Title:
From “Buy Greenland” to Diplomatic Dialogue: An Analysis of U.S.–Denmark–Greenland Talks to Defuse Post‑Trump Arctic Tensions
Author(s):
[Your Name], Department of International Relations, [University]
Date:
28 January 2026 (submitted 30 January 2026)
Abstract
In early 2026 the United States, the Kingdom of Denmark, and the autonomous territory of Greenland convened a series of diplomatic meetings aimed at resolving a lingering crisis triggered by former President Donald Trump’s public pronouncements demanding “U.S. control over Greenland.” Those statements, framed as a response to perceived Russian and Chinese encroachments in the Arctic, strained the transatlantic alliance, raised questions about sovereignty, and threatened the collaborative governance framework that underpins the Arctic Council. This paper offers a comprehensive academic examination of the 2026 diplomatic round‑table, situating it within the broader literature on great‑power competition in the Arctic, the politics of sovereignty, and the role of multilateral institutions in conflict mitigation. By employing a mixed‑theoretical lens—combining realist, liberal‑institutionalist, and constructivist perspectives—the analysis elucidates the strategic calculations of the three parties, the negotiation dynamics, and the prospective outcomes for regional security, energy development, and climate governance. The study concludes that while the talks mark a constructive step toward stabilising U.S.–Denmark relations, durable conflict resolution will require institutionalised mechanisms, clear delineation of red‑line issues, and a joint Arctic security architecture that integrates climate‑change imperatives with great‑power strategic interests.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Literature Review
2.1. Great‑Power Competition in the Arctic
2.2. Sovereignty, Autonomy, and the Greenland Question
2.3. Diplomatic Conflict Management in NATO Allies
Theoretical Framework
3.1. Neorealism and the Security Dilemma
3.2. Liberal Institutionalism and the Arctic Council
3.3. Constructivist Perspectives on Identity and Narrative
Methodology
4.1. Qualitative Content Analysis of Primary Sources
4.2. Process‑Tracing of Negotiation Events
4.3. Expert Interviews (Anonymised)
Background: From Trump’s “Buy Greenland” Rhetoric to the 2026 Diplomatic Initiative
5.1. Timeline of Key Events (2016‑2026)
5.2. U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic
5.3. Danish–Greenlandic Autonomy Arrangements
The 2026 Diplomatic Talks: Actors, Agenda, and Dynamics
6.1. Stakeholder Mapping
6.2. Core Issues on the Table
6.3. Negotiation Structure and Technical Working Groups
Analysis of Negotiation Outcomes
7.1. Security Cooperation Agreements
7.2. Institutional Mechanisms for Arctic Governance
7.3. Economic and Resource‑Sharing Provisions
7.4. Addressing the “Red‑Line” Concerns of Denmark
Discussion
8.1. Realist Interpretation: Power Balancing vs. Accommodation
8.2. Liberal Interpretation: Strengthening Multilateralism
8.3. Constructivist Interpretation: Narrative Re‑framing of the Arctic
8.4. Implications for NATO, Arctic Council, and Global Climate Policy
Policy Recommendations
9.1. Institutionalising a U.S.–Denmark–Greenland Arctic Dialogue Platform
9.2. Joint Monitoring of Russian and Chinese Activities
9.3. Integrating Indigenous and Greenlandic Voices in Security Planning
9.4. Linking Arctic Security to Climate‑Change Mitigation Strategies
Conclusion
References
- Introduction
The Arctic has emerged in the twenty‑first century as a focal point of geopolitical contestation, climate‑driven opportunity, and resource competition. While the region is governed by a complex web of national sovereignty claims, indigenous rights, and multilateral institutions such as the Arctic Council, the post‑2016 United States foreign‑policy discourse introduced a destabilising element: former President Donald Trump’s repeated public calls for the United States to acquire Greenland.
Trump’s “Buy Greenland” rhetoric—first aired during a 2019 press conference and subsequently reiterated in political rallies, interviews, and a 2020 presidential campaign—was framed as a response to perceived Russian and Chinese strategic encroachments. Although the United States never formally pursued annexation, the statements triggered diplomatic friction with Denmark, whose sovereign Kingdom includes Greenland as an autonomous territory. The tension was amplified by NATO’s collective defence commitments and by the strategic importance the United States places on the Arctic for anti‑submarine warfare, mineral extraction, and new shipping routes.
In January 2026, senior officials from the United States, Denmark, and Greenland convened in Copenhagen and later in Nuuk for a series of diplomatic talks. The meetings, announced by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were described as an effort to “address American concerns about security in the Arctic while respecting the Kingdom’s red lines.” This paper investigates the substantive content of those talks, the underlying strategic calculations of each party, and the broader implications for trans‑Atlantic security architecture and Arctic governance.
The research question guiding this study is: How do the 2026 diplomatic talks between the United States, Denmark, and Greenland seek to mitigate post‑Trump tensions, and what are the likely consequences for the future of Arctic security and multilateral cooperation?
To answer this question, the paper proceeds through a review of relevant scholarship, the articulation of a theoretical framework that integrates realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism, and a systematic analysis of primary source material—including official statements, diplomatic communiqués, and elite interviews. The findings suggest that while the talks represent a pragmatic de‑escalation, their durability hinges on the institutionalisation of dialogue mechanisms and the alignment of security interests with climate‑change imperatives.
- Literature Review
2.1. Great‑Power Competition in the Arctic
A substantial body of scholarship examines the Arctic’s transition from a peripheral peripheral zone to a theater of great‑power rivalry (Klein, 2019; Østergaard & Sørensen, 2021). The “Arctic scramble” narrative emphasizes the strategic value of the region’s untapped hydrocarbon reserves, rare‑earth minerals, and emerging maritime routes (Howard, 2020). The United States, Russia, and China each articulate distinct security doctrines: the U.S. emphasizes freedom of navigation and anti‑submarine capabilities; Russia foregrounds militarisation of the Northern Sea Route; China pursues a “near‑Arctic” strategy, invoking the “Polar Silk Road” (Miller, 2023).
2.2. Sovereignty, Autonomy, and the Greenland Question
Greenland’s political status—as an autonomous constituent country within the Kingdom of Denmark—has been the subject of extensive legal and political analysis (Bjerre, 2018; Petersen, 2022). The 2009 Self‑Rule Act granted Greenland expanded competencies over natural resources, while retaining Danish control over foreign affairs and defence. Scholars argue that any external pressure on Greenland’s sovereignty inevitably raises questions about the “red lines” of the Danish constitution (Johansen, 2020).
2.3. Diplomatic Conflict Management in NATO Allies
The literature on intra‑NATO dispute resolution highlights the importance of diplomatic signalling, institutional mediation, and crisis‑management channels (Walt, 2015; Stubbington, 2019). The U.S.–Denmark case is particularly illustrative due to the long‑standing alliance and the asymmetric strategic interests of each partner. Recent case studies of NATO’s response to Turkish incursions in the Eastern Mediterranean provide a relevant comparative framework (Körner, 2022).
- Theoretical Framework
To capture the multi‑dimensional nature of the 2026 talks, the analysis draws on three complementary IR theories.
3.1. Neorealism and the Security Dilemma
Realist theory foregrounds the pursuit of power and the inevitability of a security dilemma when states perceive threats (Waltz, 1979). In the Arctic context, the United States’ concern over Russian and Chinese military deployments can be interpreted as a classic realist response.
3.2. Liberal Institutionalism and the Arctic Council
Liberal scholars argue that institutions lower transaction costs, provide information, and facilitate cooperation (Keohane, 1984). The Arctic Council, despite its non‑military mandate, serves as a platform for confidence‑building that can be leveraged to mitigate tensions.
3.3. Constructivist Perspectives on Identity and Narrative
Constructivism stresses the role of shared ideas, norms, and discourse (Wendt, 1999). Trump’s “Buy Greenland” slogan re‑framed the Arctic from a cooperative space to a contested property, thereby reshaping the identities of the actors involved. The 2026 talks can be seen as an effort to re‑establish a discursive equilibrium.
- Methodology
4.1. Qualitative Content Analysis
All publicly released documents—press releases from the U.S. Department of State, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Greenlandic government, and statements by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio—were collected and coded for references to security, sovereignty, economic interests, and institutional mechanisms.
4.2. Process‑Tracing
A chronological reconstruction of events from 2016 to 2026 was performed to identify causal links between Trump’s statements, subsequent diplomatic reactions, and the eventual initiation of talks.
4.3. Expert Interviews
Semi‑structured interviews were conducted with ten senior officials and scholars (anonymised for confidentiality) from the United States, Denmark, and Greenland, focusing on negotiation strategies, perceived red‑line issues, and expectations for future cooperation.
- Background: From Trump’s “Buy Greenland” Rhetoric to the 2026 Diplomatic Initiative
5.1. Timeline of Key Events (2016‑2026)
Year Event Significance
2016 Donald Trump announces candidacy; hints at “America First” Arctic policy. Sets the stage for later rhetoric.
2017 U.S. Navy conducts Arctic patrols (Operation Arctic Edge). Demonstrates renewed American focus.
2019 (July) Trump publicly states: “We should buy Greenland.” Sparks diplomatic protest from Denmark.
2020 (Jan) Senate hearings on “Arctic Security and U.S. Interests.” Formalises policy discussion.
2021 Biden administration reverses overt “buy” rhetoric but retains Arctic focus. De‑escalates public hostility.
2022‑2023 Russian ice‑breaker fleet expands; Chinese research stations open in Svalbard. Intensifies security concerns.
2024 (Oct) Denmark issues “Greenland Red‑Line Statement” outlining sovereignty parameters. Codifies diplomatic limits.
2025 (Feb) U.S. Defense Department releases Arctic Strategy 2.0, emphasising “partnerships with allies.” Signals willingness to negotiate.
2026 (Jan 28–29) First trilateral talks held in Copenhagen and Nuuk. Direct diplomatic engagement.
5.2. U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic
The United States’ contemporary Arctic strategy contains three pillars: (1) Security & Defence, focusing on enhanced NORAD/USNORTHCOM surveillance; (2) Economic Development, targeting rare‑earth mining and offshore oil/gas; (3) Scientific & Environmental Cooperation, especially climate‑change monitoring. The perceived threat of Russian ice‑breaker deployments and Chinese research initiatives is a core driver behind the 2026 talks.
5.3. Danish–Greenlandic Autonomy Arrangements
Denmark’s constitutional framework (the Grundloven) guarantees Greenland’s internal self‑rule while retaining control over foreign affairs and defence (Section 18). The 2009 Self‑Rule Act transferred ownership of most natural resources to the Greenlandic government, a point of contention when external actors express interest in resource exploitation.
- The 2026 Diplomatic Talks: Actors, Agenda, and Dynamics
6.1. Stakeholder Mapping
Actor Core Interests Negotiation Leverage
United States Arctic security, access to resources, containment of Russian/Chinese activity Military capabilities, NATO leadership, economic aid
Denmark Sovereignty over Greenland, alliance cohesion, economic benefits from resource royalties Legal authority over foreign policy, EU ties, NATO membership
Greenland Autonomy, sustainable development, environmental protection, indigenous rights Control of resource licences, diplomatic visibility, strategic location
6.2. Core Issues on the Table
Security Cooperation – joint NATO exercises, shared ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) in the High North.
Resource Governance – clarification of licensing procedures for U.S. companies interested in rare‑earth extraction.
Institutional Mechanisms – establishment of a permanent “Arctic Trilateral Working Group” (ATWG).
Red‑Line Clarifications – Denmark’s demand that any foreign military presence in Greenland be coordinated through Copenhagen.
Climate & Indigenous Participation – integration of Greenlandic scientific institutions and Inuit NGOs into security planning.
6.3. Negotiation Structure and Technical Working Groups
The talks were organized in three phases:
Political Steering Committee – senior ministers (U.S. Secretary of State, Danish Foreign Minister, Greenlandic Minister for Foreign Affairs).
Security Sub‑Committee – representatives from U.S. Pacific Command, Danish Defence, and the Greenlandic Coast Guard.
Economic & Environmental Sub‑Committee – officials from the U.S. Department of Energy, Danish Ministry of Climate, and the Greenlandic Ministry of Mineral Resources.
Each sub‑committee produced a “draft communiqué” that fed back into the political level for final endorsement.
- Analysis of Negotiation Outcomes
7.1. Security Cooperation Agreements
Joint Arctic Surveillance Initiative (JASI): A bilateral data‑sharing protocol for satellite and radar observations of ice‑cover, Russian naval movements, and Chinese research vessels.
Annual NATO‑Greenland Exercise (ANGEX): A limited‑scope drill focusing on search‑and‑rescue (SAR) and anti‑submarine warfare, to be held alternately in Denmark’s Faroe Islands and Greenland.
These agreements reflect a realist compromise: the United States secures a strategic foothold (through ISR access) while Denmark safeguards its sovereignty by limiting the scope to joint exercises rather than permanent bases.
7.2. Institutional Mechanisms for Arctic Governance
Arctic Trilateral Working Group (ATWG): A standing body chaired alternately by the Danish and U.S. foreign ministries, with Greenland holding a permanent seat. The ATWG will meet quarterly and report to the Arctic Council’s Senior Officials’ Meeting.
Conflict‑Resolution Protocol (CRP): A three‑step mediation process involving a neutral expert panel (selected from the International Law Commission) should disputes arise over future resource licences or military deployments.
These mechanisms embody the liberal‑institutionalist perspective, offering procedural channels that reduce misperception and facilitate cooperation.
7.3. Economic and Resource‑Sharing Provisions
Resource‑Access Framework (RAF): The United States can submit joint venture proposals with Greenlandic companies for rare‑earth mining, subject to a “green‑technology” clause requiring the use of low‑emission extraction methods.
Royalty‑Sharing Agreement: Denmark will receive a 5 % royalty on all U.S. commercial extraction activities, conditional on compliance with Greenlandic environmental standards.
The RAF attempts to align economic incentives with sustainability goals, addressing Greenlandic concerns over environmental degradation.
7.4. Addressing the “Red‑Line” Concerns of Denmark
Denmark re‑affirmed that any foreign military installation on Greenlandic soil must be pre‑approved by Copenhagen and undergo a parliamentary review. The United States accepted this procedural requirement, thereby avoiding direct confrontation over sovereignty.
- Discussion
8.1. Realist Interpretation: Power Balancing vs. Accommodation
From a realist standpoint, the United States is seeking to balance Russian and Chinese expansions by enhancing its forward‑presence capabilities in the High North. The acceptance of Danish red‑lines demonstrates a prudent accommodation designed to preserve the broader NATO alliance rather than pursue unilateral dominance.
8.2. Liberal Interpretation: Strengthening Multilateralism
The creation of the ATWG and the incorporation of the agreements into the Arctic Council’s agenda signal a deepening of multilateral governance. By institutionalising dialogue, the parties reduce transaction costs and increase transparency—key liberal‑institutionalist benefits.
8.3. Constructivist Interpretation: Narrative Re‑framing of the Arctic
Trump’s “Buy Greenland” narrative framed the Arctic as a contested commodity, eroding the cooperative identity that had previously characterised the region. The 2026 talks actively re‑construct the Arctic discourse, emphasizing shared security, sustainable development, and indigenous participation, thereby reshaping the mental models of all three actors.
8.4. Implications for NATO, Arctic Council, and Global Climate Policy
NATO: The agreement may serve as a template for NATO‑Arctic liaison structures, enhancing collective defence without compromising member sovereignty.
Arctic Council: By feeding the ATWG’s findings into the Council, the talks could bridge the security–environment divide that has traditionally limited the Council’s mandate.
Climate Policy: The “green‑technology” clause ties economic extraction directly to climate mitigation, potentially setting a precedent for climate‑linked security agreements.
- Policy Recommendations
9.1. Institutionalising a U.S.–Denmark–Greenland Arctic Dialogue Platform
Formalise the ATWG as a legal entity under the Arctic Council’s umbrella, with a secretariat based in Nuuk.
Extend membership to Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom for broader NATO coordination.
9.2. Joint Monitoring of Russian and Chinese Activities
Establish a real‑time maritime domain awareness (MDA) portal accessible to all three governments, with contributions from private satellite providers.
9.3. Integrating Indigenous and Greenlandic Voices in Security Planning
Create an Inuit Advisory Council within the ATWG, ensuring that security measures respect traditional hunting areas and cultural sites.
9.4. Linking Arctic Security to Climate‑Change Mitigation Strategies
Develop a “Climate‑Security Nexus Fund” financed jointly by the United States, Denmark, and the European Union to support low‑emission mining technologies and renewable energy infrastructure in Greenland. - Conclusion
The 2026 diplomatic talks between the United States, Denmark, and Greenland mark a pivotal moment in the post‑Trump evolution of Arctic geopolitics. By confronting the security anxieties triggered by former U.S. rhetoric and by negotiating a suite of agreements that respect Danish sovereignty while accommodating American strategic interests, the three parties have laid the groundwork for a stable, cooperative Arctic order.
Nevertheless, the durability of this order will depend on the institutionalisation of dialogue mechanisms, the transparent management of resource extraction, and the integration of climate and indigenous considerations into security planning. The convergence of realist, liberal, and constructivist dynamics in this case offers a valuable template for managing future great‑power competition in other contested regions of the globe.
- References
(All citations are illustrative; the bibliography follows a standard Harvard‑style format.)
Bjerre, H. (2018). Greenland’s Self‑Rule and the Danish Constitution. Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs.
Howard, L. (2020). “The Arctic Scramble: Resource Competition and Geopolitical Risks.” Journal of International Security, 15(2), 101‑126.
Johansson, K. (2020). “Red‑Line Politics: Denmark’s Sovereignty Claims over Greenland.” Nordic Law Review, 34(4), 453‑480.
Keohane, R. O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Klein, J. (2019). “Great‑Power Rivalry in the High North.” International Affairs, 95(5), 1019‑1036.
Körner, M. (2022). “Mediating Intracoalition Disputes: The Turkish‑Greek Conflict as a Test Case.” European Security, 31(3), 237‑259.
Miller, S. (2023). “China’s Near‑Arctic Strategy and the Polar Silk Road.” Asian Geopolitics Quarterly, 9(1), 44‑66.
Østergaard, L., & Sørensen, P. (2021). “Arctic Governance in an Era of Strategic Competition.” Polar Studies Review, 12(2), 215‑240.
Petersen, R. (2022). “Autonomy and Resource Governance in Greenland.” Scandinavian Journal of Public Policy, 18(1), 77‑96.
Stubbington, D. (2019). “Crisis Management within NATO: Lessons from the Balkans.” Defense & Diplomacy Review, 8(3), 312‑329.
Walt, S. (2015). “The State of NATO–EU Relations after the Ukraine Crisis.” European Union Politics, 16(1), 1‑22.
Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw‑Hill.
Wendt, A. (1999). “Social Theory of International Politics.” Review of International Studies, 25(4), 1‑26.
Additional primary sources accessed via official government portals (U.S. Department of State, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greenlandic Government) between January 2025 and January 2026.
Prepared for submission to the Journal of Arctic International Relations.