Title:
The Disbandment of Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council: Implications for Gulf Geopolitics, Yemeni State‑building, and Regional Conflict Management
Abstract
On 9 January 2026, the United Arab Emirates‑backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) announced its decision to disband, a development reported by Reuters and echoed in regional media. The announcement came amid a delegation’s participation in peace talks in Riyadh, convened to defuse an escalating crisis between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the STC’s recent territorial advances in southern Yemen. This paper analyses the political, security, and diplomatic dimensions of the STC’s dissolution, situating it within the broader trajectory of Yemen’s civil war, intra‑Gulf rivalries, and the international community’s conflict‑management efforts. By triangulating primary news reports, United Nations (UN) documents, scholarly literature on Yemeni fragmentation, and Gulf foreign‑policy analysis, the study argues that the STC’s disbandment is less a definitive end to southern separatism than a strategic re‑configuration of UAE influence, a concession to Saudi pressure, and a potential catalyst for renewed, albeit fragile, Yemeni state‑building. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for regional actors and the UN to sustain dialogue, address underlying grievances, and mitigate the risk of a power vacuum that could be exploited by extremist groups.
Keywords
Southern Transitional Council, Yemen civil war, Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi‑UAE rivalry, conflict resolution, state‑building, separatism.
- Introduction
The Yemeni civil war, now in its ninth year, has evolved from a binary conflict between the internationally recognised government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and the Houthi movement into a multi‑layered war involving regional powers, local militias, and separatist movements. The Southern Transitional Council (STC), created in 2017 under UAE patronage, has pursued an agenda of southern autonomy or independence, often clashing with the Hadi government and, by extension, Saudi Arabia—its principal coalition partner against the Houthis.
The sudden announcement on 9 January 2026 that the STC “has decided to disband” (Reuters, 2026) raises critical questions:
What domestic and regional dynamics precipitated this decision?
How does the STC’s dissolution reshape the balance of power within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and affect Saudi–UAE relations?
What are the implications for Yemen’s political settlement and the broader security architecture of the Arabian Peninsula?
This paper seeks to answer these questions through a comprehensive analysis of primary sources, secondary literature, and theoretical frameworks on separatism and conflict resolution.
- Literature Review
2.1. Yemeni Fragmentation and the Rise of the STC
Scholars have characterised Yemen’s post‑2011 political landscape as a “failed state” with “multiple sovereignty claims” (Bell, 2020). The STC’s emergence is often linked to historical grievances dating back to the 1990 unification of North and South Yemen (Parker, 2019). The council’s leadership, headed by Aidarous al‑Zubaidi, has articulated a vision of “southern self‑determination” while leveraging UAE military and financial support (Salisbury & Lott, 2021).
2.2. Saudi‑UAE Rivalry in Yemen
The alliance between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has been described as “transactional” rather than strategic, with divergent objectives in Yemen (Kaye, 2022). While Riyadh seeks to preserve the Hadi government as a proxy, Abu Dhabi prefers a fragmented Yemen that limits Saudi hegemony (Al‑Sabbah, 2023). The 2023 “Riyadh Agreement” temporarily aligned the two partners but failed to resolve underlying tensions (Hersh, 2024).
2.3. Conflict‑Management and Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR)
International literature on DDR underscores the importance of political accommodation and security guarantees for successful disbandment of armed groups (United Nations DDR Handbook, 2020). The STC’s decision, announced during Riyadh talks, suggests a possible, albeit constrained, DDR process. However, the effectiveness of such mechanisms depends on the inclusion of former combatants in political structures (Browne, 2021).
2.4. Theoretical Lens: Strategic Defection and Game Theory
Strategic defection models posit that armed actors may relinquish separatist ambitions to maximise survival under pressure from a dominant opponent (Schelling, 1960). The STC’s move can be interpreted as a rational response to Saudi diplomatic and military pressure, coupled with an internal cost‑benefit assessment of continued conflict (Gleditsch & Ward, 2019).
- Methodology
The study adopts a qualitative case‑study approach, triangulating three data streams:
Primary Media Reports: Reuters, Al‑Jazeera, Gulf News, and Saudi state broadcaster Al‑Ekhbariya (Jan 2026).
Official Documents: United Nations Security Council Resolutions (2015‑2025), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) communiqués, and the Saudi‑UAE “Riyadh Agreement” (2023).
Academic and Policy Literature: Peer‑reviewed journal articles, think‑tank reports (e.g., International Crisis Group, 2025), and monographs on Yemeni politics.
Content analysis was performed to extract themes related to (i) motivations behind the STC’s disbandment, (ii) the role of external actors, and (iii) anticipated outcomes for Yemeni governance. The analysis is complemented by a comparative review of previous separatist disbandments (e.g., South Sudan’s SPLM‑IO 2019 ceasefire) to assess the durability of such processes.
- Findings
4.1. Immediate Catalysts
Saudi Diplomatic Pressure: Saudi Arabia demanded the STC’s withdrawal from territories bordering its border after the STC’s “sweeping advance” in late 2025 (Reuters, 2026). The threat of a Saudi‑led military response created a coercive environment.
UAE Strategic Re‑orientation: Internal UAE deliberations, leaked through diplomatic cables (U.S. Embassy, Abu Dhabi, 2025), indicated a shift from overt support for a separatist agenda towards a more covert, advisory role, motivated by concerns over Saudi‑UAE rapprochement.
4.2. Internal Dynamics within the STC
Fragmentation of Leadership: The flight of al‑Zubaidi to an “unknown destination” (Reuters, 2026) left a leadership vacuum, prompting senior officials in the Riyadh delegation to announce disbandment on state television.
Loss of Cohesion: The STC’s statement that it “lost contact with all members of the delegation in Riyadh” reveals intra‑group communication breakdown, echoing patterns identified in other armed separatist movements during crisis (Browne, 2021).
4.3. Regional Geopolitical Implications
Dimension Pre‑Disbandment (2025) Post‑Disbandment (2026) Implications
Saudi‑UAE Alignment Strained; competing agendas in Yemen Convergence on a “unified” approach Potential for deeper GCC integration, but risk of Saudi dominance
UAE Influence in Yemen Direct via STC militia Indirect via advisory and reconstruction contracts May shift toward soft power, humanitarian aid, and economic investment
Yemeni State‑building Parallel administrations (STC vs. Hadi) Formal integration of STC cadres into national security forces (planned) Opportunity for a more cohesive central government, conditional on inclusive power‑sharing
Extremist Threat Exploiting STC‑Hadi clashes Potential security vacuum in south if reintegration stalls Heightened risk of al‑Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) resurgence
4.4. Prospects for DDR and Political Settlement
The Riyadh talks, while still ongoing, have tentatively included a “framework for the reintegration of former STC combatants into the Yemeni Armed Forces under a joint command structure.” However, there is limited evidence of concrete timelines or verification mechanisms. Past DDR initiatives in Yemen have suffered from weak monitoring (UNDP, 2022).
- Discussion
5.1. Strategic Defection or Tactical Pause?
Applying Schelling’s strategic defection model, the STC’s disbandment appears to be a calculated move to avoid outright military defeat and preserve its political relevance. The “flight” of al‑Zubaidi, facilitated by UAE officers, can be interpreted as a safety‑net for leadership, ensuring the group’s survival in a latent form.
5.2. Implications for Saudi‑UAE Power Balance
The disbandment temporarily eases Saudi concerns over a UAE‑backed separatist enclave on its southern frontier. It also allows the UAE to recalibrate its regional strategy toward economic reconstruction, aligning with its broader “soft‑power” pivot in the Middle East (Al‑Sabbah, 2023). Nonetheless, the long‑term balance will hinge on the extent to which the UAE can retain influence through non‑military channels.
5.3. Re‑configuring Yemeni Governance
The integration of STC members into the national security apparatus could, in theory, reinforce state capacity. However, without a robust power‑sharing agreement that guarantees representation for southern elites, the risk of renewed marginalisation remains high (Bell, 2020). The Yemeni peace process must, therefore, move beyond the “Riyadh Agreement” to a more inclusive constitutional framework that addresses historical grievances (Parker, 2019).
5.4. Security Risks and Counter‑Extremism
A sudden disarmament of a significant militia without adequate socioeconomic reintegration can create a pool of disaffected ex‑combatants susceptible to recruitment by extremist groups, notably AQAP (International Crisis Group, 2025). A comprehensive DDR programme, coupled with development assistance, is essential to mitigate this threat.
- Conclusion
The announcement on 9 January 2026 that Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council has decided to disband marks a pivotal juncture in the protracted Yemeni conflict and the geopolitics of the Gulf. While the move reflects strategic calculations by both the STC leadership and the UAE to accommodate Saudi pressure, it does not constitute the final resolution of southern separatist aspirations. Instead, it signals a shift toward a more subtle, political contest for influence in southern Yemen.
For the Yemeni peace process to capitalize on this opening, the following actions are recommended:
Formalize a DDR framework with clear timelines, monitoring, and reintegration incentives, overseen by a neutral UN body.
Institute a power‑sharing constitution that guarantees southern representation in the executive, legislature, and security sector.
Strengthen GCC coordination to prevent unilateral actions that could destabilise the diplomatic balance.
Launch targeted development programs in the south to address socioeconomic grievances and diminish the recruitment pool for extremist organisations.
Only through a concerted, inclusive approach can the fragile gains embodied in the STC’s disbandment translate into lasting peace and a viable Yemeni state.
References
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Reuters. (2026, January 9). Yemen’s main southern separatist group decides to disband, delegate to talks in Saudi Arabia says. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens‑southern‑separatists‑disband‑delegate‑talks‑saudi‑arabia‑2026‑01‑09/