A New Dimension to Reputational Risk
The freezing of bank accounts and seizure of assets belonging to two naturalized Singaporean billionaires in Bangladesh marks a significant moment in Singapore’s evolution as a global financial hub. The cases of Muhammad Aziz Khan and Saiful Alam Masud raise complex questions about how political upheaval in one jurisdiction can reverberate through Singapore’s carefully cultivated reputation for financial integrity and rule of law.
The Scale of Singapore’s Exposure
Khan appeared on Forbes’ 2025 list as Singapore’s 49th-richest person with a net worth of US$1.1 billion, while his flagship company Summit Power International is based at One Raffles Place and was valued at US$1.5 billion following a 2019 investment by Japanese energy giant JERA Co. The businessman maintains director or shareholder positions in 10 other active companies in Singapore.
Beyond the Summit Group, Alam’s entities own several hotels and a commercial property in Singapore and Malaysia, representing significant real estate holdings in the city-state. The combined exposure of these two business groups alone suggests hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars in Singapore-linked assets potentially affected by the Bangladesh investigations.
Singapore’s Regulatory Tightrope
The cases present Singapore authorities with a delicate balancing act. On one hand, the city-state has built its reputation on being a stable, rules-based jurisdiction that respects due process and doesn’t arbitrarily seize assets or freeze accounts based on unproven allegations. On the other hand, Singapore has also invested heavily in combating money laundering and maintaining the integrity of its financial system, particularly following the US$3 billion money laundering case involving Chinese nationals in 2023.
Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs noted that under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, Singapore can provide mutual legal assistance to foreign jurisdictions, including through information sharing on the movement of assets and the enforcement of foreign confiscation orders, working with foreign authorities on asset sharing and return on a case-by-case basis.
This framework suggests that if Bangladesh makes formal legal requests through proper channels, Singapore may be obligated to cooperate—even if the allegations remain contested and politically charged.
The Citizenship Question
Khan became a Singapore permanent resident in 1988 and became a Singapore citizen sometime between April 2023 and February 2024. The timing is notable: Khan obtained Singapore citizenship during or shortly before the political crisis in Bangladesh that would ultimately lead to his current legal troubles.
This raises uncomfortable questions about Singapore’s citizenship vetting processes for high-net-worth individuals with significant business interests in politically volatile jurisdictions. While Singapore has legitimate interests in attracting successful entrepreneurs and business leaders, the cases demonstrate how quickly political winds can shift, transforming assets into liabilities.
Particularly striking is the Bangladeshi courts’ suspension of an order from the previous Hasina administration that permitted Alam to voluntarily renounce his Bangladeshi citizenship, suggesting that Bangladesh authorities are actively working to maintain jurisdiction over individuals who may have sought to distance themselves legally from the country.
Economic Implications for Singapore-Bangladesh Relations
The investigations could have broader implications for bilateral economic relations. Khan first arrived in Singapore in the 1970s as an 18-year-old Master of Business Administration graduate, worked for a company dealing in thermoplastics before establishing the first independent power plant in Bangladesh in 1997. His trajectory represents a model of Singaporean entrepreneurship extending into frontier markets—precisely the kind of regional economic integration Singapore has historically encouraged.
If prominent Singapore-based businesspeople with operations in Bangladesh face sustained legal pressure, it may deter other Singaporean firms from investing in the country or cause existing investors to reassess their exposure. Khan himself noted that the situation is delaying his plans to invest approximately US$1 billion in data centers to address data poverty in Bangladesh, suggesting that the investigations are already having a chilling effect on future investment.
Reputational Contagion Risk
Singapore’s attractiveness as a financial center rests partly on the perception that wealth held here is legitimate and that the jurisdiction exercises appropriate due diligence. The involvement of two billionaires resident in Singapore in high-profile corruption investigations abroad—even if they are ultimately exonerated—creates reputational spillover effects.
Alam’s American lawyers have filed an international arbitration claim with the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, arguing their client is the victim of a targeted campaign of arbitrary asset freezing, confiscation and value destruction. This characterization—if validated through international arbitration—would suggest that Bangladesh’s new government is engaging in politically motivated asset seizures, which raises questions about whether Singapore should cooperate with such requests.
Conversely, if the allegations prove substantiated, Singapore would face criticism for having provided a haven for individuals who allegedly profited from corruption in Bangladesh.
The “Hasina Network” Problem
The crackdown has targeted individuals and business conglomerates perceived to be connected to the Hasina administration, with December 2025 seizures of assets worth 66,146 crore Bangladeshi taka (S$683 million) from 10 major business groups. This reveals the scale of business interests that may have been intertwined with the previous government.
A White Paper commissioned by the new Yunus administration found that during Hasina’s second stint as prime minister, which lasted over 15 years, an estimated US$234 billion might have been illegally siphoned out of the country. If even a fraction of this alleged outflow ended up in Singapore, it would represent a significant vulnerability for the city-state’s financial system.
The political dimension is particularly sensitive given that Khan’s brother, who was the civil aviation and tourism minister in Bangladesh, was arrested in 2024 in connection with the alleged murder of a political activist and is currently in jail awaiting trial. This family connection to the previous regime’s alleged abuses makes the cases more politically charged.
Business Continuity and Corporate Governance
Despite the investigations, Khan stated that “for each of our businesses, it has gotten better,” suggesting that the Singapore-based operations continue to function. This resilience speaks to the structural separation between Summit Power International’s Singapore operations and the political turbulence in Bangladesh.
However, the cases raise questions about corporate governance and the extent to which Singapore-domiciled companies can be insulated from political risk in the jurisdictions where they operate. The Yunus administration cancelled a liquified natural gas project with Khan’s Summit Group after the venture was flagged in the White Paper in December 2024, demonstrating how quickly commercial arrangements can unravel when political protection evaporates.
Precedent and Pattern Recognition
These cases are not occurring in isolation. The article references Singapore police investigations into Prince Group’s Chen Zhi before US indictment, and a Cambodian company accused in a global scam ring with links to Singapore firms. This suggests an emerging pattern of Singapore-based entities or Singapore-resident businesspeople being drawn into legal controversies originating in other Southeast Asian jurisdictions.
The pattern raises systemic questions: Is Singapore becoming a preferred domicile for wealthy individuals seeking to diversify political risk? Are Singapore’s due diligence processes adequate for detecting when business success in neighboring countries may be built on political favoritism or corruption? How should Singapore balance its role as a regional financial hub with its responsibilities under international anti-corruption frameworks?
The Tax Exemption Controversy
The White Paper identified Summit Group as one of selected large conglomerates which enjoyed exemptions on project income and exemptions on income arising from power generation, though Summit Power International rebutted that these exemptions were not exclusive to Summit Group but were reflective of a sector-wide strategy to enhance Bangladesh’s energy capacity.
This defense—that the favorable treatment was industry-wide rather than company-specific—will be scrutinized. If the exemptions were legitimately part of a broader economic policy to develop Bangladesh’s energy infrastructure, that supports Khan’s position. However, if the exemptions were disproportionately generous or selectively enforced, it would suggest that political connections yielded tangible financial benefits.
Looking Ahead: Singapore’s Response Options
Singapore faces several strategic choices in how to navigate these cases:
The Strict Legalist Approach: Singapore could insist on formal legal processes, only cooperating with Bangladesh if proper mutual legal assistance requests are made and only freezing or seizing assets if Bangladesh obtains judgments that meet Singapore’s legal standards for enforcement. This approach protects Singapore’s legal integrity but may be seen as providing safe haven for allegedly corrupt wealth.
The Proactive Cooperation Approach: Singapore could work closely with Bangladesh authorities, sharing information and potentially freezing assets even before formal court judgments, particularly if there is evidence linking the assets to corruption. This demonstrates Singapore’s commitment to fighting financial crime but risks being seen as cooperating with what may be politically motivated prosecutions.
The Enhanced Scrutiny Approach: Regardless of the outcomes in these specific cases, Singapore could use them as a catalyst for enhanced due diligence on high-net-worth individuals from politically volatile jurisdictions, particularly those with significant business interests dependent on government contracts or concessions.
The Broader ASEAN Dimension
The cases occur against a backdrop of political transitions across Southeast Asia, with implications for how the region’s financial centers manage politically connected wealth. As countries experience political change—whether through elections, protests, or other means—individuals who prospered under previous regimes often face scrutiny under new governments.
Singapore’s response to the Bangladesh cases may establish precedents for how it handles similar situations involving businesspeople from Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, Cambodia, or other regional countries experiencing political transitions. The city-state’s approach will signal to both legitimate entrepreneurs and potentially corrupt individuals what they can expect from Singapore as a domicile and financial center.
Conclusion: Singapore at a Crossroads
The investigations into Khan and Alam represent more than just two individual cases—they are a stress test of Singapore’s model as a global financial hub that attracts regional wealth while maintaining high standards of financial integrity. The tension between these two objectives has always existed, but rarely has it been so starkly illustrated.
Khan stated that he has not been contacted by the Singapore authorities regarding his legal issues in Bangladesh, suggesting that Singapore has so far maintained a hands-off approach, allowing the legal processes to unfold in Bangladesh without preemptively taking action based on allegations alone.
Whether this measured approach continues will depend on how the cases develop, whether formal legal assistance requests are made, and whether evidence emerges that clearly links Singapore-held assets to corruption. For now, Singapore finds itself in the uncomfortable position of hosting the wealth—and the reputational risk—of billionaires caught in the political crossfire of Bangladesh’s post-Hasina reckoning.
The ultimate impact on Singapore will depend not just on these specific cases, but on how the city-state uses them to refine its approach to politically exposed persons, cross-border financial crime, and the fundamental question of what it means to be a trusted financial center in an increasingly complex and politically volatile region.