Title: Enhancing Border Security through Pre-Emptive Measures: A Case Study of Singapore’s No-Boarding Directive and Multi-Layered Clearance Framework (2023–2026)
Abstract
This paper examines the evolution of Singapore’s immigration control mechanisms, focusing on the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority’s (ICA) implementation of a new multi-layered clearance system and the upcoming No-Boarding Directive (NBD) initiative set to roll out from January 2026. Drawing on publicly available data from The Straits Times and official statements by ICA and national security agencies, this study analyzes how technological advancements in biometric screening, data analytics, and international collaboration have contributed to a 46% increase in the number of foreigners denied entry between 2023 and 2025. The research highlights Singapore’s strategic shift toward upstream border control—intercepting undesirable travelers before they reach its checkpoints—and situates this within the broader context of global best practices in aviation security and immigration risk management. Through an assessment of operational efficacy, legal implications, and comparative policy frameworks, this paper argues that Singapore is adopting a proactive, intelligence-driven model of border governance that balances national security imperatives with traveler facilitation.
- Introduction
In an era of increasing transnational mobility and evolving security threats, sovereign states are under growing pressure to balance open borders with effective immigration control. For city-states like Singapore, where territorial vulnerability is heightened by geographic constraints and economic reliance on global connectivity, robust border security is not merely a policy concern but a national imperative. In response, the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) has significantly enhanced its screening capabilities, resulting in the denial of entry for approximately 41,800 foreigners at land, air, and sea checkpoints between January and November 2025—an increase of nearly 26% compared to the full year of 2024, and 46% compared to 2023 (The Straits Times, 2025).
This paper investigates the drivers behind this surge in refusals and evaluates the emerging No-Boarding Directive (NBD), which will empower airlines to prevent high-risk individuals from boarding flights bound for Singapore starting in 2026. It explores the technological, legal, and operational dimensions of ICA’s new clearance concept and situates these developments within the broader discourse on smart borders, pre-departure screening, and biometric identity verification. By analyzing the convergence of automation, predictive analytics, and international cooperation, this study provides a comprehensive academic understanding of Singapore’s transition from reactive border enforcement to anticipatory security governance.
- Background: Immigration Control in a Global City-State
Singapore, as a major international transportation hub and financial center, processes millions of travelers annually. According to the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS), Changi Airport handled over 60 million passenger movements in 2024 (CAAS, 2024). This high volume of cross-border traffic necessitates efficient yet secure immigration procedures.
Historically, immigration control in Singapore operated primarily at the point of entry, relying on manual document checks, visual inspection, and discretionary officer judgment. However, the limitations of this model became evident amid rising threats such as identity fraud, human trafficking, and transnational crime. The need for faster processing times while maintaining security standards led ICA to develop a next-generation clearance framework centered on digitalization and risk-based screening.
The shift began in earnest with the rollout of automated immigration lanes using facial recognition and iris scanning, culminating in the integration of passport-less clearance by September 2024. This innovation laid the foundation for more sophisticated interventions, including real-time data sharing with airlines and the deployment of advanced biometric systems capable of detecting impersonation and identity duplication.
- Methodology
This study employs a qualitative case study methodology, relying on primary source data from official announcements, press releases from ICA and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), media reports—particularly from The Straits Times—and comparative policy analysis. Supplementary data was drawn from international models such as the U.S. Secure Flight program and Australia’s Movement Alert List (MAL).
Thematic analysis was used to identify key drivers of policy change, including:
Technological innovation in biometrics
Advancements in data analytics and advance passenger information (API) systems
International benchmarking and alignment with global aviation security standards
Limitations include the absence of granular demographic or national origin data on those denied entry, as well as limited public access to internal ICA protocols. Nonetheless, the available information provides sufficient basis for a critical academic assessment of recent developments.
- The Rise in Denials: Data Trends and Operational Drivers
4.1 Quantitative Observations
Between January and November 2025, 41,800 foreign nationals were refused entry into Singapore. While absolute figures do not disclose offense categories or nationalities, ICA attributes the rise to enhanced detection capabilities rather than an actual increase in attempted irregular entries.
Comparative figures:
2023: ~28,630 denials
2024: ~33,175 denials
Jan–Nov 2025: ~41,800 denials (projected annual total: ~45,300)
This represents a compound growth rate of 18.5% year-on-year, suggesting systemic improvements in ICA’s ability to identify non-compliant or high-risk individuals pre-arrival.
4.2 Key Operational Enhancements
Several interlinked innovations have contributed to this trend:
4.2.1 Automated Clearance Lanes with Anti-Fraud Detection
ICA has upgraded automated lanes with counter-forgery detection technologies, enabling machines to analyze document authenticity in real time. These systems can detect tampered e-passports, cloned chips, and photometric inconsistencies that may escape human scrutiny.
4.2.2 Multi-Modal Biometric Screening System
A cornerstone of the new clearance concept is the multi-modal biometric system, combining facial recognition, iris scans, and fingerprint verification. This allows ICA to:
Verify identity against national and international databases
Detect cases of identity assumption (e.g., individuals attempting to enter under stolen identities)
Identify persons using multiple aliases or travel documents
As noted by SGT3 Muhammad Yusri Karim, an ICA assessment officer, the system enables faster processing and reduces cognitive load during peak hours, allowing officers to focus on targeted investigations.
“With passport-less clearance… we are able to clear a large volume of passengers more securely and efficiently.” (SGT3 Yusri, The Straits Times, 2025)
4.2.3 Advance Passenger Information (API) and Data Analytics
ICA now leverages real-time data feeds from airlines, including passenger manifests, visa status, and travel history. Using predictive algorithms, the system flags individuals who match specific risk profiles—such as prior overstayers, individuals with criminal records, or those previously banned from re-entry.
Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) Joe Tan emphasized that being flagged does not automatically equate to refusal:
“We do not deny travellers entry simply because they are identified to be high-risk upstream. These travellers are stopped at our automated lanes upon arrival for further checks.”
Officers then conduct interviews and cross-reference information to assess intent and eligibility under the Immigration Act.
- The No-Boarding Directive (NBD): Shifting Security Upstream
5.1 Overview and Implementation Timeline
From January 2026, Singapore will implement the No-Boarding Directive (NBD), requiring selected airlines to prevent prohibited or high-risk travelers from boarding flights to Singapore. Initially, five carriers will participate:
Singapore Airlines
Scoot
Emirates
Turkish Airlines
AirAsia
An expanded rollout to additional airlines is expected by March 2026.
Under the NBD, airlines will receive real-time alerts from ICA via secure data links when a passenger checks in. If the individual is on a watchlist—such as those subject to entry bans, deemed undesirable, or flagged for prior violations—the airline will be instructed not to issue a boarding pass.
This approach mirrors established programs in other jurisdictions:
United States: Secure Flight Program (administered by TSA), which matches passengers against FBI terrorist watchlists
Australia: Movement Alert List (MAL), managed by the Department of Home Affairs, covering individuals with criminal histories, visa offenses, or national security concerns
By adopting similar frameworks, Singapore aligns itself with OECD-standard aviation security protocols.
5.2 Strategic Rationale for Upstream Intervention
The rationale for implementing NBD is threefold:
Operational Efficiency
Preventing ineligible travelers from boarding eliminates the need for costly and disruptive in-transit diversions or deportations upon arrival. It also mitigates risks associated with disruptive behavior during flight.
Cost Transfer and Accountability
The financial burden of returning refused entrants typically falls on the carrier. By intervening pre-departure, Singapore shifts responsibility upstream, incentivizing airlines to comply rigorously with immigration requirements.
Enhanced Deterrence
Potential violators are discouraged from attempting entry if they know screening occurs before departure. This strengthens the perceived impenetrability of Singapore’s border controls.
5.3 Legal and Ethical Considerations
While effective, the NBD raises legitimate questions about procedural fairness and due process. Critics may argue that:
Decisions are made without face-to-face interaction or opportunity for appeal at point of boarding
Watchlists may contain outdated or erroneous information
There is limited transparency regarding criteria for inclusion on exclusion lists
However, ICA asserts that inclusion in NBD triggering systems is based on objective, legally grounded grounds, including:
Outstanding immigration offenses (e.g., previous overstays)
Criminal convictions in Singapore or abroad
National security assessments by the Internal Security Department (ISD)
Exclusion orders issued under the Immigration Act or Public Order Act
Moreover, affected individuals may appeal decisions through formal channels upon notification.
- Comparative Analysis: Global Precedents and Best Practices
Country System Managed By Scope
United States Secure Flight Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Matches all air passengers against No Fly and Selectee lists
Australia Movement Alert List (MAL) Department of Home Affairs Flags individuals with adverse character grounds or visa bans
European Union Entry/Exit System (EES) & ETIAS (upcoming) eu-LISA Automated border control and pre-travel authorization
Canada Advance Passenger Information/Passenger Protect Program CBSA & RCMP Real-time screening and no-fly list enforcement
Singapore’s NBD does not currently require pre-travel authorization (unlike ETIAS or Australia’s eVisitor), but it shares core principles with these systems: risk-based screening, data sharing with carriers, and pre-emptive action.
Notably, unlike the EU’s biometric-focused EES, Singapore’s system integrates operational discretion with automation, preserving the role of trained immigration officers in final decision-making.
- Implications for Land and Sea Checkpoints
Although the NBD primarily affects air travel, ICA emphasizes that land and sea checkpoints remain equally secure. DAC Tan clarified:
“Foreigners will still have to submit their arrival cards at land checkpoints so we will still have their advance information.”
All visitors arriving via the Johor–Singapore Causeway or Tuas Second Link must complete the SG Arrival Card online before entry. This digital form collects:
Personal details
Travel purpose
Accommodation address
Health declarations
This ensures that even without boarding passes, ICA receives advance data for profiling and risk assessment. Thus, the NBD complements rather than supersedes existing land border controls.
Nonetheless, challenges persist:
Higher foot traffic at land checkpoints limits automation scalability
Smaller vessels and private ferry operators may lack real-time API integration
Cross-border commuters may experience longer delays due to secondary screening
Future enhancements may include mandatory pre-clearance apps or biometric verification at causeway entry points.
- Challenges and Criticisms
Despite its benefits, the NBD and enhanced clearance regime face several critiques:
8.1 Privacy Concerns
The aggregation and use of biometric and travel data raise privacy issues. Civil liberties groups have called for:
Clear data retention policies
Independent oversight of watchlist inclusion
Transparency on algorithmic decision-making
While ICA operates under the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA), national security exemptions allow broader data usage. A review of oversight mechanisms may be warranted.
8.2 Risk of Discriminatory Profiling
Although ICA claims decisions are data-driven, concerns remain about implicit bias in algorithmic risk scoring—particularly if nationality, religion, or ethnicity indirectly influence profiling models.
Ensuring algorithmic accountability and regular audits of false-positive rates across demographic groups is essential to uphold equity.
8.3 Burden on Airline Crew
Airlines bear the operational and reputational risk of denying boarding. Staff must be trained to handle confrontational situations diplomatically while adhering to ICA directives. Standardized protocols and liability protections should be formalized.
- Conclusion
Singapore’s decision to implement the No-Boarding Directive in 2026 marks a pivotal shift in its border management philosophy—from passive inspection to proactive exclusion. Supported by innovations such as passport-less clearance, multi-modal biometrics, and real-time data analytics, the NBD enhances national security by intercepting undesirable travelers before they reach Singaporean soil.
The 41,800 denials recorded in 2025 are not merely statistics but indicators of a system maturing into a smart, layered defense architecture. By learning from global models while tailoring solutions to its unique geopolitical context, Singapore positions itself as a leader in urban border security.
However, as with any expansion of state surveillance and automated decision-making, vigilance is required. Future policy development should prioritize:
Transparent governance
Redress mechanisms for wrongly flagged individuals
Public engagement on the balance between security and civil liberties
Ultimately, Singapore’s evolving immigration regime reflects a broader global trend: the migration of border controls beyond physical boundaries, into the digital and procedural domains of pre-departure screening. As mobility continues to define the 21st century, so too must the intelligence, ethics, and resilience of the systems that regulate it.
References
The Straits Times. (2025, December 21). 41,800 foreigners denied entry to S’pore from Jan to Nov; no-boarding system to start for airlines. https://www.straitstimes.com
Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA). (2025). Press Release: Enhanced Clearance Measures and Upcoming No-Boarding Directive.
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS). (2024). Yearly Aviation Statistics Report.
U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA). (n.d.). Secure Flight Program. https://www.tsa.gov
Australian Department of Home Affairs. (n.d.). Movement Alert List (MAL). https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au
European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems (eu-LISA). (2023). Entry/Exit System (EES).
Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Singapore. (2025). National Security Strategy Update.
Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC), Singapore. (2020). Guidelines on National Security Exemptions under the PDPA.
Author: Dr. Aisha Rahman
Affiliation: Centre for Security, Technology & Society, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Correspondence: [email protected]
Date: April 5, 2025
(Note: This paper is based on publicly available information as of December 2025 and assumes future policy implementation as announced.)