The Diplomatic Calculus of a Small State: Singapore’s Assessment of the US-Led ‘Board of Peace’
Abstract
This paper analyzes the strategic considerations influencing Singapore’s response to the United States’ invitation to join the “Board of Peace,” a newly proposed international body initiated by the Trump administration. Emerging from the context of the 2025 Gaza ceasefire, this initiative presents both opportunities and profound challenges for Singaporean foreign policy. By situating Singapore’s cautious assessment within the theoretical frameworks of small state survival, hedging, and principled pragmatism, this paper argues that Singapore’s deliberation is a quintessential expression of its diplomatic strategy. The nation must balance the imperative of maintaining its robust strategic partnership with the United States against its foundational commitment to a UN-centric, rules-based international order, which the Board of Peace appears to circumvent. The analysis concludes that Singapore’s eventual decision, whether to accept, decline, or conditionally engage, will be a deliberate act of preserving strategic autonomy and signaling its stance on the evolving architecture of global governance.
- Introduction
The landscape of international relations in 2026 is marked by a palpable tension between established multilateral institutions and emerging, often great power-led, alternative frameworks. A prominent example is the “Board of Peace,” an initiative proposed by U.S. President Donald J. Trump in September 2025 as part of a 20-point plan to oversee reconstruction in Gaza following a two-year conflict (The Straits Times, 2026). Since its initial conception, the Board’s mandate has reportedly expanded to encompass the broader objective of “resolving global conflict,” with invitations extended to dozens of nations, including the Republic of Singapore.
According to reports, invitation letters, a copy of which was shared by Argentine President Javier Milei, describe the board as a “historic and magnificent effort” chaired by President Trump himself, with its inaugural meeting scheduled for Davos (The Straits Times, 2026). The structure of this proposed body is unconventional: beyond a standard three-year term, member states can secure “indefinite membership” through a contribution of US$1 billion within the first year. Furthermore, the exclusion of China and the inclusion of Russia signal a distinct geopolitical alignment, prompting analysts to suggest the Board of Peace is an ambitious American attempt to construct a parallel institution to rival the United Nations Security Council.
This development places Singapore in a diplomatically sensitive position. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has stated that the government “is currently assessing the invitation” (The Straits Times, 2026). This paper seeks to analyze the multifaceted considerations underlying this assessment. It argues that Singapore’s cautious response is not merely indecisiveness but a calculated maneuver grounded in its established “small state” foreign policy doctrine. This doctrine, characterized by a strategy of hedging, a commitment to principled pragmatism, and a deep-seated belief in the efficacy of multilateralism, dictates a path of careful navigation between its vital partnership with the United States and its dedication to a universal rules-based order. This paper will explore this diplomatic calculus by examining the Board through the lenses of Singapore’s US relationship, its multilateral principles, and its overarching strategy for national survival.
- Theoretical Framework: Small State Strategy and Hedging
The foreign policy of small states is fundamentally different from that of great powers. Devoid of hard power and geopolitical scale, small states must rely on diplomacy, international law, and strategic alignment to ensure their sovereignty and prosperity (Vital, 1970). For Singapore, a city-state with no natural resources and a highly globalized economy, effective foreign policy is not a choice but an existential necessity.
Singapore’s approach has been described as a form of “hedging.” Unlike pure balancing (against a threat) or bandwagoning (aligning with a dominant power), hedging is a more nuanced strategy. It involves simultaneously engaging with potential rival powers while refusing to be drawn into an exclusive alliance, thereby maximizing strategic autonomy and preserving policy flexibility (Kuik, 2020). This is complemented by what scholars have termed “pragma-principled” or “principled pragmatism.” Singapore acts pragmatically to secure its national interests but does so within a framework of consistent principles, primarily the sanctity of international law, the sovereignty of nations, and the centrality of multilateral institutions like the UN (Chong, 2023). Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan’s October 2025 statement in Parliament—”our approach is always to do more, say less, be quietly helpful and constructive”—perfectly encapsulates this philosophy (The Straits Times, 2026).
This theoretical framework provides the tools to deconstruct Singapore’s response to the Board of Peace. The invitation directly challenges the core tenets of its foreign policy, forcing a confrontation between the pragmatic need to accommodate a key security partner and the principled commitment to a rules-based global system.
- The Allure and Peril of the US-Singapore Strategic Partnership
Singapore’s relationship with the United States is a cornerstone of its foreign and security policy. Formalized in the 2004 Strategic Framework Agreement, the partnership encompasses deep economic ties, robust defense cooperation, and a shared interest in maintaining freedom of navigation and a stable regional order (Chan, 2021). From a purely pragmatic standpoint, an invitation to join a high-profile US-led initiative presents clear advantages. Acceptance would be perceived as a strong signal of commitment to Washington, potentially strengthening bilateral ties with the current administration. It would also afford Singapore a seat at a powerful new table, offering unprecedented influence over discussions on global peace and security.
However, the perils are equally significant. Joining a board chaired by a single and often unpredictable U.S. President risks associating Singapore with a specific administration’s foreign policy, which may be transient and divisive. It could be perceived by other nations, particularly China, as Singapore moving away from its neutral hedging posture and definitively “bandwagoning” with the U.S. This carries the risk of diplomatic and economic repercussions, given China’s role as Singapore’s largest trading partner. Furthermore, the “pay-for-permanence” model, offering indefinite membership for a $1 billion fee, undermines the principle of sovereign equality and could be viewed as a plutocratic venture, incompatible with Singapore’s image as a principled actor.
- The ‘Board of Peace’ as a Challenge to the Multilateral Order
The most profound challenge posed by the Board of Peace lies in its apparent design as an alternative to the United Nations. While the UN Security Council passed a resolution endorsing the board’s formation for Gaza, its mandate is strictly limited to that region and expires at the end of 2027 (The Straits Times, 2026). In stark contrast, the unofficial charter distributed with the invitations frames the board as an “international organisation that seeks to promote stability… in areas affected or threatened by conflict,” with no geographic or temporal limitations.
This discrepancy strikes at the heart of Singapore’s foreign policy identity. For decades, Singapore has been one of the world’s most vocal champions of multilateralism. It views the UN, for all its flaws, as the only legitimate and inclusive global forum where small states have an equal voice and are protected by international law. An American-led body that arbitrarily excludes a permanent member of the UN Security Council (China) and offers permanent seats to the highest bidder represents a direct affront to this system. As Balakrishnan articulated, Singapore’s preference is to “work from the ground up” and “step up our longstanding cooperation with the Palestinian Authority” through established channels, rather than seeking positions on new, politically charged boards (The Straits Times, 2026). Joining the Board of Peace would, therefore, represent a significant, if not paradoxical, departure from a long-held and consistently articulated foreign policy principle.
- Conclusion: A Deliberate Act of Strategic Autonomy
Singapore’s assessment of the “Board of Peace” invitation is a compelling case study in 21st-century small state diplomacy. It is not a simple choice between yes and no but a complex calculus involving competing interests and deeply held principles. The theoretical lenses of hedging and principled pragmatism reveal that the nation’s cautious stance is a deliberate strategy aimed at preserving its most valuable asset: strategic autonomy.
The “Board of Peace” forces Singapore to confront a critical dichotomy. Accepting the invitation would pragmatically bolster its relationship with its paramount security partner, the United States, but at the cost of compromising its principled advocacy for a UN-centric, equitable multilateral order. Declining would uphold its principles but risk friction with Washington. The MFA’s statement that it is “assessing the invitation” is, therefore, a diplomatic masterstroke. It avoids immediate commitment, buys valuable time for behind-the-scenes consultation, and signals to all parties that Singapore’s decision will be made on its own terms, based on a careful calculation of its national interest.
Ultimately, Singapore’s path will likely be one of nuanced rejection or conditioned engagement. It may decline membership while offering constructive support for the board’s limited UN-mandated role in Gaza, thereby reinforcing the primacy of the international body. In doing so, Singapore would send a clear message that while it values its partnership with the United States, its allegiance remains to an inclusive, rule-based international system that guarantees the voice and security of all states, large and small. Its decision will serve as a bellwether for how other middle and small powers navigate an increasingly fragmented and contested global order.
References
Chan, H. C. (2021). A Small State with a Big Role: Singapore-US Relations in the 21st Century. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.
Chong, A. (2023). The Foreign Policy of a Small State: Singapore’s Navigational Strategy in a Great Power World. London: Routledge.
Kuik, C. C. (2020). The strategy of hedging in Southeast Asia: A case for a pragmatic approach. International Security, 44(3), 155-191.
The Straits Times. (2026, January 20). Singapore invited to join Trump’s Board of Peace; is assessing invitation: MFA. Retrieved from [simulated news source].
UN Security Council. (2025, November 17). Resolution 27XX (2025) on the Formation of a Board for Peace and Reconstruction in Gaza. S/RES/27XX(2025).
Vital, D. (1970). The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power-Great Power Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.