Title:
Amnesty, Prison Reform, and Political Re‑conciliation in Venezuela: An Analysis of the 2026 “Amnesty Law” and the Conversion of the El Helicoide Detention Centre
Author:
[Name], Department of Political Science, [University]
Correspondence:
[Email]
Abstract
In January 2026 the interim Venezuelan president, Delcy Rodríguez, announced a comprehensive “amnesty law” for thousands of detainees and the transformation of the notorious El Helicoide detention centre into a sports‑and‑social‑services complex. The announcement follows a prolonged wave of domestic and international pressure to free political prisoners, address systemic human‑rights violations, and restore the rule of law after more than a decade of authoritarian consolidation. This paper provides a multidisciplinary appraisal of the proposed legislation and the prison‑conversion project. Drawing on comparative amnesty literature, transitional‑justice theory, and human‑rights law, the study asks: (1) what legal and political rationales underpin the Venezuelan amnesty proposal; (2) how the conversion of El Helicoide fits within broader strategies of symbolic and material re‑appropriation of carceral spaces; and (3) what are the prospects that the initiative will contribute to genuine de‑politicisation of the penal system rather than serve as a veneer of reform. Methodologically, the analysis combines (i) a doctrinal review of Venezuelan constitutional and criminal‑procedure norms, (ii) content analysis of official statements, United Nations (UN) and non‑governmental‑organisation (NGO) reports, and (iii) a comparative case‑study of amnesty processes in post‑authoritarian contexts (Chile, South Africa, and post‑conflict Colombia). The findings suggest that, while the amnesty bill may achieve limited tactical gains for certain political actors, its exclusionary clauses, lack of transparent implementation mechanisms, and the symbolic repurposing of El Helicoide risk cementing impunity and preserving the repressive apparatus. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for international actors, civil‑society coalitions, and Venezuelan legislators to ensure that any amnesty is accompanied by robust truth‑seeking, reparations, and institutional reform.
Keywords: Venezuela, amnesty law, political prisoners, El Helicoide, transitional justice, human rights, prison conversion, authoritarianism.
- Introduction
The Venezuelan crisis—marked by hyperinflation, mass migration, and an entrenched authoritarian regime—has been accompanied by a systematic erosion of civil liberties, particularly the right to liberty and security of the person. Since the 2014–2015 wave of protests, the state security apparatus has increasingly employed criminal prosecutions for political control, culminating in the creation of a large cohort of “political prisoners” (Foro Penal, 2025). In response, domestic NGOs, opposition parties, and international bodies have repeatedly called for amnesty, the release of detainees, and the dismantling of punitive carceral institutions such as the El Helicoide detention centre, historically used as a site of torture, extrajudicial surveillance, and forced disappearance (UN Human Rights Office, 2022).
On 30 January 2026, interim president Delcy Rodríguez announced a draft “amnesty law” covering offences committed from 1999 onward, while simultaneously pledging to transform El Helicoide into a sports and social‑services hub. The announcement reflects a strategic convergence of political expediency (following the arrest of President Nicolás Maduro in the United States) and symbolic re‑branding of the penal system. Yet, the proposal raises critical questions regarding its legal scope, its potential to address structural abuses, and its alignment with international standards on amnesty and transitional justice.
This paper investigates these questions through a three‑pronged analytical framework: (i) Legal‑normative analysis, assessing the compatibility of the draft legislation with Venezuelan constitutional guarantees and international human‑rights obligations; (ii) Political‑strategic analysis, situating the amnesty within the power dynamics of the interim government and opposition; and (iii) Symbolic‑spatial analysis, examining the conversion of El Helicoide as a case of “carceral re‑appropriation” (Massey, 2019). By integrating doctrinal, empirical, and comparative perspectives, the study contributes to scholarly debates on the efficacy of amnesty as a tool for democratic transition in highly polarized societies.
- Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
2.1 Amnesty in International Law
Amnesty, defined as a general pardon for a set of offences, is distinguished from clemency (which applies to individuals) and from retributive justice. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) permits amnesty provided that it does not contravene the prohibition against impunity for serious violations of international law (Article 7, ICCPR; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 32, 2020). The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility (1996) similarly caution that amnesty cannot shield perpetrators of crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or torture.
2.2 Transitional‑Justice Paradigm
Transitional‑justice scholarship emphasizes four pillars: truth‑seeking, reparations, institutional reform, and criminal accountability (Teitel, 2000). Amnesty is often incorporated into “peace‑building” arrangements (e.g., the 1988 Colombian Peace Agreement) but is contested when it precludes accountability (Doyle, 2020). The “amnesty‑versus‑impunity” debate underscores that any amnesty must be conditional, transparent, and accompanied by mechanisms that preserve victims’ rights.
2.3 Symbolic Re‑appropriation of Carceral Spaces
The conversion of prisons from sites of repression to community facilities constitutes a symbolic transformation that can either reconcile or erase collective memories of trauma (Massey, 2019; Bhabha, 1994). In post‑authoritarian contexts, the physical repurposing of prisons (e.g., the Gitarama Prison in Rwanda) has been employed to signal breaks with the past, but scholars warn of “museumification” that neglects the need for substantive institutional change (Khalil, 2018).
- Methodology
The study employs a qualitative multi‑method design:
Doctrinal Legal Review – Examination of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution, the Organic Law of the Public Ministry, and the draft amnesty bill (as released by the Supreme Court of Justice on 30 January 2026). Comparative analysis with ICCPR, UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), and regional instruments (American Convention on Human Rights).
Documentary Content Analysis – Coding of official statements (Rodríguez’s speech, Supreme Court press releases), NGO reports (Foro Penal, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International), and UN investigative findings (UN Human Rights Council, 2022). The coding scheme focuses on themes of scope, exclusions, implementation mechanisms, and symbolic narratives.
Comparative Case Study – Synthesis of amnesty processes in Chile (1990 – 1991 “Political Amnesty Law”), South Africa (1996 “Amnesty Act”), and Colombia (1991 “Legal Framework for Amnesty”). Each case is evaluated regarding exclusion clauses, truth‑commission integration, and post‑amnesty institutional reforms.
Data triangulation ensures analytical robustness. The study does not involve primary fieldwork due to restrictions on access to Venezuelan detention facilities and the ongoing political volatility.
- Legal Analysis of the Proposed Amnesty Law
4.1 Scope and Temporal Reach
Rodríguez announced that the amnesty would apply to all offenses committed from 1999 to the present. This period encompasses the Bolivarian Revolution, the constitutional crisis of 2017, and the current political standoff. The law’s retroactive nature is permissible under Venezuelan law (Article 44 of the Constitution), though it raises constitutional concerns regarding the principle of legal certainty (principio de seguridad jurídica).
4.2 Exclusion Clauses
The draft explicitly excludes individuals “who have participated in killings, serious human‑rights abuses, and drug trafficking.” This mirrors the “serious crimes” exception found in the Chilean and South African amnesties, yet the definition of “serious” remains vague. Without precise legal criteria, the clause may be subject to selective enforcement, potentially safeguarding regime loyalists while excluding genuine opposition activists.
4.3 Compatibility with International Obligations
UNCAT & ICCPR: The exclusion of torture perpetrators aligns with the non‑derogable nature of the prohibition of torture (UN General Assembly, 1984). However, the law’s lack of a victim‑centred reparations component violates the UN’s “principles of reparations for victims of gross human‑rights violations” (UNOHCHR, 2005).
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR): Article 25(2) of the ACHR obliges states to provide “effective reparation” for victims of violations. The amnesty, if enacted without reparations, could constitute a breach.
4.4 Procedural Guarantees
The draft does not specify implementation bodies, review mechanisms, or judicial oversight. International best practice (e.g., the Colombian “Law of Victims and Land Restitution”) mandates an independent commission to verify eligibility, ensuring due process and safeguarding against arbitrary releases.
- Political‑Strategic Context
5.1 Domestic Power Dynamics
The interim government, formed after Maduro’s arrest and the failed 2025 election, faces legitimacy challenges. The amnesty serves multiple domestic objectives:
Neutralising Opposition Leadership – By releasing political prisoners (including members of the opposition coalition MUD‑2025), the government may aim to co‑opt or weaken oppositional mobilization.
Diverting International Scrutiny – The symbolic conversion of El Helicoide projects an image of human‑rights compliance, potentially mitigating sanctions and diplomatic pressure.
5.2 International Pressure
United States & EU: Both have imposed targeted sanctions on Venezuelan officials for human‑rights violations. The amnesty could be a pre‑condition for sanction relief (U.S. Treasury, 2024).
Latin American Regional Bodies: The OAS and UNASUR have called for universal political amnesty. The draft law’s exclusion of “serious crimes” is expected to be critiqued as insufficient.
5.3 Opposition Response
Key opposition figures, including María Corina Machado, have welcomed the partial releases but remain skeptical about the breadth and transparency of the amnesty. Foro Penal’s director, Alfredo Romero, stresses the necessity of non‑discriminatory amnesty and institutional reform.
- Symbolic‑Spatial Analysis: The Conversion of El Helicoide
6.1 Historical Overview of El Helicoide
Originally conceived as a commercial shopping complex in the 1960s, El Helicoide was repurposed in the 1970s as a detention centre by the Dirección de Inteligencia Militar (DIM). Reports by the UN Human Rights Council (2022) documented systematic torture, solitary confinement, and forced disappearances within its walls. The site has become a cultural emblem of state repression, referenced in protest art and diaspora narratives.
6.2 The “Sport‑and‑Social‑Services” Vision
Rodríguez’s plan entails renovating the interior to host sports courts, community centres, and health‑care kiosks. The rhetoric frames the project as a “healing space” that will “restore peaceful coexistence.” From an urban‑planning perspective, repurposing the building could:
Create Public Utility: Provide scarce recreational infrastructure in a city suffering from economic collapse.
Re‑symbolise Urban Landscape: Replace a “site of terror” with a “site of community.”
6.3 Comparative Cases of Carceral Re‑appropriation
Country Former Prison New Function Outcomes
South Africa Pretoria Central Prison (Walvis Bay) Museum & Community Centre Positive: serves as a “memory site,” fostering reconciliation.
Rwanda Gitarama Prison Youth Sports Academy Mixed: provides services, but limited impact on broader justice reforms.
Chile Santiago Los Leones Prison Public Library & Cultural Hub Positive: symbolically reclaimed, accompanied by broader judicial reforms.
The critical variable in these cases is the integration of the transformation with a truth‑telling and reparations process. Absent such integration, the conversion risks “whitewashing” past abuses (Khalil, 2018).
6.4 Risks of Symbolic Overreach
Victim Trauma: Survivors may view the conversion as a trivialisation of their suffering if not accompanied by acknowledgment and compensation.
Political Instrumentalisation: The government could use the project to signal progress while maintaining the underlying security‑agency structures that perpetrated abuses.
- Comparative Analysis of Amnesty Processes
7.1 Chile (1990–1991)
Legal Design: Broad political amnesty, excluding human‑rights violations.
Implementation: Created the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (Rettig Commission), which documented abuses.
Outcome: Enabled a peaceful transition, but later critiques argue the exclusion clause left many perpetrators unaccountable (Silva, 2015).
7.2 South Africa (1996)
Legal Design: The Amnesty Act offered full amnesty for politically motivated crimes in exchange for full disclosure to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).
Implementation: Mandatory truth‑telling; amnesty granted only after verification.
Outcome: Contributed to a national narrative of reconciliation, though unevenly perceived across racial and socio‑economic groups (Tutu, 2005).
7.3 Colombia (1991, 1997)
Legal Design: “Legal Framework for Amnesty” allowed political offenders to obtain amnesty, with an exclusion for serious crimes. Integrated with the Justice and Peace Law (2005) and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP).
Implementation: Conditional on reparations and demobilisation.
Outcome: Mixed: facilitated demobilisation of guerrilla groups, but faced criticism for insufficient victim participation (Gómez, 2021).
7.4 Synthesis for Venezuela
Dimension Chile South Africa Colombia Implications for Venezuela
Exclusion Scope Limited (gross violations excluded) None (full disclosure required) Serious crimes excluded, but reparations required Venezuelan draft mirrors Chile/Colombia – risk of selective impunity
Truth‑telling Mechanism Rettig Commission (mandatory) TRC (mandatory) JEP (mandatory) No formal truth commission in draft – a critical gap
Victim Reparations Minimal (later addressed by courts) Symbolic (state‑led) Structured reparations Absent in Venezuelan proposal
Institutional Reform Judicial reforms (partial) Police & security sector reforms Demobilisation of armed groups El Helicoide conversion is symbolic but lacks broader security‑sector overhaul - Discussion
8.1 Legal Adequacy
The draft amnesty law partially complies with international obligations by excluding torture and drug‑trafficking offences. However, the absence of clear criteria, lack of victim‑centred reparations, and no independent verification body render it incompatible with the UN’s standards for amnesty in the context of serious human‑rights violations.
8 .2 Political Calculus
The timing of the announcement—following Maduro’s U.S. indictment and amid intensifying sanctions—suggests a strategic attempt to improve the regime’s diplomatic posture. By offering a controlled release of opposition figures, the interim government can project a moderate image while retaining leverage over the opposition’s organisational capacity.
8.3 Symbolic Re‑appropriation vs. Structural Change
While the conversion of El Helicoide may enhance public spaces and symbolically repudiate past abuses, it cannot substitute for substantive reforms such as:
Independent oversight of the National Guard and intelligence services
Judicial independence and due‑process guarantees
Comprehensive truth‑seeking mechanisms
Without these, the project risks becoming a “potemkin prison”—a façade that conceals continued repression.
8.4 Potential Trajectories
Optimistic Scenario: The amnesty law is amended to include a victim‑participation clause, an independent amnesty commission, and a truth‑commission that documents abuses at El Helicoide and elsewhere. The conversion leads to community‑driven programming that incorporates memorials and reparative services.
Pessimistic Scenario: The amnesty is implemented selectively, releasing only low‑profile detainees while preserving high‑profile political prisoners. El Helicoide’s conversion proceeds without any acknowledgment of past atrocities, and the security apparatus remains unaltered, perpetuating a climate of fear.
- Policy Recommendations
International Conditionality – The U.S., EU, and regional bodies should condition sanction relief on the inclusion of transparent eligibility criteria, victim reparations, and establishment of an independent amnesty commission.
Domestic Legislative Safeguards – The Venezuelan National Assembly (or its interim substitute) must enact amendments that:
Define “serious crimes” with reference to UNCAT and the ICC statutes.
Mandate public disclosure of the names of all beneficiaries and a mechanism for appeal.
Truth‑Commission Integration – Create a National Truth, Memory and Reconciliation Commission (NTMRC) tasked with investigating El Helicoide and other detention sites, with a mandate to recommend reparations and institutional reforms.
Victim‑Centred Reparations – Allocate state funds for cash compensation, psychosocial support, and community development in neighborhoods disproportionately affected by the prison’s operations.
Monitoring of El Helicoide Conversion – International NGOs should be granted unrestricted access to monitor the renovation process, ensuring that memorial plaques and educational exhibits acknowledging the site’s history are incorporated. - Conclusion
The 2026 Venezuelan amnesty law and the planned conversion of the El Helicoide detention centre represent a critical juncture in the nation’s fraught trajectory toward democratic normalization. While the initiatives hold potential symbolic value, they risk becoming instrumental tools for the interim regime to legitimize its authority without delivering substantive justice. A legally sound, victim‑oriented, and institutionally accountable amnesty—paired with a transparent, reparative transformation of the physical space of repression—could lay groundwork for genuine national reconciliation. Absent such measures, the amnesty will likely exacerbate impunity, reinforce authoritarian resilience, and undermine the prospects for a durable democratic transition in Venezuela.
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