The Nara Summit: A New Chapter in Japan-South Korea Relations in the Face of 21st-Century Strategic Competition
Abstract
The summit held on January 13, 2026, in Nara, Japan, between Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and President Lee Jae Myung, marks a potentially transformative moment in the complex and often fraught relationship between Japan and South Korea. This paper analyzes this diplomatic engagement through the lenses of neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist theory, arguing that the rapprochement is primarily driven by converging external security threats—namely, North Korea’s nuclear advancements and China’s strategic assertiveness. Facilitated by sustained U.S. diplomatic pressure to forge a united front in the Indo-Pacific, the Takaichi-Lee meeting signifies a pivot from a relationship historically constrained by colonial-era grievances to one increasingly defined by contemporary strategic and technological imperatives. The paper examines the key drivers of this realignment, the focus areas of security and high-tech economic cooperation, and the significant domestic and historical headwinds that threaten the durability of this newfound partnership. It concludes that while the Nara summit heralds a new era of pragmatic cooperation, its success is contingent upon sustained political leadership and the careful management of unresolved historical disputes that remain a powerful undercurrent in bilateral ties.
- Introduction
The diplomatic landscape of East Asia, long characterized by historical animosities and strategic rivalries, appears to be undergoing a significant realignment. The January 13, 2026, summit between Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung in the historic city of Nara serves as a critical case study of this shift. On the surface, the meeting was a standard diplomatic engagement focused on “bolstering security and economic cooperation” (Reuters, 2026). However, its symbolic weight and substantive undertones suggest a deeper, more strategic convergence between two of Asia’s most vital democracies.
This paper seeks to answer the central research question: What are the primary drivers, key manifestations, and potential limitations of the apparent strategic rapprochement between Japan and South Korea under the Takaichi and Lee administrations? The thesis is that this summit signifies a pivotal, albeit fragile, strategic realignment. It is driven by an accelerating security dilemma created by a belligerent North Korea and an assertive China, facilitated by U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, and operationalized through deepening security coordination and high-tech economic integration. This new phase of relations, however, remains susceptible to the persistent gravitational pull of historical memory, nationalism, and domestic political constraints in both nations.
To substantiate this argument, this paper will first situate the analysis within relevant international relations theory. It will then provide a concise overview of the historical pendulum of Japan-South Korea relations before delving into the core drivers of the current rapprochement. Subsequent sections will analyze the key areas of cooperation discussed at the Nara summit, followed by an examination of the enduring challenges that could impede progress. The paper concludes by assessing the long-term prospects for this bilateral transformation and its implications for the broader regional order.
- Theoretical Framework: Realism, Liberalism, and the Constructivist Constraint
The dynamics of the Japan-South Korea relationship can be effectively analyzed through a synthesis of international relations theories. Neorealism, or structural realism, provides the most compelling explanation for the why of the current rapprochement. In an anarchic international system, states are primarily driven by survival concerns. The regional distribution of power—with a rising China, a nuclear-armed North Korea, and the relative decline of unipolar American hegemony—has created a compelling logic for balancing (Waltz, 1979). Both Tokyo and Seoul perceive existential threats that overwhelm their long-standing bilateral disputes. From this perspective, their cooperation is a rational response to external pressures, a classic case of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” where shared threats override historical animosities.
Neoliberal Institutionalism, meanwhile, explains the how of this deepening cooperation. This theory posits that while states are self-interested, international institutions, economic interdependence, and shared democratic values can foster cooperation and mitigate the risks of mistrust (Keohane & Nye, 1977). The U.S.-led hub-and-spoke alliance system acts as a crucial institution. Trilateral frameworks, intelligence-sharing agreements like the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), and shared supply chains in critical technologies create tangible benefits and path dependencies that make cooperation a rational choice. The focus on semiconductors and artificial intelligence at the Nara summit is not merely economic; it is a form of “techno-security” that builds resilience and embeds the two nations in a mutually reinforcing strategic economic bloc.
Finally, Constructivism offers a necessary caveat. Constructivism argues that state interests and identities are socially constructed and that ideas, norms, and historical narratives shape international politics (Wendt, 1992). The “history problem”—Japan’s colonial legacy and disputes over “comfort women” and forced labor—is a powerful social construct that has defined the bilateral identity for decades. This framework reminds us that despite the realist and liberal pressures for alignment, the relationship remains constrained by deeply embedded identities and narratives. Any progress can be derailed by actions or statements that trigger these historical sensitivities. The fragility of the Takaichi-Lee thaw lies precisely in this constructivist constraint.
- Drivers of the Takaichi-Lee Rapprochement
The warmth of the Nara summit did not emerge in a vacuum. It is the product of three interlocking drivers that have reshaped the strategic calculations in both Tokyo and Seoul.
3.1. The North Korean Imperative: Pyongyang’s relentless development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology represents a direct and immediate existential threat. For Japan, the overflight of missiles and the unresolved issue of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea decades ago create a potent sense of vulnerability. President Lee’s willingness to engage on the abduction issue, while primarily a Japanese concern, signals a significant diplomatic concession and a recognition of shared security interests (Reuters, 2026). Cooperation now extends beyond rhetoric to include real-time military intelligence sharing and discussions on integrated missile defense architectures, making a bilateral response more credible and robust.
3.2. The China Factor: China’s rise is the overarching strategic variable in East Asia. Its military modernization, coercive economic tactics, and uncompromising stance on Taiwan have created a new commonality of interest between Tokyo and Seoul. Prime Minister Takaichi, a known security hawk, has articulated this with unusual clarity, stating that Japan could deploy its forces if a Chinese attack on Taiwan posed an existential threat—a statement that triggered a diplomatic row with Beijing (Reuters, 2026). For South Korea, the dilemma is more acute. While economically intertwined with China, the Lee administration recognizes that a regional conflict over Taiwan would be catastrophic for South Korean security and trade. President Lee’s careful statement that the Japan-China dispute “was not desirable for regional peace” but that he “would not intervene” (Reuters, 2026) is a masterful act of strategic hedging. It signals solidarity with Japan and the U.S. while preserving pragmatic diplomatic and economic space with Beijing.
3.3. U.S. Strategic Alignment: A critical, and often underestimated, driver is the sustained pressure from the United States. Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is predicated on a network of strong alliances. The persistent friction between its two key Asian allies, Japan and South Korea, was seen as a critical vulnerability. The Biden and its successor administrations actively encouraged both capitals to resolve their historical disputes and present a united front. The Nara summit can be seen as the culmination of this U.S. diplomatic effort, representing a significant victory for American strategy and solidifying a trilateral security partnership that is central to countering Chinese influence and managing the North Korean threat.
- Analysis of Key Cooperation Areas
The summit’s agenda reflects a shift from symbolic gestures to substantive, future-oriented collaboration.
4.1. Security Integration: The leaders’ discussion of denuclearization is standard, but the real significance lies in the less-publicized elements of security integration. This includes expanding trilateral military exercises with the U.S., enhancing cyber-defense cooperation, and exploring joint development and production of military hardware. A key question for the future is South Korea’s role in a Taiwan contingency. While Seoul has officially maintained neutrality, deepening ties with Japan suggest a framework for consultation and potential coordination, a development with profound geopolitical implications.
4.2. Strategic Economic Ties: The focus on artificial intelligence and semiconductors moves economic cooperation from the realm of simple trade to strategic national security (Reuters, 2026). The global chip shortage and the risk of Chinese weaponization of supply chains have underscored the need for a resilient, democratic-led semiconductor ecosystem. Japan’s strength in materials, equipment, and design complements South Korea’s dominance in memory chip manufacturing (Samsung, SK Hynix). This collaboration aims to create a “CHIP 4.0” anchored by Japan and South Korea, securing the technological backbone of both economies and those of their allies against external coercion.
- Challenges and Prospects
Despite the optimistic tone from Nara, significant challenges persist. The “history problem” has not been solved, merely superseded. A single provocative statement, a new court ruling on forced labor, or a dispute over history textbooks could rapidly reignite public fury and derail political momentum.
Domestically, both leaders face opposition. Prime Minister Takaichi’s nationalist credentials, while bolstering her security platform, make her a target of criticism in Seoul. Conversely, President Lee, a member of the progressive Democratic Party, must manage opposition from his own base, which is traditionally more skeptical of Japan and sympathetic to China. Public opinion in both countries remains wary of the other, making it difficult for leaders to make the bold concessions needed for a full and final resolution of historical issues.
Finally, China looms as a “veto player.” Beijing possesses significant economic leverage over Seoul and could apply pressure to slow or reverse South Korea’s strategic drift toward Japan and the United States. President Lee’s delicate balancing act will be continually tested.
- Conclusion
The January 2026 Nara summit between Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and President Lee Jae Myung is more than a routine diplomatic meeting; it is a public confirmation of a strategic shift in East Asia. Driven by the hard logic of neorealist power politics and enabled by neoliberal incentives for cooperation, Japan and South Korea are pragmatically aligning to face a shared and daunting strategic environment. The relationship is transitioning from being defined by the shadows of the past to being shaped by the challenges of the future.
However, this transition is neither complete nor guaranteed. The constructivist constraints of history, identity, and nationalism remain potent forces. The durability of this “Nara moment” will depend on the sustained political will of both leaders to manage these domestic and historical sensitivities while pursuing a pragmatic, forward-looking agenda. If successful, this partnership will not only secure the interests of Japan and South Korea but will also serve as the democratic and technological core of a stable and free Indo-Pacific for decades to come.
References
Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown.
Reuters. (2026, January 13). Japan’s Takaichi, South Korea’s Lee meet to discuss security, economic ties.
Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International Organization, 46(2), 391-425.
[Fictional Sources for Context]
Kim, H. (2025). The Dragon and the Peninsula: China’s Strategy for the Korean Peninsula. Seoul National University Press.
Yamaguchi, T. (2024). Sanae’s Gamble: Japanese Nationalism and the Taiwan Crisis. Tokyo: Kodansha International.