Title:
Strategic Intimidation and Sovereignty Assertion: An Analysis of China’s 2025 Live-Fire Military Drills Around Taiwan as a Geopolitical Warning to Separatist and External Forces
Date:
April 5, 2026
Abstract
This paper examines the strategic, political, and legal dimensions of China’s large-scale live-fire military exercises conducted around Taiwan in late December 2025. Framed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a “stern warning” against “Taiwan independence” and “external interference,” these drills represent a calibrated escalation in Beijing’s coercive diplomacy amid rising tensions with the United States and Japan over regional security and arms transfers. This study analyzes the military scope and objectives of the exercises, their geopolitical context—including U.S.-Taiwan arms sales and Japanese strategic positioning—and the implications for cross-strait stability and the broader Indo-Pacific order. Drawing on official statements, defense reports, and international law, the paper argues that Beijing’s actions reflect an evolving doctrine of “comprehensive deterrence,” integrating kinetic demonstrations with informational and psychological operations. The conclusion assesses the risks of miscalculation and the urgent need for diplomatic de-escalation mechanisms.
- Introduction
On 29 December 2025, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theatre Command launched extensive joint military drills encircling the island of Taiwan. These live-fire exercises, involving air, naval, rocket, and drone units, were conducted in five designated zones surrounding the Taiwan Strait and extended into waters to the north, southwest, southeast, and east of the island. Officially framed as a “legitimate and necessary action” to safeguard national sovereignty, the operation marked a significant intensification of military signaling in one of the world’s most volatile geopolitical flashpoints.
This paper investigates the motivations, execution, and implications of these maneuvers. It situates the drills within the broader context of Sino-American rivalry, evolving cross-strait dynamics, and regional security architectures. While the PLA did not explicitly name external actors in its initial statements, the timing and messaging clearly indicate a response to recent U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and statements from Japan’s leadership suggesting potential intervention in a Taiwan contingency.
- Historical and Political Context: The Taiwan Question
The roots of the current crisis trace back to the Chinese Civil War (1927–1949), which culminated in the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the retreat of the Republic of China (ROC) government—led by the Kuomintang (KMT)—to Taiwan. Since then, the island has operated under de facto independent governance while maintaining its own constitution, democratically elected leadership, and military apparatus. Nevertheless, the PRC has consistently asserted Taiwan as an inalienable part of its territory under the “One-China Principle.”
Despite this claim, direct military conflict has been avoided through a combination of deterrence, economic interdependence, and U.S. strategic ambiguity. Since 1979, the United States has maintained unofficial relations with Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), committing to provide defensive arms and maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion that would jeopardize the island’s security (U.S. Congress, 1979).
Recent years have witnessed a deterioration in cross-strait relations, particularly under the administration of Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te, whose Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is perceived in Beijing as promoting formal independence. This perception has triggered increasingly assertive responses from the PRC.
- The December 2025 Drills: Scope and Strategic Objectives
3.1. Military Deployment and Operational Features
According to Senior Colonel Shi Yi, spokesperson for the PLA Eastern Theatre Command, the drills involved:
Naval Forces: Destroyers (e.g., Type 052D), frigates, and missile boats deployed to the north and southwest of the strait.
Air Assets: J-16 and J-20 fighter jets, H-6K bombers, and reconnaissance drones conducting combat air patrols.
Rocket Force Units: Long-range precision missile systems positioned for simulated strikes on maritime targets.
Joint Command Structure: Integration of sea, air, space, cyber, and electronic warfare units under a unified command.
The exercises emphasized joint sea-air operations, blockade simulations of key ports, and live-fire targeting of floating platforms, reflecting a shift toward high-intensity, multi-domain warfare readiness.
3.2. Geographic and Temporal Dimensions
The drills spanned across five maritime zones—two in the Taiwan Strait, and one each to the northern, southwestern, and southeastern flanks of the island. Notably, the eastern drills entered airspace and waters historically less frequented by the PLA, signaling Beijing’s capacity to project power beyond the first island chain.
Scheduled for 8:00–18:00 on 30 December 2025, these were not isolated incidents but part of a pattern of periodic intimidation seen since the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis (Bush, 2004). However, unlike past exercises, this iteration publicly emphasized “all-dimensional deterrence outside the island chain,” reflecting doctrinal evolution toward anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies designed to limit U.S. intervention.
3.3. Symbolism and Psychological Messaging
The PLA released official propaganda posters titled “Shield of Justice, Smashing Illusion” (正义之盾，破妄之举). These depicted military aircraft and ships flanking stylized Great Wall motifs, with the message: “Any foreign forces or separatists touching the shields will be eliminated.” This blend of nationalist symbolism and threat projection constitutes a deliberate strategic communication campaign, aimed at domestic audiences, the Taiwanese public, and international observers.
- Geopolitical Triggers: U.S. Arms Sales and Japanese Posturing
4.1. U.S.-Taiwan Arms Transfers
The immediate catalyst for the drills was Washington’s announcement on 20 December 2025 of a $10.2 billion defense package to Taiwan, the largest in history. The package included:
F-16V upgrade kits
Harpoon coastal defense systems
MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones
Integrated air defense network components
Beijing responded swiftly, imposing sanctions on 20 U.S. defense firms (including Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and General Dynamics) and 10 executives involved in the sale. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs characterized the sale as “seriously undermining China’s sovereignty and security interests” (MFA PRC, 21 Dec 2025).
While the U.S. justifies arms transfers under the TRA as non-lethal and defensive, China interprets them as de facto support for Taiwan’s de jure independence and a violation of the 1982 Joint Communique, in which Washington pledged gradual reductions in arms sales (Kao, 2023).
4.2. Japan’s Strategic Shift
Further inflaming tensions, Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated on 26 December that “the Japan Self-Defense Forces cannot remain indifferent” if China were to launch an attack on Taiwan, citing threats to Japanese territories like the Southwest Islands. This marked a notable departure from Japan’s traditionally cautious stance.
While not constituting a formal alliance, the remarks align with growing U.S.-Japan military integration and joint planning for Taiwan contingencies. For Beijing, such statements are perceived as evidence of “external interference” and Western encirclement, reinforcing narratives of containment and neocolonialism.
- Taiwan’s Response and Regional Reactions
5.1. Taipei’s Military Posture
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed that combat readiness drills and rapid response exercises were activated during the PLA maneuvers. The military deployed Patriot missile batteries, F-16V fighters, and coastal surveillance assets. Reservist units underwent intensive training in Ilan County, reflecting a shift toward asymmetric defense strategies.
President Lai’s office, through spokesperson Karen Kuo, condemned the drills as “a flagrant violation of international norms” and “a challenge to peace in the Indo-Pacific.” Taiwan also reached out to international partners, including the Quad (U.S., Japan, India, Australia), urging collective diplomatic responses.
5.2. International Reactions
United States: The Pentagon issued a statement calling for “restraint” and reaffirmed its “one-China policy,” while emphasizing its commitment to Taiwan’s self-defense.
European Union: Expressed concern over “destabilizing actions” and called for peaceful resolution of disputes.
ASEAN: Divided responses, with Singapore and Indonesia advocating dialogue, while Vietnam and the Philippines expressed cautious alignment with U.S. concerns.
- Legal and Normative Considerations
Under international law, particularly the UN Charter (Article 2(4)), the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state is prohibited. However, the PRC invokes self-defense and sovereignty under Article 51, asserting that Taiwan is an internal matter.
Critics argue that the live-fire exercises, particularly in international waters and airspace, constitute coercion prohibited under customary international law. The UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) permits military activities in exclusive economic zones (EEZs), but the scale and proximity of these drills—coupled with blocking simulations—risk violating principles of due regard for other states’ navigation rights.
- Strategic Implications and Risks
7.1. Escalation Dynamics
The 2025 drills represent a move from symbolic deterrence to operational intimidation. By conducting live-fire exercises near key shipping lanes and simulating blockade scenarios, the PLA increases the risk of accidental engagement, miscalculation, or technological failure (e.g., drone collisions, radar lock incidents).
7.2. Doctrinal Evolution: Toward Systemic Deterrence
Beijing’s strategy now combines:
Military readiness (A2/AD, joint operations)
Economic pressure (trade restrictions, sanctions)
Information warfare (disinformation, cyber operations)
Legal-political framing (asserting sovereignty under international law)
This “comprehensive deterrence” model, outlined in the 2022 Defense White Paper, aims to create an environment of strategic uncertainty, dissuading both Taipei and external actors from actions perceived as separatist.
- Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
China’s December 2025 military drills around Taiwan are not isolated provocations but components of a broader, systematic strategy to assert sovereignty and deter perceived threats. While framed defensively by Beijing, the exercises deepen regional instability and challenge the rules-based international order.
To mitigate risks of conflict, the following measures are recommended:
Establish Direct Military-to-Military Communication between the PLA and U.S./Taiwanese forces to reduce accidents.
Reinforce Crisis Management Mechanisms, including hotlines and protocols for airspace/naval encounters.
Encourage Multilateral Dialogue, such as ASEAN-led forums, to de-escalate tensions.
Clarify U.S. Strategic Messaging to avoid ambiguity that might embolden or provoke either side.
Promote Track II Diplomacy between Chinese, Taiwanese, and international scholars and former officials.
As great power competition intensifies in the Indo-Pacific, the Taiwan Strait remains a tinderbox where rhetoric and military posturing can quickly spiral into conflict. Only through sustained diplomacy, transparency, and adherence to international norms can peace be preserved.
References
Bush, R. C. (2004). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press.
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). (2025). Statement on U.S. Arms Sale to Taiwan. 21 December.
Kao, L. M. (2023). “Arms Sales and Cross-Strait Relations: Legal and Political Dimensions.” Asian Security, 19(2), 145–162.
U.S. Congress. (1979). Taiwan Relations Act. Public Law 96-8.
People’s Liberation Army Eastern Theatre Command. (2025). Press Conference Transcript, 29 December.
Euronews. (2025). China stages live-fire military drills around Taiwan in warning to ‘separatist forces’. 29 December.
United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
PRC State Council. (2022). China’s National Defense in the New Era: White Paper.
Author Biography:
Dr. Elena M. Zhang is Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Hong Kong. Her research focuses on Chinese military strategy, cross-strait relations, and Indo-Pacific geopolitics. She is the author of Red Deterrence: China’s Evolving Doctrine of Coercion (Oxford University Press, 2024).