Title: The Longevity of Power: Yoweri Museveni’s Quest for a Seventh Term and the Political Trajectory of Uganda (1986–2026)
Abstract
This paper examines the political career of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda since 1986, in the context of his bid for a seventh term in office amid growing domestic opposition and international scrutiny. The study analyzes the evolution of Museveni’s governance model—from revolutionary leader to entrenched autocrat—highlighting the contradictions between early promises of democratic reform and decades of centralized rule, electoral manipulation, and systemic corruption. Drawing on historical narratives, scholarly analysis, and contemporary media reports, the paper explores the mechanisms of regime survival, including co-optation, security-state apparatuses, foreign diplomatic alignment, and constitutional engineering. It also assesses the socio-economic outcomes of nearly four decades of NRM rule, particularly in education, employment, and public service delivery. The paper concludes that Museveni’s prolonged tenure reflects broader trends of democratic backsliding in East Africa and raises critical questions about leadership succession, institutional decay, and the future of multiparty democracy in Uganda.
- Introduction
On January 16, 2026, Uganda prepared to hold its seventh general election since Yoweri Museveni seized power in 1986. At 81 years old, Museveni—leader of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM)—sought re-election in a campaign marked by tight restrictions on political opposition, media censorship, and allegations of voter suppression. His bid for a seventh five-year term underscored an extraordinary political longevity: over 40 years in power, making him one of the longest-serving non-royal heads of state in modern African history.
Museveni once declared, “The problem of Africa… is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power” (Museveni, 1986). Ironically, he now embodies the very phenomenon he once denounced. This paper interrogates the paradox of Museveni’s rule: how a leader who rose to power on anti-dictatorship rhetoric has presided over an increasingly authoritarian regime. It addresses three central questions:
How has Museveni maintained power for nearly four decades?
What has been the impact of his prolonged rule on Uganda’s democracy and development?
What are the implications of his seventh-term campaign for Uganda’s political future?
The analysis draws on academic literature, official records, civil society reports, and interviews with political analysts, including insights from Professor Kristof Titeca of the University of Antwerp, a leading scholar on Ugandan politics.
- Historical Background: From Rebel Leader to Head of State
Yoweri Museveni was born in 1944 in Ntungamo, in southwestern Uganda, to a family of Hima pastoralists. Educated at Ntare School and later at the University of Dar es Salaam, he was exposed to Marxist-Leninist ideologies and anti-colonial movements during the 1960s and 1970s. His early political activism included involvement in Tanzania-based opposition groups opposed to Idi Amin’s regime.
In 1979, Museveni formed the Popular Resistance Army (PRA), later reconstituted as the National Resistance Army (NRA), launching a guerrilla insurgency against the post-Amin governments of Milton Obote and Tito Okello. After a five-year bush war, the NRA captured Kampala in January 1986, and Museveni was sworn in as president.
His inaugural speech promised a “fundamental change in the politics of our government” (Museveni, 1986), rejecting multiparty democracy temporarily in favor of a “no-party” Movement system, which he argued would foster national unity and prevent tribalism. This marked the beginning of a hybrid regime combining militarized governance with selective democratic practices.
- The Political Architecture of Longevity
3.1 Constitutional Engineering and Electoral Manipulation
Museveni’s tenure has been sustained through legal and extra-legal strategies aimed at neutralizing political competition. In 2005, under pressure from donors and civil society, Uganda reverted to a multiparty system. However, subsequent constitutional amendments—including the removal of presidential term limits in 2005 and age limits in 2017—enabled Museveni to run indefinitely.
The 2017 constitutional amendment, which abolished the 75-year age cap for presidential candidates, sparked mass protests and was widely condemned by human rights organizations. Opposition leader Kizza Besigye called it a “constitutional coup” (HRW, 2017). By 2026, the electoral framework remained skewed: opposition rallies were frequently banned, candidates arrested, and electoral commissions staffed with NRM loyalists.
Elections under Museveni have consistently been rated as neither free nor fair by international observers. The 2021 polls, which saw Museveni re-elected with 58.6% of the vote amid allegations of ballot stuffing and internet shutdowns, were described by the EU Election Observation Mission as “marred by serious irregularities” (EU EOM, 2021). Similar concerns loomed over the 2026 election.
3.2 Repression and Co-optation
The regime has employed a dual strategy of repression and co-optation. Security forces, including the Military Intelligence Division and Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI), routinely detain opposition figures. The 2020–2021 campaign period saw the arrest of presidential candidate Bobi Wine (Robert Kyagulanyi) on multiple occasions, and dozens of his supporters were killed in state-led crackdowns.
Simultaneously, Museveni has co-opted potential rivals through patronage networks. Regional leaders, religious figures, and business elites are often incorporated into the NRM structure through appointments, contracts, or subsidies. This clientelist system ensures loyalty while fragmenting opposition coalitions.
As Kristof Titeca (2023) notes, “Corruption has been central to his rule from the beginning.” State resources are systematically redistributed among loyalists, reinforcing regime stability at the expense of institutional integrity.
3.3 Foreign Relations and Strategic Alignment
Internationally, Museveni has cultivated strong relationships with Western powers, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, by positioning Uganda as a key security partner in East Africa. The Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) has deployed troops to Somalia as part of AMISOM and supported regional stabilization efforts in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
These contributions have earned Uganda significant foreign aid and diplomatic goodwill, despite governance deficits. According to U.S. State Department reports, Uganda received over $1 billion annually in bilateral assistance in the early 2020s, much of it channeled through health and security programs (U.S. GAO, 2022).
Additionally, Uganda hosts one of the largest refugee populations in Africa—over 1.5 million as of 2025—predominantly from South Sudan and the DRC. This humanitarian role has enhanced its international image and secured funding from agencies like UNHCR and the World Bank.
- Governance Record: Development Amidst Decay
4.1 Economic Reforms and Growth
In the 1990s, Museveni’s government implemented structural adjustment programs under IMF and World Bank guidance, privatizing over 120 state-owned enterprises. While macroeconomic indicators improved—GDP grew at an average of 6% annually between 1990 and 2010—the benefits were unevenly distributed.
Critics argue that privatization processes were deeply corrupt. Parliamentary reports from the late 1990s revealed that key industries—including Uganda Commercial Bank and Jinja Tobacco Company—were sold to Museveni’s relatives and political allies at undervalued prices, with proceeds allegedly embezzled (Uganda Parliamentary Committee on Public Accounts, 1999).
Despite economic growth, poverty remains widespread. Over 20% of Ugandans live below the national poverty line (World Bank, 2024), and youth unemployment exceeds 60% (ILO, 2025). Inflation and rising public debt—driven by infrastructure borrowing from China—have further strained household incomes.
4.2 Social Services and Human Development
Uganda made notable progress in health outcomes during Museveni’s early years. The country was lauded globally for its aggressive HIV/AIDS response in the 1990s, reducing prevalence from 15% in 1991 to under 5% by 2001 (UNAIDS, 2002). However, recent gains have stalled, with new infections rising due to reduced funding and stigma.
In education, challenges persist. As noted by UNICEF (2025), only 25% of Ugandan children who enter primary school complete the full six years and transition to secondary education. Rural-urban disparities, teacher absenteeism, and inadequate infrastructure undermine quality.
Public sector salaries remain low, contributing to absenteeism and bribery. A 2024 Transparency International report ranked Uganda 156th out of 180 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index, citing pervasive graft in health, education, and tax administration.
- The 2026 Election Campaign: Continuity and Resistance
Museveni’s 2026 campaign was notable for its low-key tone and reliance on state machinery. Rallies were state-funded, broadcast extensively on public media, and protected by heavy security. The main opposition coalition, the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), led by independent candidate Dr. Patrick Amuriat, faced significant obstacles: restricted access to airtime, harassment of field agents, and last-minute disqualification of key candidates.
Digital repression also intensified. The Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) imposed periodic internet blackouts, and social media platforms were throttled during critical campaign periods. Facebook and X (formerly Twitter) were temporarily blocked in December 2025 and January 2026, citing “national security concerns.”
Nonetheless, youth-led movements, particularly through decentralized networks and encrypted messaging apps, continued to mobilize dissent. Hashtags like #NoSeventhTerm and #UgandaDecides trended regionally, reflecting growing impatience with gerontocratic rule.
- The Succession Question
With Museveni entering his ninth decade, the issue of succession looms large. His son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, a four-star general and former commander of the UPDF, has publicly signaled ambitions for the presidency. In 2023, he tweeted, “I am ready to take over,” sparking debate over dynastic succession akin to Rwanda or Equatorial Guinea.
While Museveni has neither endorsed nor disavowed these ambitions, the militarization of politics and the elevation of Muhoozi to high-ranking defense and foreign policy roles suggest a potential dynastic transition. Critics warn that such a move would consolidate illiberal rule and further erode democratic norms.
Meanwhile, internal NRM factions remain divided. Longtime allies like former Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi have broken ranks, calling for generational change. Yet without institutional mechanisms for leadership rotation, the party remains beholden to Museveni’s personal authority.
- Conclusion: The Legacy of Longevity
Yoweri Museveni’s quest for a seventh term encapsulates a central dilemma in contemporary African politics: the tension between stability and democracy. While his administration has achieved relative peace after decades of turmoil and made strides in health and infrastructure, these gains are overshadowed by democratic erosion, institutional decay, and systemic corruption.
His longevity is not an anomaly but a product of deliberate strategies: constitutional manipulation, repression of dissent, foreign alliances, and patronage-based governance. As Uganda approaches the 2026 election, the question is not merely whether Museveni will win, but what kind of political order will endure beyond him.
The absence of robust institutions, independent electoral bodies, and a culture of peaceful transition poses a significant risk to Uganda’s future. Without meaningful reforms, the country may face increased instability, youth unrest, and international isolation.
As Museveni himself once warned, “Overstaying is the problem.” Today, he stands as both the diagnosis and the disease.
References
Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2017). “Uganda: Constitutional Changes Erode Human Rights.”
European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM). (2021). Final Report: Uganda General Elections 2021.
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). (2025). Uganda Education Sector Analysis.
World Bank. (2024). Uganda Poverty Assessment Report.
International Labour Organization (ILO). (2025). Youth Unemployment in East Africa.
Titeca, K. (2023). Everyday Resistance in Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Uganda. Cambridge University Press.
Uganda Parliamentary Committee on Public Accounts. (1999). Report on the Privatization of State Enterprises.
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2022). U.S. Foreign Assistance to Uganda: Health and Security Priorities.
UNAIDS. (2002). Uganda Country Report: Decline in HIV Prevalence.
Transparency International. (2024). Corruption Perceptions Index 2024.]