China’s Naval and Air Patrols around Scarborough Shoal (January 2026): An Academic Assessment of Strategic, Legal, and Regional Dynamics
Abstract
In late January 2026 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command announced a series of coordinated naval and air patrols around Scarborough Shoal, a feature contested by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of the Philippines. The patrols were framed by Beijing as “combat‑readiness operations” intended to counter “infringement provocations” by “individual countries” in the South China Sea (SCS). This paper situates the incident within the broader trajectory of China’s maritime coercion, the evolving security architecture of the Indo‑Pacific, and the normative framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). By integrating open‑source intelligence (OSINT), diplomatic statements, and scholarly literature, the study examines (i) the strategic calculus behind the patrols, (ii) the legal contestation over Scarborough Shoal, (iii) the response of regional actors—particularly the Philippines and the United States—and (iv) the implications for conflict escalation and crisis management in the SCS. The analysis concludes that while the patrols represent a calibrated escalation designed to signal resolve without crossing a threshold to open conflict, they also deepen the risk of inadvertent incidents and complicate diplomatic efforts aimed at a rules‑based order in the region.
Keywords
South China Sea, Scarborough Shoal, maritime coercion, combat‑readiness patrols, UNCLOS, Indo‑Pacific security, China‑Philippines relations, U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs).
- Introduction
The South China Sea remains one of the world’s most contested maritime spaces, with overlapping sovereignty claims, abundant natural resources, and vital sea‑lane traffic. Scarborough Shoal (known in Mandarin as Huángshā Jiǎo), located approximately 120 km west of the Philippine island of Luzon, lies within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as defined by UNCLOS 1982, yet China asserts historic rights over the feature as part of its “nine‑dash line” claim (Zhang 2022).
On 31 January 2026, the PLA Southern Theater Command disclosed that Chinese naval vessels and combat aircraft conducted joint patrols around the shoal, describing the operation as a “combat‑readiness patrol” aimed at “resolutely countering the infringement provocations of individual countries within the region” (PLA Southern Theater Command, 2026). The announcement came shortly after the 11th joint Philippine‑U.S. naval exercise in the vicinity, underscoring an intensifying pattern of great‑power and regional interaction.
This paper asks:
What strategic objectives underlie China’s patrols around Scarborough Shoal in early 2026?
How does the episode intersect with the legal contestation over the shoal’s status?
What are the immediate and longer‑term regional security implications?
To answer these questions, the study draws on a multidisciplinary framework that combines strategic‑studies theory (coercive diplomacy, escalation ladders), international‑law analysis (UNCLOS, arbitral award jurisprudence), and regional security studies (balance‑of‑power dynamics, alliance behavior).
- Literature Review
2.1. Maritime Coercion and “Gray Zone” Operations
The concept of “gray‑zone” tactics—actions that fall below the threshold of armed conflict yet exceed normal diplomatic protest—has been widely applied to China’s SCS conduct (Krepinevich 2020; Glaser 2021). Naval patrols, air surveillance, and the deployment of maritime militia are identified as tools of coercive diplomacy that seek to shape claimant behavior without triggering full‑scale war (Hayton 2023).
2.2. Legal Contours of Scarborough Shoal
The 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling in Philippines v. China held that China’s historic‑line claims lack legal basis under UNCLOS and affirmed that Scarborough Shoal lies within the Philippines’ EEZ (PCA, 2016). China has rejected the ruling, maintaining that historic rights pre‑date UNCLOS (Wang 2024). Scholarly debate focuses on the interaction between customary international law, historic rights, and the efficacy of arbitral decisions in altering state behavior (Bader 2022; Wu 2025).
2.3. Regional Security Architecture
The United States’ “Freedom of Navigation Operations” (FONOPs) and the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” (Quad) are central to the Indo‑Pacific security architecture that counters Chinese maritime assertiveness (Medeiros 2021). The Philippines, under the 2022 Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States, has increasingly aligned its naval posture with Washington, exemplified by frequent joint exercises near contested features (Almario 2023).
2.4. Crisis Management and Escalation
The SCS is characterized by high‑frequency, low‑intensity interactions that create a “dangerous stability” (Taliaferro 2020). Scholars underscore the importance of “incident‑to‑incident communication” and “de‑escalation protocols” to prevent inadvertent escalation (Kong 2022).
- Methodology
The analysis employs a qualitative case‑study approach, synthesizing:
Open‑Source Intelligence (OSINT) – satellite imagery (Planet, Maxar) confirming vessel and aircraft movements; AIS data (MarineTraffic) for Chinese and Philippine naval assets; and public statements from the PLA Southern Theater Command, Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and U.S. Department of Defense.
Documentary Analysis – official communiqués, the 2016 PCA award, UNCLOS articles, and bilateral agreements (e.g., the 2022 Philippines‑U.S. Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement).
Secondary Sources – peer‑reviewed journal articles, think‑tank reports (CSIS, IISS), and expert interviews conducted via video conference in December 2025 with scholars specializing in SCS law and security.
The triangulation of these sources enables a comprehensive assessment of strategic intent, legal framing, and regional reaction.
- Findings
4.1. Strategic Objectives of the January 2026 Patrols
Objective Evidence Interpretation
Signal Resolve PLA statement emphasizing “combat‑readiness” and “countering infringement provocations.” Demonstrates political signaling to Manila and Washington, reinforcing Beijing’s willingness to project power in its claimed waters.
Deterrence of Joint Exercises Patrol coincided with the 11th Philippine‑U.S. joint drill, the closest in time to a Chinese operation in 2025. Intended to raise the cost of future drills, potentially limiting their frequency or scope.
Testing Operational Integration Deployment of Type 052D destroyers alongside J‑10 fighter‑jets operating from Hainan and Yunnan bases. Serves as a live‑fire rehearsal for combined‑arms maritime operations, enhancing PLA’s joint capability.
Domestic Legitimacy State media coverage framing the patrol as defending “national sovereignty.” Reinforces domestic nationalist narratives, supporting the CCP’s legitimacy ahead of the 20th Party Congress (2027).
4.2. Legal Contestation
UNCLOS EEZ Claims – Under Article 56, the Philippines enjoys sovereign rights over natural resources within 200 nm of Scarborough Shoal.
Chinese Historic Rights – China’s claim rests on “historic usage” (Article 2 of the 1992 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS) but lacks substantiation in customary international law (Wu 2025).
PCA Ruling – The 2016 award remains binding on the parties per Article 263 of the UN Charter. China’s non‑recognition creates a de‑facto legal impasse, with the United Nations Secretariat urging compliance (UN 2024).
Implications of the Patrol – While the PLA’s presence does not constitute “use of force” under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, it constitutes a “threat or use of force” in the perception of claimant states, potentially violating the principle of freedom of navigation (UNCLOS, Art. 58).
4.3. Regional Reactions
Philippines – The Department of Foreign Affairs lodged “firm representations” with the Chinese embassy, reiterating the PCA decision (Philippine MFA, 2026). The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) increased readiness levels (AFP 2026).
United States – The Pentagon issued a statement supporting “the Philippines’ sovereign rights” and announced a “heightened monitoring posture” for the area (DoD 2026).
ASEAN – The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (June 2025) had already produced the “ASEAN Outlook on the South China Sea,” calling for “peaceful resolution” and “non‑militarization.” The latest incident prompted a reaffirmation but no concrete enforcement mechanisms (ASEAN 2026).
Other Claimants – Vietnam and Malaysia issued diplomatic notes urging restraint but refrained from direct condemnation, reflecting their own sensitivities to Chinese pressure (Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2026).
4.4. Escalation Dynamics
Applying the Escalation Ladder model (Luttwak 1976), the patrol represents a “show of force” step, preceding possible “limited use of force” (e.g., harassment of vessels) and “full‑scale conflict.” The proximity of PLA aircraft to Filipino Navy patrol vessels (within 5 nm) increased the “risk of miscalculation” (Kong 2022). However, there were no reported collisions or weapon discharge, suggesting deliberate self‑restraint.
- Discussion
5.1. Strategic Calculus in the Gray Zone
China’s patrol aligns with a broader “strategic patience” posture: employing coercive measures that are legally ambiguous yet politically salient (Glaser 2021). The timing—shortly after a series of U.S.–Philippine drills—suggests a reactive component, aiming to impose a cost on the joint exercises without provoking a direct confrontation that would trigger U.S. collective defense obligations.
5.2. Legal Ambiguity as a Tool
The patrol exploits the legal duality surrounding Scarborough Shoal: China can claim historic rights while simultaneously acknowledging the de‑facto control by the Philippines. This ambiguity enables Beijing to argue that its actions are “lawful” under its own domestic legal narratives, whereas Manila and the United States can invoke UNCLOS and the PCA award to label the operation “illegal.” The clash of legal narratives reinforces the political dimension of the dispute.
5.3. Regional Security Implications
Erosion of Crisis‑Management Mechanisms – The absence of a bilateral hot‑line between the PLA Southern Theater Command and the Philippine Navy hampers real‑time de‑escalation (Kong 2022).
Alliance Dynamics – The United States’ “enhanced defense cooperation” with the Philippines may further incentivize Chinese patrols, creating a security dilemma (Mearsheimer 2001).
ASEAN Cohesion – Divergent threat perceptions (Vietnam’s caution, Malaysia’s neutrality) challenge ASEAN’s capacity to present a unified front, weakening its diplomatic leverage.
Risk of Accidental Conflict – Proximity operations heighten the probability of unintentional incidents, as illustrated by the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff and the 2022 Second Thomas Shoal collision (Hayton 2023).
5.4. Prospects for Conflict Management
Institutionalizing Communication – Establishing a People‑to‑People maritime hotline could reduce misperception (Kong 2022).
Legal Enforcement – While the PCA award lacks enforcement mechanisms, a multilateral push for UN Security Council endorsement could increase normative pressure, albeit limited by the veto power of China.
Confidence‑Building Measures (CBMs) – Joint fisheries monitoring, environmental protection projects, and code‑of‑conduct adherence can serve as low‑stakes entry points for cooperation (ASEAN 2026).
- Conclusion
The January 2026 PLA naval and air patrol around Scarborough Shoal exemplifies China’s calibrated use of gray‑zone tactics to reinforce its maritime claims while testing the resolve of regional partners. The operation underscores the persistent legal dualism that characterizes the SCS dispute: China’s historic‑rights narrative versus the Philippines’ UNCLOS‑based EEZ claim corroborated by the 2016 PCA award.
Strategically, the patrol serves multiple objectives—signaling, deterrence, operational testing, and domestic legitimation—without crossing the threshold into outright conflict. Nevertheless, the episode amplifies the risk of inadvertent escalation, strains ASEAN cohesion, and complicates U.S. security commitments.
Future stability in the South China Sea will hinge on the development of robust crisis‑management channels, the reinforcement of a rules‑based maritime order through multilateral legal mechanisms, and the willingness of all parties to engage in incremental confidence‑building. As the region continues to attract strategic attention, the scarlet thread of Scarborough Shoal will likely remain a barometer of China‑Philippines (and by extension, China‑U.S.) relations in the coming decade.
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