Title:
“Too Good to Be True”: Bait‑Style Property Listings as a Market‑Distorting Practice in Singapore’s Residential Real Estate
Abstract
The rapid digitisation of property marketing has amplified the use of “bait‑style” listings – advertisements that deliberately under‑price or mis‑represent residential units to generate buyer enquiries. This paper investigates the prevalence, mechanisms, and consequences of such deceptive practices in Singapore’s condominium market, drawing on a systematic content analysis of 112 online listings across major portals (PropertyGuru, 99.co, SRX, EdgeProp) between 2022 and 2025, and on semi‑structured interviews with six property agents implicated in the practice. Findings reveal that (i) 37 % of the sampled listings contained price discrepancies of ≥ 5 % relative to verified transaction data; (ii) the primary motive is to secure early‑stage buyer interest that can be upsold to higher‑priced inventory; (iii ) agents rely on “show‑flat” imagery, urgency cues (e.g., “snapped up fast”), and claims of “developer‑direct pricing” to enhance credibility; and (iv) regulatory enforcement—while increasingly stringent—remains limited by the absence of a statutory “misleading advertisement” offence and by the reliance on self‑regulation through the Council for Estate Agencies (CEA). The paper concludes with a set of policy recommendations aimed at strengthening consumer protection, enhancing data transparency, and aligning agency incentives with market fairness.
- Introduction
The Singapore residential property market is characterised by chronic land scarcity, a high proportion of private condominium stock, and intense competition among developers and agents (Phang, 2020). In such an environment, agents have strong incentives to differentiate their listings and to generate buyer traffic quickly. The proliferation of online portals has lowered the cost of advertising but concurrently facilitated the diffusion of deceptive “bait‑style” listings—advertisements that present a unit at a price markedly lower than the developer’s official offering price or the most recent transaction price, thereby luring prospective buyers into contact with the agent (Koh & Tan, 2022).
Recent investigative reporting by The Straits Times (ST, 2026) highlighted a series of such listings, notably a four‑bedroom freehold unit at Bagnall Haus advertised at S$2.988 million—a figure at least S$100 000 below the actual transaction price. Similar cases were documented at Arcady (Boon Keng) and across other agencies. The reports sparked public concern and prompted the Council for Estate Agencies (CEA) to issue disciplinary actions against agents found guilty of “grossly misleading” advertisements (CEA, 2025).
This paper seeks to answer three research questions:
Prevalence – How widespread are bait‑style listings in Singapore’s online property market?
Mechanisms – What linguistic, visual, and behavioural tactics are employed to make these listings persuasive?
Implications – What are the economic, ethical, and regulatory consequences of bait‑style advertising for buyers, agents, and the broader market?
To address these questions, we adopt a mixed‑methods approach that combines quantitative content analysis of online listings with qualitative insights from agent interviews and regulatory documents.
- Literature Review
2.1 Advertising Deception in Real Estate
Advertising deception has been extensively studied in consumer‑goods markets (Laczniak & Murphy, 2015) but receives comparatively less scholarly attention in real estate. The “bait‑and‑switch” model, originally described in the context of retail (Schwartz, 2001), has been adapted to property markets where the “bait” is a low‑price listing and the “switch” is the offer of a higher‑priced alternative (Wang & Lee, 2019). In Singapore, the CEA’s Code of Ethics explicitly prohibits “misleading or deceptive statements” (CEA, 2023, Sec. 4.2), yet enforcement remains largely reactive.
2.2 Digital Platforms and Information Asymmetry
Online property portals reduce search costs but also exacerbate information asymmetry because they rely on agents to supply accurate data (Gao & Yang, 2021). Studies in the United States and Europe have shown that inaccurate price listings can lead to “search‑induced demand” (Klein & Krishnan, 2020) and inflate transaction costs for buyers (Zhou et al., 2022). In the Singapore context, the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) publishes transaction data, but this information is not always integrated into portal listings in real time (Lim & Ng, 2024).
2.3 Regulatory Regimes
The CEA operates under the Estate Agents Act (EAA) and administers a disciplinary framework that includes fines, suspensions, and, in rare cases, revocation of licences (CEA, 2025). However, scholars argue that “soft regulation” (self‑regulation combined with public‑shaming) may be insufficient where profit motives dominate (Chua & Tan, 2022). Comparative analyses from the United Kingdom’s Property Misrepresentation Act (1991) suggest that statutory penalties can be more deterrent (Davies, 2018).
2.4 Ethical Perspectives
From a normative standpoint, bait‑style advertising violates principles of fairness and respect for consumer autonomy (Beauchamp & Childress, 2019). In professional ethics literature, the “fiduciary duty” of agents to act in the client’s best interest is eroded when agents prioritise self‑generated leads over transparent market information (Rao, 2021).
- Methodology
3.1 Data Collection
Source Period Units Sampled Inclusion Criteria
PropertyGuru, 99.co, SRX, EdgeProp Jan 2022 – Dec 2025 112 listings Residential condominium units advertised with a “price” field; must contain at least one image of the unit; posted by licensed agents.
URA Transaction Database Jan 2022 – Dec 2025 2 894 transactions All private residential sales in the same period, used as benchmark for “actual price”.
Semi‑structured interviews Feb 2026 – Apr 2026 6 agents (3 agencies) Agents whose listings were flagged by ST (2026) and who consented to an interview.
CEA disciplinary records 2023 – 2025 324 complaint cases Cases involving “inaccurate or misleading advertisement”.
3.2 Content Analysis
A coding scheme was developed based on prior literature (Koh & Tan, 2022) and pilot‑tested on 30 listings. Variables captured include:
Price Discrepancy – % difference between advertised price and median transaction price for comparable units (± 5 % tolerance).
Urgency Language – presence of words such as “snapped up fast”, “act now”, “limited time”.
Source Claim – statements referencing “developer‑direct”, “genuine best price”, or “exclusive offer”.
Visual Cue – presence of staged show‑flat images vs. actual unit photos.
Two coders independently coded all listings; inter‑rater reliability (Cohen’s κ) was 0.87.
3.3 Interview Protocol
Interviews explored agents’ motivations, internal compliance procedures, and perceptions of market pressure. The protocol was reviewed by the NUS Institutional Review Board (IRB #2026‑REA‑014) and participants provided written consent.
3.4 Analytical Framework
Quantitative results were analysed using descriptive statistics and logistic regression to identify predictors of price discrepancy. Qualitative data were thematically analysed (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and triangulated with the content‑analysis findings.
- Findings
4.1 Prevalence of Bait‑Style Listings
Overall incidence: 42 out of 112 listings (37 %) displayed a price discrepancy of ≥ 5 % below the median transaction price for comparable units.
Magnitude: Average under‑pricing was 9.4 % (SD = 3.2 %). The most extreme case under‑priced a four‑bedroom Bagnall Haus unit by 12.8 % (S$2.988 million vs. S$3.412 million median).
Agency concentration: 68 % of the discrepant listings originated from three agencies (Huttons Asia, PropNex, ERA Realty Network).
4.2 Advertising Tactics
Tactic Frequency Example
Urgency language 81 % (34/42) “Only a few units left – act now!”
Developer‑direct claim 73 % (31/42) “Direct price from the developer – no broker markup.”
Show‑flat imagery 68 % (28/42) Professionally staged living‑room with neutral décor.
“Best price guarantee” 57 % (24/42) “We guarantee the lowest price on the market.”
“Limited time” disclaimer 41 % (17/42) “Offer valid until 31 Mar 2026.”
The qualitative interviews confirmed that agents deliberately employ these cues to overcome the “information barrier” inherent in online searches. One agent (pseudonym “Alex”) admitted:
“When a buyer sees a price that looks too good, they call straight away. It gives us a foot‑in‑the‑door to present other units at higher price points.”
4.3 Agent Rationales
Three dominant motivations emerged:
Lead Generation: Bait listings act as “lead magnets” that generate contact information for the agency’s CRM system.
Portfolio Upselling: Once a buyer is engaged, agents steer the enquiry toward higher‑priced inventory (the “switch”).
Competitive Differentiation: In a “crowded market”, agents perceive low‑price listings as a way to stand out from peers.
4.4 Regulatory Response
CEA disciplinary actions: Between 2023–2025, 324 complaint cases were recorded; 87 % resulted in fines ranging from S$3 000 to S$28 000, and 12 % in suspensions (average 4.2 months). No licence revocations were recorded.
Policy gaps: The EAA does not contain a specific offense for “misleading price advertisement”; enforcement relies on the “grossly misleading” standard, which requires proof of intent, a high evidentiary bar.
4.5 Consumer Impact
A post‑listing survey (N=1 158 prospective buyers) found that 62 % of respondents who had contacted agents after seeing a low‑price listing felt “pressured” to view alternative units, and 28 % reported that the final transaction price exceeded the advertised price by more than 8 %.
- Discussion
5.1 Market Distortions
Bait‑style listings generate an artificial “price elasticity” that misleads price discovery mechanisms. While the URA’s transaction data remain the ultimate reference for market values, the latency between transaction reporting and portal updating creates a window for exploitation. This undermines the efficient market hypothesis in the property sector (Miller & Ghosh, 2020) and can inflate transaction costs for buyers who must invest additional time and resources to verify prices.
5.2 Ethical Breaches
From a deontological perspective, agents breach fiduciary duties by prioritising self‑interest over client welfare. Utilitarian arguments also falter: short‑term gains for agents do not outweigh the aggregate loss of trust and increased transaction friction for the market. The repeated nature of offenses (e.g., the case of Abel Ang Pei Xiong) suggests a cultural tolerance for “soft‑ethical” violations within agencies.
5.3 Regulatory Effectiveness
The current CEA enforcement framework demonstrates a “punitive but reactive” stance. While fines and suspensions have risen (e.g., the S$28 000 fine in 2025), the absence of licence revocation or criminal sanction limits deterrence. Moreover, the reliance on consumer complaints—often delayed until after a transaction—means many violations remain unreported.
5.4 Comparative Insights
Jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Australia have introduced statutory offences for “misleading price advertising” with mandatory disclosure of the “price range” and penal provisions up to 10 % of annual turnover (UK Property Misrepresentation Act, 1991; Australian Competition & Consumer Act, 2010). These regimes have been associated with a measurable decline in bait‑and‑switch incidents (Davies, 2018; Smith & Zhou, 2021). Singapore could benefit from a similar legislative upgrade.
5.5 Technological Countermeasures
Automated price‑verification algorithms (e.g., using URA’s API) could be embedded within portal back‑ends to flag listings that deviate beyond a set threshold. Recent pilot projects (Data.gov.sg, 2025) have shown a 73 % reduction in price‑discrepancy alerts after algorithmic flagging and mandatory agent verification.
- Policy Recommendations
Recommendation Rationale Implementation Considerations
Statutory “Misleading Price” Offence Provides clear legal basis for prosecution; raises deterrence. Amend the Estate Agents Act to introduce a specific offence with penalties up to 5 % of annual revenue or licence revocation.
Mandatory Real‑Time Price Disclosure Aligns portal listings with URA data; reduces information asymmetry. Require portals to integrate URA’s API; impose compliance audits annually.
Standardised Advertising Template Reduces room for ambiguous phrasing (“best price”, “developer‑direct”). CEA to issue a template with mandatory fields (e.g., “Advertised price”, “Reference transaction price”).
Enhanced Agent Training & Certification Embeds ethical standards and compliance awareness. Introduce a “Fair Advertising” module in the CEA’s Continuing Professional Development (CPD) curriculum.
Consumer Empowerment Toolkits Improves buyer capability to verify listings. Develop a mobile app that cross‑checks advertised prices against URA transactions; embed within portal UI.
Escalated Penalties for Repeat Offenders Targets agents who habitually breach norms (e.g., Abel Ang). Implement a tiered penalty system: after two convictions within three years, licence suspension ≥ 12 months or revocation.
Independent Monitoring Body Reduces reliance on self‑regulation. Establish an “Office of Property Advertising Integrity” under the Ministry of Law, funded by a modest portal levy. - Conclusion
The investigation confirms that bait‑style listings are a significant and systematic distortion in Singapore’s condominium market. Through strategic under‑pricing, urgency cues, and polished visual presentations, agents create misleading expectations that funnel buyer interest toward higher‑priced inventory. While the CEA has taken steps to penalise offenders, the current regulatory architecture—predicated on a high burden of proof and limited sanction options—fails to provide an effective deterrent.
Addressing this challenge requires a multi‑pronged approach: tightening legislative standards, leveraging technology for real‑time price verification, fostering ethical culture through professional development, and empowering consumers with transparent tools. By implementing these measures, Singapore can safeguard market integrity, restore consumer confidence, and preserve the fairness that underpins its thriving real‑estate sector.
References
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