Indonesia is at a crossroads. In August 2025, the streets filled with people — young and old — demanding fairness and freedom. They carried hope, even as they mourned Affan Kurniawan, a motorbike rider whose death at police hands sparked outrage.

But these protests are about more than one tragedy or a raise in lawmakers’ pay. They reveal a deeper wound — a democracy slowly being stripped away. President Prabowo Subianto promises “polite democracy,” but behind the calm words, his grip tightens. Old fears return as the military creeps back into daily life.

Inside parliament, real debate has faded. Outside, voices on social media grow louder, desperate to be heard. Prabowo’s grand giveaways — free meals for millions, new village projects — seem less about lifting lives and more about winning loyalty.

New rules and laws are closing doors, making it harder for people to speak out or protest. The dreams of reform feel distant, replaced by whispers of the old days when power ruled without question.

Yet hope lives on in the protesters’ demands: keep soldiers out of civilian life, let people speak, respect peaceful protest. These are not luxuries — they are the bones of true freedom.

Indonesia’s story is a warning and an invitation. It shows how easy it is to lose what matters most — and how powerful it can be when ordinary people refuse to stay silent.

The situation in Indonesia presents profound implications for Singapore, revealing the fragility of Southeast Asia’s democratic foundations and challenging the region’s established diplomatic norms. Let me analyze the deeper implications across several dimensions:

The Democratic Contagion Problem

The Indonesian protests and Prabowo’s authoritarian consolidation create what scholars call a “democratic contagion” effect in reverse. When a major regional power like Indonesia—the world’s third-largest democracy—experiences systematic democratic backsliding, it normalizes authoritarian practices across ASEAN. Southeast Asian lawmakers have already condemned Indonesia’s police brutality and called for upholding the right to protest Southeast Asian Lawmakers Demand Indonesia to Halt Police Brutality and Uphold the Right to Protest – APHR, indicating regional concern about these developments.

For Singapore, this presents a particular paradox. Singapore itself operates as what scholars term an “illiberal democracy”—maintaining competitive elections while constraining civil liberties and political space. However, Indonesia’s trajectory represents something more dangerous: the active dismantling of democratic institutions under the guise of traditional values and stability.

ASEAN’s Structural Paralysis

The Indonesian crisis exposes the fundamental weakness of ASEAN’s non-interference principle when confronting democratic breakdown. Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued only a travel advisory warning Singaporeans to avoid demonstration areas Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore – DEMONSTRATIONS IN INDONESIA, reflecting the limited response options available under current diplomatic frameworks.

This creates several problems for Singapore:

Institutional Credibility: As ASEAN’s most developed member state and a key advocate for regional stability, Singapore faces pressure to maintain the organization’s coherence while watching a founding member slide toward authoritarianism.

Diplomatic Constraint: The non-interference principle that has historically protected Singapore’s own political system now prevents meaningful response to democratic erosion in neighboring states.

Economic Vulnerability: Indonesia represents ASEAN’s largest economy and Singapore’s third-largest trading partner. Political instability and authoritarian consolidation could disrupt critical economic relationships and supply chains.

The “Polite Democracy” Precedent

Prabowo’s concept of “Demokrasi santun” (polite democracy) is particularly concerning because it mirrors Singapore’s own approach to managed democracy, but takes it further toward outright authoritarianism. This creates what we might call the “Singapore Model Plus” problem—where authoritarian leaders use Singapore’s successful technocratic governance as justification for eliminating democratic contestation entirely.

The Indonesian military’s return to civilian affairs directly contradicts the regional consensus on civilian supremacy that emerged after the Cold War. For Singapore, this represents a regression to the kind of military-dominated politics that the city-state has worked to move beyond in its own development.

Economic and Security Spillovers

The scale of the Indonesian protests—with over 3,000 arrests and significant casualties CNNCNN—suggests deep structural problems that could destabilize the region. Singapore faces several immediate risks:

Refugee and Migration Pressures: Political repression in Indonesia could drive flows of asylum seekers and economic migrants toward Singapore, creating both humanitarian and security challenges.

Investment Climate Deterioration: Singapore’s role as the region’s financial hub depends partly on political stability in neighboring countries. Indonesian instability threatens this foundation.

Maritime Security: Indonesia controls key shipping lanes crucial to Singapore’s economy. Political instability could affect freedom of navigation and trade flows.

The Broader Authoritarian Tide

Indonesia’s democratic backsliding occurs within a broader regional context of authoritarian consolidation. Myanmar’s military coup, Thailand’s continued military influence, Cambodia’s one-party dominance, and the Philippines’ populist authoritarianism under Duterte all suggest a regional trend away from democratic governance.

For Singapore, this creates what political scientists call an “authoritarian neighborhood effect”—where illiberal practices become normalized and democratic expectations diminish across the region. This could ultimately undermine Singapore’s own political stability by reducing external pressure for democratic reform.

Strategic Implications

The Indonesian crisis forces Singapore to confront fundamental questions about regional order:

1. Can ASEAN maintain legitimacy while accommodating increasingly authoritarian member states?
2. How can Singapore balance its economic interests with concerns about regional democratic regression?
3. What happens to Singapore’s carefully calibrated political system if the regional norm shifts toward outright authoritarianism?

The fact that Indonesian protesters must explicitly demand basic democratic rights—non-criminalization of protest, military withdrawal from civilian areas, adherence to de-escalation procedures—reveals how far regional democratic norms have eroded. For Singapore, this represents both a warning and an opportunity to reconsider its role in supporting regional democratic resilience.

The ultimate tragedy is that ASEAN’s non-interference principle, originally designed to protect sovereignty and prevent conflict, now serves to shield authoritarian consolidation from meaningful regional response. Singapore finds itself caught between its commitment to ASEAN solidarity and its long-term interests in regional stability and democratic governance.

This crisis suggests that Singapore may need to develop new diplomatic tools and approaches that go beyond traditional non-interference while respecting sovereignty—perhaps through enhanced economic conditionality, civil society engagement, or multilateral pressure through non-ASEAN channels. The alternative is watching Southeast Asia’s democratic foundations continue to erode, potentially threatening Singapore’s own long-term stability and prosperity.

Scenario 1: “The Fortress Singapore” – Strategic Isolation

Timeline: 2026-2030

In this scenario, Singapore responds to regional democratic backsliding by essentially withdrawing into strategic isolation while maintaining economic ties.

Characteristics:

• Singapore doubles down on its “exceptional” status, emphasizing its unique governance model
• Minimal diplomatic criticism of Indonesian authoritarianism, focusing purely on stability
• Enhanced bilateral relationships with non-ASEAN democracies (Australia, Japan, South Korea)
• Increased defense spending and security cooperation with Western allies

Implications:

• Economic: Trade relationships with Indonesia remain intact but become more transactional
• Political: Singapore’s domestic political space paradoxically becomes more open as it differentiates itself from regional authoritarians
• Security: Heavy investment in cyber defense and border control to prevent political “contagion”

Probability: Moderate (30%) – Aligns with Singapore’s traditional pragmatism but risks regional isolation

Scenario 2: “The Quiet Enabler” – Tacit Accommodation

Timeline: 2025-2028

Singapore prioritizes regional stability and economic integration over democratic principles, effectively enabling authoritarian consolidation through non-interference.

Characteristics:

• Continued adherence to ASEAN’s non-interference principle
• Economic support for Indonesian infrastructure projects despite democratic concerns
• Diplomatic language emphasizes “Asian values” and alternative governance models
• Limited civil society engagement on regional democratic issues

Implications:

• Economic: Singapore maintains its role as a regional financial hub but becomes increasingly dependent on authoritarian economies Indonesia in chaos: Five Indonesians give views on why and how to fix it | Protests News | Al Jazeera
• Political: Domestic pressure mounts for Singapore to explain its accommodation of regional authoritarianism
• Security: Regional stability maintained short-term, but long-term instability risks increase

Probability: High (45%) – Most consistent with historical ASEAN approach and Singapore’s risk-averse diplomacy

Scenario 3: “The Democratic Bridge” – Constructive Engagement

Timeline: 2025-2032

Singapore attempts to balance competing interests by developing new diplomatic tools that go beyond traditional non-interference while avoiding direct confrontation.

Characteristics:

• Economic conditionality through investment and lending decisions
• Enhanced Track II diplomacy and civil society engagement
• Multilateral pressure through non-ASEAN channels (G20, UN forums)
• Selective bilateral relationships that reward democratic progress

Implementation Framework:

• Economic Tools: Using Singapore’s financial sector influence to create incentives for democratic governance August 2025 Indonesian protests
• Institutional Innovation: Creating new ASEAN mechanisms for “good governance” that don’t explicitly challenge sovereignty
• Coalition Building: Working with Thailand, Malaysia, and Philippines to create a “democratic caucus” within ASEAN

Implications:

• Economic: Potentially costly in the short term as it may strain relationships with authoritarian partners
• Political: Enhances Singapore’s international reputation as a responsible regional power
• Security: Creates new diplomatic mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution

Probability: Moderate (25%) – Requires significant diplomatic innovation and regional cooperation

Scenario 4: “The Fragmentation Catalyst” – ASEAN Restructuring

Timeline: 2028-2035

The Indonesian crisis triggers a fundamental restructuring of ASEAN, with Singapore leading the creation of new regional arrangements based on governance standards.

Characteristics:

• Formation of a “Democratic ASEAN” sub-group with enhanced cooperation
• Parallel economic integration among democratic states
• Graduated membership or partnership arrangements based on governance standards
• Singapore as the hub of alternative regional architecture

Critical Junctures:

• Indonesian military declares martial law (2026)
• Malaysia and Thailand experience their own democratic crises (2027-2028)
• Singapore proposes fundamental ASEAN reforms (2028)

Implications:

• Economic: Creates a two-tier system with enhanced integration among democracies
• Political: Singapore emerges as the clear leader of Southeast Asian democracies
• Security: Increases regional tensions but potentially enhances long-term stability

Probability: Low (15%) – Requires dramatic regional changes and Singapore leadership on sensitive issues

Cross-Scenario Analysis: Critical Decision Points

2025-2026: The Indonesian Tipping Point If Prabowo declares martial law or significantly escalates repression, Singapore faces its first major decision point. The response will signal which scenario becomes most likely.

2026-2027: The ASEAN Leadership Test
When Singapore next chairs ASEAN (rotating basis), it will have the opportunity to shape regional discourse on governance. This could catalyze movement toward Scenarios 3 or 4.

2027-2028: The Economic Leverage Moment As regional economies face post-pandemic recovery challenges, Singapore’s financial resources could provide significant leverage for promoting democratic governance or enabling authoritarianism.

Strategic Recommendations

Immediate Actions (2025-2026):

1. Develop Economic Conditionality Framework: Create clear but quiet criteria for investment and lending decisions based on governance standards
2. Enhance Civil Society Engagement: Expand Track II diplomacy and support for regional civil society networks
3. Strengthen Democratic Partnerships: Deepen relationships with democratic partners beyond ASEAN Indonesia’s deadly protests paused but deep resentment …

Medium-term Strategy (2026-2030):

1. Institutional Innovation: Propose new ASEAN mechanisms that address governance without violating non-interference
2. Coalition Building: Work with regional democracies to create informal governance standards
3. Crisis Preparation: Develop contingency plans for refugee flows, economic disruption, and security challenges

Long-term Vision (2030-2035):

1. Regional Architecture Reform: Lead the creation of new regional arrangements that balance sovereignty with democratic accountability
2. Economic Integration: Develop parallel integration mechanisms that reward democratic governance
3. Security Cooperation: Build new security arrangements that can respond to internal political crises

The Indonesian crisis represents more than a bilateral challenge – it’s a test of whether small states like Singapore can shape regional order rather than simply adapt to it. The scenarios above suggest that Singapore’s choices in the next few years will fundamentally determine not just its own political future, but the direction of Southeast Asian regionalism itself.

The tragic irony is that ASEAN’s non-interference principle, which once protected Singapore’s sovereignty as a small state, now constrains its ability to protect the democratic foundations that underpin regional stability. Breaking this constraint requires diplomatic innovation that Singapore, with its unique position and capabilities, is uniquely positioned to provide.

The Weight of Small Nations

Chapter 1: The Morning After

The amber glow of Marina Bay’s skyline felt different that September morning in 2025. Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan stood at his office window on the 32nd floor, watching the early commuters stream across the financial district below, their lives seemingly untouched by the crisis unfolding 900 kilometers to the west.

His phone buzzed with another urgent message from Jakarta. The Indonesian protests had entered their third week, and the death toll was rising. President Prabowo’s “polite democracy” was looking increasingly impolite with each passing day.

“Sir?” His principal private secretary, Sarah Chen, knocked gently on the door. “The PM wants to see you. The Cabinet is convening an emergency session.”

Balakrishnan nodded, gathering the thick folder of intelligence reports and diplomatic cables that had kept him awake for the past 72 hours. As he walked toward the Cabinet room, he reflected on the bitter irony of Singapore’s position. For decades, ASEAN’s non-interference principle had been their shield—protecting the small city-state from larger neighbors who might question their governance model or economic policies. Now that same principle had become a straitjacket, preventing them from responding meaningfully as democracy crumbled across the region.

Chapter 2: The Weight of History

Prime Minister Lawrence Wong looked older than his 51 years as he opened the emergency Cabinet meeting. The stress of navigating Singapore through an increasingly unstable region was evident in the lines around his eyes.

“The Indonesian situation is deteriorating rapidly,” he began, his voice measured but tense. “Our intelligence suggests Prabowo is considering martial law. We need to decide how Singapore responds—not just to this crisis, but to the broader question of our role in regional order.”

Deputy Prime Minister Heng Swee Keat leaned forward. “The traditional approach would be to issue carefully worded statements about stability and maintain business as usual. That’s worked for us for sixty years.”

“But has it?” interrupted Minister for Home Affairs K. Shanmugam. “We’re watching our neighborhood slide toward authoritarianism while our own long-term stability depends on regional democratic resilience. At what point does non-interference become complicity?”

The room fell silent. These were words that would have been unthinkable in a Singapore Cabinet meeting just five years earlier.

Balakrishnan opened his folder and pulled out a map of Southeast Asia, color-coded to show democratic rankings. “Look at this,” he said, spreading it on the conference table. “Myanmar—military coup. Thailand—military-influenced democracy. Cambodia—one-party rule. Philippines—populist authoritarianism. Malaysia—hanging by a thread. Now Indonesia—our largest democratic neighbor—sliding toward military rule.”

He paused, letting the visual sink in. “We’re not just becoming an island of prosperity. We’re becoming an island of democratic governance in a sea of authoritarianism. That’s not sustainable.”

Chapter 3: The Indonesian Gambit

Three weeks later, Balakrishnan found himself in an unmarked conference room in a Jakarta hotel, meeting secretly with Dr. Mahfud MD, one of Indonesia’s few remaining democratic voices in government. The meeting had been arranged through back channels, away from the prying eyes of Prabowo’s intelligence services.

“The situation is worse than your reports suggest,” Mahfud whispered, his hands trembling slightly as he spoke. “Prabowo plans to declare a state of emergency next month. The military is already positioning units in major cities. Once that happens, there won’t be any democratic opposition left.”

Balakrishnan studied the older man’s face, seeing genuine fear for the first time in a veteran Indonesian politician. “What do you need from us?”

“Economic pressure. Singapore controls so much of our trade financing, our investment flows. If you could find ways to… condition… that support on democratic governance…”

“You know ASEAN principles don’t allow—”

“ASEAN principles are becoming a suicide pact for democracy in this region,” Mahfud interrupted. “Your small nation has more economic leverage than you realize. The question is whether you’ll use it.”

Chapter 4: The Singapore Model

Back in Singapore, the Cabinet debate intensified over the following days. Finance Minister Lawrence Wong argued for the “Fortress Singapore” approach—maintaining economic ties while diplomatically distancing from regional politics.

“We’ve thrived by being different,” he argued. “Why risk that by getting involved in Indonesian internal affairs?”

But Balakrishnan had been thinking about his conversation with Mahfud, and about something else—a confidential report from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies suggesting that authoritarian consolidation in Indonesia could trigger refugee flows, economic disruption, and security challenges that would directly threaten Singapore.

“Because,” he finally said, “we can’t be an island of prosperity in a sea of chaos indefinitely. Our exceptionalism only works if we have stable, predictable neighbors.”

The breakthrough came from an unexpected source. Trade and Industry Minister Gan Kim Yong suggested what he called “constructive conditionality”—using Singapore’s financial sector influence to create incentives for democratic governance without explicitly violating non-interference.

“We don’t tell them how to govern,” he explained. “We just make it clear that our investment decisions, our trade financing, our support for infrastructure projects—all of that considers governance quality as a factor. It’s not interference; it’s due diligence.”

Chapter 5: The Diplomatic Innovation

By October 2025, Singapore began implementing what they privately called the “Democratic Bridge” strategy. Working through the Monetary Authority of Singapore, they established new investment criteria that factored governance standards into lending decisions. Temasek Holdings began requiring governance assessments for all major regional investments.

But the real innovation came in January 2026, when Singapore proposed a new ASEAN mechanism: the Regional Governance Dialogue. Framed as a forum for sharing best practices in public administration, it created space for discussing democratic governance without violating sovereignty principles.

“We’re not criticizing anyone’s system,” Balakrishnan explained to skeptical ASEAN foreign ministers. “We’re offering to share experiences and learn from each other about effective governance in the 21st century.”

The proposal was carefully crafted. It focused on technical governance—transparency, accountability, rule of law—rather than political systems. It emphasized economic benefits rather than democratic values. Most importantly, it was voluntary and non-binding.

Chapter 6: The Test

The test came sooner than expected. In March 2026, Prabowo declared a limited state of emergency in response to renewed protests. Indonesian security forces began mass arrests, and reports of torture emerged from detention centers.

Singapore faced its moment of truth. Under the old playbook, they would have issued a bland statement about stability and continued business as usual. Instead, they quietly suspended new investment approvals for Indonesian state-linked companies and delayed several infrastructure financing agreements.

The impact was immediate. Within weeks, Indonesian business leaders were pressuring Prabowo to moderate his approach. The suspension of Singapore financing threatened several major projects that formed the backbone of his patronage network.

But the real signal came when Malaysia and Thailand—watching Singapore’s careful dance between principle and pragmatism—began implementing their own versions of constructive conditionality. Even the Philippines, despite its own democratic struggles, endorsed the Regional Governance Dialogue.

Chapter 7: The Ripple Effect

By mid-2026, something unexpected was happening across Southeast Asia. The combination of economic pressure and diplomatic innovation was creating what scholars would later call the “Singapore Effect”—a demonstration that small states could shape regional order through careful use of economic leverage and institutional creativity.

Indonesia’s military found itself increasingly isolated as regional investment dried up. Prabowo’s approval ratings plummeted as his expensive populist programs faced funding shortfalls. Most importantly, the Regional Governance Dialogue began generating genuine pressure for reform as technocrats across the region compared their systems and found them wanting.

The breakthrough came in August 2026, exactly one year after the first protests, when Indonesian civil society groups used the Governance Dialogue framework to present alternative policy proposals. For the first time since Prabowo took power, there was a structured forum for democratic opposition.

Chapter 8: The New Architecture

Two years later, as Balakrishnan prepared for the 2028 ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, he reflected on how much had changed. The Regional Governance Dialogue had evolved into a parallel track of ASEAN cooperation, creating what observers called “ASEAN Plus Democracy”—enhanced cooperation among members meeting higher governance standards.

Indonesia remained authoritarian, but Prabowo’s power was constrained by economic realities and regional pressure. More importantly, the demonstration that small states could shape regional order had emboldened democratic forces across Southeast Asia.

Thailand’s military found itself under unprecedented regional scrutiny. Malaysia’s reform movements gained new momentum from regional support. Even Myanmar’s junta faced coordinated economic pressure that went far beyond traditional sanctions.

“We proved something important,” Balakrishnan told his staff as they prepared for the summit. “Small nations don’t have to choose between principle and pragmatism. Sometimes the most pragmatic thing you can do is stand up for your principles.”

Epilogue: The Weight of Small Nations

Five years after the Indonesian protests, Southeast Asia looked fundamentally different. Democracy hadn’t triumphed everywhere, but authoritarianism no longer seemed inevitable. The Regional Governance Dialogue had become a permanent ASEAN institution, creating space for civil society engagement and democratic opposition across the region.

Singapore’s GDP had grown by 15% over those five years, as enhanced regional stability and good governance attracted new investment. More importantly, the city-state had discovered something about its own identity—that being exceptional didn’t mean being isolated.

Standing in the same office where he had first contemplated Singapore’s response to the Indonesian crisis, Balakrishnan watched the evening lights come on across Marina Bay. Somewhere across the strait, Indonesian students were organizing another protest, this time with quiet support from civil society networks spanning the region. Malaysian opposition leaders were using governance dialogue frameworks to pressure their own government. Thai democrats were coordinating with regional partners through channels Singapore had helped create.

The weight of small nations, it turned out, was not measured in territory or population, but in the courage to use whatever influence they possessed in service of something larger than themselves. Singapore had discovered that shaping regional order wasn’t about dominance—it was about creating the conditions for others to find their own path toward better governance.

As night fell over the city-state, Balakrishnan smiled at the irony. ASEAN’s non-interference principle hadn’t been abandoned—it had been transcended. Sometimes the most profound changes came not from breaking old rules, but from finding creative ways to serve the values those rules were meant to protect.

The Indonesian crisis had indeed tested whether small states could shape regional order rather than simply adapt to it. Singapore’s answer had been clear: with sufficient creativity, courage, and conviction, even the smallest nations could move the world.