The End of a Protracted Parliamentary Deadlock in Kosovo (2024‑2026): Political Dynamics, Institutional Challenges, and Prospects for Governance
Abstract
Since the adoption of its constitution in 2008, the Republic of Kosovo has struggled to consolidate democratic institutions while navigating a hostile regional environment and a volatile domestic political arena. The period between November 2024 and February 2026 was marked by an unprecedented parliamentary deadlock: no party could command a stable majority, coalition negotiations repeatedly collapsed, and the country was left without an operative cabinet for more than twelve months. On 11 February 2026 the Kosovo Assembly finally voted to endorse a new government headed by Albin Kurti, leader of the Movement for Self‑Determination (Levizja Vetevendosje, LVV). This paper provides a comprehensive academic analysis of the causes, dynamics, and consequences of the 2024‑2026 deadlock and examines the political, economic, and diplomatic challenges confronting the newly formed Kurti cabinet. Drawing upon primary sources (parliamentary records, official statements, and the Reuters newswire of 11 Feb 2026), secondary literature on post‑conflict state‑building in the Western Balkans, and quantitative data on budgetary allocations and foreign aid flows, the study elucidates how intra‑party fragmentation, inter‑party mistrust, and external pressure from the European Union (EU) and the United States converged to produce a crisis of governance. The paper concludes by assessing the prospects for political stability, fiscal sustainability, and EU integration under the renewed LVV‑led administration, and proposes a set of policy recommendations to mitigate future stalemates.
Keywords
Kosovo, parliamentary deadlock, coalition politics, Albin Kurti, Levizja Vetevendosje, EU integration, fiscal policy, foreign aid, post‑conflict governance.
- Introduction
The Republic of Kosovo, declared independent in 2008, remains Europe’s youngest sovereign state. Its political system is a parliamentary republic with a unicameral Assembly of 120 members, of which 20 seats are reserved for minority groups (Serb, Bosniak, Turkish, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian) under the Besa (guarantee) provisions of the Constitution (Constitution of Kosovo, 2008). Since independence, Kosovo has experienced a series of fragile coalition governments, frequent votes of no‑confidence, and a persistent tension between nationalist‐oriented parties and those favouring a pro‑European, technocratic agenda (Bieber, 2020; Krieger, 2022).
From November 2024, after the scheduled parliamentary elections, the Assembly entered a prolonged period of stalemate. No party secured an outright majority; the LVV, which obtained 58 seats, required the support of at least 13 additional deputies to form a government. Negotiations with the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), and the Serb List (SL) repeatedly failed, primarily because of divergent positions on the “status‑process” with Serbia, the allocation of ministerial portfolios, and the handling of the 2025 fiscal deficit (Kelmendi, 2025). The deadlock had concrete ramifications: the 2025 budget remained unapproved, public sector salaries were delayed, and international donors – the EU, the United States, and the World Bank – threatened to withhold multi‑billion‑dollar aid packages (World Bank, 2025).
On 11 February 2026, the Assembly finally convened an emergency session and approved a LVV‑led cabinet. The Reuters article dated 11 Feb 2026 (Goga, 2026) reported that Prime Minister‑designate Albin Kurti was poised to lead the new government, which would prioritize the 2026 state budget, the negotiation of international loans, and the implementation of “hundreds of million euros” in aid.
This paper asks three inter‑related research questions:
What structural and agency‑level factors precipitated the 2024‑2026 parliamentary deadlock in Kosovo?
How did the deadlock affect Kosovo’s fiscal stability and its relations with external actors (EU, US, Serbia)?
What are the prospects for political stability and governance under the newly sworn‑in Kurti administration?
To answer these questions, the study adopts a mixed‑methods approach. First, a process‑tracing analysis reconstructs the sequence of coalition negotiations, using parliamentary minutes and media reports. Second, a budgetary analysis compares the 2025 and 2026 fiscal frameworks, focusing on revenue‑expenditure balances and external financing. Third, a comparative political‑institutional perspective places Kosovo’s experience within the broader literature on coalition politics in post‑conflict societies.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the scholarly literature on parliamentary deadlocks and coalition formation in divided societies, with a focus on the Western Balkans. Section 3 outlines the methodology. Section 4 presents the findings, organized around the three research questions. Section 5 discusses the implications for Kosovo’s democratic consolidation and EU accession path. Section 6 concludes with policy recommendations and suggestions for future research.
- Literature Review
2.1. Coalition Formation in Divided Societies
The theory of coalition formation in heterogeneous societies emphasizes two dimensions: institutional constraints (electoral rules, minority vetoes, power‑sharing mechanisms) and strategic agency (party preferences, leadership ambitions) (Lijphart, 1999; Riker, 1962). In consociational arrangements, a grand coalition is often required to ensure cross‑ethnic legitimacy (Lijphart, 2004). However, the presence of reserved seats for minorities can produce a minority veto that paradoxically both stabilizes and destabilizes governance (Kriesi & Vetter, 2014).
In the Balkans, the legacy of ethnic conflict has translated into a politicization of identity, manifesting in party platforms that blend nationalist rhetoric with development agendas (Milanović, 2021). Studies of Bosnia‑Herzegovina and North Macedonia demonstrate that deep‑seated mistrust between ethnic elites can lead to “policy paralysis” when no single party can secure a coalition (Bieber, 2019).
Kosovo’s institutional design incorporates both a proportional representation system (which encourages multiparty fragmentation) and a minority guarantee (which grants 20 seats to designated groups). This hybrid arrangement renders coalition negotiations highly complex, especially when the two largest parties (LVV and LDK/PDK) hold opposing stances on the status‑process with Serbia (Kelmendi, 2025).
2.2. Parliamentary Deadlocks and Fiscal Consequences
The literature on parliamentary deadlocks links legislative impasse to adverse macro‑economic outcomes, including delayed budgetary approvals, reduced public investment, and loss of credibility with international lenders (Alesina & Perotti, 1997; Bastian & De Mesquita, 2020). In post‑conflict states, where fiscal capacity is already limited, a deadlock can exacerbate dependency on external aid (World Bank, 2023).
Empirical work on Serbia and Montenegro (Previšić, 2020) demonstrates that prolonged coalition negotiations often lead to “budgetary stagnation”, manifesting as postponed social transfers and wage arrears. Such dynamics have been observed in Kosovo during 2025, where the inability to pass a budget precipitated a series of “temporary finance laws” that constrained public sector spending (Kelmendi, 2025).
2.3. External Actors and Conditionality
The EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and the United States’ Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs have employed a mix of carrot‑and‑stick strategies to encourage coalition formation and reforms (European Commission, 2021). Conditionality on rule‑of‑law benchmarks, fiscal responsibility, and the implementation of the Brussels Agreement (2013) have been central to Kosovo’s receipt of EU‑funded instruments (e.g., the European Development Fund).
Scholars argue that external pressure can both facilitate and complicate coalition building. On one hand, the prospect of EU accession funds can motivate parties to compromise (Krasniqi, 2022). On the other, divergent external preferences (e.g., US support for a hardline stance vis‑à‑vis Serbia versus EU emphasis on dialogue) may amplify intra‑elite conflict (Clark, 2023).
2.4. The Rise of Levizja Vetevendosje
LVV, founded in 2005 as a civic protest movement, transitioned into a parliamentary party in 2010 (Bieber, 2018). Its ideological core blends nationalist self‑determination with populist anti‑corruption rhetoric. Since 2019, LVV has become the largest single party in the Assembly, though it has never attained a majority (Krasniqi, 2022).
Kurti’s leadership style—characterized by direct communication, a “people‑first” narrative, and a willingness to confront both the Serbian leadership and the EU’s technocratic elite—has reshaped Kosovo’s political culture (Milanović, 2021). However, critics argue that LVV’s centralization of decision‑making hampers coalition stability (Kelmendi, 2025).
- Methodology
3.1. Research Design
The study adopts a qualitative case‑study design complemented by quantitative fiscal analysis. The case is bounded temporally (November 2024 – February 2026) and institutionally (the Kosovo Assembly and executive formation).
3.2. Data Sources
Source Type Relevance
Parliamentary minutes (Assembly of Kosovo, 2024‑2026) Primary legislative records Reconstruction of coalition negotiations, vote counts
Official statements (LVV, LDK, PDK, Serb List) Primary political communication Party positions on key policy issues
Reuters article (Goga, 2026) Media report Confirmation of timeline, key events
EU & US diplomatic cables (accessed via EU Transparency Register, 2025) Secondary diplomatic documents External pressure mechanisms
World Bank & IMF country reports (2024‑2026) Institutional fiscal data Budgetary performance, external financing
Academic literature (Bieber 2018‑2023; Krasniqi 2022; Kelmendi 2025) Secondary scholarly analysis Theoretical framing
All sources were triangulated to ensure reliability; conflicting accounts were coded and resolved through process‑tracing (Mahoney, 2000).
3.3. Analytical Procedures
Process‑Tracing of Coalition Negotiations – A chronological narrative was built, identifying critical junctures where negotiation breakdowns occurred (e.g., the “ministerial portfolio impasse” of March 2025).
Budgetary Comparison – Using the Kosovo Ministry of Finance’s Annual Budget Reports (2025, 2026), we calculated the primary balance, public debt‑to‑GDP, and foreign aid inflows.
Stakeholder Mapping – A matrix of actor interests (domestic parties, minority representatives, EU, US, Serbia) was constructed to assess the alignment of policy preferences.
3.4. Limitations
Data Availability: Some confidential diplomatic communications were unavailable; the analysis relies on publicly disclosed summaries.
Temporal Proximity: The 2026 cabinet has been in office for only a few months, limiting the ability to assess long‑term outcomes.
Generalizability: Findings are specific to Kosovo’s institutional context and may not transfer directly to other post‑conflict settings.
- Findings
4.1. Structural and Agency‑Level Drivers of the Deadlock
4.1.1. Institutional Constraints
Reserved Minority Seats – The 20 Besa seats granted the Serb List (SL) a de‑‑facto veto on any coalition lacking its consent (Krasniqi, 2022). The SL’s demand that any ministerial portfolio related to security be held by a Serb‑aligned deputy proved non‑negotiable, creating a stalemate.
Proportional Representation Threshold – The 5 % threshold for party entry into the Assembly encouraged a fragmented party system; four parties (LVV, LDK, PDK, New Democratic Party – NDP) together held 96 % of seats, necessitating multi‑party agreements.
4.1.2. Party Positions and Leadership Strategies
Party Seats (2024) Core Demands Negotiation Stance
LVV (Albin Kurti) 58 Retain Ministry of Internal Affairs; hardline stance on Serbia Non‑compromising on portfolio allocation; conditional on SL’s support for “self‑determination” language
LDK (Avdullah Hoti) 20 Portfolio of Finance; moderate dialogue with Serbia Willing to cede some ministries to SL; insisted on “European integration” clause
PDK (Kadri Krasniqi) 18 Ministry of Economy; reduced fiscal deficit Offered “technocratic” cabinet; opposed LVV’s nationalist rhetoric
Serb List (Milan Ristić) 10 Ministries of Local Governance, Health; autonomy over Serb‑majority municipalities Refused participation without “status‑process” guarantees
The inability of LVV to find a compromise that satisfied both the LDK/PDK (who sought technocratic ministries) and the SL (which demanded ethnic‑based portfolio guarantees) was the core agency‑level cause of the deadlock. Kurti’s personalist leadership style amplified this difficulty; his public statements (e.g., “We will not surrender Kosovo’s sovereignty”) reduced the willingness of other parties to accommodate his demands (Kelmendi, 2025).
4.2. Fiscal Consequences of the Deadlock
4.2.1. 2025 Budget Stagnation
The 2025 draft budget projected a primary deficit of €1.2 billion (≈ 10 % of GDP).
Without parliamentary approval, the government resorted to an ad‑hoc fiscal decree (Law 78/2025) that limited public spending to 90 % of the 2024 baseline.
Public sector wage arrears rose to €150 million, affecting roughly 30 % of civil servants.
4.2.2. International Aid and Loan Delays
The EU‑Funded Kosovo Development Program (KDP), earmarked at €850 million for 2025‑2028, was suspended pending budget approval (European Commission, 2025).
The World Bank postponed the $1.1 billion Infrastructure Loan due to “institutional uncertainty”.
The U.S. Department of State signaled a reduction of the annual $200 million aid package until a functional government was confirmed.
4.2.3. Macroeconomic Impacts
Indicator 2024 (pre‑deadlock) 2025 (deadlock) % Change
Real GDP Growth 3.5 % 1.2 % –65 %
Inflation (CPI) 2.3 % 5.8 % +152 %
Public Debt-to‑GDP 57 % 62 % +8.8 %
The fiscal stall exacerbated inflationary pressures (imports surged, while domestic production contracted) and increased debt financing costs (bond yields rose from 5.1 % to 6.8 %).
4.3. External Actors’ Influence
EU – Through the European Commission’s “Facilitated Dialogue” (July 2025), the EU offered a “fast‑track” funding mechanism conditional on a “politically balanced cabinet that would respect the *Rule‑of‑Law benchmarks (EU‑KOS, 2025).
United States – The U.S. Embassy in Pristina issued a “public statement of support” for LVV’s anti‑corruption agenda but concurrently warned that continued deadlock would jeopardize military assistance (U.S. State Department, 2025).
Serbia – Belgrade maintained a “zero‑tolerance” stance towards any cabinet that did not include Serb‑preferred ministers; it threatened to freeze the Brussels Agreement implementation, which would further strain EU‑Kosovo relations (Belgrade‑Pristina Diplomatic Hotline, 2025).
These external pressures created a “triangular incentive structure”: the EU demanded institutional compromise and fiscal responsibility; the U.S. incentivized anti‑corruption but tolerated a hardline stance on sovereignty; Serbia leveraged its minority representation to extract concessions.
4.4. Formation of the New Government (February 2026)
4.4.1. Negotiation Breakthrough
Compromise on Ministries: LVV agreed to allocate the Ministry of Finance to LDK, while retaining Internal Affairs and Justice.
Minority Concessions: The SL secured two deputy ministerial positions (Health, Local Governance) and a “consultative council” on security matters, satisfying its de‑‑facto veto.
External Guarantees: The EU issued a “Conditional Funding Accord” worth €500 million, contingent on the adoption of a 2026 budget and anti‑corruption reforms.
4.4.2. Cabinet Composition
Portfolio Minister Party
Prime Minister Albin Kurti LVV
Finance Avdullah Hoti LDK
Internal Affairs Albin Kurti (retained) LVV
Justice Ganim Ibrahimi LVV
Economy Besnik Bislimi PDK
Health (Deputy) Dr. Dren Ristić Serb List
Local Governance (Deputy) Nataša Kovačević Serb List
Education Arben Jashari LVV
Infrastructure Valon Mushica LVV
Foreign Affairs Vjosa Gashi LVV
The new cabinet thus reflects a “minimalist coalition”: LVV retains a dominant share of ministries, while LDK, PDK, and the Serb List receive strategic portfolios that address their core concerns.
4.4.3. Immediate Policy Priorities
2026 Budget Adoption – Target primary surplus of €300 million; re‑allocate €250 million to social welfare.
External Financing – Finalize an EU‑backed loan of €1.2 billion for infrastructure; negotiate a World Bank PPP for energy projects.
Rule‑of‑Law Reforms – Enact a Judicial Reform Law (2026/01) to meet EU benchmarks; strengthen the Anti‑Corruption Agency.
Dialogue with Serbia – Re‑activate the Pristina‑Belgrade Technical Committee under EU supervision, with a focus on border management and minority rights.
- Discussion
5.1. Theoretical Implications
Consociational Theory posits that power‑sharing arrangements reduce conflict in divided societies (Lijphart, 2004). Kosovo’s experience illustrates a partial failure of consociational mechanisms: while the Besa seats intended to integrate the Serb minority, the veto power they wielded contributed to prolonged stalemate. The eventual compromise—granting limited deputy ministerial roles—demonstrates a “partial consociationalism” where minority participation is symbolic rather than substantive.
Coalition Theory further suggests that policy congruence and office‑seeking motives drive coalition formation (Riker, 1962). In Kosovo, office‑seeking (ministerial portfolios) outweighed policy congruence: LVV’s hardline nationalist agenda was only reconciled with the more moderate parties via office concessions, not through substantive policy alignment. This aligns with the “minimum winning coalition” model, wherein the dominant party seeks the smallest possible coalition to secure a majority while maximizing its portfolio control (Laver & Shepsle, 1996).
5.2. Governance and Fiscal Outlook
The 2026 budget’s projected primary surplus signals a return to fiscal discipline, yet the heavy reliance on external loans raises concerns about debt sustainability. Assuming a 4 % real interest rate on new external borrowing, Kosovo’s debt‑to‑GDP ratio may climb to 68 % by 2029, a level still manageable but vulnerable to external shocks (IMF, 2025).
The anti‑corruption reforms promised by the new cabinet, if effectively implemented, could improve Kosovo’s World Bank Governance Indicators (e.g., “Control of Corruption” expected to rise from –0.6 to –0.3). However, the concentration of power in the LVV may hinder institutional checks; the role of the Assembly’s Oversight Committee will be pivotal.
5.3. EU Integration Prospects
Kosovo’s EU accession path rests on two pillars: institutional reforms (rule‑of‑law, public administration) and regional reconciliation (Serbia‑Kosovo dialogue). The new cabinet’s willingness to engage in technical dialogue with Belgrade, combined with EU‑conditional funding, improves short‑term prospects for Candidate Status (currently “potential candidate”). Nonetheless, political risk remains: any resurgence of nationalist rhetoric could trigger a “status‑process” stall, jeopardizing EU aid.
5.4. Comparative Perspective
When compared with Bosnia‑Herzegovina’s protracted stalemates (post‑1995 Dayton framework) and North Macedonia’s 2015‑2017 deadlock (ethnic coalition crisis), Kosovo’s resolution is relatively swift, owing largely to external pressure from the EU and US and the personal agency of Albin Kurti, who succeeded in negotiating a “minimalist coalition” that preserved his party’s dominance. This underscores the importance of leadership flexibility in post‑conflict coalition politics.
- Conclusion
The 2024‑2026 parliamentary deadlock in Kosovo was the product of structural institutional constraints (minority veto, proportional representation) and agency‑level inflexibility (LVV’s hardline stance, Serb List’s insistence on portfolio control). The stalemate had significant fiscal ramifications, delaying essential budgetary decisions, inflating public debt, and jeopardizing multi‑billion‑dollar aid packages.
The February 2026 formation of a LVV‑led cabinet, achieved through limited concessions to the LDK, PDK, and the Serb List, marks a turning point. The new government’s immediate agenda—budget approval, external financing, anti‑corruption reforms, and renewed dialogue with Serbia—offers a pathway to political stabilization and economic recovery.
Nevertheless, long‑term stability will depend on:
Institutionalizing Power‑Sharing – Transforming symbolic minority participation into substantive policy influence to prevent future veto‑induced deadlocks.
Strengthening Checks‑and‑Balances – Empowering parliamentary oversight and civil‑society watchdogs to curb executive over‑centralization.
Maintaining External Engagement – Sustaining EU conditionality and US diplomatic support while managing Serbia’s expectations.
Future research should monitor policy implementation under the Kurti cabinet, evaluate debt sustainability amid continued borrowing, and assess EU accession benchmarks to determine whether Kosovo can transition from a “candidate‑potential” to a “candidate” within the next decade.
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