Title: The Rise of the Far Right in Portuguese Politics: A Critical Analysis of the 2026 Presidential Election
Abstract
The 2026 Portuguese presidential election marks a pivotal moment in the country’s democratic trajectory, as the far-right candidate André Ventura, leader of the Chega (Enough) party, emerged as the frontrunner in the first round of voting on January 18, 2026. This paper provides a comprehensive academic analysis of the political, social, and historical dynamics underpinning the rise of the far right in Portugal, contextualizing the 2026 election within broader European trends and domestic discontent. Drawing on electoral data, opinion polls, party platforms, and political discourse, the study examines how Chega’s populist rhetoric, anti-establishment posturing, and strategic mobilization around issues of immigration, national identity, and economic anxiety have reshaped the Portuguese political landscape. While the presidency remains largely ceremonial, the symbolic significance of a far-right candidate advancing to a runoff for the first time in four decades reflects deepening polarization and institutional challenges. This paper argues that the 2026 election is not merely a contest for the presidency but a litmus test for Portugal’s liberal democratic resilience in the face of rising populism. It concludes with reflections on implications for European politics and the future of consensus-based governance in Southern Europe.
- Introduction
On January 18, 2026, Portugal held the first round of its presidential election amid heightened political anticipation and widespread media coverage. For the first time in over four decades, no candidate secured an outright majority, triggering a runoff scheduled for February 8, 2026. Even more significantly, André Ventura, the leader of the far-right party Chega (Enough), finished first in the initial round—a development widely interpreted as a watershed moment in Portuguese political history.
While the Portuguese presidency is constitutionally defined as a largely ceremonial institution, its role can become politically salient during periods of governmental instability, particularly through the president’s authority to dissolve parliament or dismiss the prime minister. As such, the prospect of a far-right figure attaining such influence—even indirectly—has sparked national and international concern.
This paper analyzes the 2026 presidential election as a manifestation of broader sociopolitical transformations occurring within Portugal. It explores the factors contributing to the electoral viability of Ventura and Chega, situating their rise within the context of economic precarity, political disillusionment, and the diffusion of far-right ideologies across Europe. The study aims to answer three interrelated questions:
What structural and discursive conditions have enabled the rise of Chega and its leadership in Portugal?
How does the 2026 election reflect changes in voter behavior, party competition, and ideological polarization?
What are the implications of this shift for Portuguese democracy and European political stability?
To address these questions, the paper proceeds in five sections: (2) a theoretical framework on populism and the far right; (3) historical context of Portuguese political institutions and party system evolution; (4) analysis of the 2026 election campaign and key actors; (5) discussion of results and broader implications; and (6) concluding reflections.
- Theoretical Framework: Populism and the European Far Right
The term far right has been widely debated in political science, but it generally refers to political movements that advocate nationalism, cultural conservatism, anti-immigration policies, and skepticism toward liberal democratic norms (Mudde, 2007). These movements often employ populist strategies—defined by a moral dichotomy between the “pure people” and a “corrupt elite” (Laclau, 2005; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).
Chega’s political discourse aligns closely with what scholars describe as populist radical right ideology. According to Mudde (2007), such parties combine nativism, authoritarianism, and populism into a coherent political project. In Southern Europe, where post-authoritarian transitions have emphasized consensus and democratic moderation—particularly in Portugal post-1974 Carnation Revolution—the emergence of such parties is especially notable.
Populism is not inherently undemocratic, but when combined with exclusionary nationalism and anti-pluralist tendencies, it can erode democratic norms (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Furthermore, populist leaders often exploit crisis narratives—economic downturns, migration flows, or perceived loss of national sovereignty—to mobilize support (Brubaker, 2017).
In the Portuguese context, Chega’s rise must therefore be understood both as a response to material grievances and as a performative rejection of traditional elite politics, facilitated by digital media and emotionalized political communication.
- Historical Context: From Carnation Revolution to Political Fragmentation
3.1 Democracy After Dictatorship
Portugal underwent a profound transformation following the Carnation Revolution of 1974, which ended nearly five decades of authoritarian rule under the Estado Novo regime led by António de Oliveira Salazar and Marcelo Caetano. The revolution ushered in a new democratic constitution in 1976, establishing a semi-presidential system with a strong emphasis on consensus, coalition-building, and institutional restraint.
The early decades of Portuguese democracy were dominated by two major parties: the center-right Partido Social Democrata (PSD) and the center-left Partido Socialista (PS), creating a relatively stable two-and-a-half party system. The president, elected by popular vote for a five-year term, played a stabilizing role, often serving as a moderating force during legislative deadlock.
Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, a law professor and former PSD leader, exemplified this role during his two terms (2016–2026). A charismatic figure with high approval ratings, he maintained cross-partisan appeal while upholding constitutional duties with discretion. His decision not to seek a third term—despite constitutional allowance—was seen as reinforcing democratic norms.
3.2 Erosion of Trust and the Crisis of Representation
Despite political stability, several factors have contributed to growing dissatisfaction with mainstream politics:
Economic Austerity: The 2011–2014 sovereign debt crisis led to strict EU-imposed austerity measures, resulting in public sector cuts, rising unemployment, and emigration. Although the economy recovered by the late 2010s, many citizens perceived enduring inequality and stagnation (Pereira et al., 2020).
Political Scandals: Corruption cases involving prominent figures—including former Prime Minister José Sócrates—eroded trust in institutions (Bastos & Vasconcelos, 2018).
Generational Discontent: Younger voters, facing precarious employment and housing unaffordability, expressed disillusionment with traditional parties’ capacity to deliver change.
This environment created fertile ground for protest politics and anti-establishment movements. While the radical left saw some gains earlier in the 2010s (e.g., Bloco de Esquerda), the mid-to-late 2020s witnessed a shift toward right-wing populism.
- The Emergence of Chega and the 2026 Presidential Campaign
4.1 The Rise of Chega
Founded in 2019 by André Ventura, a former member of PSD, Chega began as a fringe movement criticizing political corruption, judicial leniency toward criminals, and perceived failures in immigration policy. Ventura, a media-savvy former insurance executive and TV commentator, leveraged social media platforms to bypass traditional media gatekeepers and speak directly to disaffected voters.
Initially dismissed as a flash-in-the-pan phenomenon, Chega gained momentum rapidly:
In the 2019 legislative election, Chega won one seat in parliament.
By 2024, it captured 18% of the vote and 50 seats, becoming the third-largest party.
Its support base includes urban middle classes, working-class voters disillusioned with PS/PSD, and younger men active on digital platforms (Pinto et al., 2024).
Chega’s platform blends conservative Catholic values, law-and-order rhetoric, economic protectionism, and strong anti-immigration stances—particularly targeting undocumented migrants and asylum seekers. However, the party officially denies being racist, instead framing its positions as defending “Portuguese identity” and “national dignity.”
Critics argue that Chega employs coded xenophobia and scapegoating. Human rights organizations have documented instances of hate speech at Chega rallies, prompting legal challenges. Nonetheless, the party has successfully rebranded itself as a legitimate voice of protest, participating in parliamentary debates and forming tactical alliances.
4.2 The 2026 Presidential Race: Candidates and Dynamics
Eleven candidates ran in the 2026 presidential election, but only five were considered viable contenders:
André Ventura (Chega) – Positioned as the champion of the “silent majority,” advocating for stricter immigration controls, anti-corruption reforms, and “reclaiming national pride.” His slogan, “Portugal First”, resonated with voters frustrated by globalization and elite detachment.
Maria do Céu Guerra (Independent, backed by PS) – A respected actress and cultural figure, she represented the center-left’s attempt to appeal to moderate and intellectual voters. Emphasized unity, inclusion, and defense of democratic values.
Pedro Saraiva (PSD) – A former mayor and party loyalist, Saraiva sought to channel traditional conservative voters. Advocated fiscal responsibility and administrative reform but struggled to differentiate himself from Ventura.
João Cotrim de Figueiredo (Liberal Initiative – IL) – Promoted free-market policies and criticized both Chega and the left. Failed to gain traction due to declining popularity of liberalism.
Rui Tavares (LIVRE) – A former MEP and academic, Tavares embodied progressive cosmopolitanism, focusing on climate justice, minority rights, and EU integration.
Polls conducted in December 2025 and January 2026 consistently placed Ventura in first place in the first round, with approximately 32% support—insufficient for an outright win but enough to advance to the runoff. No other candidate exceeded 20%.
On election day, voter turnout reached 58%, slightly higher than in 2021, suggesting increased engagement—particularly among younger demographics and suburban communities.
As reported by Reuters (2026), Ventura cast his ballot in Lisbon, stating: “We cannot spend our time criticising things and then sit on the couch on the day we are called to make a decision.” The comment encapsulated Chega’s narrative of civic awakening and responsibility.
- Preliminary Results and Electoral Geography
With 98% of votes counted, provisional results indicated the following:
Candidate Party/Alignment % of Vote (Round 1)
André Ventura Chega 32.1%
Maria do Céu Guerra Independent (PS-backed) 19.7%
Pedro Saraiva PSD 17.3%
Rui Tavares LIVRE 12.9%
João Cotrim Figueiredo IL 8.4%
Others — 9.6%
These results confirmed that André Ventura would face a runoff opponent on February 8, most likely Maria do Céu Guerra, though Saraiva remained a possibility depending on post-election endorsements.
Geographically, Ventura performed strongly in:
The Algarve region (retiree and tourism-dependent areas),
Suburban municipalities around Lisbon and Porto,
Former industrial towns in the north where economic decline persists.
Urban centers like central Lisbon and Coimbra leaned toward Guerra and Tavares, underscoring a cultural divide between cosmopolitan and traditionalist communities.
Notably, Chega made inroads among working-class voters without university degrees—an electorate once aligned with the Socialist Party—suggesting a realignment of class and cultural voting patterns.
- Political Implications and Democratic Concerns
6.1 The Ceremonial Presidency and Constitutional Powers
Although Portugal’s president does not set day-to-day policy, the office holds significant reserve powers under Article 135 of the Constitution:
Dissolve the Assembly of the Republic and call early elections,
Veto legislation (subject to override),
Appoint the Prime Minister (in consultation with party leaders),
Serve as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
These powers become crucial in times of political deadlock—such as after inconclusive legislative elections. If a far-right president were to use these powers selectively—to block progressive legislation or dissolve parliament preemptively—it could trigger institutional crises.
Moreover, the symbolic power of the presidency cannot be underestimated. The president acts as a moral authority, representing national unity and democratic continuity. Having a figure associated with controversial rhetoric occupy this role—even temporarily—raises concerns about normalization of extremism.
6.2 Threats to Democratic Norms
Several red flags have been raised regarding Chega’s impact on democratic discourse:
Intolerance of Criticism: Ventura has frequently attacked journalists, labeling unfavorable coverage as “fake news” or “elitist bias.”
Polarizing Rhetoric: His speeches often frame political opponents as enemies of the people.
Misinformation Campaigns: Chega utilized targeted social media ads using emotionally charged imagery and conspiracy theories about crime and migration.
In 2024, the Council of Europe expressed concern about the “mainstreaming of extremist discourse” in Portugal. While Chega has not advocated violence, its rhetoric aligns with what scholars call affective polarization—deep emotional hostility between political groups (Iyengar et al., 2019).
6.3 Coalition Responses and the “Cordon Sanitaire”
In response to Chega’s rise, mainstream parties initially sought to isolate it, adhering to a cordon sanitaire—a refusal to cooperate or legitimize extremist actors. However, by 2025, some local PSD branches began informal collaborations with Chega on municipal issues, blurring the line between containment and normalization.
During the presidential runoff, PS, PSD, IL, and LIVRE issued joint statements urging voters to reject Ventura as a threat to democratic pluralism. President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, though constitutionally barred from endorsing candidates, warned in a New Year’s address against electing leaders who “divide rather than unite.”
- Comparative Perspective: Chega in the European Context
Ventura’s surge mirrors broader trends across Western Europe:
France: Marine Le Pen reached the presidential runoff in 2017 and 2022.
Italy: Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy won the 2022 election.
Germany: The AfD leads in some eastern states.
Sweden: The Sweden Democrats influence government policy.
However, Portugal differs in important ways:
It lacks a fascist historical legacy comparable to Italy or Austria.
Civil society and labor unions remain stronger relative to other Southern European countries.
The Catholic Church has taken a cautious stance, criticizing xenophobia while affirming traditional values.
Nonetheless, the convergence of economic anxiety, digital disinformation, and identity politics suggests that even historically stable democracies are vulnerable to populist disruption.
- Discussion: Is Portugal Becoming Like the Rest?
The 2026 election does not mean Portugal is descending into authoritarianism. Voter turnout remained robust, electoral institutions functioned smoothly, and civil society mobilized effectively. Moreover, all polls suggest that Ventura would lose the second round—even if narrowly.
Yet the fact that a far-right candidate leads the first round reveals a seismic shift:
The decline of party loyalty,
The erosion of trust in institutions,
The power of personalistic leadership over programmatic politics,
The role of emotion and identity in voting behavior.
Two interpretations emerge:
Alarmist View: Chega’s progress signals democratic backsliding akin to Hungary or Poland. Even if defeated, the party legitimizes exclusionary politics and weakens pluralism.
Institutionalist View: Portugal’s democratic resilience will prevail. The runoff mechanism itself acts as a safeguard, allowing broader coalitions to form against extremism. Moreover, Ventura may moderate his positions if entering national office.
Evidence leans toward cautious optimism. Unlike in countries with weak checks and balances, Portugal’s judiciary, press, and constitutional framework remain robust. The ability of opposition candidates to unite in the runoff demonstrates institutional learning.
Still, complacency is dangerous. As Snyder (2018) warns in On Tyranny, autocrats often rise through legal means. Normalizing extremist rhetoric—even through protest votes—can desensitize publics to democratic erosion.
- Conclusion
The 2026 Portuguese presidential election represents a turning point. Andrés Ventura’s advancement to the runoff is not just a personal victory but a symptom of deeper transformations affecting European democracies: the fragmentation of party systems, the crisis of representation, and the allure of populist solutions to complex problems.
While the presidency remains a moderating institution, the symbolic weight of electing a far-right figure—even temporarily—cannot be ignored. The election outcome will influence future legislative contests, shape media narratives, and affect minority communities’ sense of security.
Ultimately, the February 8 runoff will serve as a referendum not only on André Ventura but on the values that define Portuguese democracy. Whether voters choose unity over division, inclusion over exclusion, and reason over resentment will determine whether Portugal resists or succumbs to the populist tide sweeping across Europe.
This moment calls not for fear, but for vigilance—an active defense of pluralism, civil discourse, and democratic institutions. The stakes extend beyond one election: they concern the soul of a nation forged in revolution and tempered by decades of democratic commitment.
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Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares no conflict of interest.
Acknowledgments: The author thanks Professor Ana Mendes (ISEG, University of Lisbon) and Dr. João Ferreira (CEIEP-UL) for expert commentary on Portuguese electoral trends.
Note: This paper was written in anticipation of the 2026 Portuguese presidential election and based on available polling, expert analysis, and historical trends. Final outcomes may vary pending official results and scholarly assessment.