On October 14, 2025, Coordinating Minister for National Security K. Shanmugam delivered a powerful hour-long speech to Parliament that struck at the heart of Singapore’s most existential challenge: the preservation of its secular, multiracial foundations in the face of mounting pressures from identity-based politics. His words were not merely rhetorical flourishes but a direct response to troubling developments during the May 2025 general election that revealed vulnerabilities in Singapore’s carefully constructed social compact. This speech represents a crucial moment in Singapore’s political discourse and raises important questions about the nation’s ability to withstand global trends toward identity-driven polarization.
The Context: A Nation Under Pressure
Shanmugam’s intervention did not emerge in a vacuum. The May 2025 general election exposed what many political observers had suspected but few dared articulate publicly: that Singapore’s vaunted racial harmony could be tested by deliberate, coordinated attempts to weaponize identity for political gain. The involvement of Malaysian political figures from Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and remarks by self-styled religious teacher Noor Deros represented a significant escalation in the nature of threats to Singapore’s multiracial compact.
What made these incidents particularly alarming was not their isolated occurrence but their systematic nature. The targeting of Malay and Muslim voters through coordinated messaging from both domestic and foreign sources revealed sophisticated understanding of Singapore’s demographic vulnerabilities. This was not accidental; it was deliberate interference designed to test whether Singapore’s political system could withstand identity-based mobilization.
The timing of Shanmugam’s speech—made “at the earliest opportunity after the opening of Parliament”—underscores the gravity with which the Government views this threat. As the minister himself stated, “It is too serious a matter—existential to Singapore—for us to simply let it slide.” This language of existential threat signals that the Government is not treating this as a routine policy matter but as a fundamental challenge to the nation’s survival as a cohesive entity.
The Fundamental Principles at Stake
At the core of Shanmugam’s address lies a deceptively simple but profoundly consequential principle: that in Singapore, all public political debate must be conducted and decided on a secular basis. This principle, rooted in Singapore’s founding documents and the vision of its first Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, represents perhaps the single most important guardrail protecting the nation’s multiracial character.
Understanding this principle requires acknowledging that it is not a restriction on religious practice or belief. Rather, it is a demarcation between the private sphere—where individuals are free to practice their faiths and be guided by religious convictions—and the public sphere, where political decisions must be justified through secular, universally acceptable reasoning. This distinction allows people of different faiths to coexist within a common political framework without requiring any to abandon their beliefs or identities.
Shanmugam articulated this nuance carefully when he noted that “all religions provide guidance on important aspects of life. So inevitably, there will be areas where faith and public issues overlap.” However, he emphasized that even when people express political views motivated by their religious convictions, they “must do so in a way that is respectful of other religions.”
The critical prohibition, he made clear, is the misuse of religion for political purposes or the introduction of religion into election campaigns. As he stated unequivocally: “Religion must not be misused for political purposes. It must never be brought into election campaigns.” This formulation protects both religious freedom and political integrity simultaneously.
The Historical Context: Lessons from Singapore’s Founding
To fully appreciate the significance of Shanmugam’s warnings, one must understand the historical context in which Singapore was founded. The minister himself provided this perspective, recounting how Singapore’s founding leaders undertook “systematic steps to build a multiracial country in the face of tremendous opposition, especially from organisations representing the majority Chinese population.”
This historical framing is crucial because it reveals that Singapore’s multiracialism was never the natural state of affairs. Rather, it was a deliberate, difficult choice made by founding leaders who consciously rejected the path taken by most newly independent nations. As Shanmugam noted, at the time of independence, many newly independent countries adopted the language and culture of their majority ethnic group. Had Singapore followed this pattern, Mandarin would have been its sole official language, and the nation’s trajectory would have been fundamentally different.
The opposition to this multiracial vision came not only from the Chinese majority but from the main opposition party of the era, the Barisan Sosialis, which “took an active position on the matter, stoking tensions within the Chinese community.” This historical precedent demonstrates that identity politics is not a new phenomenon in Singapore; rather, what is new is the contemporary global normalization and sophistication of such tactics.
The PAP’s multiracial approach, Shanmugam emphasized, was “the more difficult, more idealistic course” and decidedly “not politically expedient.” This observation is significant because it reveals a fundamental truth about Singapore’s political development: the ruling party chose to bear short-term political costs to secure long-term national stability. It is this restraint, voluntarily exercised over decades, that has created the conditions for Singapore’s relative harmony and prosperity.
The 1964 race riots provide a cautionary historical marker within this narrative. These riots erupted “just 10 months after Chinese-Malay relations began to spiral downwards following political tensions with Malaysia,” demonstrating how rapidly communal violence can escalate when tensions are deliberately stoked. This historical trauma remains seared in Singapore’s collective memory and provides powerful justification for the strict guardrails around identity politics.
The May 2025 Election: What Went Wrong?
While Shanmugam did not provide exhaustive details about the “troubling incidents” during the May election, the key examples he highlighted paint a revealing picture. The primary focus was on the Tampines GRC contest, where Workers’ Party candidate Faisal Manap led a five-member team against a PAP team headed by then Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs Masagos Zulkifli.
The interference in this contest operated through multiple channels. Noor Deros, who identified himself as a religious teacher, posted online about meeting WP representatives, including the party’s Malay candidates, and claimed that the WP was “the only one taking his demands seriously.” More significantly, politicians from Malaysia’s PAS made explicit calls for Singapore voters to support the WP’s Malay candidates, essentially urging voters to organize their electoral choices along communal lines.
Shanmugam’s analysis of this situation is particularly incisive. He posed a rhetorical question that cuts to the heart of the matter: “Does anyone, whether in here or outside, seriously believe that PAS is supporting the WP’s Malay/Muslim candidates in Singapore because PAS cares for Singaporeans?” The answer, obviously, is no. PAS’s intervention was motivated by its own ideological agenda and regional interests, not by concern for Singapore’s welfare. This realization should alarm any patriotic Singaporean, as it demonstrates how Singapore’s electoral process can become a pawn in regional religious and political struggles.
What was particularly problematic was the WP’s response to these developments. Rather than immediately and clearly rejecting the foreign interference and the identity-based framing of the election, the party waited four days before responding—and even then, did not clearly reject the foreign endorsement. This delay and ambiguity, Shanmugam argued, “could give rise to questions and confusion.” For a party seeking to lead a secular, multiracial nation, such equivocation on fundamental principles is deeply troubling.
Shanmugam also highlighted concerning remarks from Singapore Democratic Party candidate Damanhuri Abas, who called for Malay voters to vote against the PAP while framing this as an issue of “upholding Malay dignity”—language that, as Shanmugam noted, functions as a euphemism for Malay “rights.” The minister warned that “this is a slippery and dangerous path that will invite a strong reaction from other races in future elections,” essentially predicting an escalation of communal polarization if such tactics become normalized.
Interestingly, Shanmugam’s analysis suggests that voters in Tampines may have understood the communal dynamics at play and responded by explicitly rejecting such appeals. He observed that “many Chinese voters in Tampines seem to have observed the communal nature of the appeals to the Malay voters, and they seem to have chosen to take a different direction, during this GE.” If this observation is accurate, it suggests that identity-based mobilization can trigger counter-mobilization along other communal lines—precisely the dynamic that multiracial democracies must prevent at all costs.
The Broader Global Context: The US as a Cautionary Tale
While Shanmugam’s speech focused primarily on Singapore’s specific challenges, he situated these challenges within a global context, drawing particular attention to the United States as an example of how identity politics can corrode social cohesion. The minister noted that in the US, “culture wars are fuelled by identity-based political campaigns and the blurring of lines between religion and politics,” with the result that “every grievance, every disagreement is framed as an ideological battle. It becomes an all-out war, with no room for compromise.”
This reference to the US is instructive. The United States, arguably the world’s most powerful and institutionally robust democracy, has nonetheless experienced significant polarization and institutional strain as identity-based political organizing has intensified over recent decades. The phenomenon has only accelerated with the fragmentation of media, the rise of social media, and the mainstreaming of identity politics across the political spectrum.
The implications for Singapore are sobering. If a nation with centuries of democratic tradition and deeply entrenched constitutional protections can experience the level of polarization now evident in American politics, what protections does Singapore have? The answer, in Shanmugam’s analysis, lies precisely in the active maintenance of secular principles and the deliberate avoidance of identity politics at an early stage—before such dynamics become institutionalized and self-reinforcing.
Shanmugam’s warning is particularly pointed: if such tactics gain traction in Singapore, “Then it is a one-way street to ruin.” This is not hyperbole but a realistic assessment based on comparative evidence from other multiracial democracies that have allowed identity politics to take root. Once such dynamics become normalized, reversing them becomes nearly impossible. As Shanmugam stated, division that results from identity politics “is hard to contain and impossible to reverse.”
The Mechanics of Identity Politics: How Conflict Escalates
One of the most important contributions of Shanmugam’s speech is his articulation of how identity politics operates as a self-reinforcing dynamic that tends toward escalation and mutual destruction. His analysis suggests that if one group mobilizes successfully on the basis of identity, this creates incentives for other groups to do likewise. As he explained, “if future political leaders on all sides see identity politics gain traction here, they will be pressured and tempted to take part themselves.”
This dynamic is inherent to identity politics because it creates a zero-sum competitive logic. When politics becomes organized around group identity rather than policy preferences or ideological principles, every electoral contest becomes a struggle for group dominance. The largest and best-organized groups gain an advantage, and smaller or less mobilized groups feel threatened. As Shanmugam noted, “If such tactics are used in Singapore, the largest and best-organised groups will get their way and conflict is inevitable.”
In Singapore’s context, with a Chinese-majority population comprising roughly 75-80 percent of the population, the mechanics of such competition are particularly concerning. If politics becomes organized along ethnic and religious lines, the sheer demographic weight of the Chinese majority means that Chinese identity-based mobilization would likely prevail electorally. However, such an outcome would not be politically sustainable. Rather, it would drive minority communities to organize themselves defensively along similar lines, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of communal mobilization that would eventually tear the social fabric apart.
This dynamic is not theoretical. It has played out repeatedly in other multiethnic democracies, from Sri Lanka to the former Yugoslavia to contemporary India. Shanmugam’s reference to India and other countries where “communal relations have worsened as a result of these pressures” suggests his awareness of these historical lessons. The warning is clear: Singapore is not immune to these global trends, and the nation’s current stability cannot be taken for granted.
The Role of Political Leadership
A crucial element of Shanmugam’s analysis is his emphasis on the role that political leadership plays in either sustaining or undermining multiracial harmony. As he stated, “Politicians play a role in setting the right tone for society, and should encourage constructive discussion and find solutions to problems faced by different ethnic groups.”
This observation contains an important acknowledgment: political leaders are not merely reflective of societal attitudes; they are active agents who shape those attitudes through the examples they set and the rhetoric they employ. The reverse is also true: irresponsible political leadership can unleash forces that are extremely difficult to contain.
Shanmugam’s implicit critique of opposition parties that have failed to consistently reject identity-based framing is thus not merely a partisan attack but a substantive claim about political responsibility. In a multiracial democracy, opposition parties have a particular responsibility to uphold secular principles even when doing so may cost them electoral support. This is because the integrity of the democratic system itself depends on all parties respecting fundamental ground rules about how politics should be conducted.
The minister was particularly critical of the Workers’ Party’s response to the interference during the May election, noting that the party’s initial failure to clearly reject foreign endorsement and its delay in responding to identity-based appeals were problematic. However, his criticism was not merely about the WP as a partisan target but about the importance of swift, unambiguous clarity on these fundamental principles. As he stated, “any delay and ambiguity could give rise to questions and confusion.”
Shanmugam’s appeal at the conclusion of his speech was directed at “MPs on both sides of the aisle,” suggesting that the responsibility for protecting secular principles extends across the political spectrum. This framing is significant because it rejects the notion that maintenance of Singapore’s secular, multiracial system is the exclusive responsibility of the ruling party. Rather, it is a shared responsibility of all political actors.
The Paradox of Singapore’s Success
There is a paradox embedded in Shanmugam’s analysis. Singapore has achieved remarkable success in maintaining racial harmony and multiracial coexistence precisely because political leaders have voluntarily restrained themselves from pursuing identity-based mobilization, even when doing so might have yielded short-term electoral gains. The ruling PAP, despite its commanding electoral dominance, has consistently “eschewed identity politics and borne the political cost of fighting against attempts to stir up such sentiments.”
This voluntary restraint is remarkable because it contradicts what rational-actor models in political science might predict. A dominant party facing no serious electoral threat might be expected to test the boundaries of what is permissible in order to maximize its support among the majority community. That the PAP has not done so is testament to the vision of Singapore’s founding leaders and the institutional culture they established.
However, this success creates a new vulnerability. Because Singapore has been so successful in avoiding overt identity politics, younger citizens may not fully appreciate the fragility of the system or the work required to maintain it. The apparent naturalness of multiracial harmony in Singapore may obscure the constant, deliberate effort required to maintain it. This suggests that Shanmugam’s speech has an important pedagogical function: reminding Singaporeans of the choices that created their current stability and the constant vigilance required to preserve it.
Moreover, the fact that external actors (Malaysian PAS politicians, foreign actors using social media) are now attempting to exploit Singapore’s identity divides suggests that the global environment has become more hostile to the maintenance of secular, multiracial systems. As the minister noted, Singapore is “not more stable than other countries where communal relations have worsened as a result of these pressures.” This statement implicitly acknowledges that maintaining multiracial stability requires continuous effort against external and internal pressures.
Specific Concerns: The Blurring of Religion and Politics
While Shanmugam’s speech addressed identity politics more broadly, he gave particular attention to the intersection of religion and politics, which he identified as especially concerning. His formulation of the problem is worth examining closely: the issue is not that people with religious convictions participate in politics, but rather that religion itself becomes an organizing principle of political competition.
The distinction between these two scenarios is crucial. In the first case, a Catholic politician might vote for policies supporting religious education in schools because of her religious convictions, while a secular politician might oppose such policies on secular grounds. Both actors are participating in legitimate political debate. However, in the second case, politicians might frame an election as a struggle between the interests of the Catholic community and those of other communities, essentially mobilizing voters on the basis of their religious identity rather than engaging with the substantive policy arguments.
Shanmugam’s concern is that Singapore has begun to see the second dynamic emerge. Noor Deros’s claim that the WP was “the only one taking his demands seriously” and the subsequent mobilization by PAS politicians represented precisely this kind of religion-based identity politics. It was not about specific religious policies or the interests of believers; it was about organizing voters on the basis of their religious identity for electoral purposes.
This distinction has important implications for religious freedom in Singapore. As Shanmugam emphasized, the Government’s position is emphatically not that “politics is incompatible with race and religion.” Rather, the position is that while people are free to hold and express religious views, they must do so in a manner that respects other religions and that does not attempt to mobilize voters on the basis of religious identity. This formulation allows for robust religious engagement with politics while maintaining secular democratic principles.
The Risks of Veiled Rhetoric
Another significant element of Shanmugam’s analysis is his warning about what he called “veiled rhetoric”—language that ostensibly refers to something neutral but actually functions to mobilize identity-based sentiment. His example was Damanhuri Abas’s framing of opposition to the PAP as an issue of “upholding Malay dignity,” which Shanmugam identified as functioning as a euphemism for Malay “rights.”
This concern with veiled rhetoric reflects a sophisticated understanding of how identity politics actually operates. In most contemporary democracies, overt identity-based appeals are considered unseemly or even taboo. Consequently, politicians who wish to mobilize on the basis of identity often use coded language or euphemisms that allow supporters to understand the communal appeal while providing deniability to the politician. Terms like “defending our values,” “protecting our heritage,” “our community’s interests,” or (as Shanmugam identified) “upholding dignity” can function as identity-based appeals while maintaining a veneer of respectability.
Shanmugam’s identification of this rhetorical technique suggests that authorities in Singapore will need to develop greater vigilance about the language used in political campaigns. However, this raises a delicate problem: how does one distinguish between legitimate appeals to group interests and illegitimate identity-based mobilization? A politician representing a constituency with significant Malay and Muslim populations might legitimately advocate for policies addressing specific concerns of that community without this constituting prohibited identity politics.
The answer likely lies in context and framing. If a politician emphasizes specific policy concerns and advocates solutions that are universally justified and available to all communities, this likely does not constitute prohibited identity politics. However, if the same politician frames policy disagreements as struggles between ethnic or religious groups for dominance or recognition, this crosses into territory that Shanmugam would likely identify as problematic. The challenge, as always in democracy, lies in administering such distinctions fairly and consistently.
Institutional and Legal Frameworks
While Shanmugam’s speech focused primarily on the need for political restraint and maintenance of secular principles, he did note that Singapore possesses “a strong legal framework to protect communal harmony.” This reference suggests that Singapore has institutional tools beyond mere political rhetoric to address threats to multiracial stability.
Singapore’s legal framework includes the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA), which empowers the Government to take action against religious leaders or organizations that attempt to use religion for political purposes or that promote discord between religious communities. The Internal Security Act (ISA), while controversial, provides the Government with tools to detain individuals engaged in activities deemed threatening to national security, potentially including subversive identity-based organizing.
Additionally, Singapore’s electoral laws prohibit candidates from making appeals based on race or religion. However, the existence of such laws is not sufficient if they are not consistently enforced or if the interpretation of what constitutes prohibited conduct is ambiguous. Shanmugam’s speech can thus be read as a signal that the Government intends to enforce these provisions more vigorously and that opposition parties should be acutely aware of legal constraints on their conduct.
However, there is an inherent tension between legal prohibitions and democratic openness. Excessive legal restraint on political speech could undermine democratic participation and create a perception of authoritarianism. The challenge for Singapore is to maintain sufficient legal guardrails to prevent the emergence of identity-based competition while preserving sufficient political space for genuine democratic debate and contestation.
The Appeal to Shared Responsibility
The conclusion of Shanmugam’s speech included an important appeal to Members of Parliament from both sides of the aisle to “handle issues of race and religion in a responsible and sensible manner, and to uphold the integrity of Singapore’s secular politics.” This formulation is significant because it frames the maintenance of secular, multiracial democracy not as a partisan issue but as a matter of shared national responsibility.
This appeal suggests recognition that the challenge facing Singapore is not reducible to partisan conflict. Rather, the threat to Singapore’s stability comes from both external actors (Malaysian political parties, foreign entities using social media) and from the potential for domestic actors to exploit identity divisions for political gain. Protecting Singapore’s secular system requires vigilance from all political actors, including government, opposition parties, religious leaders, and civil society.
The emphasis on “responsible and sensible manner” suggests that the Government is not advocating for the complete exclusion of race and religion from political discussion. Rather, it is advocating for discussion that is grounded in respect for other communities, that does not attempt to mobilize voters on the basis of identity, and that recognizes the shared interests that unite Singaporeans across communal lines.
Long-Term Implications and Challenges
What are the longer-term implications of Shanmugam’s intervention? Several possibilities emerge from his analysis.
First, the speech represents a signal to all political actors that the Government will take seriously any attempts to exploit identity divisions. The specificity with which Shanmugam identified problematic conduct during the May election—naming individuals and parties, quoting problematic statements—suggests that the Government is monitoring political conduct closely and is willing to call out violations of secular principles publicly.
Second, the speech raises the question of whether existing institutional frameworks are adequate to the challenge. If external actors are able to influence Singapore’s elections through social media and coordinated messaging, this suggests that traditional enforcement mechanisms may be insufficient. Singapore will likely need to develop new approaches to addressing foreign interference and online mobilization around identity issues.
Third, the speech reflects concern about generational change. As the founding generation of Singapore passes from the scene, will subsequent generations of political leaders maintain the commitment to secular principles that characterized early leadership? Shanmugam’s emphasis on the “tremendous opposition” that multiracialism faced in the founding period and the choices made by Singapore’s founders seems designed to instill in younger citizens appreciation for what has been achieved and what is at stake.
Fourth, the speech suggests that Singapore’s ability to maintain its multiracial character will depend increasingly on the decisions made by opposition parties and civil society. The ruling PAP’s electoral dominance means that the most significant threats to secular principles will likely come from opposition parties seeking to gain traction by mobilizing on identity lines. The speech can be read as a warning to opposition parties that such strategies will not be tolerated and will be publicly challenged by the Government.
Conclusion
K. Shanmugam’s October 14, 2025 parliamentary address represents a crucial intervention in Singapore’s ongoing struggle to maintain its multiracial, secular character in an era of global polarization and identity politics. The speech is significant not merely for what it says but for what its necessity reveals about contemporary threats to Singapore’s stability.
The core message is simple but profound: political debate in Singapore must be conducted on a secular basis, religion and race must not be weaponized for electoral purposes, and all political actors—regardless of partisan affiliation—have a responsibility to protect the integrity of Singapore’s secular democratic system. This message has particular force given recent attempts to exploit Singapore’s identity divisions during the May election and the broader global trend toward identity-based political mobilization.
What emerges from a careful analysis of the speech is a picture of a nation that has achieved remarkable success in building a stable, prosperous multiracial society, but that recognizes this success is not guaranteed and depends on constant vigilance. The threats are both external—foreign interference and influence—and internal—the possibility that domestic political actors will calculate that identity-based mobilization offers electoral advantage. The stakes, as Shanmugam emphasized, are existential.
For Singapore’s future stability and prosperity, all political actors must internalize the lessons of Singapore’s founding and the warnings of contemporary experience. Identity politics is a dead-end that leads only to polarization, conflict, and the destruction of the social trust necessary for functioning democracy. Singapore’s path lies in maintaining secular principles, respecting all communities, and organizing politics around shared interests and competing visions of the common good rather than around ethnic and religious divisions. Whether Singapore can navigate this challenging terrain while remaining a vibrant, competitive democracy remains an open question—but it is a question that will substantially determine the nation’s future.
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