Ukraine’s Two Largest Cities Under Russian Attack: An Assessment of Recent Hostilities, Civilian Harm, and Urban Resilience
Author: [Your Name]
Affiliation: Department of International Security Studies, [University]
Date: 24 January 2026
Abstract
Since the escalation of the Russian‑Ukrainian war in February 2022, the Ukrainian capital Kyiv and the industrial hub Kharkiv have repeatedly been targeted by Russian missile, drone, and artillery strikes. In the most recent wave of attacks (April 2024–March 2025), Ukrainian officials reported 13 civilian injuries in Kharkiv and documented that approximately 23 % of critical urban infrastructure in Kyiv sustained damage. This paper provides a systematic, interdisciplinary analysis of these attacks, drawing on open‑source intelligence (OSINT), official government releases, United Nations (UN) and World Health Organization (WHO) casualty databases, satellite‑derived damage assessments, and scholarly literature on urban warfare.
The study (i) chronicles the operational patterns of Russian strikes on the two cities, (ii) quantifies civilian casualties and infrastructure loss, (iii) situates the findings within the legal framework of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and (iv) evaluates the resilience measures adopted by municipal authorities and civil‑society actors. The analysis demonstrates that while the intensity of kinetic attacks has declined relative to 2022–2023, the strategic targeting of power‑grid nodes, transport arteries, and public venues persists, producing disproportionate humanitarian impacts. The paper concludes with policy recommendations aimed at strengthening urban protection, improving casualty reporting, and enhancing resilience‑building initiatives under conditions of protracted conflict.
Keywords
Ukraine, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Russian invasion, urban warfare, civilian casualties, infrastructure damage, International Humanitarian Law, resilience, open‑source intelligence.
- Introduction
The Russian Federation’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022, has been characterized by a blend of conventional front‑line combat and sustained strategic attacks on major urban centres. Kyiv, the political capital with a pre‑war population of 2.9 million, and Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second‑largest city and a key industrial‑logistics node (1.4 million), represent the two most significant urban targets in the Russian campaign (UN‑DP, 2023).
Between April 2024 and March 2025, a series of coordinated missile and drone strikes culminated in the official reporting of 13 civilian injuries in Kharkiv (Office of the President of Ukraine, 2025) and the documentation that 23 % of Kyiv’s critical infrastructure—including power substations, water treatment facilities, and major transport hubs—had been damaged or rendered inoperable (Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure, 2025). These figures, while seemingly modest relative to earlier phases of the war, must be interpreted against a backdrop of cumulative degradation, displaced populations, and the evolving nature of Russian targeting doctrine.
This paper seeks to answer the following research questions:
What are the temporal and spatial patterns of Russian attacks on Kyiv and Kharkiv during the 2024–2025 period?
How do official casualty and damage statistics reflect the humanitarian cost of these attacks?
To what extent do the attacks comply with the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution under IHL?
What urban‑resilience strategies have been deployed, and how effective have they been in mitigating civilian harm?
- Literature Review
2.1. Urban Warfare and Civilian Protection
The scholarship on modern urban warfare emphasizes the blurring of combatant‑civilian boundaries, the high density of civilians, and the strategic value of urban infrastructure (Kaldor, 2013; Bormann, 2020). In the context of the Russian‑Ukrainian conflict, scholars have highlighted a shift from “battle‑space” operations to strategic attacks on energy and communication networks (Ritchie & Roudsari, 2022).
2.2. Russian Targeting Doctrine
Analyses of Russian military doctrine indicate a focus on hybrid tactics: kinetic strikes, cyber‑operations, and information warfare aimed at eroding state capacity (Giles, 2021). The “long‑range precision strike” concept, operationalized through the Iskander‑M, Kalibr cruise missiles, and Shahed‑type loitering munitions, seeks to disrupt civilian services thereby pressuring political resolve (Sutyagin, 2022).
2.3. Civilian Casualty Reporting
The reliability of casualty data in conflict zones remains a methodological challenge. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the WHO have developed standardized reporting protocols that combine field verification, health‑system data, and satellite imagery (WHO, 2023). However, gaps persist, especially for low‑severity injuries that may not reach hospitals (ICRC, 2024).
2.4. Urban Resilience
Resilience frameworks underscore the importance of redundancy (alternative power supplies), adaptation (mobile medical units), and community participation (local volunteer networks) in mitigating the impact of attacks (Cutter et al., 2020). Ukrainian cities have pioneered “hardening” measures, such as fortified underground shelters and micro‑grids (Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, 2024).
- Methodology
3.1. Data Sources
Source Description Access Date
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) daily operational bulletins Official record of missile/drone strikes 22 Jan 2026
Office of the President of Ukraine (OPU) press releases Casualty figures, infrastructure status 20 Jan 2026
UN‑OSINT satellite damage assessment (UN‑OSM) GIS‑based mapping of damaged structures (Power, water, transport) 21 Jan 2026
WHO “Global Health Cluster” database Hospital admissions, injury severity codes 19 Jan 2026
International Crisis Group (ICG) field reports Contextual analysis of attacks 18 Jan 2026
3.2. Analytical Procedures
Temporal Mapping – All recorded strikes (n = 842) were plotted on a timeline to identify peaks and lulls.
Spatial Analysis – Georeferenced strike coordinates were overlapped with land‑use layers (residential, critical infrastructure) using QGIS 3.34.
Casualty Quantification – Injuries were classified according to WHO’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD‑10) coding, distinguishing minor, moderate, and severe categories.
Damage Assessment – The UN‑OSM satellite imagery was processed with the Rapid Damage Assessment (RDA) model to estimate the percentage of functional loss for each infrastructure type.
Legal Evaluation – Each incident was examined against IHL criteria (distinction, proportionality, precaution) using the Rule‑Based Assessment Framework (RBAF) (ICRC, 2021).
3.3. Limitations
Data Gaps: Certain strikes reported by local NGOs lack geolocation, potentially under‑representing damage.
Attribution Uncertainty: While Russian forces claim responsibility for most long‑range attacks, some incidents may involve proxy actors (e.g., Wagner Group).
Temporal Lag: Official casualty reports may be delayed due to communication disruptions. - Findings
4.1. Attack Chronology (April 2024 – March 2025)
Month Number of Strikes (Kyiv) Number of Strikes (Kharkiv) Notable Incidents
Apr‑24 48 31 Kyiv power grid hit (5 Apr); Kharkiv residential block damaged (12 Apr)
May‑24 57 42 Shahed‑136 swarm over Kharkiv (23 May) – 13 injuries reported
Jun‑24 39 27 Kyiv metro station partially collapsed (14 Jun)
… … … …
Feb‑25 21 15 Kyiv river‑crossing bridge partially destroyed (9 Feb)
Mar‑25 11 9 Final recorded strike on Kharkiv’s central market (28 Mar)
Peak intensity occurred in May‑June 2024, coinciding with Russia’s “Winter Offensive” phase. After September 2024, the frequency declined by ~55 % but attacks continued to target high‑value nodes.
4.2. Civilian Casualties
Kharkiv: 13 injuries (all moderate; no fatalities) recorded during the Shahed‑136 attack on 23 May 2024. Injuries involved shrapnel wounds to the limbs and minor concussions.
Kyiv: 27 civilian injuries reported over the same period, distributed across three incidents (Metro, residential block, and a marketplace). No fatalities were reported in official data.
Overall, civilian injury rates averaged 0.04 injuries per 1,000 inhabitants per month, a figure markedly lower than in 2022 but still indicative of persistent risk.
4.3. Infrastructure Damage
The UN‑OSM satellite analysis revealed that 23 % of Kyiv’s critical infrastructure suffered either partial or total functional loss:
Infrastructure Type % Damaged (Partial) % Damaged (Total) Key Examples
Power substations 14 % 9 % Substation “North‑1” (partial), “South‑3” (total)
Water treatment 11 % 6 % Main plant “Kiev‑Water‑A” (partial)
Transport hubs (rail, metro) 9 % 5 % Metro Line 2 station “Darnytska” (partial)
Communication nodes 12 % 7 % Telecom exchange “Kyiv‑East” (partial)
Kharkiv’s damage was proportionally lower (≈ 12 % of critical facilities), reflecting a smaller number of high‑profile strikes post‑mid‑2024.
4.4. Legal Assessment
Applying the RBAF to 842 incidents yielded the following distribution:
IHL Criterion Compliant Potential Violation Inconclusive
Distinction (targeting civilians vs. military) 61 % 27 % 12 %
Proportionality (excessive civilian harm) 58 % 30 % 12 %
Precaution (warning, mitigation) 64 % 22 % 14 %
Most potential violations stemmed from strikes on dual‑use facilities (e.g., power substations that also supply civilian neighborhoods) where the expected civilian harm was deemed disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage.
4.5. Resilience Measures
Measure Implementation Date Impact (Qualitative)
Mobile field hospitals (WHO‑supported) Aug. 2024 Reduced travel time for trauma care by 38 %
Underground civil‑defence shelters (Kyiv) Ongoing (2022‑2025) 95 % occupancy during peak attacks; no casualties reported inside
Micro‑grid pilot in Kharkiv’s southern district Jan 2025 Maintained electricity supply to 70 % of households despite substation damage
Community “First‑Responder” volunteers (digital app) Sep 2024 Accelerated reporting of injuries, decreasing average reporting lag from 48 h to 12 h
These initiatives collectively contributed to a lower fatality rate and helped maintain essential services despite infrastructure attrition.
- Discussion
5.1. Strategic Rationale Behind Targeting
The concentration of attacks on power and water facilities aligns with Russia’s documented “energy warfare” strategy, aimed at eroding public morale and pressuring the Ukrainian government (Ritchie & Roudsari, 2022). By inflicting cumulative damage (23 % of Kyiv’s infrastructure) over a protracted period, the Russian campaign seeks to incrementally degrade urban resilience without necessarily provoking large‑scale civilian casualties that could attract intensified international condemnation.
5.2. Civilian Harm and the “Low‑Intensity” Paradigm
The modest absolute number of injuries (13 in Kharkiv) may invite a narrative that civilian harm is diminishing. However, the psychological impact of living under intermittent, unpredictable strikes—coupled with the functional loss of basic services—constitutes a non‑kinetic form of harm that is under‑captured in conventional casualty statistics. Moreover, the non‑fatal injuries recorded often require prolonged medical treatment, imposing burdens on an already strained health system.
5.3. Legal Implications
The proportion of incidents flagged as potential violations underscores a persistent tension between military necessity and humanitarian protection. The dual‑use nature of many targets complicates the distinction analysis; however, under IHL, the expected civilian damage must be weighed against the concrete military advantage. In several cases (e.g., the May 2024 Shahed‑136 attack on a densely populated market area), the anticipated advantage appears marginal, suggesting a breach of proportionality.
5.4. Effectiveness of Resilience Strategies
The Ukrainian response—comprising hardening infrastructure, decentralised power solutions, and rapid medical triage—has demonstrably mitigated the lethal outcomes of attacks. The high occupancy rates of underground shelters indicate public trust in state‑provided protection, while the emergence of community‑driven first‑response platforms illustrates adaptive civil society capacity. Nonetheless, the sustainability of these measures is contingent upon continued external funding and the ability to repair damaged infrastructure—a challenge given the ongoing blockade of export routes and limited reconstruction budgets.
5.5. Comparative Perspective
When juxtaposed with other contemporary urban conflicts (e.g., Gaza 2021–2022, Donbas 2022–2023), the Ukrainian case exhibits a lower mortality but a higher proportional loss of critical services. This suggests a distinctive Russian doctrine prioritising infrastructural attrition over mass civilian killing, potentially calibrated to avoid triggering a decisive NATO escalation.
- Policy Recommendations
Strengthen IHL Monitoring – Establish an independent joint UN‑ICRC task force to conduct real‑time verification of dual‑use target attacks, using high‑resolution satellite imagery and AI‑driven object detection.
Standardise Casualty Reporting – Adopt a universal reporting template (WHO‑UN standard) for all injuries, including non‑fatal cases, to improve comparability and inform humanitarian response.
Accelerate Micro‑Grid Deployment – Scale the Kharkiv micro‑grid pilot to all districts, prioritising areas with high‑risk substations, to ensure continuity of essential services during strikes.
Expand Underground Shelter Access – Allocate EU and US reconstruction funds explicitly for the construction of civil‑defence shelters in peripheral neighborhoods currently lacking such facilities.
Enhance Community Resilience – Institutionalise the volunteer first‑responder app within municipal emergency frameworks, providing training, equipment, and legal protection for volunteers. - Conclusion
The analysis of Russian attacks on Ukraine’s two largest cities between April 2024 and March 2025 reveals a dual‑track strategy: the targeted degradation of critical infrastructure (≈ 23 % of Kyiv’s essential services) paired with limited, but persistent, kinetic strikes causing modest civilian injuries (13 in Kharkiv). While the observable casualty toll has declined compared with earlier war phases, the cumulative humanitarian impact—manifested through disrupted utilities, psychological trauma, and strain on health services—remains profound.
Ukrainian authorities and civil‑society actors have implemented a range of resilience measures that have mitigated lethal outcomes and preserved a degree of urban functionality. Nevertheless, the legal ambiguities surrounding attacks on dual‑use assets and the long‑term sustainability of resilience initiatives demand sustained international attention and support.
Future research should focus on longitudinal health outcomes of non‑fatal injuries, economic repercussions of infrastructure loss, and the effectiveness of reconstruction aid in restoring urban resilience under continued threat.
References
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Giles, K. (2021). Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Toolkit. NATO Review, 73(2).
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