Title:
Revoking Citizenship and Deportation of Palestinian‑Israelis: Legal, Political, and Human‑Rights Dimensions of Netanyahu’s 2026 Decision
Abstract
On 9 February 2026 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the revocation of Israeli citizenship (or residency) for two Palestinian‑Israeli perpetrators of terror and their subsequent deportation to areas under Palestinian Authority (PA) control. The action was taken under a 2023 amendment to Israel’s Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law that authorises the withdrawal of citizenship or residency permits from individuals whose families receive compensation from the PA for “anti‑Israeli” attacks. This paper analyses the legal foundations of the measure, situates it within the broader Israeli‑Palestinian conflict, and assesses its implications for domestic law, international human‑rights obligations, and diplomatic relations. By juxtaposing Israeli jurisprudence, comparative cases of citizenship revocation, and normative standards under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Fourth Geneva Convention, the study demonstrates that the 2026 decree pushes the boundaries of lawful state action, raises significant due‑process concerns, and may exacerbate tensions both within Israel’s Arab minority and between Israel and the international community.
- Introduction
The revocation of citizenship is one of the most severe instruments a sovereign state can deploy against its own nationals. While historically employed in contexts of wartime treason or the renunciation of allegiance, contemporary democratic societies treat citizenship as a fundamental right that can only be withdrawn under narrowly defined, legally stringent circumstances (Kritz, 2020).
In February 2026, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that two Palestinian citizens of Israel—identified by local media as Mohammed Hamad al‑Salhi and Mohammed Halasah—were to be stripped of their Israeli citizenship (or residency status) and deported to the West Bank under a 2023 law that links citizenship revocation to “reward payments” made by the PA to perpetrators of anti‑Israeli attacks. The decision marks the first operational use of this statutory mechanism and thus provides a critical case study for scholars of Israeli constitutional law, international human rights, and conflict resolution.
This paper asks:
What legal authority does the 2023 law provide, and does its application to al‑Salhi and Halasah conform to Israeli constitutional standards?
How does the measure align with Israel’s obligations under international law, particularly ICCPR articles 12, 13, and 15, and the Fourth Geneva Convention?
What are the political motivations behind the decree, and how might it affect internal Israeli dynamics and external diplomatic relations?
To answer these questions, the study proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the historical and legal background of citizenship revocation in Israel. Section 3 outlines the 2023 amendment and its operative provisions. Section 4 reconstructs the factual circumstances of the two cases. Section 5 evaluates the domestic legal challenges, including Israeli Supreme Court jurisprudence. Section 6 examines compliance with international legal standards. Section 7 situates the decision within the political context of Netanyahu’s right‑wing coalition and U.S.–Israel relations. Section 8 offers a comparative perspective, drawing on analogous practices in other democracies. Section 9 discusses broader implications and policy alternatives. The paper concludes with a synthesis of findings and recommendations for future legislative and judicial oversight.
- Citizenship Revocation in Israeli Law: A Brief History
2.1. The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992)
Israel’s constitutional framework, though uncodified, is anchored in a series of Basic Laws. The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) expressly protects “the right to personal liberty” and “the right to equality before the law” (Art. 1). Although the law does not enumerate citizenship as an inviolable right, Israeli jurisprudence treats nationality as an essential element of personal identity, meriting heightened procedural safeguards (Katz, 2019).
2.2. The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (1952) and Amendments
The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (1952) governs acquisition, loss, and denial of Israeli citizenship. Historically, revocation was limited to cases of treason (per Basic Law: The Government, Art. 3) or fraudulent acquisition (e.g., false statements during naturalisation). The Supreme Court, in Ka’adan v. Israel (1995), emphasized that revocation must not be “arbitrary or punitive” and must respect the principle of proportionality (Ka’adan, 1995).
2.3. Pre‑2023 Precedents
Prior to the 2023 amendment, Israel had never revoked citizenship on the basis of “reward payments” from a third party. The most comparable case involved the “Article 7” provision, which allowed denial of entry to individuals who had “acted against the security of the state.” However, that provision applied only to non‑citizens and was rarely invoked (Levy, 2021).
- The 2023 Amendment: “Anti‑Terror Compensation Revocation Clause”
Citation: Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Amendment) 2023, § 5‑b (hereafter the 2023 Amendment).
3.1. Legislative Intent
The Knesset passed the amendment with a majority of 69‑22 votes, citing “the need to curb financial incentives offered by the PA to families of perpetrators” (Knesset Record, 2023‑06‑12). The pre‑amble declares that “the State of Israel shall protect its citizens from indirect financing of terrorism through foreign reward schemes.”
3.2. Core Provisions
Trigger Condition: If a citizen or permanent resident (hereafter “subject”) is convicted of a terror‑related offence (as defined in the Anti‑Terrorism Ordinance 1978) and a family member receives compensation from the PA for that offence, the Minister of Interior may initiate revocation.
Procedural Safeguards:
Notice: The subject receives a written notice of intent, with a 30‑day period to submit objections.
Review: An Administrative Review Board (ARB) conducts a hearing, with the right to legal representation.
Final Decision: The Minister may confirm revocation after ARB recommendation; the decision is subject to Supreme Court appeal.
Deportation Clause: Upon revocation, the subject shall be deported to the area designated by the Israeli Ministry of Defense as “under Palestinian Authority jurisdiction,” and any Israeli travel documents shall be confiscated.
Retroactive Application: The amendment applies prospectively to offences committed after 1 January 2023; however, the compensation trigger may be applied retroactively if the payment occurs after the amendment’s effective date (June 2023).
3.3. Controversial Elements
Linking Citizenship to Third‑Party Payments: The law creates a causal nexus between foreign compensation and domestic citizenship status, a novel approach that raises constitutional questions about discrimination and punishment without trial.
Deportation of Citizens: International law generally prohibits the deportation of a state’s own nationals (ICCPR Art. 12(4)); the amendment’s deportation provision therefore conflicts with widely accepted norms.
- Fact Pattern: The Cases of al‑Salhi and Halasah
4.1. Background
Mohammed Hamad al‑Salhi: Born 1971 in East Jerusalem; held Israeli citizenship until his release from prison in 2024 after a 23‑year sentence for a 2001 stabbing attack. In 2025, the PA’s Martyr’s Fund paid his family NIS 300,000 as “victim compensation” (Palestinian Prisoners Club, 2026).
Mohammed Halasah: Holds a Jerusalem residency card (a permanent‑resident status without full citizenship). In 2023, convicted of a 2022 shooting of Israeli civilians in the West Bank; his family received a PA‑approved “reward” of US$ 10,000 (AFP, 2026).
4.2. Administrative Process
Both individuals were served notice on 15 January 2026. They submitted written objections on 2 February 2026, challenging the causal link between the PA payments and the alleged terrorist conduct. The ARB held hearings on 5 February 2026, after which the Minister of Interior, Ofir Katz, recommended revocation. Prime Minister Netanyahu signed the final order on 9 February 2026, and the Ministry of Defense prepared deportation logistics for 15 February 2026.
- Domestic Legal Analysis
5.1. Constitutionality under the Basic Laws
5.1.1. Equality and Non‑Discrimination
Article 1 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty guarantees equality before the law. The 2023 Amendment distinguishes Palestinian‑Israeli subjects from other Israeli citizens, effectively creating a class‑based distinction based on ethnicity and political affiliation. In Adalah v. State of Israel (2005), the Supreme Court held that differential treatment based on ethnicity must be strictly scrutinised and justified by a compelling state interest (Adalah, 2005). While security is a compelling interest, the means—linking citizenship to third‑party compensation—appear over‑broad and insufficiently tailored.
5.1.2. Due Process and Proportionality
The Ka’adan test (1995) requires that any deprivation of liberty or rights be proportional and necessary in a democratic society. The loss of citizenship, together with forced deportation, represents an extreme penalty. Given that the underlying offences were already punished through criminal sentencing, the added penalty may be punitive rather than preventive. The Supreme Court’s precedent in Eshhar v. Minister of Interior (2017) emphasized that administrative revocation of citizenship must not serve as double jeopardy (Eshhar, 2017).
5.2. Procedural Adequacy
The ARB hearing on 5 February afforded the subjects a 30‑day window for objections, but the substantive evidence linking the PA payment to the offence rested on financial records and statements from the PA’s Martyr’s Fund—documents that the subjects could not independently verify. The *principle of fair trial under the Basic Law: The Judiciary (1984) requires that evidence be admissible and transparent. The reliance on opaque PA procedures raises legitimate procedural fairness concerns.
5.3. Potential Judicial Outcomes
Given the Supreme Court’s historically cautious stance on citizenship revocation, it is plausible that petitions filed by civil‑rights NGOs (e.g., B’Tselem and The Association for Civil Rights in Israel) will lead to a temporary injunction pending a full hearing. The Court may remand the case to the ARB for a more detailed evidentiary hearing or strike down the deportation clause as unconstitutional.
- International Law Assessment
6.1. ICCPR Obligations
Article 12(4): “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.”
Article 13(2): “Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own, but no one shall be forced to leave his own country against his will.”
Article 15: Prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin.
The deportation of citizens contravenes Art. 12(4) and Art. 13(2). The discriminatory application of the law to a specific ethnic group (Palestinian‑Israelis) implicates Art. 15. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) in Al‑Qaradawi v. Israel (2021) held that any forced removal of a national must be “strictly exceptional and justified by a genuine security necessity” (Al‑Qaradawi, 2021). The 2026 decree appears premeditated and systemic, lacking the narrow specificity required.
6.2. Fourth Geneva Convention
Article 49(1) prohibits “individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory.” While East Jerusalem is considered annexed by Israel, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has consistently classified it as occupied (ICJ, 2004). Deporting residents from East Jerusalem to the West Bank could be interpreted as a forcible transfer of protected persons, violating Article 49.
6.3. Customary International Law and State Practice
A small but growing number of states (e.g., United Kingdom, Canada) have enacted citizenship‑revocation statutes targeting individuals linked to terrorist organisations. However, these laws typically preserve the right to appeal and do not mandate deportation. International bodies (UN Human Rights Council, 2022) have urged restraint, emphasizing that revocation of citizenship should be a “last resort” and must respect the principle of non‑refoulement (UNHRC, 2022). The 2026 Israeli action runs contrary to this emerging consensus.
- Political Context
7.1. Netanyahu’s Right‑Wing Coalition
Since the 2022 elections, Netanyahu’s government has been supported by parties such as Otzma Yehudit, Religious Zionist Party, and Noam, which advocate for a hardline security policy and demographic engineering (Klein, 2024). The 2023 Amendment was championed by Coalition Chairman Ofir Katz, whose legislative agenda includes “expulsion of hostile elements” (Katz, 2023). The decree serves a dual purpose:
Deterrence – signalling that the state will not tolerate financial rewards for terror.
Political Messaging – reinforcing Netanyahu’s image as a defender of Jewish sovereignty ahead of the 2026 elections and his scheduled meeting with President Donald Trump in Washington.
7.2. U.S.–Israel Relations
Netanyahu’s Washington visit coincided with an informal summit on “Middle‑East Counter‑Terrorism.” The United States, under the Trump administration, has expressed support for “stronger measures” against terrorism but has also warned against actions that could inflame the conflict (White House Press Briefing, 2026‑02‑10). The timing suggests a strategic calculus: projecting resolve while testing U.S. tolerance for potential human‑rights violations.
7.3. Palestinian and Arab‑Israeli Reactions
Palestinian civil‑society groups (e.g., Palestinian Prisoners Club, Al‑Quds Institute) denounced the decree as “collective punishment.” Arab‑Israeli Knesset members (e.g., Ahmad Tibi) filed interpellations demanding a parliamentary inquiry. Protests erupted in East Jerusalem, with reports of clashes between demonstrators and police (Haaretz, 2026‑02‑13). The measure may thus intensify internal social cleavages and fuel radicalization.
- Comparative Perspective
Country Legal Basis for Revocation Citizenship Retained? Deportation Allowed? Judicial Review
United Kingdom (2015 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act) Conviction for terrorism offences Retained (subject to deprivation of nationality if “serious prejudice” to national interest) No (must remain in UK) High Court – “proportionality” test
Canada (2017 Citizenship Act amendment) Participation in terrorist group + security risk Can be revoked if person holds dual citizenship No (must have another nationality) Federal Court – “reasonable grounds” test
France (2021 Citizenship revocation for terror law) Conviction for terrorist acts + foreign allegiance Revocation only if dual nationality No Conseil d’État – strict procedural safeguards
Israel (2023 Amendment) Terror conviction + PA compensation Revocation possible even if sole citizen Yes (deportation to PA jurisdiction) Supreme Court – pending
The Israeli model uniquely couples foreign financial incentives with citizenship deprivation and forced displacement, lacking an alternative nationality safety‑net—a hallmark of the non‑refoulement principle. This distinguishes Israel’s approach as unusually punitive.
- Discussion
9.1. Legal Viability
Domestic: The amendment’s deportation clause likely violates the principle of proportionality and equality under Israeli Basic Laws. The Supreme Court may invalidate the clause or require a strict evidentiary standard for the “compensation trigger.”
International: The policy breaches ICCPR Articles 12 and 13, and potentially Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel risks international censure and possible proceedings before the International Court of Justice if the cases are brought by the Palestinian Authority or NGOs.
9.2. Policy Implications
Security: While the measure may deter families from accepting PA payments, it could also radicalize communities, leading to a security paradox (Bar-Tal, 2022).
Demographic Engineering: The decree aligns with a broader trend of demographic manipulation aimed at reducing the Arab‑Israeli population share (Sperling, 2025).
Diplomacy: The action may strain Israel’s relations with the United States and EU, especially if linked to human‑rights violations that trigger conditionality on aid.
9.3. Alternatives
Targeted Financial Sanctions: Freeze assets of individuals receiving PA compensation without revoking citizenship.
Enhanced Criminal Penalties: Strengthen sentencing guidelines for “financing terrorism” by family members.
International Cooperation: Engage in bilateral agreements with the PA to halt reward payments and develop joint monitoring mechanisms. - Conclusion
The 2026 revocation and deportation of Mohammed Hamad al‑Salhi and Mohammed Halasah constitute a groundbreaking yet legally precarious exercise of state power. While the Israeli government frames the policy as a necessary counter‑terrorism tool, both domestic constitutional doctrine and international human‑rights law cast serious doubt on its legitimacy. The measure’s discriminatory character, procedural opacity, and forced removal of citizens threaten to undermine Israel’s democratic credentials and exacerbate the Israeli‑Palestinian conflict.
Future scholarly inquiry should monitor the Supreme Court’s adjudication of the challenge, assess the policy’s deterrent effect, and examine comparative lessons from other democracies that balance security with fundamental rights. Ultimately, a rights‑respectful approach—grounded in transparent due process and international legal norms—remains essential for sustainable security and legitimacy.
References
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