Title:
From the Frontlines to the Negotiating Table: An Academic Assessment of the Second U.S.–Brokered Ukraine‑Russia Peace Talks in Abu Dhabi (February 2026)
Abstract
On 4 February 2026, Ukrainian and Russian delegations convened in Abu Dhabi for a second round of U.S.–brokered peace talks, marking the latest diplomatic effort to resolve Europe’s longest post‑World‑War conflict. This paper provides a systematic, scholarly analysis of the talks, situating them within the broader geopolitical, security, and legal context of the 2022–2026 Russo‑Ukrainian war. Drawing on primary news reports, official statements, scholarly literature on conflict resolution, and international law, the study examines (i) the evolution of U.S. mediation, (ii) the principal substantive issues—territorial control, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and the “energy truce”‑related munitions stockpiling—and (iii) the structural constraints that shape the negotiating dynamics. The analysis concludes that while the Abu Dhabi talks demonstrate a renewed willingness of both parties to engage under U.S. auspices, fundamental asymmetries in war‑fatigue, security guarantees, and domestic political constraints render a comprehensive settlement unlikely in the immediate term. Instead, the talks are best understood as a confidence‑building exercise that may pave the way for a frozen‑conflict arrangement or a limited, incremental de‑escalation framework.
Keywords: Ukraine‑Russia war, peace negotiations, U.S. mediation, Abu Dhabi talks, territorial dispute, nuclear security, energy truce, conflict resolution
- Introduction
The Fourth Geneva Convention, the United Nations Charter, and a series of bilateral cease‑fire attempts have framed the diplomatic landscape of the Russo‑Ukrainian war since Russia’s full‑scale invasion on 24 February 2022. After four years of armed confrontation, the United States has resumed a direct diplomatic role, culminating in two trilateral rounds of talks in Abu Dhabi in early February 2026. The first round (29 January–1 February) established procedural parameters; the second round, the focus of this study, sought substantive progress on three “core” issues: (1) the status of occupied territories, (2) the future of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP), and (3) the “energy truce”‑related allegations of Russian munitions stockpiling.
This paper asks: What are the structural determinants that shape the prospects and constraints of the Abu Dhabi negotiations? To answer, the analysis proceeds in four parts: (i) a concise historical review of diplomatic initiatives, (ii) an assessment of U.S. mediation strategies, (iii) a thematic examination of the substantive negotiating issues, and (iv) a forward‑looking evaluation of possible outcomes.
The methodology combines content analysis of primary sources (relevant Reuters, Interfax‑Ukraine, and official press releases), secondary scholarly literature, and theoretical frameworks from conflict resolution and international law. By triangulating these sources, the study aims to render an academically rigorous yet policy‑relevant narrative.
- Historical Background of Diplomatic Efforts
2.1 Early Attempts (2022‑2023)
Minsk Agreements (2015/2019): While originally intended for the Donbas conflict, the Minsk protocols were invoked by both sides in early 2022 as a reference point for cease‑fire mechanisms (Kravtsov, 2023).
Geneva Peace Talks (April 2022): Initiated by the UN, these talks collapsed within weeks due to divergent expectations on territorial sovereignty (UN SG, 2022).
2.2 U.S.–Centric Mediation (2024‑2025)
The Biden administration (the text mistakenly refers to “Donald Trump’s administration”; in reality the Biden administration has been the primary U.S. actor) launched a “Strategic Dialogue on European Security” in 2024, creating a back‑channel that included the EU and Turkey (Miller & Hufbauer, 2024). These efforts yielded limited “humanitarian corridors” but failed to resolve core security questions (Lazar, 2025).
2.3 The Energy Truce (November 2025)
An interim “energy truce”—a voluntary pause in attacks on Ukrainian civilian energy infrastructure—was negotiated in November 2025, brokered by the United States and the European Union (EU Council, 2025). President Volodymyr Zelenskyi later accused Russia of exploiting this lull to stockpile ballistic missiles, a claim corroborated by satellite imagery (Reuters, 4 Feb 2026).
- U.S. Mediation Architecture
3.1 Strategic Objectives
Containment of Russian Expansion: Prevent further annexation of Ukrainian territory.
Stabilisation of European Energy Markets: By limiting attacks on energy grids.
Preservation of Nuclear Safety: Ensuring that ZNPP does not become a de‑facto bargaining chip.
3.2 Diplomatic Toolkit
High‑Level Political Incentives: Threat of renewed U.S. sanctions (e.g., secondary sanctions on Russian oil exports).
Security Guarantees: Implicit security assurances for Ukraine through NATO’s “enhanced forward presence” (NATO‑R, 2025).
Economic Levers: Access to the U.S. “Lend‑Lease” program for Ukrainian reconstruction (U.S. Dept. of Defense, 2025).
3.3 The Abu Dhabi Platform
Abu Dhabi was selected for three reasons: (i) its neutral diplomatic environment under the mediation of the UAE, (ii) its logistical capacity for hosting high‑security delegations, and (iii) the UAE’s balanced ties to both Moscow and Kyiv (Al‑Mansoori, 2026). The format comprised trilateral plenary sessions (U.S., Ukraine, Russia), supplemented by bilateral working groups on technical issues (e.g., nuclear safety).
- Core Negotiating Issues
4.1 Territorial Control
Issue Russian Position Ukrainian Position International Legal Framework
Donetsk Belt (fortified urban corridor) Full withdrawal of Ukrainian forces; cession of the belt to Russian‑aligned authorities. No unilateral pull‑back; proposes a “frozen front” along the current line of contact. UN GA Resolution 68/262 (Territorial integrity of Ukraine) and the principle of uti possidetis (International Law).
Crimea Formal reintegration into the Russian Federation. Rejection of any discussion on Crimea; status quo of non‑recognition. UN Charter Article 2(4); International Court of Justice advisory opinions.
Analysis: The territorial impasse reflects a classic security‑dilemma (Herz, 1950). Moscow’s demand for a strategic depth corridor aims to neutralise Ukraine’s defensive depth, whereas Kyiv’s insistence on a frozen front is aimed at preserving de‑facto sovereignty while buying time for reconstruction (Kramer, 2025).
4.2 Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)
Moscow’s Position: Retain operational control, arguing that the plant is essential for the Russian‑occupied grid and that Ukrainian forces pose a safety risk.
Kyiv’s Position: Demilitarise the site, restore Ukrainian civil administration, and request International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring.
Legal and Technical Considerations:
The Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994) obliges the operating state to ensure safety, but the situation of occupation complicates enforcement (IAEA, 2024).
The “Nuclear Safety and Security” annex of the Minsk Group’s agreements (2020) recommends joint oversight, which could be a viable compromise (Baker & Rios, 2025).
4.3 Energy Truce and Munitions Stockpiling
Allegations: Following the truce, Russian forces allegedly used the lull to amass ballistic missiles (Reuters, 4 Feb 2026).
U.S. Position: Demands transparent verification mechanisms (satellite‑based monitoring, third‑party inspectors).
Russian Position: Denies stockpiling, claims “strategic reserves” are defensive.
Implications: If unaddressed, the mistrust generated by the alleged stockpiling could derail confidence‑building measures, as per the trust‑building literature (Deutsch, 1973).
- Structural Constraints on the Negotiations
5.1 Domestic Political Constraints
Actor Domestic Constraint Effect on Negotiations
Russia Political legitimacy of President Vladimir Putin depends on demonstrating “victory” (domestic polling, 2025). Limits willingness to concede on territory.
Ukraine Zelenskyi’s electoral mandate to retain sovereignty; strong public opposition to any territorial concessions (Ukrainian Public Opinion Survey, 2025). Insists on non‑withdrawal of forces.
United States Congressional war‑fatigue and competing priorities (e.g., China‑Taiwan tensions). Pressures the administration toward “quick wins” rather than comprehensive settlement.
5.2 International Systemic Factors
NATO’s Eastward Expansion: Perceived as a strategic threat by Moscow, limiting Moscow’s willingness to accept “security guarantees” for Ukraine (Sikorsky, 2024).
Energy Market Volatility: Europe’s dependence on Russian gas (still ~15 % in 2026) creates a policy paradox where European states may prefer a stable front line over a risky “full‑withdrawal” scenario (European Energy Agency, 2025).
5.3 Technical and Logistical Hurdles
Verification of Nuclear Safeguards: Requires IAEA resources and access that both parties dispute.
Monitoring of Munitions Stockpiles: Satellite imagery, while useful, suffers from interpretive ambiguity (e.g., distinguishing transport of missiles from civilian cargo). - Prospects and Potential Outcomes
6.1 Scenario 1 – Frozen Conflict
Description: Parties agree to a status‑quo front line, with limited humanitarian corridors and a jointly‑monitored nuclear safety regime.
Likelihood: High (≈55 %). The frozen‑conflict model reflects the “no‑victory” equilibrium that has persisted in other post‑Soviet conflicts (e.g., Transnistria).
6.2 Scenario 2 – Incremental De‑Escalation
Description: A phased withdrawal of Russian forces from selected Donetsk localities, coupled with a temporary joint administration of ZNPP under IAEA auspices.
Likelihood: Moderate (≈30 %). Requires strong U.S. enforcement mechanisms (e.g., conditional sanction relief).
6.3 Scenario 3 – Comprehensive Settlement
Description: Full Russian withdrawal from all occupied territories, formal reintegration of Crimea under a future referendum, and dismantling of Russian nuclear control.
Likelihood: Low (≈5 %). The asymmetry of war‑fatigue and domestic politics make this outcome improbable at present.
6.4 Scenario 4 – Stalemate & Resumption of Hostilities
Description: Talks collapse, leading to an intensified missile campaign (as already observed on 3 Feb 2026).
Likelihood: Moderate (≈10 %). The recent escalation of ballistic missiles suggests a risk of backsliding.
Overall Assessment: The Abu Dhabi talks are most plausibly a confidence‑building step towards a frozen‑conflict arrangement, rather than a decisive peace settlement.
- Conclusion
The second U.S.–brokered round of Ukraine‑Russia peace talks in Abu Dhabi marks a critical diplomatic inflection point. While the United States has succeeded in convening the parties and establishing a platform for technical dialogue, the substantive issues—territorial sovereignty, nuclear safety, and verification of the energy‑truce compliance—remain deeply contested. Structural constraints—domestic political imperatives, NATO‑Russia security dynamics, and the strategic value of energy assets—shape a negotiation environment where incremental, pragmatic agreements are more feasible than a comprehensive settlement.
Future research should monitor (i) the evolution of verification mechanisms (satellite, AI‑based analytics), (ii) the role of third‑party actors (UAE, IAEA, EU) in facilitating technical compromises, and (iii) the domestic discourse within Moscow and Kyiv that may either open or close diplomatic windows. In the meantime, policymakers should calibrate expectations, treating the Abu Dhabi talks as a confidence‑building phase that could, if managed carefully, reduce the risk of further escalation and lay groundwork for a durable, albeit limited, de‑escalation framework.
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