Executive Summary

The current US-Mexico water dispute represents one of the most significant transboundary water challenges facing North America. The conflict centers on Mexico’s failure to meet water delivery obligations under the 1944 Water Treaty, with President Trump threatening tariffs and Mexico citing drought and physical constraints. This case study examines the historical context, current crisis, future outlook, potential solutions, and implications for Singapore’s water security strategy.

President Trump threatened to impose an additional 5% tariff on Mexico on Monday, alleging violations of the 1944 water treaty. Al JazeeraChannels Television Trump claimed Mexico owes over 800,000 acre-feet of water and demanded 200,000 acre-feet be released before December 31. Deccan Chronicle

According to the article you provided, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum said she expects officials from both countries to meet later on Tuesday (December 9) to resolve the dispute.

Mexico’s Position

Sheinbaum submitted a proposal to US officials on Wednesday outlining short-term steps to address water supply and instructed Mexico’s environment, agriculture and foreign ministers to contact their US counterparts. Deccan Chronicle She expressed confidence that an agreement would be reached.

However, Sheinbaum noted physical constraints, explaining that “due to the size of the pipe, it would not be possible to deliver the amount of water requested in a very short time.”

Mexico has experienced three years of drought and claims it has fulfilled obligations “to the extent water is available.” Al JazeeraDeccan Chronicle

The Treaty Context

The 1944 treaty requires Mexico to deliver 1.75 million acre-feet of Rio Grande water to the US every five years. The latest five-year cycle ended in October, with data showing Mexico delivered less than 30% of the mandated volume. Al JazeeraDeccan Chronicle

Note: As of my search, I did not find specific details about the outcome of today’s meeting or whether it has concluded. The meeting was scheduled for later on December 9, and President Sheinbaum expressed optimism about reaching an agreement, but final results have not been publicly reported yet.


1. Background and Historical Context

The 1944 Water Treaty Framework

The Treaty between Mexico and the United States for the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, signed February 3, 1944, established the foundational framework for binational water management. The treaty created reciprocal obligations:

US Obligations:

  • Deliver 1.5 million acre-feet annually to Mexico from the Colorado River
  • Consistently met since 1944 (though the US refused delivery for the first time on March 20, 2025)

Mexican Obligations:

  • Deliver 1.75 million acre-feet from Rio Grande tributaries over five-year cycles (averaging 350,000 acre-feet annually)
  • From 1944-1994, Mexico reliably met this obligation and often exceeded it

Governance Structure

The International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), established by the treaty, serves as the primary arbiter for water disputes. The commission uses “minutes” (amendments) to adapt the treaty to changing conditions without formal renegotiation. Over 100 years, this mechanism has resolved most border water disputes peacefully.

Historical Performance

Mexico’s compliance record dramatically shifted after 1992. Three five-year cycles ended in deficit:

  • 1992-1997 cycle: First modern deficit due to drought
  • 1997-2002 cycle: Accumulated debt, eventually rolled over
  • 2010-2015 cycle: Another deficit requiring payback in subsequent cycle
  • 2020-2025 cycle: Severe shortfall with only 400,000 acre-feet delivered by mid-2024 (less than 30% of required volume)

The 2002-2007 and 2015-2020 cycles saw last-minute deliveries, with Mexico fulfilling obligations within days or months of cycle deadlines.


2. Current Crisis Analysis (December 2025)

Immediate Trigger

On December 8, 2025, President Trump threatened an additional 5% tariff on Mexican goods if Mexico doesn’t immediately provide more water, specifically demanding 200,000 acre-feet before December 31, 2025. This unprecedented tariff threat represents an escalation beyond traditional diplomatic channels for water disputes.

Mexico’s Position

President Claudia Sheinbaum has emphasized three key constraints:

  1. Physical Infrastructure Limitations: The pipeline carrying water to the Rio Grande cannot physically deliver 200,000 acre-feet in the requested timeframe
  2. Domestic Water Needs: Mexico has experienced three consecutive years of drought, limiting available water
  3. Treaty Interpretation: Mexico claims it has complied “to the extent water is available” under the treaty’s “extraordinary drought” provision

Outstanding Debt

Current estimates indicate Mexico owes over 800,000 acre-feet of water to the United States, with the five-year cycle having ended in October 2024.

Domestic Mexican Tensions

In 2020, the water dispute created internal conflict within Mexico when President López Obrador deployed the National Guard to confront farmers in Chihuahua who had taken over the Boquilla Dam to prevent water releases to the US. One protestor was killed. This illustrates how the binational water issue has become entangled with domestic political tensions over water allocation between Mexican states and between Mexico and the US.


3. Root Causes and Systemic Issues

Climate Change Impacts

The Rio Grande basin faces multiple climate-driven stressors:

Declining Water Availability:

  • Natural flow reduced by 80-95% compared to historical levels
  • Peak spring runoff arriving up to one month earlier by 2099
  • Snowpack in headwaters decreased 25% between 1958-2015
  • Projected 11.4% decline in yearly release volume between 2021-2070
  • Only 5% of the river’s historical natural flow continues

Temperature and Precipitation Trends:

  • Increased temperatures accelerating evaporation
  • Decreased precipitation, particularly in spring months
  • More persistent droughts and erratic precipitation patterns
  • The Southwest experiencing greatest climate change impacts among snowmelt-driven basins in western US

Reservoir Status:

  • Amistad and Falcon reservoirs (international storage) barely reaching 30% capacity over past five years
  • Elephant Butte Reservoir showing dramatic declines in storage levels

Demand-Supply Imbalance

The Rio Grande serves over 13 million agricultural, municipal, and industrial water users across four jurisdictions (Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Chihuahua, Mexico). Current demand far exceeds what was envisioned in 1944, when the treaty was negotiated under very different hydrological and demographic conditions.

Projected Shortfalls:

  • By 2060, the Lower Rio Grande Basin faces a total shortfall of 678,522 acre-feet per year
  • This includes 592,084 acre-feet from existing planning plus 86,438 acre-feet from climate change impacts
  • Water supply completely unsustainable without major management changes

Treaty Design Limitations

The 1944 treaty contains critical ambiguities that complicate modern water management:

“Extraordinary Drought” Provision:

  • Treaty allows postponement of deliveries during “extraordinary drought or serious accident”
  • Terms remain undefined after 80 years
  • Applied inconsistently across different river systems (Colorado River, Upper Rio Grande, Lower Rio Grande)
  • On Lower Rio Grande, Mexico must make up shortfalls in subsequent cycles, unlike proportional reduction approach used elsewhere

Allocation Mechanism:

  • Based on absolute volumes (acre-feet) rather than percentage of available water
  • No adjustment mechanism for changed hydrological conditions
  • Cycle-to-cycle debt can only be carried once (Minute 234 stipulates no shortfalls for two consecutive cycles)

Missing Elements:

  • No groundwater management provisions (deliberately excluded to facilitate treaty negotiation)
  • No clear prioritization framework for competing uses
  • Limited adaptability mechanisms for long-term climate change

4. Economic and Social Impacts

Texas Agriculture

Water shortages have devastated South Texas agriculture:

  • Texas’s last sugar mill shut down in 2025 due to water shortages
  • Citrus industry in Lower Rio Grande Valley at risk
  • Farmers forced to find alternate water sources, change crops, or reduce operations
  • Pumping groundwater costs more than river water and produces saltier water, reducing crop yields over time

Binational Economic Relations

The water dispute threatens broader economic cooperation:

  • Trump’s tariff threats link trade policy to water delivery for first time
  • Potential additional 5% tariff on all Mexican goods would affect billions in bilateral trade
  • Congressional representatives describing dispute as affecting US-Mexico relationship fundamentally

Mexican Domestic Impacts

Water scarcity affects Mexican border communities severely:

  • Agricultural communities in Chihuahua and other northern states facing crop failures
  • Competing demands between domestic use and treaty obligations
  • Political tensions between federal government and states over water allocation
  • Constitutional questions about water ownership and use priorities

5. Future Outlook

Short-Term (2025-2030)

Likely Scenarios:

Optimistic Case:

  • Negotiated resolution through IBWC minutes addressing immediate delivery shortfall
  • Graduated payment schedule allowing Mexico to catch up over next cycle
  • Tariff threats withdrawn in exchange for good-faith compliance plan
  • Increased transparency and monitoring mechanisms

Pessimistic Case:

  • Tariffs implemented, damaging broader US-Mexico relations
  • Water debt continues accumulating
  • Domestic protests in Mexico intensify
  • Legal challenges and potential international arbitration
  • Deterioration of cooperative frameworks built over 80 years

Medium-Term (2030-2050)

Climate projections indicate worsening conditions:

  • Continued decline in river flows (18%+ decrease in snowmelt runoff by century’s end)
  • More frequent and severe droughts
  • Earlier peak runoff timing disrupting agricultural planning
  • Increased competition between users on both sides of border

Without significant interventions, the treaty framework may become unworkable. The probability of delivering full annual allocations decreases significantly, with maximum consecutive years below full allocation increasing from 10 to 14 years.

Long-Term (2050-2100)

Fundamental questions about the treaty’s viability emerge:

  • Can absolute volume allocations survive in a dramatically reduced flow regime?
  • Will the “extraordinary drought” provision become the norm rather than exception?
  • Can agricultural water use continue at current levels?
  • What happens when groundwater reserves (currently supplementing surface water) are depleted?

Multiple studies conclude that without major changes to water management rules and practices on both sides, supplies will be completely unsustainable.


6. Proposed Solutions

Immediate-Term Solutions (0-2 Years)

1. Emergency Delivery Plan

  • Negotiate realistic delivery schedule through end of 2025 considering pipeline capacity
  • Establish weekly monitoring and reporting mechanisms
  • Create interim agreement allowing graduated payments over 12-18 months
  • Withdraw tariff threats in exchange for demonstrated progress

2. Enhanced Transparency and Data Sharing

  • Real-time monitoring of reservoir levels and releases
  • Joint assessment of drought conditions using agreed-upon metrics
  • Public reporting dashboards accessible to stakeholders on both sides
  • Independent verification of delivery volumes

3. Diplomatic De-escalation

  • Return to IBWC-led negotiations rather than presidential-level threats
  • Engage UN or other neutral third parties as observers/mediators
  • Separate water issues from broader trade negotiations
  • Acknowledge mutual dependencies and good faith efforts

Short-Term Solutions (2-5 Years)

4. Develop New Treaty Minute

  • Formally define “extraordinary drought” with objective criteria (e.g., reservoir levels, precipitation percentiles, streamflow measurements)
  • Establish triggers for proportional reduction in allocations during severe scarcity
  • Create drought management protocol with staged responses
  • Include climate change adaptation language

5. Flexibility in Allocation Mechanisms

  • Shift from absolute volumes to percentage-based allocations during drought periods
  • Allow water banking and carry-forward of surplus deliveries
  • Create smoothing mechanisms to reduce year-to-year volatility
  • Permit multi-year averaging with tighter monitoring

6. Agricultural Efficiency Programs

  • Joint investment in water-efficient irrigation (drip irrigation, soil moisture sensors)
  • Crop switching incentives toward less water-intensive varieties
  • Fallowing programs with compensation for farmers
  • Technology transfer and capacity building between US and Mexican agricultural sectors

Medium-Term Solutions (5-15 Years)

7. Infrastructure Modernization

  • Upgrade conveyance systems to reduce losses
  • Expand storage capacity where feasible
  • Improve pumping and distribution efficiency
  • Repair aging dam and reservoir infrastructure

8. Alternative Water Sources

  • Expand desalination capacity in coastal areas
  • Brackish groundwater treatment
  • Water reuse and recycling programs
  • Rainwater harvesting and stormwater capture during intense precipitation events

9. Demand Management

  • Urban water conservation programs
  • Pricing reforms to reflect true water scarcity
  • Reduction of non-essential water uses
  • Public education campaigns

10. Watershed Management

  • Reforestation and soil conservation in headwaters
  • Wetland restoration to improve water retention
  • Management of invasive species that consume excessive water
  • Cross-border coordination on land use planning

Long-Term Solutions (15+ Years)

11. Treaty Modernization

  • Comprehensive renegotiation acknowledging changed hydrological reality
  • Integration of groundwater management (currently excluded)
  • Climate change adaptation principles embedded in core text
  • Flexible governance allowing rapid response to changing conditions

12. Regional Water Market

  • Allow water trading between users and sectors
  • Create price signals reflecting scarcity
  • Enable voluntary transfers from lower-value to higher-value uses
  • Protect environmental flows and basic human needs

13. Shift Agricultural Paradigm

  • Gradual transition from water-intensive agriculture in arid regions
  • Economic diversification for farming communities
  • Investment in alternative livelihoods
  • Recognition that current agricultural production levels may be unsustainable

14. Integrated Basin Management

  • Holistic approach considering entire watershed from Colorado headwaters to Gulf of Mexico
  • Coordination across multiple treaties and jurisdictions
  • Ecosystem needs alongside human demands
  • Indigenous water rights recognition and integration

15. Financial Mechanisms

  • Side payments and issue linkage (as proven effective in treaty literature)
  • Compensation for foregone water use
  • Joint investment funds for water infrastructure
  • Insurance mechanisms for drought years

7. Singapore Impact and Lessons Learned

Why Singapore Should Care

While geographically distant, the US-Mexico water dispute holds several important implications for Singapore:

1. Transboundary Water Security Lessons

Singapore’s water security depends significantly on the 1962 Water Agreement with Malaysia (expiring 2061), which allows drawing up to 250 million gallons daily from the Johor River. The parallels are striking:

Similarities:

  • Long-term agreements negotiated under different conditions
  • Upstream provider (Johor/Mexico) facing water stress
  • Periodic price disputes and renegotiation attempts
  • Critical dependency for downstream user (Singapore/Texas)
  • Climate change threatening water availability for both parties

Key Differences:

  • Singapore’s agreements registered with UN, protected by international law
  • Singapore has aggressively diversified water sources (“Four National Taps”)
  • Political relationship between Singapore-Malaysia different from US-Mexico power dynamic
  • Singapore committed to self-sufficiency by 2061

2. Climate Adaptation Imperatives

The Rio Grande case demonstrates how climate change transforms water agreements from administrative arrangements into potential sources of conflict. Singapore must anticipate similar pressures:

  • Malaysia’s own water security challenges may intensify
  • Johor experiencing its own climate impacts
  • Growing population and development in southern Malaysia increasing local water demand

3. Self-Sufficiency as Strategic Necessity

The US-Mexico dispute validates Singapore’s strategy of water independence:

  • Desalination expansion (5 plants operational, more planned)
  • NEWater (high-grade reclaimed water) expansion
  • Domestic catchment maximization (two-thirds of land as water catchment area)
  • Target: full self-sufficiency by 2061 when current agreement expires

4. Treaty Design Insights

Singapore can learn from the 1944 treaty’s limitations:

What Worked:

  • IBWC as permanent joint institution
  • Minute process allowing flexible adaptation
  • Generally successful conflict resolution for 50+ years

What Failed:

  • Absolute volume allocations in changing climate
  • Undefined “extraordinary drought” provision
  • No groundwater integration
  • Insufficient adaptability mechanisms

Singapore’s Treaty Advantages:

  • Clearer legal standing (UN registration, Vienna Convention protection)
  • More favorable treatment as water importer (pays market rate, develops infrastructure)
  • Recent reaffirmation of commitments at 11th Malaysia-Singapore Leaders’ Retreat (2024)

Specific Recommendations for Singapore

1. Accelerate Self-Sufficiency Timeline

  • Don’t wait until 2061 to achieve independence
  • Set intermediate targets for reducing Malaysia dependence
  • Expand desalination and NEWater capacity ahead of schedule
  • Treat 2061 as backstop, not target

2. Strengthen Institutional Frameworks

  • Regular high-level dialogues on water security
  • Joint climate adaptation planning with Malaysia
  • Technology and capacity building partnerships
  • Shared monitoring and data systems

3. Maintain Multiple Contingencies

  • Continue diversification beyond four taps
  • Explore additional sources (e.g., Indonesia discussions)
  • Build strategic reserves and buffer capacity
  • Scenario planning for various supply disruption scenarios

4. Regional Water Diplomacy

  • Lead ASEAN discussions on transboundary water cooperation
  • Share Singapore’s water management expertise
  • Support regional climate adaptation initiatives
  • Position Singapore as honest broker for water disputes

5. Research and Innovation

  • Invest in water-efficient technologies
  • Develop cost-effective desalination
  • Improve water reuse systems
  • Create exportable water management solutions

6. Public Education and Demand Management

  • Continue public awareness campaigns (e.g., “Save Water” initiatives)
  • Pricing policies reflecting true scarcity value
  • Water conservation in all sectors
  • Cultural shift toward water stewardship

The Singapore Advantage

Singapore’s approach to water security offers a compelling contrast to the US-Mexico situation:

Proactive vs. Reactive: Singapore planned decades ahead for water independence, while Texas remains reactive to supply shocks.

Diversification vs. Dependency: Singapore’s Four National Taps (local catchment, imported water, NEWater, desalinated water) versus heavy reliance on treaty water in South Texas.

Investment vs. Complacency: Singapore invested S$300+ million in Linggiu Dam construction (which it doesn’t own) and billions in domestic infrastructure, while US-Mexico water users relied on 1944 treaty assumptions.

Legal Protection vs. Ambiguity: Singapore’s UN-registered agreements versus undefined “extraordinary drought” provisions in 1944 treaty.

Political Stability vs. Conflict: Reaffirmed commitments at bilateral summits versus tariff threats and domestic protests.

However, Singapore must not become complacent. The US-Mexico case demonstrates how quickly long-standing water agreements can become sources of acute tension under climate stress and political change.


8. Comparative Analysis: Successful Transboundary Water Agreements

Lessons from Global Best Practices

1. Indus Waters Treaty (India-Pakistan, 1960)

  • Survived three wars between countries
  • Clear allocation of rivers between parties
  • World Bank facilitation and guarantee
  • Permanent Indus Commission for dispute resolution
  • Lesson: Institutional permanence and third-party guarantees enhance stability

2. Mekong River Commission (1995)

  • Four countries cooperating despite political differences
  • Data and information sharing protocols
  • Joint monitoring systems
  • Notification procedures for major projects
  • Lesson: Transparency and information exchange build trust

3. Rhine River Agreements (Multiple European countries)

  • Evolved from pollution focus to comprehensive management
  • Strong supranational institutions
  • Benefit-sharing beyond just water allocation
  • Integrated with broader EU cooperation frameworks
  • Lesson: Issue linkage and mutual benefits promote cooperation

4. Singapore-Malaysia Water Agreements

  • Multiple agreements with different expiration dates
  • UN registration for international legal protection
  • Downstream investment in upstream infrastructure
  • Mutual dependencies (Singapore treats water for Johor)
  • Lesson: Legal certainty and mutual benefit structures work

5. Senegal River Basin (West Africa)

  • Joint development organization (OMVS) managing shared resources
  • Co-ownership of infrastructure
  • Revenue sharing from hydropower
  • Regional integration benefits
  • Lesson: Shared ownership and benefits distribution matter

Common Success Factors

The literature on transboundary water cooperation identifies key elements for effective agreements:

  1. Flexible yet specific allocation mechanisms (percentages better than absolute volumes)
  2. Strong institutional frameworks (joint commissions with authority and resources)
  3. Enforcement and monitoring provisions
  4. Conflict resolution mechanisms
  5. Adaptability clauses allowing adjustment to changing conditions
  6. Side payments or issue linkage creating financial incentives or connecting water to broader relations
  7. Third-party involvement providing neutral facilitation and guarantees
  8. Benefit sharing beyond simple allocation
  9. Data sharing and transparency
  10. Environmental considerations protecting ecosystem needs

The 1944 US-Mexico treaty has elements 2, 3, 4, and 9, but lacks or weakly addresses 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10. This helps explain current challenges.


9. Conclusion and Strategic Implications

Key Takeaways

  1. Climate Change as Game-Changer: The US-Mexico dispute demonstrates that water agreements negotiated under past climate conditions may become unworkable, requiring fundamental renegotiation or collapse.
  2. Treaty Design Matters: Ambiguous provisions (“extraordinary drought”), absolute volume allocations, and insufficient adaptability mechanisms create vulnerability to changing conditions.
  3. Economic-Political Linkages: Water disputes can rapidly escalate to affect broader bilateral relations, especially when linked to trade and tariffs.
  4. Domestic-International Nexus: Transboundary water issues create internal political tensions, as seen with Chihuahua farmers opposing deliveries to the US.
  5. Infrastructure Limitations: Physical constraints (pipeline capacity) can prevent compliance even with political will.
  6. Self-Sufficiency as Security: Singapore’s diversification strategy appears vindicated by the vulnerability demonstrated in US-Mexico case.

Final Assessment

The US-Mexico water dispute of 2025 represents a critical juncture for one of the world’s most important transboundary water agreements. The outcome will influence not only bilateral relations between these neighbors but also set precedents for how water-stressed regions worldwide manage shared resources under climate change.

For Singapore, the lessons are clear: continue aggressive diversification, strengthen legal frameworks, maintain diplomatic engagement with Malaysia, invest heavily in water infrastructure, and never take water security for granted. The path to water independence by 2061 must be accelerated, not delayed.

The Rio Grande conflict offers a sobering preview of what happens when water security is treated as a settled issue rather than an evolving challenge requiring constant adaptation, investment, and cooperation. Singapore’s proactive approach stands in stark contrast—and provides a model for other water-stressed nations to follow.

As climate change intensifies and water becomes increasingly scarce globally, the choice between cooperation and conflict over shared water resources will define the 21st century. The US-Mexico case shows both the fragility of old agreements and the urgent need for new frameworks adapted to our changing world.


References and Further Reading

Primary Sources

  • Treaty between Mexico and the United States for the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (1944)
  • IBWC Minutes and Resolutions
  • Singapore-Malaysia Water Agreements (1962, 1990)
  • UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses

Academic Research

  • Wilson Center: “Bilateral Water Management: Water Sharing between the US and Mexico”
  • Texas Commission on Environmental Quality: “Texas Relies on 1944 Treaty Water”
  • Journal articles on extraordinary drought provision and transboundary water cooperation
  • Climate impact studies for Rio Grande Basin by USGS, NOAA, and US Bureau of Reclamation

Policy Reports

  • IBWC Rio Grande White Paper (2023)
  • Lower Rio Grande Basin Study (US Bureau of Reclamation)
  • Singapore’s 50-Year Water Action Plan
  • World Bank reports on transboundary water cooperation

This case study was prepared December 2025 and reflects information available as of that date.