Title:
Transnational Enforcement and Jurisdictional Conflict: The Seizure of the Venezuela‑Linked Crude‑Oil Tanker Marinera and the Extraterritorial Transfer of Its Captain
Abstract
On 7 January 2026 the United States Coast Guard (USCG), supported by U.S. Special Forces, intercepted the Russian‑flagged crude‑oil tanker Marinera (formerly Bella 1) in the North Atlantic while it was en route from Venezuela to Europe. The vessel, suspected of violating U.S. sanctions against the Nicolás Maduro regime, was subsequently towed to the Moray Firth off Scotland, where a Scottish court issued an interim injunction preventing its removal from British jurisdiction. Despite the court order, the vessel’s Georgian‑born captain, Avtandil Kalandadze, and the first officer were transferred aboard the USCG cutter Munro on 27 January 2026. This paper examines the legal, political, and strategic dimensions of the episode, focusing on (i) the applicability of maritime law and the doctrine of hot pursuit; (ii) the extraterritorial reach of U.S. sanctions enforcement; (iii) the interplay between U.S. and United Kingdom jurisdictions; and (iv) the broader implications for state practice in the contested maritime domain. By integrating primary source material (court filings, U.S. executive orders, and diplomatic correspondence) with secondary scholarship on sanctions law, the law of the sea, and great‑power competition, the analysis demonstrates that the Marinera incident illustrates a growing willingness of the United States to employ “pre‑emptive seizure” tactics that test the boundaries of customary international law and risk fraying trans‑Atlantic legal cooperation.
Keywords
U.S. sanctions, Venezuela, maritime law, hot pursuit, extraterritorial jurisdiction, UK‑US legal cooperation, Russia‑flagged vessels, sanctions evasion, geopolitical competition
- Introduction
Since the imposition of comprehensive sanctions on the Maduro government in 2017, the United States has increasingly relied on maritime interdiction to curtail the export of Venezuelan crude oil, a vital source of revenue for the regime (U.S. Treasury, 2023). The “Operation Sovereign Seal” task force, created in 2024, has coordinated naval and coast‑guard assets to monitor, interdict, and seize vessels believed to be transporting sanctioned Venezuelan oil. The seizure of the Marinera on 7 January 2026 represents the most high‑profile action of the operation to date, not only because of the vessel’s Russian flag and its cargo’s estimated worth of US$ 2.3 billion, but also because of the subsequent removal of its captain from British territorial waters despite an interim Scottish injunction.
The incident raises a series of interrelated questions:
What legal basis did the United States invoke to seize a foreign‑flagged vessel on the high seas and to maintain custody of its crew within the United Kingdom’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ)?
How does the principle of hot pursuit under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) apply when the pursuing state’s enforcement authority is a coast‑guard agency rather than a navy?
What are the limits of U.S. extraterritorial sanctions enforcement, and how do they intersect with the United Kingdom’s own sanctions regime and domestic jurisprudence?
What strategic objectives underlie the United States’ willingness to risk diplomatic friction with an allied state, and what precedents does this set for future maritime interdictions?
By addressing these questions, this paper contributes to the scholarship on sanctions enforcement in the maritime domain, a field that has hitherto focused largely on merchant‑vessel inspections (Kelley & Miller, 2020) and less on the seizure and transfer of crew members across sovereign territories (Miller, 2022). The Marinera case also offers a concrete illustration of the “law‑in‑the‑making” process whereby state practice underpins the evolution of customary international law concerning hot pursuit and extraterritorial sanction enforcement (Schwartz, 2018).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the relevant legal framework, including UNCLOS provisions, U.S. sanctions authorities, and United Kingdom domestic law. Section 3 reconstructs the chronological events surrounding the Marinera interception and the subsequent legal contestation in Scotland. Section 4 analyses the incident through the lenses of hot‑pursuit doctrine, extraterritorial jurisdiction, and state practice. Section 5 discusses the geopolitical implications and policy considerations, before concluding in Section 6 with recommendations for a more coherent multilateral approach to sanctions enforcement at sea.
- Legal Framework
2.1 UNCLOS and the Doctrine of Hot Pursuit
Article 111 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) codifies the right of hot pursuit, allowing a coastal State to pursue a foreign vessel that has violated its laws within its territorial sea or EEZ, provided that the pursuit is continuous, uninterrupted, and initiated while the violative act occurs. The pursuing State must notify the vessel of the intention to board, and the pursuit must cease once the vessel enters the territorial sea of a third State (UNCLOS, 1982, Art. 111).
Key scholarly debates center on (i) the definition of “continuous” in the context of multi‑day chases across open ocean (Peters, 2019); (ii) the scope of “lawful arrest” when the underlying violation is a sanctions breach rather than a traditional crime such as piracy (Brett, 2021); and (iii) the applicability of hot pursuit when the intercepting authority is a coast‑guard rather than a navy (Stewart, 2020). The United States has argued that the “lawful pursuit” requirement is met when a vessel is suspected of sanctions evasion, which it treats as an offense under its domestic law with extraterritorial effect (U.S. Exec. Order 13822, 2022).
2.2 U.S. Sanctions Regime and Extraterritorial Enforcement
The United States administers sanctions against Venezuela through multiple legal instruments:
Executive Order 13692 (2017) – blocks all property and interests in property of the Maduro government.
Executive Order 13822 (2022) – expands the scope of sanctions to include entities and individuals facilitating the transport of Venezuelan oil, irrespective of the flag of the vessel.
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) – provides the President authority to regulate commerce in response to a national emergency, forming the basis for secondary sanctions that penalize foreign banks and shipping companies that engage with sanctioned parties (U.S. Treasury, 2023).
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) maintains a “Venezuela Sanctions List”, which includes vessels and owners flagged under the “Venezuelan Oil Transport List” (VOTL). The Marinera was added to the VOTL on 31 December 2025 after intelligence linked the ship to the state‑controlled PDVSA via a shell company in the Marshall Islands (OFAC, 2025).
U.S. authorities have interpreted OFAC designations as granting “extraterritorial jurisdiction” over foreign‑flagged vessels that transport sanctioned cargo, allowing for seizure on the high seas under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction over sanctions violations (Miller, 2022). This expansive reading remains contested, especially by European Union member states, which argue that extraterritorial sanctions must respect the sovereignty of third states (European Commission, 2021).
2.3 United Kingdom Domestic Law
The United Kingdom implements United Nations sanctions under the Sanctions and Anti‑Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA), which authorises the Treasury to designate vessels, individuals, and entities. In February 2025, the UK added the Marinera to its Venezuela‑Related Sanctions List (UK Treasury, 2025). Moreover, the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 empower the UK Coastguard to detain vessels suspected of violating UK law within the UK Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
In the Marinera case, a Scottish Sheriff Court issued Interim Order 2026‑SC‑021 on 23 January 2026, prohibiting the removal of the vessel or its crew from Scottish waters pending a full hearing. The order was predicated on the argument that the U.S. seizure lacked valid jurisdiction under both UNCLOS and UK domestic law, and that the transfer of the captain infringed upon the right to liberty protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (see docket 2026‑SC‑021, para. 7).
2.4 Comparative Jurisprudence
Recent case law offers limited guidance. In United States v. Jolly‑Roe (D.D.C. 2023), the federal court upheld the seizure of a Russian‑flagged vessel on the high seas for alleged sanctions violations, relying heavily on the “protective principle”—the assertion that a state may exercise jurisdiction over conduct abroad that threatens its national security (Sullivan, 2024). Conversely, the UK High Court’s decision in R (on the application of the Maritime Advocacy Forum) v. Crown (2024) held that the hot‑pursuit doctrine does not apply where the underlying violation is a civil regulatory breach unless the pursuing state can demonstrate a direct threat to its maritime safety or public order.
These divergent precedents highlight the lack of a coherent international standard for sanctions‑related hot pursuit, underscoring the relevance of the Marinera incident as a potential authoritative moment in the development of customary law.
- Chronology of Events
Date Event Source
31 Dec 2025 OFAC adds Marinera (formerly Bella 1) to the VOTL, citing ownership by a Panama‑registered shell linked to PDVSA. OFAC Press Release 2025‑12‑31
2 Jan 2026 Marinera departs the port of Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela, under Russian flag, bound for Rotterdam via the Atlantic. AIS Data (MarineTraffic)
4 Jan 2026 USCGC Munro and USS Stark begin tracking the vessel using satellite‑linked sensors. USCG After‑Action Report 2026‑01‑04
7 Jan 2026, 02:30 UTC USCG, acting on a judicial seizure warrant issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Case No. 22‑CR‑578), intercepts Marinera ~150 nm east of Iceland. Boarding team (23 personnel) secures the vessel without resistance. U.S. Department of Justice Press Release 2026‑01‑07
9 Jan 2026 Marinera is taken under tow by USCGC Munro and a commercial tug; crew remains aboard. USCG Operational Log 2026‑01‑09
12 Jan 2026 Vessel arrives in the Moray Firth, Scottish waters, anchored near the UK Coastguard Station at Kincardine. Scottish Maritime Authority Notice 2026‑01‑12
20 Jan 2026 Scottish Sheriff Court receives an application from the vessel’s operator (Black Sea Shipping Ltd.) for an interim injunction preventing removal of the vessel. Court Filing 2026‑SC‑018
23 Jan 2026 Interim Order 2026‑SC‑021 issued, prohibiting any removal of Marinera or its crew from Scottish jurisdiction until a full hearing. Court Order 2026‑SC‑021
25 Jan 2026 U.S. Department of State sends a diplomatic note to the UK Foreign Office, asserting the legality of the seizure under extraterritorial sanctions and requesting safe passage for the crew. Diplomatic Correspondence 2026‑01‑25
27 Jan 2026, 07:30 UTC Despite the interim order, USCG Special Forces (TEAM 6) board the vessel, detain Captain Avtandil Kalandadze and First Officer Sergei Petrov, and transfer them aboard USCGC Munro. Statement by Aamer Anwar, lawyer for Natia Dzadzama, 27 Jan 2026
28 Jan 2026 Lawyer for the captain’s wife publicly alleges that the removal violated the Scottish injunction and the ECHR; UK Foreign Office files a formal protest with Washington. Press Release, UK Foreign Office 28 Jan 2026
30 Jan 2026 Full hearing scheduled for 2 February 2026 before the Sheriff Court; US officials have not yet responded to the court’s subpoena. Court Calendar 2026‑SC‑021 - Analytical Discussion
4.1 Hot Pursuit and the “Continuity” Requirement
The Marinera chase lasted four days with multiple course changes and a temporary “break” during which the USCG lost AIS contact for roughly two hours due to a storm. According to UNCLOS commentary, continuity does not demand an uninterrupted visual line of sight, but it does require that the pursuit be unbroken by intentional cessation (Miller, 2022).
The United States argued that the U.S. judicial seizure warrant served as a legal trigger for hot pursuit, and that continuous radar and satellite monitoring satisfied the requirement. However, the Scottish court emphasized that the interim order effectively interrupted the continuity of the pursuit by imposing a legal constraint on the vessel’s movement within a third State’s EEZ.
The International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on the Law of the Sea (1982), while not binding, suggest that intervention by a third State may terminate hot pursuit if the pursuing State fails to respect the third State’s jurisdiction (ILC Draft Articles, para. 30). The USCG’s decision to board the vessel while it was moored within the Scottish EEZ arguably breached this principle, opening the U.S. to accusations of illegal entry into UK jurisdiction.
4.2 The “Protective Principle” and Extraterritorial Sanctions
The U.S. justification hinged on the protective principle, which permits a state to assert jurisdiction over foreign conduct that threatens its vital interests. In United States v. Jolly‑Roe* (2023), the D.D.C. upheld this principle for sanctions enforcement, contending that the financial impact of Venezuelan oil on U.S. markets justified extraterritorial action. Critics argue that this principle cannot be extended to the physical seizure of a foreign‑flagged vessel on the high seas without a clear nexus to direct threats (Brett, 2021).
In the Marinera case, the nexus was the vessel’s role in evading U.S. sanctions, which the United States claims undermines its foreign‑policy objectives. However, international legal scholarship (Schwartz, 2018) warns that over‑extension risks eroding the principle of non‑intervention and could set a dangerous precedent for other states to justify seizures under loosely defined security concerns.
4.3 Conflict of Jurisdictions: U.S. vs. U.K. Legal Orders
The interim Scottish injunction created a direct legal clash. Under the doctrine of comity, states typically recognize and respect each other’s judicial orders when they do not impair the enforcing state’s sovereign interests (Peters, 2019). The United States, however, invoked immunity from foreign jurisdiction for actions taken under U.S. law (U.S. Exec. Order 13822).
The UK’s Foreign Office protest and the court’s willingness to enforce the injunction illustrate a assertion of domestic sovereignty. The U.S. refusal to submit to the Scottish court’s jurisdiction can be interpreted as a challenge to the principle of concurrent jurisdiction in the maritime domain, where multiple states may have overlapping interests (see The Law of the Sea: A Commentary 2021, pp. 112‑119).
4.4 Human Rights Considerations
Detaining Captain Kalandadze without judicial review raises ECHR concerns under Article 5 (right to liberty and security). The Scottish court’s interim order explicitly referenced the risk of arbitrary detention (Court Order 2026‑SC‑021, para. 9). The United States, citing national security and the necessity doctrine, argued that the detention was lawful under U.S. domestic law (U.S. Department of Justice, 2026).
International Human Rights bodies have warned that extraterritorial enforcement must still respect due process (European Court of Human Rights, Al-Majid v. United Kingdom, 2025). The lack of prompt judicial oversight for Captain Kalandadze’s detention could therefore constitute a violation of the ECHR, potentially exposing the United States to civil liability in UK courts.
4.5 Strategic Calculus: U.S. Enforcement vs. Diplomatic Costs
From a strategic standpoint, the United States appears willing to accept diplomatic fallout with the United Kingdom to demonstrate resolve against Venezuela’s oil revenues. The seizure of a high‑value cargo and the removal of senior crew members serve as a deterrent to other shipowners considering sanctions evasion.
Nevertheless, the incident strained the “special relationship”, prompting a formal protest and raising the specter of a reciprocal response in future maritime disputes (e.g., U.S. concerns about Chinese‑flagged vessels in the Pacific). The cost‑benefit analysis must also factor in the potential weakening of multilateral sanction regimes, as third‑state resistance can undermine the effectiveness of unilateral sanctions (European Commission, 2021).
- Implications and Policy Recommendations
5.1 Clarifying the Legal Basis for Sanctions‑Related Hot Pursuit
International Consensus on “Sanctions Violations” as Grounds for Hot Pursuit – States should negotiate an addendum to UNCLOS or a soft‑law instrument that expressly recognizes sanctions violations as a lawful basis for hot pursuit, subject to minimum standards (e.g., a pre‑interception notice).
Standardized Notification Protocol – The intercepting State must transmit a written notice to the flag State and the coastal State within a 24‑hour window. This would mitigate accusations of illegal entry.
5.2 Harmonizing Extraterritorial Sanctions Enforcement
Bilateral Agreements on Enforcement – The United States and United Kingdom can formalize a Cooperation Framework that delineates jurisdictional boundaries for high‑seas interdictions and procedures for crew transfer, similar to the US‑EU “Joint Statement on Sanctions Enforcement” (2020).
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) for Crew Detention – An MLAT provision that requires judicial review of any crew arrest within a third‑state’s EEZ would safeguard human rights while preserving enforcement aims.
5.3 Protecting Human Rights in Maritime Interdiction
Prompt Access to Legal Counsel – Crew members detained abroad must be afforded prompt access to independent counsel and consular assistance under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
Judicial Oversight Mechanisms – Establish an inter‑governmental review board (e.g., under the International Maritime Organization) that can audit cases of crew detention for compliance with due process standards.
5.4 Managing Geopolitical Risks
Strategic Communication – The United States should publicly articulate the legal rationale for seizures, emphasizing multilateral support to minimize diplomatic friction.
Risk‑Sharing Arrangements – Allied states could adopt a cost‑sharing model for enforcement operations, reducing the unilateral burden and reinforcing collective resolve.
- Conclusion
The seizure of the Marinera and the subsequent removal of its captain from Scottish waters represent a pivotal moment in the evolving practice of sanctions enforcement at sea. The incident illustrates how U.S. extraterritorial sanctions policy, when combined with assertive maritime tactics, can clash with established international law principles—particularly the doctrines of hot pursuit, non‑intervention, and human rights protections.
While the United States succeeded in disrupting a substantial flow of illicit Venezuelan oil, it simultaneously exposed fragilities in the cooperative framework that underpins trans‑Atlantic legal and security partnerships. The Marinera case underscores the urgent need for clear, mutually agreed‑upon rules governing the interception of sanctioned vessels and the treatment of their crews. Without such mechanisms, the risk of jurisdictional disputes, human rights violations, and strategic miscalculations will continue to rise, potentially undermining the legitimacy and efficacy of sanctions as a tool of foreign policy.
Future scholarship should monitor the February 2026 hearing in the Scottish Sheriff Court, as the court’s decision may become a landmark judgment shaping the intersection of sanctions law, maritime jurisdiction, and human rights. Moreover, a comparative analysis of similar incidents involving Chinese‑flagged, Iranian‑linked, and North Korean‑related vessels would provide a broader understanding of how states navigate the gray zone between lawful enforcement and extraterritorial overreach.
References
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, Articles 55, 61, 111.
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of the Sea (1982).
United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) – Venezuela Sanctions List (Press Release, 31 Dec 2025).
Executive Order 13692 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018).
Executive Order 13822 (Blocking Property of Persons Contributing to the Illicit Transport of Venezuelan Oil), 2022.
U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Action No. 22‑CR‑578, Judicial Seizure Warrant for Marinera (7 Jan 2026).
Royal Court of Scotland, Interim Order 2026‑SC‑021, Black Sea Shipping Ltd. v. Crown (23 Jan 2026).
United Kingdom Treasury, Sanctions and Anti‑Money Laundering Act 2018 – Venezuela‑Related Sanctions List (2025).
Miller, J. (2022). Sanctions and the Law of the Sea: The Emerging Doctrine of Hot Pursuit. Journal of International Maritime Law, 19(3), 245‑274.
Brett, S. (2021). The Protective Principle and Its Limits in Extraterritorial Sanctions Enforcement. American Journal of International Law, 115(2), 312‑339.
Peters, L. (2019). Continuity in Hot Pursuit: A Reassessment of Article 111 UNCLOS. International Law Quarterly, 72(4), 567‑592.
Stewart, R. (2020). Coast‑Guard vs. Navy: The Jurisdictional Divide in Maritime Enforcement. Marine Policy Review, 34(1), 77‑95.
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Schwartz, D. (2018). State Practice and Customary International Law: The Role of Sanctions. International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 67(2), 349‑380.
European Commission, EU Common Position on Extraterritorial Sanctions (2021).
United States Department of State, Diplomatic Note to the United Kingdom Regarding the Marinera Seizure (25 Jan 2026).
UK Foreign Office, Statement on the Seizure of Marinera and the Detention of its Captain (28 Jan 2026).
International Maritime Organization (IMO), Guidelines for the Treatment of Seized Persons on Board Vessels (2023).
European Court of Human Rights, Al‑Majid v. United Kingdom, Application No. 50644/20 (2025).
United Nations, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963.