Judicial Constraint, Executive Adaptation, and the Implications for Singapore
February 23, 2026 | International Trade & Constitutional Law
Abstract
On 20 February 2026, the United States Supreme Court held, 6–3, in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (607 U.S. _ (2026)) that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorise the President to impose tariffs. The ruling invalidated over USD 164 billion in tariff collections and prompted the administration to pivot immediately to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, imposing a 15% temporary global surcharge. Against this backdrop, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer affirmed that bilateral trade deals — including the US–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) — remain in force and that the administration stands by its commitments. This case study examines the constitutional, commercial, and geopolitical dimensions of that commitment, with particular focus on Singapore’s position as a small open economy highly exposed to US trade policy volatility.
- Background: The IEEPA Tariff Regime and Its Collapse
1.1 The Rise of IEEPA Tariffs
From early 2025, the Trump administration systematically invoked IEEPA — a 1977 statute originally designed for sanctions and asset freezes in genuine national emergencies — as the legal foundation for broad-based tariff policy. The administration applied IEEPA tariffs first to China, Canada, and Mexico (February–March 2025), and then extended a 10% baseline ‘reciprocal tariff’ globally under the so-called ‘Liberation Day’ proclamation of 2 April 2025. Singapore, having a goods trade surplus favouring the United States, received the baseline 10% rate rather than the higher reciprocal rates applied to economies with larger surpluses.
By January 2026, cumulative IEEPA tariff revenue had reached approximately USD 165 billion — accounting for more than 50% of all US tariff collections — generating significant macroeconomic disruption globally and raising novel constitutional questions that had been percolating in the federal courts since the first challenges were filed.
1.2 Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump: The Constitutional Holding
The Supreme Court’s 6–3 ruling, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, turned on a narrow statutory question with far-reaching consequences: does IEEPA’s grant of authority for the President to ‘regulate importation’ encompass the power to impose tariffs? The majority held it does not. The Court reasoned that tariffs are a core congressional taxing power, and that Congress — when delegating tariff authority to the executive in other statutes — has consistently done so with express, bounded language specifying duration, scope, and procedure. The absence of any reference to ‘tariffs’ or ‘duties’ in IEEPA was therefore decisive. Three Justices (Roberts, Gorsuch, Barrett) also applied the major questions doctrine, requiring clear authorisation from Congress before the executive can act on matters of vast political and economic significance.
Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh dissented, with Kavanaugh’s dissent notable for its remedial pragmatism: the majority’s silence on refunds, he warned, would create procedural chaos for importers and the government alike, with up to USD 175 billion in potential refund claims outstanding.
1.3 The Executive Branch Pivot
The Trump administration’s response was rapid and legally sophisticated. Within hours of the ruling, the President invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 — a statute that explicitly authorises the President to impose a temporary import surcharge not exceeding 15% for up to 150 days to address a ‘large and serious United States balance of payments deficit.’ Trump initially announced a 10% global surcharge, then raised it to 15% (the statutory ceiling) on 21 February 2026. The surcharge is effective from 24 February 2026 through 24 July 2026. Exemptions include USMCA-qualifying goods, goods already subject to Section 232 tariffs, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, certain electronics, and goods covered by country-specific trade deal exemptions.
Treasury Secretary Bessent stated that the use of alternative authorities — principally Section 122, Section 232 (national security), and Section 301 (unfair trade practices) — would generate ‘virtually unchanged tariff revenue in 2026,’ signalling that the administration views the SCOTUS ruling as a legal setback to be routed around rather than a substantive policy reversal. - The Status of Trade Deals: USTR Greer’s Assurances
2.1 What Greer Said
Speaking on CBS’s Face the Nation on 22 February 2026, USTR Greer stated that bilateral and multilateral trade deals with partners including the European Union and China remain in force notwithstanding the Supreme Court ruling. He affirmed: ‘We expect to stand by them. We expect our partners to stand by them.’ This statement carries particular significance for Singapore, whose bilateral relationship with the United States is governed by the USSFTA — the first FTA the United States concluded with an Asian country, in force since 1 January 2004.
Greer’s reassurances are legally coherent. The SCOTUS ruling invalidated IEEPA-based tariffs; it did not disturb tariffs or trade concessions established under other statutory authority, nor did it affect the treaty commitments embedded in existing FTAs. However, the ECB’s Christine Lagarde, appearing on the same broadcast, struck a more cautious note, expressing uncertainty about the downstream legal consequences and calling for proposals to be placed on a constitutionally sound footing.
2.2 The US–Singapore FTA: Structural Features
The USSFTA is a comprehensive agreement that, upon entry into force, reduced to zero the tariffs on all Singaporean goods entering the United States and all US goods entering Singapore. Key provisions include duty elimination across all goods categories, substantial market access for services and investment, intellectual property protections, and government procurement commitments. Singapore’s tariff schedule binds all US goods at zero; the US schedule does likewise for Singapore.
Critically, the USSFTA predates and operates independently of IEEPA. The President’s authority to negotiate and implement FTAs derives from Trade Promotion Authority legislation (the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015), not from IEEPA. The SCOTUS ruling therefore does not, on its face, affect the USSFTA’s legal validity or the zero-tariff commitments it enshrines.
Key Features of the US–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA)
Dimension Detail
Entry into Force 1 January 2004
US Tariff Rate on Singapore Goods Zero (bound under USSFTA)
Singapore Tariff Rate on US Goods Zero (bound under USSFTA)
US Goods Exports to Singapore (2023) ~USD 52 billion
Goods Trade Balance US surplus of USD 2.8 billion (2024)
Sectoral Coverage Goods, services, investment, IP, government procurement
Legal Authority Trade Promotion Authority (not IEEPA) - Singapore’s Trade Exposure: Pre-Ruling Context
3.1 Economic Structure and Vulnerability
Singapore’s economy is structurally dependent on international trade, with total trade equivalent to approximately 300% of GDP. The United States is one of Singapore’s most significant bilateral trade partners. Singapore’s principal exports to the US include semiconductors and integrated circuits, pharmaceutical products, precision instruments, and aerospace components — sectors characterised by high value-added content and deep integration into global supply chains.
The bilateral relationship has historically been asymmetric in one important respect: the US runs a goods trade surplus with Singapore (USD 2.8 billion in 2024), which meant Singapore was not subject to punitive ‘reciprocal’ tariff rates under the Liberation Day proclamation. Nonetheless, the 10% baseline IEEPA tariff — applicable as of 9 April 2025 — materially affected Singapore’s export competitiveness.
3.2 Quantified Impact of IEEPA Tariffs on Singapore
Singapore’s Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) provided the following official assessment in a Parliamentary written reply:
Singapore’s domestic exports to the United States declined 28% year-on-year between April and August 2025, a significant contraction attributable in part to the 10% IEEPA baseline tariff.
Despite this, Singapore’s GDP grew 4.3% year-on-year in H1 2025, partly cushioned by front-loading activities as regional manufacturers accelerated orders ahead of tariff implementation.
MTI forecast full-year 2025 GDP growth in the range of 1.5%–2.5%, down from an initially more optimistic outlook, as front-loading benefits faded and the structural drag from tariffs became more apparent.
Additional sectoral tariffs — 25% on automotive products, 50% on steel and aluminium, 50% on copper — also apply to Singapore under Section 232, covering goods not exempted by the USSFTA.
MTI flagged forward risk from potential Section 232 investigations into pharmaceuticals and semiconductors — two of Singapore’s most important export sectors.
Singapore Export Exposure to Key US Tariff Instruments
Tariff Instrument Rate Singapore Status Key Sectors Affected
IEEPA Baseline (struck down) 10% Was applicable; now revoked All goods (general)
Section 122 Surcharge (new) 15% Applicable (exemptions TBC) All goods (general)
Section 232 – Steel & Aluminium 50% Applicable Metals, industrial inputs
Section 232 – Automotive 25% Applicable Auto components
Section 232 – Copper 50% Applicable Electronics, industrial
USSFTA Preferential Rate 0% In force; unaffected by ruling All FTA-covered goods - Implications for Singapore Post-Ruling
4.1 Short-Term: The Section 122 Surcharge
The immediate substitution of IEEPA tariffs with a 15% Section 122 surcharge is, from Singapore’s standpoint, a net deterioration in nominal terms: the IEEPA rate was 10%, and the replacement is 15%. However, Singapore’s exporters may be eligible for exemptions under the Section 122 proclamation, particularly goods already covered by USSFTA preferential treatment or goods exempted under country-specific trade deal provisions. The precise scope of these exemptions remains to be clarified in implementing regulations, creating short-term operational uncertainty for Singapore-based exporters.
The 150-day duration of the Section 122 surcharge (expiring 24 July 2026 unless modified, terminated, or extended by Congress) introduces a new dimension: congressional involvement. Section 122 requires the President to report to Congress within 15 days, and Congress retains the power to terminate the surcharge by concurrent resolution. This may open space for negotiation between the executive and key trading partners — including Singapore — in the near term.
4.2 Medium-Term: FTA Durability and Legal Uncertainty
USTR Greer’s affirmations of FTA continuity are politically significant but legally fragile in one respect: the Section 122 proclamation exempts goods covered by ‘country-specific trade deal exemptions,’ but the administration retains discretion over which exemptions to include in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) modifications. Singapore will need to engage actively with USTR to ensure USSFTA-qualifying goods receive the exemptions to which they are entitled.
Lagarde’s cautionary remarks signal a broader concern shared by sophisticated trade partners: the durability of US trade commitments has been rendered structurally uncertain by a pattern of executive improvisation, legal challenge, judicial reversal, and statutory pivot. Even if current trade deals are honoured in letter, the credibility premium that attaches to stable, rule-bound trade relationships has been eroded. For Singapore — whose value proposition as a trade hub rests heavily on regulatory predictability and the reliability of its treaty network — this credibility erosion is a systemic, not merely transactional, concern.
4.3 Sectoral Risk Analysis
Semiconductors and Electronics
Singapore is one of the world’s leading semiconductor manufacturing hubs, accounting for approximately 11% of global semiconductor output. Any Section 232 investigation into semiconductors — flagged as a forward risk by MTI — would represent a severe threat to Singapore’s exports, potentially superseding USSFTA protections if structured as a national security measure. The administration has signalled that Section 232 and Section 301 investigations will be broadened to compensate for IEEPA revenue losses.
Pharmaceuticals
Singapore has attracted significant pharmaceutical investment from multinational corporations, partly on the basis of regulatory stability and trade access. MTI explicitly identified pharmaceutical Section 232 tariffs as a risk. The current Section 122 proclamation exempts pharmaceuticals; however, a subsequent Section 232 tariff on pharmaceuticals could override this exemption. Singapore should monitor the progress of any pharmaceutical Section 232 investigation closely.
Financial Services
The USSFTA includes substantial financial services liberalisation commitments. These are not affected by the tariff ruling and remain stable. However, uncertainty about the US trade policy framework may affect Singapore’s attractiveness as a financial intermediary for US-Asia capital flows, particularly if global supply chain restructuring accelerates in response to tariff volatility.
4.4 The Refund Dimension
Singapore-based exporters who paid IEEPA tariffs between April 2025 and February 2026 — either directly or through US-side importers — may be entitled to refunds. Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates up to USD 175 billion in refund claims nationally. However, the SCOTUS majority left remedial mechanics entirely to future proceedings, and the refund process is expected to be administratively complex, involving protests filed with US Customs and Border Protection and potential litigation before the Court of International Trade. Exporters with significant US exposure should take legal advice on their refund eligibility within the 180-day window for protesting liquidated entries. - Strategic Implications for Singapore
5.1 Diplomatic Engagement
Singapore has historically adopted a posture of calibrated engagement with the United States on trade, avoiding public confrontation while pursuing interests through bilateral channels and multilateral forums. This approach remains appropriate. Singapore should use the 150-day Section 122 window to negotiate the clearest possible USSFTA exemption carve-outs, building on USTR Greer’s stated commitment to honouring bilateral trade deals.
At the multilateral level, the SCOTUS ruling creates an opportunity for Singapore, alongside like-minded trade partners, to strengthen the normative case for rule-based trade governance through the WTO and other forums. Singapore’s constitutional commitment to international law and its reputation as a constructive multilateral actor are genuine assets in this context.
5.2 Supply Chain Diversification
The tariff volatility of 2025–2026 reinforces the case for Singapore-linked supply chains to accelerate diversification strategies. Singapore’s Economic Development Board (EDB) should continue to position the city-state as a regional hub for manufacturers seeking to serve both US and Asian markets while managing tariff exposure — particularly in sectors where Singapore offers bonded warehouse, re-export, and value-added manufacturing facilities.
5.3 Legal Risk Management
Singapore-based firms with US trade exposure should undertake a systematic audit of their tariff position across three dimensions: (i) Section 122 surcharge applicability and available exemptions; (ii) residual Section 232 and Section 301 exposure in relevant sectors; and (iii) potential IEEPA tariff refund claims. The interaction between USSFTA preferential rules of origin and the Section 122 exemption framework is a particular area requiring specialist trade legal advice. - Conclusion
Learning Resources v. Trump is the most significant judicial constraint on executive trade power in the modern era. By holding that IEEPA does not authorise tariffs, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutional logic that the taxing power belongs to Congress and cannot be assumed by the executive through statutory ambiguity. The administration’s rapid pivot to Section 122 — a statute that explicitly and boundedly delegates tariff authority — demonstrates both legal sophistication and policy continuity: the goal of maintaining elevated tariff barriers has not been abandoned, only re-routed.
For Singapore, the ruling is a mixed signal. The immediate threat of IEEPA tariffs has been removed, but replaced by a higher Section 122 surcharge whose sectoral exemptions are still being defined. The durability of the USSFTA is not in legal doubt, but its practical utility depends on the administration’s willingness to implement FTA-consistent exemptions in good faith — a commitment USTR Greer has made publicly but which requires monitoring and active diplomatic reinforcement.
More broadly, the ruling crystallises a structural challenge for Singapore and other small open economies: US trade policy has become legally fragile and procedurally unpredictable, with significant executive authority concentrated in alternative statutory instruments that remain constitutionally untested. Singapore’s long-term trade strategy must account for the possibility that the US trade regime will continue to be characterised by volatility and legal contestation for the foreseeable future, requiring greater supply chain resilience, more diversified market access, and robust legal risk management frameworks.
Key References and Sources
Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. _ (Feb. 20, 2026) — Supreme Court of the United States
WilmerHale Client Alert: ‘Supreme Court Strikes Down IEEPA Tariffs — What Now?’ (Updated Feb. 21, 2026)
K&L Gates Alert: ‘Summary: Supreme Court Decision on IEEPA Tariffs’ (Feb. 20, 2026)
Penn Wharton Budget Model: ‘Supreme Court Tariff Ruling: IEEPA Revenue and Potential Refunds’ (Feb. 20, 2026)
Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry: Written Reply to PQ on Impact of US Tariffs (2025)
SCOTUSblog: ‘A breakdown of the court’s tariff decision’ (Feb. 20, 2026)
NBC News / CNBC: Supreme Court Tariff Ruling coverage (Feb. 20–21, 2026)
CBS Face the Nation / ABC: Interviews with USTR Jamieson Greer and ECB President Christine Lagarde (Feb. 22, 2026)
US Trade Representative: US–Singapore Free Trade Agreement, trade.gov
NPR: ‘After the Supreme Court’s ruling on tariffs, companies line up for refunds’ (Feb. 21, 2026)