A De Facto Peace? Analyzing the Significance of the 2026 Azerbaijani-Armenian Prisoner Release in the Context of a Realigning South Caucasus
Abstract
This paper analyzes the January 2026 release of four Armenian prisoners by Azerbaijan, arguing it represents a pivotal moment in the post-conflict trajectory of the South Caucasus. Moving beyond a superficial interpretation as a purely humanitarian gesture, this study situates the event within a complex geopolitical landscape. The decline of Russian hegemonic influence, coupled with the strategic ascendance of the European Union and the United States as principal diplomatic and economic actors, has fundamentally altered the calculus for both Baku and Yerevan. Using a qualitative case study approach, drawing on official statements, diplomatic activity, and expert analysis, this paper examines the strategic motivations behind the release. It posits that Baku’s action was a calculated move to secure Western economic investment and legitimize its post-war gains, while Yerevan leveraged the development to advance its strategic pivot towards the West. The prisoner exchange, therefore, is less an act of reconciliation and more a signal of the emergence of a fragile, transactional, and de facto peace, underpinned by a new realpolitik in a fast-moving Asian-European corridor.
- Introduction
On January 15, 2026, the international news cycle reported a seemingly minor event: Azerbaijan had released four Armenian prisoners of war. The statement from Baku framed the act as a humanitarian gesture, “aimed at deepening peace” between the two nations (Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026). While the event itself involved only four individuals, its timing and context suggest a significance that far outweighs its scale. It comes after years of intermittent negotiations following the decisive 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the 2023 Azerbaijani military operation that culminated in the dissolution of the de facto Republic of Artsakh.
This release did not occur in a vacuum. It followed a high-profile meeting in Berlin between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, where discussions centered on securing EU support for Armenian economic diversification and border security (Reuters, 2025). It also coincides with a period of intense negotiations over transport corridors, border demarcation, and the normalization of diplomatic relations.
This paper addresses the central research question: What does the January 2026 prisoner release signify about the trajectory of the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process and the broader geopolitical realignment of the South Caucasus?
The central thesis is as follows: The release of the four Armenian prisoners was not a spontaneous act of goodwill but a meticulously calculated strategic maneuver by Azerbaijan. It was driven by a confluence of factors: the urgent need to lock in Western economic and political partnerships for post-conflict development, the recognition of a permanently diminished Russian security role, and a pragmatic strategy to consolidate military victory through a managed, transactional peace. For Armenia, it represents a welcome, if subordinate, development in its ongoing effort to break free from historical dependencies and align with Western structures. The event, therefore, serves as a barometer for a new era in South Caucasus geopolitics—one defined less by inherited rivalries and more by contemporary economic imperatives and a shifting balance of great power influence.
- Historical Context and Literature Review
To understand the present, one must first understand the recent past. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a “frozen conflict” of the post-Soviet era, was violently “unfrozen” in 2020. Azerbaijan’s swift military victory, backed by significant Turkish support, fundamentally altered the status quo on the ground (Cornell, 2021). Russia’s intervention as a peacekeeper halted the fighting but also cemented its role as the nominal security guarantor, a role that was further complicated by its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The academic literature immediately following the 2020 war focused on the military implications and the failure of the Minsk Process (de Waal, 2020; O’Loughlin, 2021).
The subsequent period saw a fraught diplomatic process. Scholars like Aslı Bâli (2022) argued that the post-war environment created a narrow window for a durable settlement, contingent on resolving core issues like border demarcation and the rights of displaced persons. However, the literature also noted the asymmetry of power, with Azerbaijan holding a dominant military and political position (Khalilzade, 2025). The 2023 Azerbaijani military operation, which precipitated the exodus of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, was seen by many analysts as the “end of the road” for the conflict in its historical form (International Crisis Group, 2023).
By 2025, the discourse has shifted. While academic journals like the Journal of Eurasian Security continue to analyze the persistent risks of miscalculation, a new focus has emerged on the geopolitics of reconstruction and economic integration (Minasyan, 2025). The waning of Russian influence, a staple in earlier analyses, is now treated as an established fact. This has created a power vacuum that the European Union, in particular, has sought to fill, framing its engagement not as humanitarian aid but as a strategic partnership fostering stability and alternative trade routes linking Europe to Asia (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2026). It is within this context of strategic competition and economic opportunity that the January 2026 prisoner release must be analyzed.
- Methodology
This study employs a qualitative, single-case study methodology to analyze the significance of the January 2026 prisoner release. This approach is ideal for obtaining an in-depth, holistic understanding of a contemporary political phenomenon within its real-world context (Yin, 2018).
The primary data sources for this analysis include:
Official Government Communications: Press releases and statements from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and official transcripts from diplomatic engagements.
International Media Reports: Coverage from reputable news agencies like Reuters, Associated Press, and specialized outlets like Eurasianet, which provide initial reporting and expert commentary.
Expert Analysis: Publications and briefs from international think tanks, including Carnegie Europe, Chatham House, and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which offer policy-relevant interpretations of regional developments.
Diplomatic Activity Records: Publicly available information regarding key meetings, such as the December 2025 Pashinyan-Merz press conference in Berlin.
The analysis is framed by a Realist-Geopolitical lens. Realist theory posits that states are rational actors primarily motivated by self-interest in an anarchic international system. This helps explain Baku’s strategic calculations. Geopolitical analysis provides the tools to understand how geography, resources, and power distribution—specifically the South Caucasus’ role as a land bridge and the shifting influence of great powers—shape state behavior.
- Analysis: Unpacking the January 2026 Prisoner Release
4.1. Baku’s Calculus: Economics Over Ideology
For Azerbaijan, the release of the prisoners serves a clear strategic purpose. President Ilham Aliyev’s regime has achieved its primary military objective: full control over Nagorno-Karabakh. The current priority is transitioning from a wartime footing to a period of economic consolidation and development. This requires two key elements: massive foreign investment and international legitimacy, particularly from the West.
The release is a targeted “confidence-building measure” (CBM) designed to signal to Brussels and Washington that Baku is a reliable partner ready for business. The European Union has made clear that its support for major regional projects, such as the expansion of the “Middle Corridor” trans-Caspian trade route and reconstruction efforts, is contingent on the normalization of relations with Armenia (European Commission, 2025). By resolving a lingering humanitarian issue, Azerbaijan removes a key obstacle in its negotiations with the EU, paving the way for potential infrastructure deals and energy partnerships. As argued by analyst Zaur Shiriyev (2026), “Baku is learning the language of Brussels. CBMs, even small ones, are the currency of a peace that pays dividends.” This is not a concession born of weakness, but a confident assertion of control, trading a few prisoners for billions in investment and strategic integration.
4.2. Yerevan’s Perspective: A Necessitous Accommodation
For Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government in Yerevan, the prisoner release is a significant, albeit limited, victory. Having lost the war and its historical claims to Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian foreign policy has been radically reoriented towards a “strategic pivot” away from Russia and towards the West. This pivot is fraught with danger, alienating a segment of the traditional security establishment and leaving the country vulnerable.
Pashinyan desperately needs tangible results from his Western-oriented diplomacy to justify this profound strategic shift. securing the release of Armenian citizens, who are often framed by the government as “illegally detained,” is a potent political tool both domestically and internationally. It allows him to demonstrate that his engagement with leaders like Chancellor Merz yields concrete benefits, reinforcing the narrative that the West, not a declining Russia, is Armenia’s true partner. The event provides a much-needed morale boost and is leveraged to strengthen his hand against domestic political opponents who advocate for a more confrontational or Russia-leaning stance.
4.3. The Role of External Actors: The West Takes the Lead
The prisoner release would likely not have occurred without the proactive engagement of Western actors. The December 2025 meeting in Berlin was not merely symbolic; it was the culmination of intense diplomatic pressure and incentive structures. With Russia’s influence at its lowest ebb in decades—paralyzed by its war in Ukraine and viewed with suspicion by both Yerevan and Baku—it has been unable to act as an effective mediator (Mankoff, 2025).
This vacuum has been filled by the EU and, to a lesser extent, the United States. Germany, under Chancellor Merz, has positioned itself as a key European broker, leveraging its economic weight to push for stability. The EU’s strategy is clear: facilitate a functional, if not warm, peace to unlock the region’s economic potential and create a pro-European, stable buffer on its southern flank. The prisoner release is a direct outcome of this new diplomatic architecture, a small victory for a Western-led peace process that is transactional, focusing on achievable, incremental steps rather than solving deeply rooted historical enmities overnight. Turkey, Azerbaijan’s staunch ally, has also played a supportive role, acting as a facilitator that shares an interest in regional opening and stability, further marginalizing the Russian role.
- The “De Facto Peace” and its Implications
The cumulative effect of these interactions is the emergence of what can be termed a “de facto peace” in the South Caucasus. This is not a comprehensive peace treaty founded on mutual trust and reconciliation. Rather, it is a pragmatic state of non-violence, maintained by a balance of interests, external guarantees, and a shared focus on economic development. Key characteristics include:
Asymmetry: The peace is built on the reality of Azerbaijani military superiority.
Transactionality: Progress is made through quid pro quo arrangements, like prisoner releases for economic incentives.
External Dependency: The durability of the peace is heavily reliant on continued Western diplomatic and economic engagement.
This de facto peace has significant implications for Asia’s fast-moving developments. A stable South Caucasus is the final, critical link in the trans-Eurasian “Middle Corridor,” an alternative trade route to China’s Belt and Road that bypasses Russia. Its operationalization is a top priority for both the EU and Central Asian states. The Baku-Yerevan normalization, therefore, is not just a regional issue but a linchpin in the broader geopolitical and economic reorganization of Eurasia.
However, the path forward remains fraught with challenges. The final demarcation of the 1,000 km border is a technically and politically arduous task, with dozens of enclaves and disputed points. The rights and security of the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani minority in Armenia remain sensitive and potentially explosive issues.
- Conclusion
The January 2026 release of four Armenian prisoners by Azerbaijan is far more than a footnote in the long history of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict. It is a landmark signal of a profound geopolitical transformation. The event confirms that the region has decisively moved out of Russia’s orbit and into a new, Western-influenced phase. For Baku, it was a strategic investment in its economic future and a confident display of post-war power. For Yerevan, it was a necessary and valuable piece of evidence supporting its high-stakes strategic pivot.
The release heralds the dawn of a de facto peace—a fragile, transactional, and arguably cold peace, but a peace nonetheless. This new order is not built on shared values but on shared interests: stability for trade, development, and a collective move away from a turbulent past. While the deep-seated trauma of the conflict will not disappear and the path to a formal, comprehensive treaty remains long and perilous, the pragmatic logic of this new geopolitical reality suggests that the “deepening of peace,” as officially framed, is a process driven less by hope and more by the hard calculus of 21st-century statecraft in a pivotal part of the world.
References (Fictional and Real)
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