Title:
China’s Recent Policy Paper on National Security in Hong Kong: Legal Foundations, Political Implications, and Personal Relevance for Scholars of Comparative Constitutional Law

Abstract

In March 2024, the Chinese State Council published a comprehensive policy paper entitled “Strengthening the Safeguard of National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” (hereafter the Policy Paper). The document articulates a renewed strategic vision for the governance of Hong Kong, expands the legal architecture of the 2020 National Security Law (NSL), and offers detailed guidance for the implementation of security‑related measures across the “One Country, Two Systems” framework. This paper conducts a systematic document‑analysis of the Policy Paper, situating it within the broader trajectory of mainland‑Hong Kong relations, and evaluates its implications for constitutional autonomy, civil liberties, and the rule of law. Particular attention is paid to the ways in which the Policy Paper intersects with the scholarly concerns of comparative constitutional scholars, including the erosion of judicial independence, the re‑definition of “national security” as a regulatory catch‑all, and the challenges it poses for transnational academic collaboration. The analysis concludes that, while the Policy Paper represents a consolidation of Beijing’s security agenda, it also generates a new field of normative contestation that directly affects the research agenda, ethical responsibilities, and personal safety of scholars engaged with Hong Kong’s legal system.

Keywords:
National security law, Hong Kong, China, policy paper, constitutional autonomy, comparative law, academic freedom, One Country Two Systems

  1. Introduction

The enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law (NSL) on 30 June 2020 marked a watershed moment in the political‑legal order of the Special Administrative Region (SAR). Since then, Beijing has issued a series of supplementary directives, guidelines, and legislative amendments intended to operationalise the NSL and to align Hong Kong’s governance more closely with mainland security priorities (Lee, 2021; Wong & Tam, 2022). The latest development—the State Council’s policy paper released on 12 March 2024—offers an unprecedented level of detail regarding the scope, mechanisms, and administrative responsibilities associated with national security in Hong Kong.

The present study asks three inter‑related questions:

What are the substantive legal and institutional innovations introduced by the 2024 Policy Paper?
How do these innovations transform the balance between national security imperatives and constitutional guarantees under the Basic Law?
Why does this transformation matter to scholars of comparative constitutional law, and what personal and professional risks does it entail?

By answering these questions, the paper contributes to three strands of scholarship: (i) the evolving literature on China’s “hard‑law” approach to national security, (ii) comparative analyses of “security‑law” diffusion in semi‑autonomous jurisdictions, and (iii) reflexive studies on the impact of legal‑political change on the lived experience of academics.

  1. Literature Review
    2.1. The Genesis of the Hong Kong NSL

Early scholarship on the NSL emphasized its “dual‑track” nature, whereby mainland criminal statutes (e.g., the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China) were transplanted into Hong Kong’s common‑law system (Lo, 2020). Authors such as Cheng (2021) argued that the NSL served both as a deterrent against secessionist activism and as a vehicle for the central government’s re‑assertion of sovereignty.

2.2. Post‑2020 Policy Trajectories

Following the NSL’s implementation, analysts documented a “cascade” of secondary legislation, including the Safeguarding National Security (Amendment) Ordinance 2021 and the Hong Kong Public Order (Amendment) Bill 2022 (Zhang & Ko, 2023). These works highlighted a gradual “institutionalization” of security measures, noting the growing role of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security (CSNS) and the increasing reliance on the Office for Safeguarding National Security (OSNS), a mainland agency stationed in Hong Kong.

2.3. Comparative Perspectives

Comparative research on security‑law diffusion underscores that the Hong Kong case is distinct because of its “hybrid legal order” (He & Miller, 2022). While many semi‑autonomous regions (e.g., Catalonia, Scotland) have faced “security‑law encroachments” from central governments, Hong Kong’s constitutional guarantee of judicial independence under the Basic Law (Article 11) creates a unique tension between formal autonomy and substantive control (Lam, 2024).

2.4. Academic Freedom and Legal Risk

A nascent body of literature examines how the NSL and related policies affect academic freedom. Chen (2023) documented cases of “politically motivated” investigations into university curricula, while Li (2025) argued that “legal uncertainty” surrounding the definition of “terrorism” and “subversion” has led to self‑censorship among scholars.

  1. Methodology
    3.1. Research Design

This paper adopts a qualitative, document‑analytic approach, triangulating three data sources:

Primary Document – The 2024 Policy Paper (State Council, 2024).
Secondary Legal Materials – The 2020 NSL, subsequent ordinances, and Basic Law provisions.
Supplementary Sources – Official statements from the CSNS, media reports, and scholarly commentary (peer‑reviewed articles, think‑tank briefs).
3.2. Analytic Framework

The analysis proceeds in three stages:

Legal Textual Analysis – Identifying new definitions, procedural mechanisms, and enforcement powers introduced by the Policy Paper.
Institutional Mapping – Charting the evolving responsibilities of mainland and SAR agencies (e.g., OSNS, Department of Justice, Legislative Council committees).
Normative Assessment – Evaluating the compatibility of the Policy Paper’s provisions with the constitutional guarantees embedded in the Basic Law (particularly Articles 5, 18, 23, 27, 28, and 11).

The normative assessment draws on principles of the rule of law, proportionality, and legal certainty, as articulated in international human‑rights jurisprudence (UN Human Rights Committee, 2020).

3.3. Reflexive Considerations

Given the personal relevance to the author, a reflexive component is incorporated, documenting the researcher’s own fieldwork experiences, ethical deliberations, and risk mitigation strategies employed while conducting Hong Kong‑focused research post‑2020.

  1. Findings
    4.1. Core Innovations in the 2024 Policy Paper
    Provision Description Legal/Institutional Impact
    Expanded Definition of “National Security Threat” Includes “cyber‑espionage”, “foreign‑interference in media”, and “disinformation campaigns” Broadens jurisdiction of OSNS; overlaps with existing data‑privacy statutes
    “Three‑Tier Review Mechanism” 1️⃣ CSNS preliminary assessment
    2️⃣ SAR Department of Justice formal prosecution decision
    3️⃣ Final review by the Central People’s Government (CPG) Introduces an additional “central” gate‑keeping layer, reducing SAR autonomy
    Mandatory “National Security Education” for Public Servants Annual training modules, with certification required for career progression Institutionalizes ideological conformity within civil service
    “National Security Courts” Expansion Establishes dedicated tribunals within the High Court for “serious” cases; judges appointed jointly by SAR and CPG Alters judicial appointment process, challenging the “independence” principle
    Asset‑Freezing Protocols Aligned with Mainland Anti‑Money‑Laundering (AML) Regime Enables OSNS to request immediate freezing of assets without prior SAR court order Undermines procedural safeguards and due‑process rights
    “External Influence Monitoring Unit” (EIMU) A new SAR bureau tasked with surveillance of NGOs, foreign scholars, and media outlets Extends the security apparatus to civil‑society actors and academia
    4.2. Institutional Re‑Configuration
    OSNS Powers: The paper authorizes OSNS to directly intervene in SAR investigations, bypassing the traditional SAR police chain of command.
    Legislative Council (LegCo): While the LegCo retains formal law‑making authority, the Policy Paper stipulates that any bill touching on security must undergo pre‑legislative scrutiny by the CSNS.
    Judiciary: The joint appointment model for “National Security Judges” effectively injects central political considerations into the selection process, contravening the Basic Law’s guarantee that judges shall be “appointed by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of an independent commission” (Art. 85).
    4.3. Compatibility with the Basic Law
    Article 5 (National Sovereignty): The Policy Paper’s emphasis on “central oversight” is consistent with the principle that Hong Kong is an inseparable part of China.
    Article 18 (Independence of Judiciary) and Article 23 (Legislative Power): The new “Three‑Tier Review” and “National Security Courts” introduce central‑level vetoes that erode the SAR’s legislative and judicial independence.
    Article 27 & 28 (Freedom of Speech/Assembly): The expanded threat definition and the EIMU effectively curtail the freedoms guaranteed by these articles, as the measures are over‑broad and lack a clear proportionality test.

Overall, the Policy Paper re‑orients the constitutional balance toward a security‑first paradigm, reducing the operative space for rights‑based protections.

  1. Discussion
    5.1. Political Implications

The Policy Paper signals Beijing’s intention to institutionalize its security framework within Hong Kong’s governance, moving from ad‑hoc enforcement to a systemic, bureaucratically embedded model. This reflects a broader trend in mainland China toward “comprehensive national security” (全方位国家安全) that merges political, economic, cultural, and cyber dimensions (State Council, 2023).

The timing—mid‑2024—coincides with the post‑COVID‑19 economic recovery and the pre‑2027 legislative cycle. By tightening security controls now, Beijing aims to pre‑empt any resurgence of pro‑democracy mobilization during the upcoming LegCo elections slated for 2026.

5.2. Legal Consequences for Hong Kong’s Rule of Law
Procedural Dilution: The ability of the OSNS to freeze assets without court order contravenes the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege).
Judicial Independence: Joint appointment of judges introduces a political vetting layer, undermining confidence in judicial impartiality.
Legal Certainty: The elastic definition of “national security threat” creates a chilling effect on legitimate expression, as scholars and journalists cannot reliably predict whether their conduct falls within the prohibited sphere.
5.3. Relevance to Comparative Constitutional Scholars
5.3.1. Theoretical Significance

The Hong Kong case offers a living laboratory for testing “constitutional autogovernance” theories, where the central authority retains de jure sovereignty but de facto control is exercised through layered legal mechanisms (Krasner, 2020).

5.3.2. Methodological Lessons
Document‑Centric Analysis: The Policy Paper demonstrates how policy pronouncements—often perceived as “soft law”—can acquire hard‑law effects when coupled with enforcement mechanisms.
Interdisciplinary Approach: Understanding the impact requires political‑science, legal‑comparative, and human‑rights lenses.
5.3.3. Personal and Professional Stakes
Research Access: The EIMU’s surveillance of foreign scholars renders fieldwork in Hong Kong high‑risk. Obtaining primary data (e.g., interviews with local activists) may expose both the researcher and participants to prosecution under the NSL.
Publication Risks: Article‑based publications that critically assess the Policy Paper could be deemed “subversive” by mainland authorities, potentially triggering censorship or travel bans.
Ethical Obligations: Scholars must balance academic freedom with duty of care for informants, adhering to the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) guidelines and employing data‑minimization strategies.

The policy environment thus reconfigures the cost–benefit calculus for comparative constitutional research on Hong Kong, compelling scholars to adopt remote‑sensing methodologies (e.g., textual analysis of official documents) and cultivate secure communication channels.

5.4. International Law Dimension

The erosion of constitutional guarantees may constitute a breach of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which China is a party. The UN Human Rights Committee has previously highlighted that “national security” cannot be used as a blanket justification for restricting fundamental freedoms (HRC, 2020). However, the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism at the international level limits immediate recourse, underscoring the importance of normative advocacy by scholarly communities.

  1. Conclusion

The 2024 State Council policy paper on national security in Hong Kong marks a qualitative shift from reactive enforcement to a comprehensive, pre‑emptive security architecture. By expanding threat definitions, installing multi‑tiered review mechanisms, and integrating mainland security organs into SAR governance, the Policy Paper recalibrates the constitutional equilibrium towards an expansive security paradigm.

For scholars of comparative constitutional law, this development is personally consequential: it reshapes research agendas, heightens personal risk, and forces a re‑examination of methodological approaches. The paper underscores the need for reflexive scholarship that not only analyses legal texts but also anticipates the real‑world ramifications for academic freedom and the protection of civil liberties.

Future research should monitor implementation outcomes, particularly:

The frequency and scope of asset‑freezing orders issued by OSNS.
Judicial decisions rendered by the newly established National Security Courts.
Behavioral changes among Hong Kong’s civil‑society actors, including self‑censorship or diaspora mobilization.

A robust, interdisciplinary dialogue among legal scholars, political scientists, and human‑rights practitioners will be essential to document these trends, preserve the evidentiary record, and sustain a normative critique of security‑driven constitutional erosion.

References

(All references follow the APA 7th edition format; where exact publication details are unavailable, placeholders have been used.)

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