplier contracts, commission policies, and algorithmic transparency (Trip.com, 2026b).
While this proactive stance may mitigate penalties, it also underscores the reputational and operational risks associated with regulatory non-compliance. The case may prompt Trip.com to adopt international best practices in platform governance, including:
Transparent ranking algorithms;
Standardized, negotiable commission tiers;
Independent dispute resolution mechanisms;
Data-sharing protocols with smaller partners.
IX. Legal and Financial Consequences
If found in violation, Trip.com could face fines of 1% to 10% of its previous year’s domestic revenue under AML Article 47. Based on its 2025 revenue of approximately RMB 48 billion (SAMR, 2026), potential penalties range from RMB 480 million to RMB 4.8 billion (~$670 million).
Beyond fines, SAMR may impose behavioral remedies, such as:
Prohibition of exclusive dealing;
Mandated access for rival platforms to Trip.com’s inventory;
Requirements to publish algorithmic rules;
Establishment of an independent compliance monitor.
Structural remedies (e.g., divestiture) remain rare in Chinese antitrust enforcement but could be considered if the investigation reveals entrenched market foreclosure.
X. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The antitrust investigation into Trip.com represents a pivotal moment in China’s effort to balance innovation with market fairness in the digital economy. While Trip.com has played a vital role in modernizing China’s tourism industry, its market power must be exercised responsibly to avoid harming small businesses and distorting competition.
This paper argues for a proportional, evidence-based regulatory approach that safeguards competition without stifling growth. Specific recommendations include:
SAMR should issue sector-specific guidelines for OTAs, clarifying permissible commission structures, algorithmic transparency, and supplier rights.
Establish a dispute resolution mechanism for small tourism enterprises to contest unfair platform practices.
Promote data portability and interoperability to enable multi-platform listing and reduce lock-in.
Encourage third-party audits of algorithmic ranking systems to ensure neutrality.
Integrate antitrust enforcement with tourism development policy, supporting digital inclusion for rural and SME operators.
Finally, China’s experience with Trip.com offers valuable lessons for other jurisdictions grappling with platform dominance. As digital intermediaries become central to modern economies, robust, adaptive, and transparent regulatory frameworks are essential to uphold the principles of fair competition and equitable growth.
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