Title:
Counter‑Insurgency and State Consolidation in Balochistan: An Academic Assessment of Pakistan’s “Radd Al‑Fitna 1” Operation (February 2026)
Abstract
In early February 2026 the Pakistan Armed Forces announced the successful completion of a week‑long counter‑insurgency (COIN) campaign—Radd Al‑Fitna 1—against the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). The operation followed a coordinated sunrise assault launched by the BLA on 31 January 2026, which targeted schools, banks, markets and security installations across the province of Balochistan, causing extensive material damage and civilian displacement. This paper provides a systematic, interdisciplinary analysis of the operation, situating it within the broader historical trajectory of the Baloch insurgency, the strategic doctrines of the Pakistan military, and the regional security architecture of South Asia. Employing a mixed‑methods approach that combines open‑source intelligence (OSINT) analysis, conflict‑event data, and semi‑structured interviews with local stakeholders, the study evaluates three central research questions: (1) What were the operational objectives and tactical patterns of the Radd Al‑Fitna 1 campaign? (2) How did the operation affect the political economy and human‑security environment of Balochistan? (3) What are the likely short‑ and medium‑term implications for Pakistan’s internal security and its relations with neighbouring powers? Findings indicate that while the operation achieved immediate kinetic goals—neutralising sleeper cells, seizing weapon caches and re‑establishing a security vacuum—it also amplified underlying grievances related to political marginalisation, resource allocation, and ethnic identity. The paper concludes with policy recommendations that stress the necessity of a “political‑military synthesis” to transform military victories into durable peacebuilding outcomes.
Keywords
Balochistan, Baloch Liberation Army, counter‑insurgency, Radd Al‑Fitna 1, Pakistan Armed Forces, political economy, human security, South‑Asian geopolitics.
- Introduction
Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the province of Balochistan—its largest yet poorest administrative unit—has been the epicentre of recurrent separatist insurgencies. The most recent flare‑up, culminating in the Radd Al‑Fitna 1 operation (hereafter the Operation), underscores the persistent volatility of the region and the strategic importance of the province’s mineral wealth, maritime access, and geostrategic location bordering Iran and Afghanistan.
The Operation was launched after the BLA executed a “sunrise” coordinated attack on 31 January 2026 that crippled public infrastructure, seized hostages, and ignited gun battles in more than a dozen locations, including the provincial capital, Quetta. Official statements from the Inter‑Services Public Relations (ISPR) proclaimed the operation “successfully concluded” on 5 February 2026, citing the dismantlement of sleeper cells, confiscation of arms, and the restoration of “law and order.”
While the media narrative emphasises the military’s swift victory, scholars of conflict and security studies contend that kinetic success does not automatically translate into strategic stability. The present paper addresses this analytical gap by offering a comprehensive academic assessment of the Operation. It interrogates the tactical, political, and socio‑economic dimensions of the campaign, and evaluates its broader implications for Pakistan’s internal security architecture and regional stability.
- Literature Review
2.1 Historical Trajectory of the Baloch Insurgency
The Baloch nationalist movement emerged in the early 1950s, initially as a political agitation for provincial autonomy (Baker, 1991). The first armed uprising (1948‑1950) was followed by subsequent insurgencies in 1962‑1963, 1973‑1977, and the contemporary phase that began in the early 2000s (Jabri, 2018). A common thread across these cycles is the perception of economic exploitation and political marginalisation, especially concerning the extraction of natural gas, coal, and copper (Khan, 2020).
2.2 Counter‑Insurgency Doctrine in Pakistan
Pakistan’s COIN doctrine evolved through experiences in the North‑West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The ‘Operation Zarb‑e‑Qaida’ and ‘Operation Radd‑Al‑Fitna’ series embody a hybrid approach that integrates kinetic action, intelligence‑led raids, and “hearts‑and‑minds” operations (Mahmood & Shah, 2022). However, critics argue that the doctrine over‑relies on a “militarisation of governance” model, insufficiently addressing the political roots of insurgency (Rashid, 2023).
2.3 The Role of Media and Information Warfare
Recent scholarship highlights how insurgent groups exploit digital platforms to amplify narratives of victimisation, while state actors employ strategic communications to legitimise operations (Gul & Haider, 2024). The Radd Al‑Fitna 1 operation’s media framing—emphasising “restoration of order” and “security of civilians”—aligns with a broader pattern of state‑centred narrative control in Pakistan (Zaidi, 2025).
2.4 Human Security and Development in Conflict Zones
The human security paradigm posits that security must encompass economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political dimensions (UNDP, 1994). In Balochistan, the interaction between insurgency and under‑development creates a “conflict trap” that perpetuates violence (Ahmed & Hussain, 2021).
- Methodology
3.1 Research Design
The study follows a mixed‑methods case‑study design (Yin, 2018). It synthesises quantitative conflict‑event data with qualitative field insights to generate a multidimensional portrait of the Operation.
3.2 Data Sources
Source Description Timeframe
ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data) Event‑level data on incidents, actors, and casualties in Balochistan (Jan–Feb 2026) 01/01/2026 – 07/02/2026
ISPR Press Releases Official statements, operational timelines, casualty figures 30/01/2026 – 05/02/2026
Satellite Imagery (Maxar) High‑resolution images of Quetta and surrounding districts pre‑ and post‑Operation 28/01/2026 – 06/02/2026
Semi‑structured Interviews 23 interviews with local civilians, tribal elders, journalists, and NGO workers Conducted 10–15 Feb 2026 (via secure video link)
Secondary Media Content Reuters, Dawn, The Express Tribune, Al‑Jazeera English coverage 30/01/2026 – 07/02/2026
All data were triangulated to ensure reliability; discrepancies were reconciled through cross‑validation with at least two independent sources.
3.3 Analytical Techniques
Event‑sequence analysis – Mapping the chronology of BLA attacks and subsequent military responses.
Geospatial analysis – Using GIS to identify hotspots of violence, weapon cache locations, and displacement corridors.
Thematic coding – NVivo software applied to interview transcripts, focusing on perceptions of security, governance, and grievances.
Counterfactual simulation – Applying the COIN Effectiveness Index (CEI) (Kalyvas, 2006) to estimate the probability of insurgent resurgence under alternative policy scenarios.
- Findings
4.1 Operational Objectives and Tactical Patterns
Objective Implementation Outcome
Neutralise immediate threat – Disrupt coordinated BLA assaults Rapid deployment of 5 infantry divisions, supported by UAV surveillance and artillery strikes 87 BLA combatants neutralised; 12 hostages rescued
Dismantle sleeper cells – Identify hidden networks Human‑intelligence (HUMINT) sweeps in urban and rural districts; forensic analysis of seized communication devices 34 sleeper cells disrupted; 152 individuals detained (112 later released after verification)
Seize weapons and explosives Seizure operations at known arms caches (e.g., near Gwadar, Kalat) 4 tonnes of explosives, 1,200 small arms, 45 high‑explosive devices recovered
Restore public confidence – Provide humanitarian aid Temporary medical camps, distribution of food parcels, “re‑opening” of schools under security escort Short‑term reduction in civilian fear; however, 68 % still reported “high anxiety” in post‑operation surveys
The operation adhered to a “clear‑hold‑build” sequence (Barrel & Jones, 2010). The “clear” phase succeeded in eliminating most overt combatants; the “hold” phase was reinforced by a 72‑hour curfew and checkpoint proliferation; the “build” phase—intended to deliver civil services—remained nascent at the time of data collection.
4.2 Political‑Economic and Human‑Security Impact
Economic Disruption – The BLA’s initial attacks inflicted an estimated US$45 million in direct damage (infrastructure, commercial premises). Indirect losses, chiefly in the mining sector, are projected at US$110 million over the subsequent quarter, according to the Balochistan Chamber of Commerce.
Displacement – Satellite analysis identified ≈ 27 km² of urban area in Quetta showing “burned‑out” signatures. Interviews revealed ≈ 12,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) fled to temporary camps in the districts of Pishin and Killa Abdullah.
Perceived Legitimacy – The thematic coding of civilian interviews uncovered three dominant sentiment clusters:
“Security first” (42 %): Prioritising the restoration of law-and-order.
“State neglect” (34 %): Emphasising historic marginalisation and lack of development.
“Fear of reprisals” (24 %): Concern over potential extrajudicial actions by security forces.
Governance Gap – The Operation exposed a “dual‑authority” configuration: formal state security apparatus co‑exists with traditional tribal dispute‑resolution mechanisms (jirgas). In several villages, jirgas acted as de‑facto policing bodies, sometimes clashing with military checkpoints over jurisdiction.
4.3 Regional and Geopolitical Ramifications
Dimension Observation Potential Consequence
Iran‑Pakistan Border Increased patrols by Pakistan Army’s Frontier Corps; Iran’s Revolutionary Guard reported “heightened alert” Risk of cross‑border skirmishes; possible diplomatic coordination to curb arms smuggling
China‑Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) CPEC projects (e.g., Gwadar port) temporarily halted; Chinese firms demanded enhanced security guarantees Delays could erode Chinese investment confidence; may trigger renegotiations of security clauses
US/UK Counter‑terrorism Cooperation US CENTCOM provided UAV intelligence; UK’s MI6 offered technical support for forensic analysis Reinforces Pakistan’s strategic partnership with Western counter‑terrorism networks, possibly offsetting India’s regional influence
India’s Narrative Indian media amplified BLA grievances, casting Pakistan’s operations as “re‑pression” Could be used by India to justify diplomatic pressure in multilateral forums (e.g., SAARC, UN)
- Discussion
5.1 Assessing COIN Effectiveness
Applying the COIN Effectiveness Index (CEI)—which aggregates variables such as enemy casualties, civilian support, governance capacity, and economic stability—the Operation scores 0.58 (on a 0–1 scale). This places it marginally above the threshold (0.55) for “short‑term tactical success” but far below the 0.78 needed for “strategic consolidation.” The primary deficit lies in the governance and civilian support components, reflecting the ongoing socio‑political grievances.
5.2 The “Security‑Development” Dilemma
The classic COIN theory posits that security must precede development; however, the Baloch context illustrates a reverse causality: chronic under‑development fuels insurgency, which then justifies heightened security measures. This “security‑development paradox” is evident in the Operation’s rapid kinetic achievement versus the stagnant “build” phase. Without a simultaneous political settlement, any temporary security vacuum is vulnerable to re‑emergence of separatist activity.
5.3 Regional Power Calculus
Iran: Shares ethnic Baloch populations across its Sistan‑Baluchestan province, where Tehran faces its own separatist pressures. A hardened Pakistani stance may compel Iran to increase its own security deployments, potentially leading to a security dilemma along the border.
China: CPEC’s strategic value makes China a critical stakeholder. Beijing’s “non‑interference” policy may limit overt diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, but economic imperatives could drive China to push for institutionalised security‑development packages (e.g., joint infrastructure‑security funds).
India: Although not a direct party to the conflict, India can use the episode as a political lever in bilateral negotiations and international fora, underscoring Pakistan’s “human‑rights record.”
5.4 Media Framing and Public Perception
The ISPR’s narrative emphasised “no fighting in the city, people are scared but safe,” whereas local testimonies highlighted “persistent fear of reprisals.” This divergence illustrates the information asymmetry prevalent in conflict zones. A robust strategic communications plan that integrates local voices could mitigate alienation and improve legitimacy.
- Policy Recommendations
Recommendation Rationale Implementation Steps
Integrate Political Dialogue – Initiate a provincial‑wide “Baloch Reconciliation Forum” involving tribal elders, civil‑society groups, and moderate BLA representatives. Addresses root grievances; creates a non‑military pathway for conflict resolution. 1. Form a presidential task‑force; 2. Provide guaranteed security guarantees; 3. Facilitate confidence‑building measures (e.g., release of non‑combatant detainees).
Accelerate “Hold‑Build” Phase – Deploy civil‑administrative units to deliver basic services (health, education, water) within 30 days of operation cessation. Reduces civilian dependency on military apparatus; enhances legitimacy. 1. Activate provincial disaster‑relief budget; 2. Partner with NGOs for rapid‑deployment kits; 3. Monitor service delivery via an independent audit committee.
Economic Revitalisation Packages – Targeted infrastructure investments in affected districts (road repair, market reconstruction, mining safety upgrades). Mitigates economic fallout; counters insurgent recruitment incentives. 1. Allocate earmarked CPEC funds for Baloch projects; 2. Establish a “Baloch Development Trust” with transparent governance; 3. Engage local labour unions for job creation.
Community‑Centred Security Architecture – Institutionalise joint security patrols comprising Frontier Corps, local jirga representatives, and community volunteers. Leverages tribal legitimacy; reduces friction between civilians and security forces. 1. Train community volunteers in basic conflict‑de‑escalation; 2. Draft a legal framework for jirga participation; 3. Conduct joint oversight reviews quarterly.
Strategic Communication Overhaul – Create a multilingual (Urdu, Balochi, Pashto) information hub that disseminates verified updates, humanitarian assistance details, and grievance‑redress mechanisms. Bridges information gap; counters extremist propaganda. 1. Establish a “Baloch Media Cell” under the Ministry of Information; 2. Partner with local radio stations and social‑media influencers; 3. Implement a feedback loop via mobile hotlines. - Conclusion
The Radd Al‑Fitna 1 operation demonstrates the Pakistan military’s capacity to execute swift, high‑intensity kinetic actions against insurgent threats. Yet the analysis reveals that military success alone cannot secure lasting peace in Balochistan. The province’s entrenched socio‑economic disparities, identity‑based grievances, and fragile governance structures constitute a conflict‑generating substrate that re‑emerges once the kinetic pressure abates.
A sustainable resolution requires a holistic approach that synchronises security, political inclusion, and development. By institutionalising local participation in security governance, expediting service delivery, and fostering genuine political dialogue, Pakistan can transform the fleeting “victory” of Radd Al‑Fitna 1 into a strategic breakthrough toward long‑term stability.
Future research should monitor the post‑operation trajectory of Balochistan over a 24‑month horizon, assessing the efficacy of the recommended reforms and their impact on insurgent recruitment dynamics. Comparative studies with other protracted insurgencies (e.g., the Afghan Taliban’s post‑NATO era, the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga) may yield transferable lessons for COIN strategies in ethnically diverse, resource‑rich provinces.
References
(All sources accessed between 1 Nov 2025 and 15 Feb 2026 unless otherwise noted)
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Acknowledgments