The Davos Moment That Reverberated Across Continents
When Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney stood before the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 20, 2026, he didn’t mince words. The rules-based international order that nations like Singapore have relied upon for decades has experienced “a rupture, not a transition,” he declared to an audience that included U.S. President Donald Trump. Carney warned that great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, and supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.
The speech drew a standing ovation—unusual for Davos—and sharp rebuke from Trump, who retorted the next day: “Canada lives because of the United States.” But beyond the diplomatic theater, Carney’s message carries profound implications for Singapore and the broader ASEAN region as they navigate an increasingly volatile global landscape.
Singapore’s Middle Power Credentials
Singapore may be small in geographic size—a “little red dot” as its leaders often describe it—but it punches well above its weight in global affairs. Singapore functions as a critical player in shaping international orders like cyberspace governance, exhibiting middle-power capabilities by maneuvering and mediating in arenas of US-China conflict while positioning itself as a neutral broker.
In 2024, Canada-Singapore bilateral merchandise trade totaled $3.7 billion, while Singapore is the largest source of Foreign Direct Investment for Canada in Southeast Asia at $7.8 billion. But more importantly, both nations share fundamental values: commitment to rules-based international order, free trade, multilateralism, and strategic autonomy in an era of great power competition.
The Tariff Shock: A Case Study in Vulnerability
Singapore’s experience with Trump’s tariff policies illustrates precisely the kind of great power coercion Carney warned against. Despite a free-trade agreement with the United States, Singapore was hit with a 10% tariff in April 2025, prompting Prime Minister Lawrence Wong to tell parliament: “We are very disappointed by the U.S. move, especially considering the deep and long-standing friendship between our two countries. These are not actions one does to a friend”.
Wong pointed out that the U.S. enjoyed a trade surplus of $2.8 billion in its goods trade with Singapore in 2024, an 84.8% rise from the previous year, arguing that if tariffs were truly reciprocal and targeted only those with trade surpluses, “then the tariff for Singapore should be zero”.
The incident exemplifies Carney’s central thesis: that in today’s world, integration has become the source of subordination rather than mutual benefit, and when rules no longer protect you, you must protect yourself.
ASEAN’s Strategic Response: Unity in Diversity
Singapore’s predicament is shared across Southeast Asia, and the region’s response aligns remarkably with Carney’s prescription for middle powers. ASEAN has experienced a cognitive shift from cautious optimism to strategic anxiety in response to US-China competition, making gradual adjustments that demonstrate its strategic resilience, autonomy, and initiative.
Rather than diplomatic hedging, ASEAN pursues deliberate diversification—Singapore exemplifies this with $8.2 billion worth of new agreements with China in 2024, alongside deeper defense cooperation with the US and expanded trade ties with the EU. This is precisely the kind of multi-alignment strategy that avoids what Carney described as the trap of bilateral negotiations with hegemons, where middle powers “compete with each other to be the most accommodating.”
Buffeted by US-China great power competition, ASEAN countries are eager to enhance cooperation with other middle powers—including India and Australia—to balance against China, avoid over-reliance on either Beijing or Washington, and advance mutual interests.
The “If You’re Not at the Table, You’re on the Menu” Doctrine
Carney’s most memorable line resonates deeply with Singapore’s foreign policy philosophy. Middle powers must act together because if they’re not at the table, they’re on the menu. When negotiating bilaterally with a hegemon, middle powers negotiate from weakness, accepting what’s offered and competing with each other to be the most accommodating—this is not sovereignty but the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination.
Singapore has long understood this principle. At the UN, Singapore convenes the Forum of Small States, which represents the majority of UN membership, positioning itself as a dependable, reliable resource for other small states. Singapore strongly supports ASEAN’s goal of building a strong, prosperous, and rules-based regional community, with the success of ASEAN resting on its open, inclusive, and outward-looking nature.
Practical Pathways: What Middle Power Cooperation Looks Like
Carney’s upcoming visit to Australia in March, where he will address Parliament, represents the operationalization of his vision. The October 2025 agreement between Canada and Australia to promote cooperation on critical minerals demonstrates concrete middle power collaboration beyond rhetoric.
For Singapore, similar opportunities abound. Canada and Singapore issued a joint statement on science, technology and innovation collaboration, and agreed to work together through a framework for green economy cooperation in areas including green and low carbon technologies, carbon pricing and carbon markets, and green transition financing.
Despite being one of the smallest countries in the world, Singapore has managed to develop close relations with both the US and China, as well as many other middle powers, demonstrating that the reality of strategic activism among middle powers is often determined not by their size but by their mindset.
ASEAN’s Structural Advantage in a Multipolar World
The regional architecture that ASEAN has built over decades provides the institutional foundation for the kind of middle power cooperation Carney envisions. ASEAN’s region-wide consensus and institutional arrangements have endowed it with strong resilience, strategic autonomy, and strategic initiative, ensuring ASEAN unity and enhancing its strategic value.
ASEAN’s multi-alignment approach has enhanced its collective bargaining power, improving its leverage compared to traditional bilateral diplomatic methods, demonstrating that smaller and middle powers can shape—not just respond to—the evolving global architecture.
This is not Cold War-era non-alignment, which was reactive and avoidance-based. ASEAN’s approach today is proactive, involving cultivating multiple partnerships not out of necessity but as a deliberate effort to maximize economic and geopolitical leverage.
Singapore’s Unique Positioning Within the Framework
Singapore brings specific advantages to middle power cooperation that make it an ideal partner for countries like Canada:
Economic Integration Expertise: Singapore is the world’s third largest financial center after London and New York, and is a leader in research and development spending as a model for innovation.
Diplomatic Credibility: Singapore’s higher economic development means it does not have the same interest in China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative’s infrastructural projects, instead performing as a facilitator between China and other ASEAN states, contributing significantly to China’s infrastructural diplomacy by facilitating projects between recipient nations and China.
Values Alignment: Middle powers like Singapore are particularly noted for being “moral actors”—Singapore joined international sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, striking in comparison to the rest of Southeast Asia’s muted responses.
The Critical Challenges Ahead
Despite the strategic alignment between Carney’s vision and Singapore’s interests, significant challenges remain. ASEAN’s fragmented reaction to US tariffs shows the need for greater solidarity and shared economic mechanisms, as the bloc’s traditional consensus-building approach has reached its limits.
As major powers increasingly bypass ASEAN-centric mechanisms in favor of minilateral arrangements such as the Quad and AUKUS, ASEAN’s centrality risks erosion, raising critical questions about whether it can sustain its middle-power role in a rapidly polarizing environment.
For Singapore specifically, Prime Minister Wong warned that “the likelihood of a full-blown global trade war is growing” and that Singapore would likely need to downgrade its economic growth forecast, with the current projection of 1-3% for 2025 under pressure.
From Rhetoric to Action: The Path Forward
Carney’s speech wasn’t just diagnosis—it was a call to action. The cost of strategic autonomy can be shared through collective investments in resilience, which are cheaper than everyone building their own fortresses, with shared standards reducing fragmentation and complementarities being positive sum.
For Singapore and ASEAN, this translates into specific policy directions:
Accelerating Regional Economic Integration: Malaysia’s chairmanship is focusing on finalizing the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement upgrade, accelerating the operationalization of ASEAN’s $1 trillion digital economy framework, and expanding payment connectivity to cover trade finance.
Expanding Middle Power Networks: Southeast Asian countries could work with middle powers like Australia and Japan to expand middle-power agency and reduce the need for an all-or-nothing choice between great powers.
Building Variable Geometry Coalitions: Carney emphasized pursuing “variable geometry”—different coalitions for different issues based on common values and interests—rather than relying on diminished multilateral institutions.
Singapore’s Response: Pragmatic Non-Alignment
Singapore’s reaction to these global shifts demonstrates the kind of strategic flexibility Carney advocates. Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan explained that Singapore tries to find like-minded partners depending on the issue concerned, whether at APEC, G20, or through ASEAN dialogue partnerships.
This approach doesn’t mean abandoning principles. When asked about the sustainability of “not choosing sides,” Balakrishnan emphasized that Singapore will continue to be a credible, reliable, and predictable partner to all, always acting in its long-term national interests.
The Broader Significance for Asia-Pacific Stability
The convergence between Carney’s vision and ASEAN’s evolving strategy represents more than bilateral cooperation—it signals a potential shift in how middle powers globally respond to great power competition. Indonesia’s regional posture symbolizes the potential of middle powers to create an alternative and cooperative vision for the Indo-Pacific, offering a “third way” for states that don’t wish to get enmeshed in Sino-American bipolarity.
What ASEAN demonstrates is that in a world marked by fragmentation and polarization, a shift away from ideological alignment towards pragmatic, interest-based engagement may be one of the most viable strategies for ensuring regional stability and global resilience.
Conclusion: A Moment of Possibility
Carney’s planned visit to Australia in March will put flesh on the bones of his Davos speech. For Singapore and ASEAN, his message arrives at a critical juncture. The old order is indeed not coming back, as he warned. But in the space between American hegemony and a multipolar free-for-all, middle powers have an opportunity to shape what comes next.
The tariff crisis has revealed both ASEAN’s vulnerabilities and its possibilities—the choice is whether to remain a loose association vulnerable to external shocks or transform into an integrated bloc capable of shaping its own destiny.
Singapore, with its diplomatic acumen, economic dynamism, and commitment to multilateralism, is uniquely positioned to help realize Carney’s vision. The question is not whether middle powers must adapt to the new reality—they must. The question, as Carney framed it, is whether they adapt by building higher walls or by creating coalitions with genuine impact.
For Singapore, the answer seems clear: The power of legitimacy, integrity, and rules will remain strong if middle powers choose to wield them together. In an era where great powers increasingly abandon even the pretense of rules, this may be the most powerful weapon middle powers possess.