Executive Summary
As Canada and over 40 nations compete to host the proposed Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB), Singapore stands at a critical juncture. While not competing for the headquarters, the city-state could become one of the bank’s most significant beneficiaries in the Indo-Pacific region. This analysis examines how the DSRB could transform Singapore’s defence ecosystem, address its unique security challenges, and position the nation as a regional hub for defence innovation.
The Bank’s Purpose and Status: The DSRB has been proposed as a multinational institution to provide capital for defence-related innovation, though no host country or timeline has been determined yet. DSRB president Kevin Reed indicated the bank has recently become a NATO priority.
Ottawa vs. Toronto Competition: Ontario Premier Doug Ford advocated for Toronto in December, calling it a rare opportunity that would benefit all of Canada. However, Ottawa’s defence sector argues their city is better suited, citing the presence of decision-makers, National Defence headquarters, Canadian Armed Forces leadership, and a strong tech community.
Industry Support: Local defence companies emphasize that access to capital remains a significant challenge. Dominion Dynamics, an Ottawa-based startup, noted the difficulty of securing credit and investment as a defence company. The bank could help address this financing gap for smaller firms and startups.
Canada’s Position: Canada is competing against over 40 countries to host the bank. Reed noted that Canada had the largest delegation at the September briefing and that RBC was the first of seven global banks to sign up with the DSRB, suggesting Canada has a strong chance of being selected.
The DSRB: A New Financial Architecture for Defence
The DSRB represents an unprecedented attempt to mobilize private capital for defence spending across NATO and Indo-Pacific allied nations. Designed as a multilateral development bank, it aims to issue AAA-rated bonds backed by member states’ combined credit strength, potentially mobilizing five to eight times the initial sovereign capital contributions.
The bank’s three core functions directly address longstanding challenges in defence financing. First, it provides governments with affordable, long-term capital that doesn’t increase national debt burdens. Second, it streamlines multinational defence procurement, enabling countries to buy equipment faster and more efficiently. Third, and perhaps most crucially for Singapore, it unlocks supply chain financing by providing guarantees that enable commercial banks to fund defence contractors throughout the ecosystem.
Major financial institutions including JPMorgan Chase, Deutsche Bank, ING, and the Royal Bank of Canada have backed the initiative. As of September 2025, representatives from 37 nations attended a high-level meeting in London to advance the bank’s development, with several countries indicating their intention to become founding members.
Singapore’s Defence Landscape: Unique Challenges and Priorities
Understanding Singapore’s potential relationship with the DSRB requires examining the nation’s distinctive defence posture. As Southeast Asia’s largest defence spender, Singapore allocated approximately SGD 23.4 billion (roughly USD 17 billion) to defence in fiscal year 2025. The country ranks among the world’s top five in per capita defence spending, alongside Qatar, Israel, the United States, and Kuwait, with approximately USD 1,885 per person as of 2021.
This substantial investment reflects Singapore’s fundamental strategic reality. As a small nation spanning just 710 square kilometers with limited manpower, Singapore has long pursued a defence strategy centered on technological superiority as a force multiplier. The country cannot compete through sheer numbers; instead, it must maintain qualitative advantages in equipment, training, and operational capabilities.
Singapore’s defence priorities encompass several critical areas. The nation has committed to acquiring advanced F-35 combat aircraft from the United States, representing one of the most sophisticated fighter platforms available. The country maintains overseas training facilities in locations including Australia, the United States, and other partner nations, necessitating substantial investment in foreign infrastructure and relationships. Singapore also focuses heavily on maritime security, given its position at the nexus of crucial trade routes including the Strait of Singapore and the Strait of Malacca, through which a significant portion of global trade flows.
The threat landscape Singapore addresses includes traditional security concerns, emerging cyber threats, terrorism from organizations like Jemaah Islamiah, and the imperative to protect vital maritime chokepoints from piracy and other disruptions. Regional tensions, particularly regarding China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea and broader Indo-Pacific stability questions, further complicate the security environment.
The Financing Gap: Why the DSRB Matters for Singapore
Despite Singapore’s robust defence spending, the nation faces structural challenges that the DSRB could address. The aerospace and defence market in Singapore, valued at approximately USD 9.29 billion in 2025 and projected to reach USD 15.84 billion by 2030, reveals both opportunity and constraint. While maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) services dominate with over 62 percent of revenue, the sector faces workforce shortages, with only 1,700 aerospace graduates entering the workforce annually against demand for 2,500 positions.
Singapore’s defence industrial base centers primarily on ST Engineering, a global technology and defence group that employs approximately 27,000 people, including around 19,000 in engineering and technical roles. The company traces its roots to the Chartered Industries of Singapore, established in 1967, and has expanded across aerospace, land systems, electronics, and marine sectors. However, the ecosystem includes numerous smaller contractors, startups, and specialized firms that face persistent challenges accessing adequate working capital.
The Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA), DSO National Laboratories, and the Centre for Strategic Infocomm Technologies (CSIT) form Singapore’s Defence Technology Community, comprising over 5,000 scientists and engineers. This community has developed expertise across multiple domains, but smaller firms and startups working with these organizations often struggle to secure financing for their innovations.
Singapore’s defence procurement strategy emphasizes technology transfer agreements for all major acquisitions, ensuring the nation can maintain and potentially manufacture critical systems domestically. The government has also implemented innovative approaches like lease-to-own arrangements for defence equipment, reducing upfront capital requirements while providing early access to advanced capabilities. These strategies demonstrate Singapore’s sophistication in defence acquisition, but they don’t fully address the financing challenges facing the broader industrial ecosystem.
Cap Vista, DSTA’s strategic investment arm, provides equity financing and technical support to startups developing defence and security technologies. However, even with government backing, many emerging companies face difficulties scaling their operations or securing working capital for production runs. Commercial banks remain hesitant to lend to defence contractors due to sector-specific risks, long payment cycles, and regulatory complexities.
Five Ways the DSRB Could Transform Singapore’s Defence Ecosystem
1. Unlocking Supply Chain Finance for Small and Medium Enterprises
The DSRB’s most immediate impact would come through its supply chain financing mechanisms. By providing guarantees to commercial banks, the bank would enable smaller Singaporean defence contractors to access credit against government contracts. This addresses a critical bottleneck identified by defence industry participants.
Consider a hypothetical scenario: a Singapore-based firm develops an advanced sensor system for maritime surveillance. The company secures a contract with the Singapore Armed Forces worth SGD 5 million, but faces an 18-month development and production cycle before receiving payment. Under current conditions, securing working capital is challenging, as banks view the contract as high-risk. With DSRB guarantees, banks could confidently lend against the contract value, enabling the company to hire staff, purchase materials, and invest in manufacturing capacity immediately.
This mechanism would be particularly valuable for companies in Singapore’s emerging defence technology sectors. Startups working on unmanned systems, artificial intelligence applications for defence, cybersecurity solutions, and advanced manufacturing techniques could scale operations faster with access to DSRB-backed financing. The multiplier effect could be substantial: a single guarantee might enable a company to hire ten additional engineers, invest in advanced equipment, and complete projects months ahead of schedule.
2. Accelerating Technology Development and Innovation
Singapore’s position as a technology hub in Southeast Asia positions it well to benefit from DSRB support for defence innovation. The country has invested heavily in emerging technologies including artificial intelligence, quantum systems, advanced materials, and autonomous platforms. The DSRB could catalyze this innovation ecosystem in several ways.
First, by providing more accessible financing, the bank would enable faster iteration and development cycles. Defence technology development typically requires substantial upfront investment before generating revenue. Companies often must build prototypes, conduct extensive testing, and navigate certification processes before securing production contracts. DSRB-backed financing could bridge this gap, allowing companies to maintain development momentum even before securing major contracts.
Second, the bank could facilitate collaborative research projects spanning multiple countries. Singapore has established itself as a preferred partner for international defence cooperation, with strong relationships across the United States, Australia, Europe, and other Indo-Pacific nations. DSRB financing could enable multi-national research consortiums where Singapore-based firms contribute specialized expertise to larger projects, with the bank providing financial coordination and risk mitigation across borders.
Third, the availability of DSRB financing could attract foreign defence companies to establish research and development operations in Singapore. The nation already hosts facilities from major players like Rolls-Royce, General Electric, and Pratt & Whitney in the aerospace sector. Similar dynamics could emerge in other defence domains if financing becomes more readily available and predictable.
3. Strengthening Regional Defence Industrial Cooperation
The DSRB’s explicit inclusion of Indo-Pacific nations alongside NATO and EU members creates opportunities for regional defence industrial collaboration centered on Singapore. Several mechanisms could emerge.
Singapore could serve as a regional hub for DSRB-financed procurement projects involving multiple Southeast Asian nations. For example, several ASEAN countries face similar maritime security challenges. The DSRB could finance joint procurement of patrol vessels, maritime surveillance systems, or coastal defence equipment, with Singapore’s shipbuilding and systems integration capabilities playing a central role. Such arrangements would create economies of scale, reduce per-unit costs, and strengthen regional security cooperation.
The bank could also facilitate technology transfer arrangements where Singapore-based companies license or co-develop systems for deployment across the region. Countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines are increasing defence spending but often lack the industrial base to develop certain capabilities domestically. Singapore firms could partner with these nations, with DSRB financing enabling local production, technology adaptation, and skills transfer.
Furthermore, Singapore’s extensive network of defence relationships positions it as an ideal partner for connecting Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic defence industrial bases. The nation already operates equipment from multiple source countries and maintains training relationships across continents. DSRB financing could enable Singapore to serve as a testing and integration hub for equipment intended for tropical and maritime environments, adding value to systems developed in Europe or North America before their deployment elsewhere in the region.
4. Expanding Singapore’s Defence Export Capabilities
Singapore has ambitions to grow its defence exports, leveraging the expertise and capabilities developed for national requirements to serve international markets. ST Engineering and other Singaporean companies already export various systems, but the DSRB could significantly expand these opportunities.
Export finance remains a major challenge in defence trade. Many potential customers, particularly developing nations, lack the immediate capital to purchase sophisticated equipment but represent sound long-term credit risks. The DSRB’s ability to provide sovereign lending could enable these countries to acquire Singaporean defence products through favorable financing terms. This would open markets currently dominated by larger nations that can offer attractive financial packages through their export credit agencies.
The bank could also finance industrial cooperation arrangements where Singapore exports not just equipment but manufacturing capability. Several nations seek to develop indigenous defence industries but lack the capital to invest in facilities, training, and technology transfer. DSRB-backed programs could enable Singapore companies to establish joint ventures or licensed production arrangements, earning returns through royalties, technical services, and long-term support contracts rather than direct equipment sales alone.
Additionally, the DSRB’s financing mechanisms could reduce risks in defence exports. Political changes, economic downturns, and other factors can leave defence exporters exposed when customers default or cancel contracts. If the DSRB provides guarantees or participates in financing packages, Singaporean companies could pursue opportunities they might otherwise consider too risky, diversifying revenue sources and building long-term relationships in emerging markets.
5. Reducing Defence Cost Pressures on the National Budget
Perhaps the most significant long-term impact would be the DSRB’s potential to ease pressure on Singapore’s defence budget. As an off-balance-sheet lender, the bank’s loans would count as contingent liabilities rather than direct national debt. This accounting treatment matters significantly for Singapore.
The nation maintains a disciplined fiscal approach and could benefit from mechanisms that preserve budget flexibility while enabling necessary defence investments. Major procurement programs, particularly for high-value assets like combat aircraft, submarines, or advanced missile systems, impose significant budget strain. DSRB financing could allow Singapore to spread these costs over longer periods at favorable interest rates, smoothing expenditure peaks and enabling more consistent investment across multiple priority areas simultaneously.
This financial flexibility would be particularly valuable given Singapore’s demographic challenges. The nation’s workforce is aging, and maintaining the current level of defence spending while addressing social spending pressures may become increasingly challenging. If the DSRB enables Singapore to maintain defence capabilities with less immediate budget impact, policymakers gain room to address other national priorities without compromising security.
The DSRB model of pooling creditworthiness across member nations could also enable Singapore to access financing at rates potentially lower than it might secure independently, despite the nation’s strong credit rating. If the bank achieves AAA status through the combined backing of all members, including larger economies, Singapore could effectively benefit from the collective credit strength while contributing its fair share to the institution.
Challenges and Considerations for Singapore
Despite these opportunities, Singapore would need to carefully consider several challenges and questions before engaging with the DSRB.
Geopolitical Positioning and Strategic Balance
Singapore has long maintained a carefully calibrated foreign policy that avoids choosing sides between major powers. The nation has strong defence and economic relationships with the United States while maintaining pragmatic engagement with China. Participation in a bank explicitly designed to strengthen “allied democracies” and enhance “collective deterrence” could be interpreted as alignment away from neutrality.
The DSRB Development Group’s September 2025 meeting included representatives from 37 nations, and the bank is designed to complement both NATO and Indo-Pacific security architectures. However, its framing as supporting “like-minded allies and partners” against “systemic threats” carries clear geopolitical implications. Singapore would need to assess whether participation aligns with its longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity and whether it might complicate relationships with countries not included in the bank’s membership.
Recent developments suggest Singapore is increasingly willing to take clearer positions on international security issues. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s statements at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2025 emphasized that Southeast Asia rejects zero-sum competition and embraces multilateralism, signaling that ASEAN nations can “shape their own destiny” amid US-China rivalry. These principles would need to be reconciled with participation in an institution that some might perceive as part of a broader containment strategy.
Defence Spending Pressure and Sovereignty Concerns
US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2025 called on Indo-Pacific allies to increase defence spending to five percent of GDP, matching NATO’s new pledge. While Singapore already spends a substantial percentage on defence compared to many regional peers, pressure to conform to specific spending benchmarks could emerge if the nation becomes a DSRB member.
Singapore currently spends approximately 3.1 to 3.3 percent of GDP on defence, significantly higher than most Southeast Asian neighbors but below the proposed five percent threshold. Participation in the DSRB could create implicit or explicit expectations about defence spending levels, potentially limiting the government’s fiscal flexibility. Singapore would need clear assurances that membership doesn’t commit the nation to specific spending targets beyond what its own security assessment determines necessary.
There are also questions about conditionality and oversight. Multilateral development banks typically impose governance, transparency, and policy conditions on borrowers. While such requirements may be reasonable for general development lending, defence procurement often involves sensitive national security decisions. Singapore would need to ensure that DSRB financing doesn’t constrain its ability to make independent decisions about equipment selection, industrial partnerships, or operational priorities.
Industrial Policy and Market Dynamics
Singapore has cultivated a defence industrial policy that emphasizes self-reliance in critical areas while pragmatically sourcing from international partners where appropriate. The nation requires technology transfer for major acquisitions and has supported the development of indigenous capabilities through government-linked companies like ST Engineering and research organizations like DSTA and DSO.
The DSRB could potentially disrupt these carefully constructed arrangements. If the bank’s financing mechanisms favor equipment from certain countries or companies, it might undermine Singapore’s balanced approach to defence procurement. The nation would need to ensure that participation doesn’t create procurement biases or limit its ability to select equipment based purely on operational merit and strategic considerations.
There’s also the question of how DSRB financing would interact with Singapore’s existing support mechanisms for defence industry development. Cap Vista, government R&D grants, and other programs serve specific policy objectives beyond purely commercial considerations. Coordination between DSRB financing and national programs would be essential to avoid contradictory incentives or inefficient duplication.
Operational and Governance Questions
As a smaller nation, Singapore would need to ensure adequate voice and representation in DSRB governance structures. Multilateral institutions can sometimes be dominated by larger member states, with smaller nations having limited influence over policy direction despite contributing capital and accepting contingent liabilities.
Singapore would need clarity on several operational matters. How would lending decisions be made, and what weight would different member nations have in approvals? Would there be regional boards or committees ensuring Indo-Pacific perspectives are adequately considered? How would disputes between members be resolved? What mechanisms would exist to ensure the bank serves the interests of smaller members rather than primarily benefiting larger economies?
The question of callable capital also deserves careful analysis. While the DSRB materials emphasize that callable capital has never been called in over 70 years of multilateral development bank history, Singapore would be providing a contingent guarantee to support the institution’s credit rating. The nation would need to assess the risks, however remote, that circumstances could require actually funding this guarantee and ensure appropriate provisions exist in national financial planning.
Regional Context and Alternative Approaches
Singapore’s assessment of DSRB participation should also consider the broader regional context and alternative approaches to addressing defence financing challenges.
ASEAN Perspectives on Defence Cooperation
Southeast Asian nations have historically approached defence matters through bilateral relationships rather than multilateral financial mechanisms. ASEAN has carefully avoided becoming a military alliance, instead emphasizing economic integration and political dialogue. Several ASEAN members, including Indonesia and Malaysia, have expressed caution about initiatives that might draw the region into great power competition.
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s comments at the Shangri-La Dialogue emphasized that economic disruption represents a more immediate concern than military imbalance for many regional states. This perspective reflects widespread sentiment that defence cooperation should support stability and prosperity rather than contribute to arms buildups or bloc formation.
Singapore would need to consider how DSRB participation might affect its relationships within ASEAN. If Singapore becomes closely associated with a Western-led defence financing institution while other ASEAN members remain skeptical or opposed, it could create tensions within the regional grouping. Conversely, if Singapore demonstrates that DSRB membership enhances its defence capabilities without compromising strategic autonomy, it might pave the way for other regional nations to consider participation.
Bilateral and Regional Alternatives
Rather than or in addition to DSRB participation, Singapore could pursue alternative approaches to addressing defence financing challenges. Several options merit consideration.
The nation could enhance bilateral defence industrial cooperation with key partners like the United States, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These relationships already exist and could be deepened through specific financing arrangements or joint development programs without the complexity of multilateral institutions. For example, Singapore could negotiate expanded export credit facilities with partner countries or establish bilateral defence development funds focused on areas of mutual interest.
Singapore could also champion ASEAN-led initiatives for defence industrial cooperation. The region faces common challenges including maritime security, disaster response, cybersecurity, and counter-terrorism. An ASEAN defence financing mechanism, possibly modeled on the ASEAN Infrastructure Investment Bank or similar regional financial institutions, could address these needs while keeping decision-making within the region. Such an approach might face less political resistance than Western-dominated institutions while still providing benefits of pooled financing and shared capabilities.
Additionally, Singapore could further develop its domestic financing mechanisms for defence industry support. Expanding Cap Vista’s mandate, creating additional grant programs for defence innovation, or establishing public-private financing vehicles specifically for defence contractors could address many of the challenges the DSRB aims to solve, without the geopolitical complications of multilateral membership.
Pathways Forward: Strategic Options for Singapore
Given these opportunities and challenges, Singapore has several strategic options for engaging with the DSRB.
Option 1: Founding Member Participation
Singapore could choose to become a founding member of the DSRB, participating in charter negotiations and contributing both paid-in capital and callable capital guarantees. This approach would provide maximum influence over the institution’s structure and operations while positioning Singapore as a key bridge between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security architectures.
Advantages of this approach include early mover benefits in shaping governance structures, priority access to financing programs once the bank becomes operational, enhanced reputation as a reliable security partner, and potential leadership opportunities in regional DSRB activities. Singapore could leverage its financial sophistication and multilateral institution experience to ensure the bank serves smaller nations effectively.
However, this option also carries maximum exposure to the geopolitical and financial risks discussed above. Early membership would require clear commitments before the bank’s operational track record is established, and it would send the strongest signal about Singapore’s strategic orientation.
Option 2: Delayed Observer Status
Alternatively, Singapore could adopt an observer or “wait and see” approach, monitoring the bank’s development without committing to membership initially. Several other nations will likely take this position, allowing Singapore to observe how the institution evolves, what benefits members actually receive, and how effectively concerns about governance and conditionality are addressed.
This conservative approach minimizes risk and preserves flexibility. Singapore could engage informally with DSRB planners, sharing perspectives on Indo-Pacific needs without formal commitment. If the bank proves successful and addresses governance concerns adequately, Singapore could join in a subsequent membership round. If problems emerge, the nation avoids being locked into an underperforming institution.
The main disadvantage is reduced influence over the bank’s design and potentially diminished access to early financing programs. Founding members may receive preferential treatment or establish norms that later members must accept rather than shape. Singapore would also miss opportunities to demonstrate leadership in Indo-Pacific security cooperation if the DSRB becomes as significant as its proponents hope.
Option 3: Conditional Participation with Safeguards
A middle path would involve Singapore indicating willingness to participate subject to specific conditions designed to address key concerns. This approach would allow Singapore to engage constructively in DSRB development while ensuring the institution serves its interests.
Conditions might include guaranteed representation for Indo-Pacific members in governance structures, limits on conditionality for defence procurement decisions, provisions protecting members’ ability to maintain balanced international relationships, caps on callable capital exposure, and flexibility in spending expectations or targets.
This approach could influence the bank’s charter development by identifying issues important to smaller nations and Indo-Pacific members specifically. If Singapore’s conditions are met, it gains the benefits of membership with key risks mitigated. If conditions aren’t met, Singapore can decline membership without having opposed the initiative outright, preserving relationships with DSRB proponents.
Option 4: Alternative Regional Framework Advocacy
Finally, Singapore could use the DSRB’s emergence as an opportunity to champion alternative regional approaches better suited to Southeast Asian needs and preferences. Rather than joining a Western-led institution, Singapore could lead efforts to establish an ASEAN or broader East Asian defence financing mechanism.
This option would demonstrate regional leadership and initiative rather than reactive positioning. It could address the same financing challenges the DSRB targets while respecting ASEAN’s preference for regional solutions and strategic autonomy. Such an institution could potentially collaborate with the DSRB on specific projects without creating the impression that Southeast Asia is being integrated into Western security architecture.
However, developing a credible alternative would require substantial diplomatic effort, time, and resources. It’s also uncertain whether other regional nations would support such an initiative or provide necessary capital. Some ASEAN members face their own fiscal constraints and might be unable to contribute meaningfully to a new institution.
Recommendations for Singaporean Policymakers
Based on this analysis, several recommendations emerge for Singapore’s consideration:
Engage actively in DSRB Development Group consultations. Regardless of whether Singapore ultimately joins, the nation should participate in discussions to ensure Indo-Pacific perspectives inform the bank’s design. This engagement allows Singapore to shape the institution’s charter and operations while preserving decision flexibility.
Conduct detailed scenario analysis. The government should model various scenarios including membership costs, potential financing benefits, exposure from callable capital, and impacts on defence industrial policy. This analysis should examine both optimistic and pessimistic cases for the bank’s performance.
Consult broadly with regional partners. Singapore should discuss the DSRB with ASEAN colleagues, assessing regional sentiment and exploring whether collective ASEAN participation might be feasible. If several Southeast Asian nations participate together, it could address concerns about isolation or signals of alignment while increasing the region’s influence within the institution.
Establish clear redlines and conditions. Before making membership decisions, Singapore should identify non-negotiable requirements for participation. These might include governance rights, protection of procurement autonomy, and limits on spending expectations. Clearly articulated conditions allow for constructive engagement while protecting core interests.
Develop domestic alternatives in parallel. While considering DSRB participation, Singapore should enhance domestic mechanisms for supporting defence industry development. This parallel track provides options if DSRB membership proves unworkable while addressing financing challenges regardless.
Communicate strategic rationale clearly. Whatever decision Singapore makes regarding DSRB participation, clear public communication about the reasoning will be important. The government should explain how the decision serves Singaporean interests and values, addressing both domestic and international audiences.
Conclusion: Balancing Opportunity and Caution
The Defence, Security and Resilience Bank represents a significant innovation in defence financing with substantial potential benefits for Singapore. Access to affordable capital, support for defence industry development, enhanced capabilities for regional cooperation, and improved export prospects all merit serious consideration.
However, Singapore’s unique position as a small, strategically located nation maintaining balanced relationships across the Indo-Pacific requires careful assessment of the geopolitical implications. Participation in a Western-led defence institution could complicate Singapore’s carefully cultivated strategic flexibility, even as it offers tangible benefits.
The wisest approach likely involves active engagement in the bank’s development, clear articulation of conditions for potential participation, and maintenance of alternative options including enhanced bilateral relationships and regional initiatives. Singapore should seek to maximize the DSRB’s benefits while minimizing risks to strategic autonomy, fiscal flexibility, and regional relationships.
Ultimately, the DSRB’s success or failure will depend not just on its financial engineering but on whether it genuinely serves the interests of smaller nations and Indo-Pacific members, not solely larger Euro-Atlantic powers. Singapore’s participation decision should hinge on whether the institution demonstrates this balance convincingly. The coming months will be crucial as the bank moves from conceptual development toward formal establishment, providing Singapore with the information needed to make an informed strategic choice.
The broader lesson extends beyond this specific institution. As geopolitical competition intensifies and defence spending pressures mount globally, nations like Singapore will face increasing pressure to align with broader coalitions and institutional frameworks. Navigating these pressures while maintaining strategic autonomy, regional relationships, and fiscal sustainability will define Singapore’s security policy in the years ahead. The DSRB decision represents an early test of how Singapore approaches this evolving landscape.